Does Bioethics Need Ethical Theories?

The relationship between philosophy and bioethics remains a matter of perennial debate, but there does appear to be a consensus on one issue: whatever bioethics might want to borrow from philosophical ethics, it won't be normative theories. This essay argues that theories can have an important role to play in bioethics, though it might not be the one traditionally assumed by philosophers.

Effects of ChatGPT's AI capabilities and human-like traits on spreading information in work environments.

The rapid proliferation and integration of AI chatbots in office environments, specifically the advanced AI model ChatGPT, prompts an examination of how its features and updates impact knowledge processes, satisfaction, and word-of-mouth (WOM) among office workers. This study investigates the determinants of WOM among office workers who are users of ChatGPT. We adopted a quantitative approach, utilizing a stratified random sampling technique to collect data from a diverse group of office workers experienced in using ChatGPT. The hypotheses were rigorously tested through Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) using the SmartPLS 4. The results revealed that system updates, memorability, and non-language barrier attributes of ChatGPT significantly enhanced knowledge acquisition and application. Additionally, the human-like personality traits of ChatGPT significantly increased both utilitarian value and satisfaction. Furthermore, the study showed that knowledge acquisition and application led to a significant increase in utilitarian value and satisfaction, which subsequently increased WOM. Age had a positive influence on WOM, while gender had no significant impact. The findings provide theoretical contributions by expanding our understanding of AI chatbots' role in knowledge processes, satisfaction, and WOM, particularly among office workers.

Moral obligations towards human persons' wellbeing versus their suffering: An analysis of perspectives of moral philosophy.

What do we owe other persons? Are we as much obliged to promote their wellbeing as we are to reduce their suffering? This question is crucial for a range of social institutions and welfare services, and especially for the health services. To address this question the article investigates prominent positions and arguments in moral philosophy. It finds that while classical utilitarianism claims that there is symmetry in the moral obligation with respect to peoples' wellbeing and their suffering, a wide range of other positions and perspectives argue for an asymmetric relationship with stronger moral obligations towards other persons' suffering than towards their wellbeing. This difference in obligations is supported ontologically by basic differences inherent in wellbeing and suffering and axiologically by a relative (gradual) difference in value. The many well-founded arguments for stronger moral obligations towards other persons' suffering than towards their wellbeing has important implications for health policy; especially for priority setting. Avoiding and reducing suffering should have priority to the promotion and enhancement of wellbeing.

Physics and the quest for transcendence: A Durkheimian approach.

This essay aims to shed some light on the still common sense of a vocation among scientists. Taking its cue from Paul Forman's analysis of twentieth-century disciplinary science and Emile Durkheim's social view of religions, it suggests that modern scientific communities resemble religious communities in their penchant for transcendence. The essay aims to illustrate this perspective by looking at some developments within the physics discipline since its emergence in the late nineteenth century. One indication for this penchant is the tendency to distance oneself from the material conditions which allowed the discipline to flourish. These utilitarian conditions, industrial as well as material, were seen to pose a threat to the disinterested pursuit of truth. Another is the persistent tendency among theoretical physicists to search for otherworldly, immaterial and unifying foundations.

James Rachels and the morality of euthanasia.

My fundamental thesis is that Rachels dismisses the traditional Western account of the morality of killing without offering a viable replacement. In this regard, I will argue that the substitute account he offers is deficient in at least eight regards: (1) he fails to justify the foundational principle of utilitarianism, (2) he exposes preference utilitarianism to the same criticisms he lodges against classical utilitarianism, (3) he neglects to explain how precisely one performs the maximization procedure which preference utilitarianism requires, (4) his account of the sanctity of life is subject to the very criticism he levels against the traditional position, (5) he cannot justify the exceptions he makes to his interpretation of the sanctity of life, (6) his account could easily be used to justify murder, (7) his embrace of autonomy as an ethical principle undermines his preference utilitarianism, and (8) he cannot maintain the moral identification of acts of killing and letting die.

Death as the extinction of the source of value: the constructivist theory of death as an irreversible loss of moral status.

