An Updated Review of Literature for Air Medical Evacuation High-Level Containment Transport During the Coronavirus Disease 2019 Pandemic.

OBJECTIVE: In 2019, our team conducted a literature review of air medical evacuation high-level containment transport (AE-HLCT) of patients infected with high-consequence pathogens. Since that publication, the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic has resulted in numerous air medical evacuations. We re-examined the new literature associated with AE-HLCTs to determine new innovations developed as a result of the pandemic. METHODS: A literature search was performed in PubMed/MEDLINE from February 2019 to October 2021. The authors screened abstracts for the inclusion criteria and reviewed full articles if the abstract was relevant to the aim. RESULTS: Our search criteria yielded 19 publications. Many of the early transports of patients with COVID-19 used established protocols for AE-HLCT, which were built from the most recent transports of patients with Ebola virus disease. Innovations from the identified articles are subdivided into preflight considerations, in-flight operations, and postflight operations. CONCLUSION: Lessons gleaned from AE-HLCTs of patients with COVID-19 in the early weeks of the pandemic, when little was known about transmission or the severity of the novel disease, have advanced the field of AE-HLCT. Teams that had never conducted such transports now have experience and processes. However, more research into AE-HLCT is needed, including research related to single-patient portable isolation units as well as containerized/multipatient transportation systems.

Leveraging a Preexisting Global Infectious Disease Network for Local Decision Making During a Pandemic.

Emerging infectious disease epidemics require a rapid response from health systems; however, evidence-based consensus guidelines are generally absent early in the course of events. Formed in 2017 by 5 high-level isolation units spanning 3 continents, the experience of the Global Infectious Disease Preparedness Network (GIDPN) early in the course of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) provides a model for accelerating best practice development and improving decision-making in health emergencies. The network served as a platform for real-time, open and transparent information-sharing during unknowns of an active outbreak by clinicians caring for patients, by researchers conducting clinical trials and transmission and infection prevention studies, and by teams advising local and national policy makers. Shared knowledge led to earlier adoption of some treatment modalities as compared to most peer institutions and to implementation of protocols prior to incorporation into national guidelines. GIDPN and similar networks are integral in enhancing preparedness for and response to future epidemics/pandemics.

Best practices of highly infectious decedent management: Consensus recommendations from an international expert workshop.

With the increasing number of highly infectious disease incidents, outbreaks, and pandemics in our society (e.g., Ebola virus disease, Lassa fever, coronavirus diseases), the need for consensus and best practices on highly infectious decedent management is critical. In January 2020, a workshop of subject matter experts from across the world convened to discuss highly infectious live patient transport and highly infectious decedent management best practices. This commentary focuses on the highly infectious decedent management component of the workshop. The absence of guidance or disparate guidance on highly infectious decedent management can increase occupational safety and health risks for death care sector workers. To address this issue, the authorship presents these consensus recommendations on best practices in highly infectious decedent management, including discussion of what is considered a highly infectious decedent; scalability and storage for casualty events; integration of key stakeholders; infection control and facility considerations; transport; care and autopsy; psychological, ethical, and cultural considerations as well as multi-national care perspectives. These consensus recommendations are not intended to be exhaustive but rather to underscore this overlooked area and serve as a starting point for much-needed conversations.

Characteristics of SARS-CoV-2 Transmission among Meat Processing Workers in Nebraska, USA, and Effectiveness of Risk Mitigation Measures.

The coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic has severely impacted the meat processing industry in the United States. We sought to detail demographics and outcomes of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 infections among workers in Nebraska meat processing facilities and determine the effects of initiating universal mask policies and installing physical barriers at 13 meat processing facilities. During April 1-July 31, 2020, COVID-19 was diagnosed in 5,002 Nebraska meat processing workers (attack rate 19%). After initiating both universal masking and physical barrier interventions, 8/13 facilities showed a statistically significant reduction in COVID-19 incidence in <10 days. Characteristics and incidence of confirmed cases aligned with many nationwide trends becoming apparent during this pandemic: specifically, high attack rates among meat processing industry workers, disproportionately high risk of adverse outcomes among ethnic and racial minority groups and men, and effectiveness of using multiple prevention and control interventions to reduce disease transmission.

