Vaccine-associated paralytic poliomyelitis in the postelimination era in Latin America and the Caribbean, 1992-2011.

The Americas interrupted the transmission of poliovirus in 1991; most Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) countries rely on the oral polio vaccine (OPV) to maintain elimination. We estimated the risk of vaccine-associated paralytic polio (VAPP) in LAC for 1992-2011. VAPP cases were identified using LAC's acute flaccid paralysis (AFP) surveillance system. VAPP was defined as any AFP case with residual paralysis 60 days following onset that did not have a clear alternative etiology and with isolation of vaccine-strain poliovirus. Recipient VAPP cases were defined as those with paralysis onset 4-40 days following OPV; cases meeting these criteria but with unknown residual paralysis were added. Nonrecipient VAPP cases were defined as those in individuals with an unknown vaccination status, those in individuals who received 0 doses, or those with paralysis onset outside the 4-40-day interval. Of 40 926 AFP cases reported in LAC from 1992-2011, we identified 72 recipient and 119 nonrecipient VAPP cases. The estimated risk of recipient VAPP was 1 case per 3.15 million newborns (95% confidence interval [CI], 1 case per 2.56-4.10 million newborns), and the estimated overall risk was 1 case per 1.19 million newborns (95% CI, 1 case per 1.04-1.39 million newborns). In this multicountry VAPP analysis in a postelimination period, we found that the risk of VAPP in LAC was lower than previously estimated.

Screening for long-term poliovirus excretion among children with primary immunodeficiency disorders: preparation for the polio posteradication era in Bangladesh.

BACKGROUND: Persons with primary immune deficiency disorders (PIDD) who receive oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV) may transmit immunodeficiency-associated vaccine-derived polioviruses (iVDPVs) and cause paralytic polio. The objective of this study was to identify children with PIDD in Bangladesh, and estimate the proportion with chronic poliovirus excretion. METHODS: Patients admitted at 5 teaching hospitals were screened for PIDD according to standardized clinical case definitions. PIDD was confirmed by age-specific quantitative immunoglobulin levels. Stool specimens were collected from patients with confirmed PIDD. RESULTS: From February 2011 through January 2013, approximately 96 000 children were screened, and 53 patients were identified who met the clinical case definition for PIDD. Thirteen patients (24%) had age-specific quantitative immunoglobulins results that confirmed PIDD. Of these, 9 (69%) received OPV 3-106 months before stool specimen collection. Among 11 patients, stool specimens from 1 patient tested positive for polioviruses 34 months after OPV ingestion. However, the poliovirus isolate was not available for genetic sequencing, and a subsequent stool specimen 45 days later was negative. CONCLUSIONS: The risk of chronic poliovirus excretion among children with PIDD in Bangladesh seems to be low. The national polio eradication program should incorporate strategies for screening for poliovirus excretion among patients with PIDD.

The respiratory route of transmission of virulent polioviruses.

AIMS: The route of transmission of wild and circulating vaccine-derived polioviruses remains controversial, between respiratory and faecal-oral, and we aim to identify the most plausible one to settle the controversy. METHODS: We explored available epidemiological clues and evidence in support of either route in order to arrive at an evidence-based conclusion. RESULTS: Historically the original concept was respiratory transmission based on epidemiological features of age distribution, which was later revised to faecal-oral as the rationale for popularising the live attenuated oral polio vaccine in preference to the inactivated poliovirus vaccine. Through epidemiological logic, we find no evidence for the faecal-oral route from available studies and observations, but all available information supports the respiratory route. CONCLUSIONS: The route is respiratory, not faecal-oral. The global polio eradication initiative assumed it was faecal-oral - and its gargantuan efforts based on this assumption have failed in two ways: eradication remains pending and circulating vaccine-derived polioviruses have seeded widely. With clarity on the route of transmission the choice of vaccine is also clear - it can only be the inactivated poliovirus vaccine.

Lessons from Vaccine-Related Poliovirus in Israel, UK and USA.