In 2017, Michael Nair-Collins formulated his Transitivity Argument which claimed that brain-dead patients are alive according to a concept that defines death in terms of the loss of moral status. This article challenges Nair-Collins' view in three steps. First, I elaborate on the concept of moral status, claiming that to understand this notion appropriately, one must grasp the distinction between direct and indirect duties. Second, I argue that his understanding of moral status implicit in the Transitivity Argument is faulty since it is not based on a distinction between direct and indirect duties. Third, I show how this flaw in Nair-Collins' argument is grounded in the more general problems between preference utilitarianism and desire fulfillment theory. Finally, I present the constructivist theory of moral status and the associated moral concept of death and explain how this concept challenges the Transitivity Argument. According to my view, brain death constitutes a valid criterion of death since brain death is incompatible with the preserved capacity to have affective attitudes and to value anything.

Environmental causality calibration: Advancing WLAN RF fingerprinting for precise indoor localization.

In recent years, considerable and valuable research progress has been made in indoor positioning technologies based on WLAN Radio Frequency (RF) fingerprinting, identifying it as one of the most promising positioning technologies with substantial potential for wider adoption. However, indoor environmental factors significantly influence the propagation of wireless RF signals, resulting in a considerable decrease in positioning accuracy as the indoor environmental conditions vary. Thus, effectively mitigating the impact of indoor environmental factors on WLAN RF fingerprinting-based positioning systems has become a crucial research problem. Currently, there is a dearth of comprehensive research on the influence of indoor climatic factors, particularly the variations in relative humidity, on the propagation of WLAN RF signals within indoor spaces and its consequential impact on positioning accuracy. To address the aforementioned issues, this paper proposes an Adaptive expansion fingerprint database (AeFd) model based on a regression learning algorithm. The AeFd, through the design of a relationship model describing the interaction between fingerprint databases under varying relative humidity, allows the fingerprint database expanded by AeFd to dynamically adapt to the changes in indoor relative humidity. Our experiments show that using the AeFd model with the KNN algorithm, a 5% performance improvement was observed over 10 days and an 8% improvement over 10 months. According to experimental test results, the fingerprint database expansion model AeFd proposed in this paper can effectively expand the fingerprint database under different relative humidity levels, thereby significantly enhancing the positioning performance of the system and improving its stability.

Translational bioethics: Reflections on what it can be and how it should work.

Translational ethics (TE) has been developed into a specific approach, which revolves around the argument that strategies for bridging the theory-practice gap in bioethics must themselves be justified on ethical terms. This version of TE incorporates normative, empirical and foundational ethics research and continues to develop through application and in the face of new ethical challenges. Here, I explore the idea that the academic field of bioethics has not yet sufficiently analysed its own philosophical foundation for how it can, and should, be practically relevant; neither has it comprehensively discussed the limitations on what impacts bioethicists should pursue. As a result, there has not been adequate training on how to suitably and appropriately impact real-world practices. Moreover, bioethical perspectives are often competing with other strong interests, for example, economic and political, which may weaken their impact on policy-making. The TE approach I propose can not only facilitate practical impacts of academic bioethics by being better informed by real-world ethical issues but it also supports targeted and ethical justifications of the actual impact of academic work in real-world contexts. In this paper, I clarify the premises for this TE approach, identify further challenges and sketch out potential solutions for the implementation of this methodological framework.

Old and new joint characterizations of leximin and variants of rank-weighted utilitarianism.

This paper proposes a new class of efficient and equitable social welfare orderings, a generalized leximin rule that includes rank-weighted utilitarianism, leximin, and their lexicographic compositions. While the famous Deschamps and Gevers' joint characterization theorem shows that a Paretian, anonymous, separable social welfare ordering must be either weak utilitarianism, leximin, or leximax under the assumption of cardinal full comparability, this study provides a new joint characterization theorem in which imposing rank-separability, instead of separability, enables acceptable social welfare ordering to be the generalized leximin rule. This result is proven by an intuitive and easy-to-understand method, which also helps show the mechanism by which a class of Paretian, anonymous, and separable social welfare orderings is limited to weak utilitarianism and leximin.

Defining dignity in higher education as an alternative to requiring 'Trigger Warnings'.

