Score-mediated mutual consent and indirect reciprocity.

Helping strangers at a cost to oneself is a hallmark of many human interactions, but difficult to justify from the viewpoint of natural selection, particularly in anonymous one-shot interactions. Reputational scoring can provide the necessary motivation via "indirect reciprocity," but maintaining reliable scores requires close oversight to prevent cheating. We show that in the absence of such supervision, it is possible that scores might be managed by mutual consent between the agents themselves instead of by third parties. The space of possible strategies for such "consented" score changes is very large but, using a simple cooperation game, we search it, asking what kinds of agreement can i) invade a population from rare and ii) resist invasion once common. We prove mathematically and demonstrate computationally that score mediation by mutual consent does enable cooperation without oversight. Moreover, the most invasive and stable strategies belong to one family and ground the concept of value by incrementing one score at the cost of the other, thus closely resembling the token exchange that underlies money in everyday human transactions. The most successful strategy has the flavor of money except that agents without money can generate new score if they meet. This strategy is evolutionarily stable, and has higher fitness, but is not physically realizable in a decentralized way; when conservation of score is enforced more money-like strategies dominate. The equilibrium distribution of scores under any of this family of strategies is geometric, meaning that agents with score 0 are inherent to money-like strategies.

Holds enable one-shot reciprocal exchange.

Strangers routinely cooperate and exchange goods without any knowledge of one another in one-off encounters without recourse to a third party, an interaction that is fundamental to most human societies. However, this act of reciprocal exchange entails the risk of the other agent defecting with both goods. We examine the choreography for safe exchange between strangers, and identify the minimum requirement, which is a shared hold, either of an object, or the other party; we show that competing agents will settle on exchange as a local optimum in the space of payoffs. Truly safe exchanges are rarely seen in practice, even though unsafe exchange could mean that risk-averse agents might avoid such interactions. We show that an 'implicit' hold, whereby an actor believes that they could establish a hold if the other agent looked to be defecting, is sufficient to enable the simple swaps that are the hallmark of human interactions and presumably provide an acceptable trade-off between risk and convenience. We explicitly consider the particular case of purchasing, where money is one of the goods.

Informed Adaptive Sensing.

For many inverse problems, the data on which the solution is based is acquired sequentially. We present an approach to the solution of such inverse problems where a sensor can be directed (or otherwise reconfigured on the fly) to acquire a particular measurement. An example problem is magnetic resonance image reconstruction. We use an estimate of mutual information derived from an empirical conditional distribution provided by a generative model to guide our measurement acquisition given measurements acquired so far. The conditionally generated data is a set of samples which are representative of the plausible solutions that satisfy the acquired measurements. We present experiments on toy and real world data sets. We focus on image data but we demonstrate that the method is applicable to a broader class of problems. We also show how a learned model such as a deep neural network can be leveraged to allow generalisation to unseen data. Our informed adaptive sensing method outperforms random sampling, variance based sampling, sparsity based methods, and compressed sensing.

The effect of population structure on the rate of evolution.

Ecological factors exert a range of effects on the dynamics of the evolutionary process. A particularly marked effect comes from population structure, which can affect the probability that new mutations reach fixation. Our interest is in population structures, such as those depicted by 'star graphs', that amplify the effects of selection by further increasing the fixation probability of advantageous mutants and decreasing the fixation probability of disadvantageous mutants. The fact that star graphs increase the fixation probability of beneficial mutations has lead to the conclusion that evolution proceeds more rapidly in star-structured populations, compared with mixed (unstructured) populations. Here, we show that the effects of population structure on the rate of evolution are more complex and subtle than previously recognized and draw attention to the importance of fixation time. By comparing population structures that amplify selection with other population structures, both analytically and numerically, we show that evolution can slow down substantially even in populations where selection is amplified.

Implementing Gaussian process inference with neural networks.

Gaussian processes compare favourably with backpropagation neural networks as a tool for regression, and Bayesian neural networks have Gaussian process behaviour when the number of hidden neurons tends to infinity. We describe a simple recurrent neural network with connection weights trained by one-shot Hebbian learning. This network amounts to a dynamical system which relaxes to a stable state in which it generates predictions identical to those of Gaussian process regression. In effect an infinite number of hidden units in a feed-forward architecture can be replaced by a merely finite number, together with recurrent connections.

Adaptation and enslavement in endosymbiont-host associations.

The evolutionary persistence of symbiotic associations is a puzzle. Adaptation should eliminate cooperative traits if it is possible to enjoy the advantages of cooperation without reciprocating-a facet of cooperation known in game theory as the Prisoner's Dilemma. Despite this barrier, symbioses are widespread and may have been necessary for the evolution of complex life. The discovery of strategies such as tit-for-tat has been presented as a general solution to the problem of cooperation. However, this only holds for within-species cooperation, where a single strategy will come to dominate the population. In a symbiotic association each species may have a different strategy, and the theoretical analysis of the single-species problem is no guide to the outcome. We present basic analysis of two-species cooperation and show that a species with a fast adaptation rate is enslaved by a slowly evolving one. Paradoxically, the rapidly evolving species becomes highly cooperative, whereas the slowly evolving one gives little in return. This helps understand the occurrence of endosymbioses where the host benefits, but the symbionts appear to gain little from the association.

Population-based continuous optimization, probabilistic modelling and mean shift.

Evolutionary algorithms perform optimization using a population of sample solution points. An interesting development has been to view population-based optimization as the process of evolving an explicit, probabilistic model of the search space. This paper investigates a formal basis for continuous, population-based optimization in terms of a stochastic gradient descent on the Kullback-Leibler divergence between the model probability density and the objective function, represented as an unknown density of assumed form. This leads to an update rule that is related and compared with previous theoretical work, a continuous version of the population-based incremental learning algorithm, and the generalized mean shift clustering framework. Experimental results are presented that demonstrate the dynamics of the new algorithm on a set of simple test problems.