Impact of risk aversion and disease outbreak characteristics on the incentives of producers as a group to participate in animal disease insurance-A simulation.

The participation of agricultural producers in financing losses caused by livestock epidemics has been debated in many countries. One of the issues raised is how reluctant producers are to participate voluntarily in the financing of disease losses before an outbreak occurs. This study contributes to the literature by examining whether disease losses should be financed through pre- or post-outbreak premiums or their combination. A Monte Carlo simulation was employed to illustrate the costs of financing two diseases of different profiles. The profiles differed in the probability in which the damage occurs and in the average damage per event. Three hypothetical financing schemes were compared based on their ability to reduce utility losses in the case of risk-neutral and risk-averse producer groups. The schemes were examined in a dynamic setting where premiums depended on the compensation history of the sector. If producers choose the preferred financing scheme based on utility losses, results suggest that the timing of the premiums, the transaction costs of the scheme, the degree of risk aversion of the producer, and the level and the volatility of premiums affect the choice of the financing scheme.