This article examines trigger warnings, particularly the call for trigger warnings on university campuses, and from a Levinasian and Kantian ethical perspective, and addresses the question: When, if ever, are trigger warnings helpful to student's learning? The nursing curriculum is developed with key stakeholders and regulatory bodies to ensure graduate nurses are competent to deliver a high standard of care to patients and clients. Practical teaching practice and published research has uncovered an increasing use of 'Trigger Warnings' before a topic is discussed, or used as warnings on core module texts. It is appreciated that some students have personal experience of psychological or physical trauma. However, apart from identifying these students through Mitigating Circumstances committees, or when the student feels confident to share this information with a personal tutor, this information remains strictly confidential. There is the potential for covert skills such as critical analysis and skilful discussion not being attained by the student. With the assistance of Kants moral theory, an argument will develop that the insidious use of Trigger warnings and the embargo of recommended reading, requires critical discussion with the public. This would involve the rationale and pedagogical justification for the use of texts, and the necessity within nursing education to address challenging clinical topics. To support students with PTSD this may involve the research discussed on personal educational needs analysis.

From informed to empowered consent.

Informed consent is ethically incomplete and should be redefined as empowered consent. This essay challenges theoretical assumptions of the value of informed consent in light of substantial evidence of its failure in clinical practice and questions the continued emphasis on autonomy as the primary ethical justification for the practice of consent in health care. Human dignity-rather than autonomy-is advanced from a nursing ethics perspective as a preferred justification for consent practices in health care. The adequacy of an ethic of obligation (namely, principlism) as the dominant theoretical lens for recognising and responding to persistent problems in consent practices is also reconsidered. A feminist empowerment framework is adopted as an alternative ethical theory to principlism and is advanced as a more practical and complete lens for examining the concept and context of consent in health care. To accomplish this, the three leading conceptions of informed consent are overviewed, followed by a feminist critique to reveal practical problems with each of them. The need for a language change from informed to empowered consent is strongly considered. Implications for consent activities in clinical practice are reviewed with focused discussion on the need for greater role clarity for all involved in consent-beyond and inclusive of the patient-physician dyad, as the practice and improvement of consent is necessarily a transdisciplinary endeavour. Specific concrete and practical recommendations for leveraging nursing expertise in this space are presented. Perhaps what is most needed in the discourse and practice of consent in health care is nursing.

Exit Duty Generator.

This article presents a revised version of negative utilitarianism. Previous versions have relied on a hedonistic theory of value and stated that suffering should be minimized. The traditional rebuttal is that the doctrine in this form morally requires us to end all sentient life. To avoid this, a need-based theory of value is introduced. The frustration of the needs not to suffer and not to have one's autonomy dwarfed should, prima facie, be decreased. When decreasing the need frustration of some would increase the need frustration of others, the case is deferred and a fuller ethical analysis is conducted. The author's perceptions on murder, extinction, the right to die, antinatalism, veganism, and abortion are used to reach a reflective equilibrium. The new theory is then applied to consumerism, material growth, and power relations. The main finding is that the burden of proof should be on those who promote the status quo.

More Process, Less Principles: The Ethics of Deploying AI and Robotics in Medicine.

Current national and international guidelines for the ethical design and development of artificial intelligence (AI) and robotics emphasize ethical theory. Various governing and advisory bodies have generated sets of broad ethical principles, which institutional decisionmakers are encouraged to apply to particular practical decisions. Although much of this literature examines the ethics of designing and developing AI and robotics, medical institutions typically must make purchase and deployment decisions about technologies that have already been designed and developed. The primary problem facing medical institutions is not one of ethical design but of ethical deployment. The purpose of this paper is to develop a practical model by which medical institutions may make ethical deployment decisions about ready-made advanced technologies. Our slogan is "more process, less principles." Ethically sound decisionmaking requires that the process by which medical institutions make such decisions include participatory, deliberative, and conservative elements. We argue that our model preserves the strengths of existing frameworks, avoids their shortcomings, and delivers its own moral, practical, and epistemic advantages.

On Matti Häyry's "Exit Duty Generator".

Matti Häyry presents a new ethical theory that he calls "conflict-responsive need-based negative utilitarianism."1 In this commentary, I present my critical observations on his main points against the more general background of utilitarianism and theories of value.

