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Impact Assessment of GNSS Spoofing Attacks on INS/GNSS Integrated Navigation System.
Liu, Yang; Li, Sihai; Fu, Qiangwen; Liu, Zhenbo.
Afiliação
  • Liu Y; School of Automation, Northwestern Polytechnical University, Xi'an 710072, China. liuyang@mail.nwpu.edu.cn.
  • Li S; School of Automation, Northwestern Polytechnical University, Xi'an 710072, China. lisihai@nwpu.edu.cn.
  • Fu Q; School of Automation, Northwestern Polytechnical University, Xi'an 710072, China. fuqiangwen@nwpu.edu.cn.
  • Liu Z; School of Automation, Northwestern Polytechnical University, Xi'an 710072, China. zhnbliu@gmail.com.
Sensors (Basel) ; 18(5)2018 May 04.
Article em En | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-29734715
ABSTRACT
In the face of emerging Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) spoofing attacks, there is a need to give a comprehensive analysis on how the inertial navigation system (INS)/GNSS integrated navigation system responds to different kinds of spoofing attacks. A better understanding of the integrated navigation system’s behavior with spoofed GNSS measurements gives us valuable clues to develop effective spoofing defenses. This paper focuses on an impact assessment of GNSS spoofing attacks on the integrated navigation system Kalman filter’s error covariance, innovation sequence and inertial sensor bias estimation. A simple and straightforward measurement-level trajectory spoofing simulation framework is presented, serving as the basis for an impact assessment of both unsynchronized and synchronized spoofing attacks. Recommendations are given for spoofing detection and mitigation based on our findings in the impact assessment process.
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Texto completo: 1 Base de dados: MEDLINE Idioma: En Ano de publicação: 2018 Tipo de documento: Article

Texto completo: 1 Base de dados: MEDLINE Idioma: En Ano de publicação: 2018 Tipo de documento: Article