A pilot study of core body temperatures in healthcare workers wearing personal protective equipment in a high-level isolation unit.

Personal protective equipment used by healthcare workers to mitigate disease transmission risks while caring for patients with high-consequence infectious diseases can impair normal body cooling mechanisms and exacerbate physiological strain. Symptoms of heat strain (e.g., cognitive impairment, confusion, muscle cramping) are especially harmful in the high-risk environment of high-consequence infectious disease care. In this pilot study, the core body temperatures of healthcare workers were assessed using an ingestible, wireless-transmission thermometer while performing patient care tasks common to a high-level isolation unit setting in powered air purifying respirator (PAPR)-level. The objective was to determine the potential for occupational health hazard due to heat stress in an environmentally controlled unit. Maximum core temperatures of the six participants ranged from 37.4 °C (99.3 °F) to 39.9 °C (103.8°F) during the 4-hr shift; core temperatures of half (n = 3) of the participants exceeded 38.5 °C (101.3 °F), the upper core temperature limit. Future investigations are needed to identify other heat stress risks both in and outside of controlled units. The ongoing COVID-19 pandemic offers unique opportunities for field-based research on risks of heat stress related to personal protective equipment in healthcare workers that can lead to both short- and long-term innovations in this field.

Update on Ebola Treatment Center Costs and Sustainability, United States, 2019.

We surveyed 56 Ebola treatment centers (ETCs) in the United States and identified costs incurred since 2014 ($1.76 million/ETC) and sustainability strategies. ETCs reported heavy reliance on federal funding. It is uncertain if, or for how long, ETCs can maintain capabilities should federal funding expire in 2020.

Can You Catch It? Lessons Learned and Modification of ED Triage Symptom- and Travel-Screening Strategy.

INTRODUCTION: Efficient identification and isolation of patients with communicable diseases limits exposure to health care workers, other patients, and visitors. In August 2014, our team developed and implemented an algorithm to triage suspected cases of Ebola virus disease in a midwestern United States emergency department and outpatient clinics based on patient travel history and symptoms. Here, we present the lessons learned and modifications to update the tool. METHODS: Two strategies were developed and utilized to properly identify, isolate, and inform on patients with suspected highly hazardous communicable diseases: 1) a robust electronic symptom and travel screen with decision support tools in the electronic medical record, and 2) the availability of workflow protocols for Ebola virus disease, Middle East Respiratory Syndrome (MERS), and coronavirus 2019 (COVID-19) once a person under investigation is identified. After action reports provided opportunities to modify the algorithm and improve the identification and isolation processes. RESULTS: Since our screening and travel electronic medical record inception 5 years ago, modifications changed iteratively to further enhance the screening process. Since 2018, staff have identified 5 patients at risk for MERS; in all cases, identification occurred during the check-in process. Exposure investigations in the emergency department decreased significantly after algorithm implementation in January 2019, from 30 in 2018 to 0 in 2019. DISCUSSION: Although highly hazardous communicable diseases like Ebola virus disease and MERS are of concern due to their mortality rates and limited treatment options, these same concepts may be applied to the early identification and isolation of patients suspected of having more common communicable diseases like measles and influenza, emphasizing the importance of protocol-based screening in the healthcare environment.

Need for Aeromedical Evacuation High-Level Containment Transport Guidelines.

Circumstances exist that call for the aeromedical evacuation high-level containment transport (AE-HLCT) of patients with highly hazardous communicable diseases. A small number of organizations maintain AE-HLCT capabilities, and little is publicly available regarding the practices. The time is ripe for the development of standards and consensus guidelines involving AE-HLCT.