You're heartless, I'm less: self-image and social norms in moral judgment.

Are moral judgments to sacrificial dilemmas shaped by a latent social norm? The present research addresses this issue. We report a set of six studies (plus a supplementary one) which question the existence of a social norm in the longstanding deontism/utilitarian debate by relying on two original tools, namely substitution technique and self-presentation paradigm. Study 1 showed that American participants asked to answer like most Americans would do gave more utilitarian responses than control participants who answered in their own name (Study 1). Study 2 showed that participants instructed to answer in a disapproval fashion were more utilitarian than both participants instructed to answer in an approval fashion and control participants. Importantly, no difference was observed between the approval and control conditions, suggesting that participants naturally align their moral judgments with a latent norm they think is the most socially desirable. Studies 3-5 explored in addition the effect of the activation of a deontism-skewed norm using the substitution instruction on subsequent impression formation. For the latter task, participants were instructed to evaluate a random participant selected from a previous study who gave utilitarian-like responses (Studies 3a-3b), or to evaluate a fictitious politician who endorsed either a deontic or utilitarian orientation (Studies 4-5). Although we consistently replicated the effect of substitution instruction, we failed to show that attempts to activate a norm in a given individual shaped their evaluation of other people who do not align with this norm. Finally, we report a mini meta-analysis targeting the pooled effect and homogeneity among our studies.

Bioethics Without Theory?

The question that this paper tries to answer is Q: "Can good academic bioethics be done without commitment to moral theory?" It is argued that the answer to Q is an unequivocal "Yes" for most of what we could call "critical bioethics," that is, the kind of bioethics work that primarily criticizes positions or arguments already in the literature or put forward by policymakers. The answer is also "Yes" for much of empirical bioethics. The second part of the paper then provides an analysis of Q in relation to "constructive bioethics," that is, bioethics work aimed at providing an argument for a particular position. In this part, it is argued that a number of the approaches or methods used that initially look like they involve no commitment to moral theory, nevertheless, involve such a commitment. This is shown to be the case for reflective equilibrium, mid-level theory, the use of theory fragments, and argument by analogy.

Toward a Social Bioethics Through Interpretivism: A Framework for Healthcare Ethics.

Recent global events demonstrate that analytical frameworks to aid professionals in healthcare ethics must consider the pervasive role of social structures in the emergence of bioethical issues. To address this, the authors propose a new sociologically informed approach to healthcare ethics that they term "social bioethics." Their approach is animated by the interpretive social sciences to highlight how social structures operate vis-à-vis the everyday practices and moral reasoning of individuals, a phenomenon known as social discourse. As an exemplar, the authors use social bioethics to reframe common ethical issues in psychiatric services and discuss potential implications. Lastly, the authors discuss how social bioethics illuminates the ways healthcare ethics consultants in both policy and clinical decision-making participate in and shape broader social, political, and economic systems, which then cyclically informs the design and delivery of healthcare.

Transformative medical ethics: A framework for changing practice according to normative-ethical requirements.

We propose a step-by-step methodological framework of translational bioethics that aims at changing medical practice according to normative-ethical requirements, which we will thus call "transformative medical ethics." The framework becomes especially important when there is a gap between widely acknowledged, ethically justified normative claims and their realization in the practice of biomedicine and technology (ought-is gap). Building on prior work on translational bioethics, the framework maps a process with six different phases and 12 distinct translational steps. The steps involve various research activities including conceptual philosophical inquiry and (socio-)empirical research. On the one hand, the framework can be used as a heuristic tool to identify barriers to the transformation process. On the other hand, it can provide guidance for researchers and practitioners to develop appropriate (conceptual action and practice) models, which are then implemented and evaluated in specific practice contexts. We use the example of realizing the norm of respect for autonomy in the practice of medical decision-making to illustrate the framework. Further research is required, for example, to theoretically underpin the framework, to apply it to other ought-is gaps, and to evaluate its feasibility and effectiveness in various practice areas. Overall, the framework of transformative medical ethics suggests a strategic process to investigate and promote practice change that is ethically informed in all phases.