Irreducibility of sensory experiences: Dual representations lead to dual context biases.

ABSTRACT

There are three views of cognitive representation the amodal, strong-embodiment, and weak-embodiment views of cognition. The present research provides support for the weak-embodiment view by demonstrating that two representational systems, one conceptual and one perceptual, underlie the cognitive processing of sensory experiences. We find that an initial sensory experience can exert two independent influences on judgments about a subsequent sensory experience. Specifically, we show that the conceptual representation of an initial sensory experience creates an expectation that biases judgments of the subsequent experience toward the initial experience (i.e., an assimilation bias), while the perceptual representation of an initial sensory experience creates a comparison standard that biases judgments of the subsequent experience away from the initial experience (i.e., a contrast bias). Documenting concurrent assimilation and contrast biases supports the claim of a dual representational system espoused by the weak-embodiment view. In so doing, we update the classic literature on context effects and contribute to the debate on representational systems in cognition.