Genetic variants of vaccine poliovirus type 2, imported from an unknown source, were detected in waste waters in Jerusalem, London and New York in early 2022. Wild poliovirus type 2 was globally eradicated in 1999, but vaccine virus type 2 continued for 16 more years; routine use of the vaccine was discontinued in 2016 and reintroduced occasionally on purpose. As an unintended consequence, type 2 vaccine virus variants (circulating vaccine-derived polioviruses, cVDPVs) that mimic wild viruses' contagiousness and neurovirulence, have been emerging and spreading. To illustrate, in just the past four years (2018-2021), 2296 children developed cVDPV polio in 35 low-income countries. Many assume that virus transmission is via the faecal-oral route. Sustained virus transmission was documented in London and New York, in spite of high standards of sanitation and hygiene. Here, virus transmission cannot be attributed to faecal contamination of food or drinking water (for faecal-oral transmission). Hence, contagious transmission can only be explained by inhalation of droplets/aerosol containing virus shed in pharyngeal fluids (respiratory transmission), as was the classical teaching of polio epidemiology. If transmission efficiency of VDPV is via the respiratory route where hygiene is good, it stands to reason that it is the same case in countries with poor hygiene, since poor hygiene cannot be a barrier against respiratory transmission. By extrapolation, the extreme transmission efficiency of wild polioviruses must also have been due to their ability to exploit respiratory route transmission. These lessons have implications for global polio eradication. It was as a result of assuming faecal-oral transmission that eradication was attempted with live attenuated oral polio vaccine (OPV), ignoring its safety problems and very low efficacy in low-income countries. Inactivated poliovirus vaccine (IPV) is completely safe and highly efficacious in protecting children against polio, with just three routine doses. Protecting all children from polio must be the interim goal of eradication, until poliovirus circulation dies out under sustained immunisation pressure. OPV should be discontinued under cover of immunity induced by IPV to stop the emergence of new lineages of VDPVs, not only type 2, but also types 1 and 3, to expedite the completion of polio eradication.

Immunogenicity and safety of 3-dose primary vaccination with combined DTPa-HBV-IPV/Hib in Indian infants.

Multivalent combination vaccines have reduced the number of injections and therefore improved vaccine acceptance, timeliness of administration and global coverage. The hexavalent diphtheria-tetanus-acellular pertussis-hepatitis B-inactivated poliovirus/Haemophilus influenzae type b (DTPa-HBV-IPV/Hib; Infanrix hexa™) vaccine, administered according to various schedules, is widely used for the primary vaccination of infants worldwide. In the current publication, we are presenting the immunogenicity and safety of 3 doses of DTPa-HBV-IPV/Hib vaccine when administered to Indian infants. 224 healthy infants (mean age 6.8 weeks) were vaccinated at 6-10-14 weeks (W) of age (n = 112) or 2-4-6 months (M) of age (n = 112). One month after the third vaccine dose, the seroprotection/seropositivity status against diphtheria, pertussis, tetanus, polio, hepatitis B and Hib antigens ranged from 98.6% to 100% in both groups. The vaccine response rate to the pertussis antigens ranged from 97% to 100%. Pain (6-10-14W group: 25.2%; 2-4-6M group: 13.4%) and fever (15.3% and; 15.2%, respectively) were the most frequently reported solicited local and general symptoms. Unsolicited adverse events were reported for 35.7% (6-10-14W group) and 22.3% (2-4-6M group) of subjects. No vaccine related serious adverse events were reported. In conclusion, the hexavalent DTPa-HBV-IPV/Hib vaccine was immunogenic and well tolerated, irrespective of the dosing schedule.

Polio / Polio

Polio continúa endémica en: Nigeria, Afganistán Pakistán e India. La iniciativa global de erradicación de polio de la OMS estableció que para 2013 no debe haber ningún niño paralítico en el mundo por el virus salvaje o por el virus derivado de la vacuna. En esta revisión se describen ambas vacunas contra el polio, la oral y la inactivada, su inmunogenicidad, seguridad y las condiciones a cumplir por un paíspara que cambie su esquema de vacunación de polio oral a inactivada. La vacuna polio oral ha permitido la erradicación de la enfermedaden varios continentes incluyendo América; sin embargo conlleva riesgos, tales como polio paralítica asociada a vacuna (VAP-siglas en inglés-) y parálisis producida por polio virus derivado de la vacuna (VDP-siglas en inglés-). La Vacuna Polio Inactivada (VPI) es segura e inmunogénica, puede ser administrada en combinaciones vacunales. Para que un país cambie a VPI debe tener cobertura y esquemaóptimo de esta vacuna, 90% de, cobertura de DTP3, vigilancia adecuada de parálisis flácida, no estar próximo en la actualidad o recientemente a un país con polio endémico. Altas coberturas vacunales son esenciales par asegurar una inmunidad adecuada de lapoblación

Polio remains endemic in Nigeria, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India. Strategic plan of Global Poliomyelitis Eradication Initiative (GPEI) of the WHO is that by 2013 no child will be paralyzed by a wild or vaccine derived poliovirus. This paper describes both oral and inactivated vaccine, safety concerns with the use of OPV, immunogenicity of IPV and the conditions to be full filled in order for a country to deliverIPV as a regular vaccine schedule. Oral polio vaccine has successfully contributed to global polio eradication in several continents including America. However, it carries risks, such as Vaccine Derived Poliovirus (VDP) and Vaccine Associated Paralytic Polio (VAPP). Inactivated Poliovirus Vaccine (IPV) is safe and immunogenic; it may be administered as monovalent or in a combined shot. Countries opting to switch from OPV to IPV should have: optimal IPV coverage and schedule, 90% of DTP 3 coverage, good surveillance of flaccid paralysis cases, and should not be near a country with endemic polio recently or at the present time. Are neither currently or were notrecently polio endemic nor has close contacts with such areas. High immunization coverage is essential to ensure adequate populationimmunity