Game-theoretic analysis of governance and corruption in China's pharmaceutical industry.

Introduction: With the rapid development of China's pharmaceutical industry, issues of corruption and regulatory effectiveness have become increasingly prominent, posing critical challenges to public health safety and the industry's sustainable development. Methods: This paper adopts a bounded rationality perspective and employs a game-theoretic evolutionary approach to establish a tripartite evolutionary game model involving pharmaceutical companies, third-party auditing organizations, and health insurance regulatory agencies. It analyzes the stable strategies of the parties involved and the sensitivity of key parameters within this tripartite game system. Results: The study reveals that adherence to health insurance regulations by pharmaceutical companies, refusal of bribes by third-party auditing organizations, and the implementation of lenient regulations by health insurance agencies can form an effective governance equilibrium. This equilibrium state contributes to reducing corruption in the pharmaceutical industry, balancing the interests of all parties, and promoting healthy industry development. Discussion: Pharmaceutical companies must balance compliance costs against the risks of non-compliance benefits while maximizing profits; third-party auditing organizations need to choose between fulfilling their duties and accepting bribes, considering their economic benefits and professional reputation; health insurance regulatory agencies adjust their strategies between strict and lenient regulation to maximize social welfare. The paper suggests enhancing policy support, strengthening compliance supervision, improving audit independence, and adjusting regulatory strategies to optimize governance in the pharmaceutical industry. Additionally, the research highlights the role of collaborative efforts among the three parties in achieving sustainable governance. Furthermore, the study conducts a numerical simulation analysis to demonstrate the impact of various parameters on the evolutionary stability of the system, providing practical insights into the implementation of regulatory policies. This research offers new insights for policy formulation and governance in China's pharmaceutical sector, providing significant reference value for guiding the industry's sustainable development.

[Discussion on the establishment of regional peacetime and wartime combined emergency hospital from the collaborative governance theory].

In the context of the prevention and control for coronavirus disease (COVID), public health emergency governance has been incorporated into an important part of the national governance system, and the "combination of peacetime and wartime" has become an important principle of public health emergency governance. Based on the experience of public health emergency management in large cities and the theory of collaborative governance, this study analyzed the problems and obstacles of general hospitals in coping with emerging respiratory infectious diseases. It is proposed to select general hospitals above tertiary level in the region to build peacetime and wartime combined emergency hospital, establish standardized conversion procedures and strengthen the construction of key elements of integrated emergency hospitals, so as to provide new ideas for the construction of emergency medical system "combination of peacetime and wartime" mechanism and improve the "combination of civilian and combat" public health emergency governance system.

How Can China's New Health Care Reform Promote the Balance of Interest Game?-Based on Game Evolution and Simulation Analysis.

Purpose: The new round of medical reform is a significant exploration of reform in the public service sector in China. Health insurance regulatory departments, medical institutions, and patients, as critical stakeholders in China's medical reform, play a crucial role in the success of the reform through their strategic interactions. Patients and Methods: Starting from the perspective of bounded rationality, applies evolutionary game theory to establish an evolutionary game model for the collaborative governance of health insurance regulatory departments, medical institutions, and patients and analyzes the stability of each party's strategy and the sensitivity of parameters in the tripartite game system. Results: The study shows that an equilibrium point will be formed when medical institutions provide reasonable treatment, patients choose to accept treatment, and health insurance regulatory departments adopt a lenient regulatory strategy, maximizing the interests of all parties involved in the game. Factors such as the benefits of unreasonable treatment by medical institutions, fines, and regulatory costs impact the decision-making of health insurance regulatory departments. To maximize social welfare, health insurance regulatory departments should reform payment methods, adjust medical service behaviors of medical institutions, and guide the rational allocation of medical resources; the government should increase subsidies for the operation of medical institutions and the intensity of penalties; regulatory departments should reduce regulatory costs and introduce third-party forces to strengthen health insurance supervision further. Conclusion: The research findings of this paper will provide valuable insights into some countries' medical and health reform.

[Development, operational dilemma and tentative idea for construction mechanism of fever clinic in China].

Establishing fever clinic was an important achievement of the fight against severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) in 2003, and played an important role in the subsequent outbreaks of H1N1, H7N9 and Middle East respiratory syndrome (MERS). Fever clinics have significant emergency characteristics, but there are no rescue conditions in the fever clinics. Consequently, the problem of establishment and management of fever clinics is still outstanding. Based on the development of fever clinics, this paper analyzes the operational dilemma of fever clinics, explores the measures of establishment and management of fever clinics, and constructs the operational mechanism of fever clinics in order to provide the basis for the emergency management system of public health emergencies, which is suitable for Chinese health system.

[Identification and antibacterial activity of secondary metabolites from Taxus endophytic fungus].

We isolated three secondary metabolites by silica gel column chromatography from endophytic fungus 12.3.2 that was isolated from Taxus yunnanensis and could produce taxanes. They were identified as cembrene (3,7,11-trimethyl-14-(1-methylethyl)-1,3,6,10-cyclotetradecatetraene), diisooctyl phthalate (1,2-benzenedicarboxylic acid diisooctylester) and ethyl oleate (9-octadecenoic acid-ethyl ester) by infrared spectra (IR), mass spectra (MS) and 1H-nuclear magnetic resonance (NMR). Their antibacterial activities against Staphylococcus aureus, Bacillus subtilis, Escherichia coli, Pseudomonas aeruginosa and Candida albicans were examined. Results show that all of the three compounds could inhibit the growth of those pathogenic bacteria. Especially, cembrene showed stronger inhibition to S. aureus, B. subtilis and C. albicans. This is the first report on cembrene produced by plant endophytic fungus.