U.S. Medical Examiner/Coroner capability to handle highly infectious decedents.

In the United States of America, Medical Examiners and Coroners (ME/Cs) investigate approximately 20% of all deaths. Unexpected deaths, such as those occurring due to a deceased person under investigation for a highly infectious disease, are likely to fall under ME/C jurisdiction, thereby placing the ME/C and other morgue personnel at increased risk of contracting an occupationally acquired infection. This survey of U.S. ME/Cs' capabilities to address highly infectious decedents aimed to determine opportunities for improvement at ME/C facilities serving a state or metropolitan area. Data for this study was gathered via an electronic survey. Of the 177 electronic surveys that were distributed, the overall response rate was N = 108 (61%), with 99 of those 108 respondents completing all the questions within the survey. At least one ME/C responded from 47 of 50 states, and the District of Columbia. Select results were: less than half of respondents (44%) stated that their office had been involved in handling a suspected or confirmed highly infectious remains case and responses indicated medical examiners. Additionally, ME/C altered their personal protective equipment based on suspected versus confirmed highly infectious remains rather than taking an all-hazards approach. Standard operating procedures or guidelines should be updated to take an all-hazards approach, best-practices on handling highly infectious remains could be integrated into a standardized education, and evidence-based information on appropriate personal protective equipment selection could be incorporated into a widely disseminated learning module for addressing suspected or confirmed highly infectious remains, as those areas were revealed to be currently lacking.

Review of Literature for Air Medical Evacuation High-Level Containment Transport.

INTRODUCTION: Aeromedical evacuation (AE) is a challenging process, further complicated when a patient has a highly hazardous communicable disease (HHCD). We conducted a review of the literature to evaluate the processes and procedures utilized for safe AE high-level containment transport (AE-HLCT) of patients with HHCDs. METHODS: A literature search was performed in PubMed/MEDLINE (from 1966 through January 2019). Authors screened abstracts for inclusion criteria and full articles were reviewed if the abstract was deemed to contain information related to the aim. RESULTS: Our search criteria yielded 14 publications and were separated based upon publication dates, with the natural break point being the beginning of the 2013-2016 Ebola virus disease epidemic. Best practices and recommendations from identified articles are subdivided into pre-flight preparations, inflight operations, and post-flight procedures. CONCLUSIONS: Limited peer-reviewed literature exists on AE-HLCT, including important aspects related to healthcare worker fatigue, alertness, shift scheduling, and clinical care performance. This hinders the sharing of best practices to inform evacuations and equip teams for future outbreaks. Despite the successful use of different aircraft and technologies, the unique nature of the mission opens the opportunity for greater coordination and development of consensus standards for AE-HLCT operations.

U.S. High-Level Isolation Unit Clinical Laboratory Capabilities Update.

In late 2014, 56 hospitals in the United States were designated by state and federal public health authorities as specially designed high-level isolation units (HLIUs) equipped with advanced infrastructure, laboratory capabilities, and trained staff to care for patients with highly hazardous communicable diseases (HHCDs), such as Ebola virus disease. This survey describes the clinical laboratory support capabilities of U.S. HLIUs, including the specific test menus that HLIUs have identified to safely manage HHCD patients and the locations where such testing would be performed. In spring 2016, a survey was electronically distributed, as a fillable pdf file, to the 56 U.S. HLIUs. Site representatives completed the surveys, and data were coded and analyzed in an electronic spreadsheet, using descriptive statistics. Thirty-six HLIUs (64%) responded, and 33 completed the laboratory capabilities section. Thirty-one HLIUs (94%) had performed risk analyses for all laboratory procedures and equipment. Twenty-nine (88%) had decontamination procedures specified for all laboratory equipment used for patients with suspected or confirmed HHCDs. On-site laboratories in 27 HLIUs (81%) had the capacity to inventory and to securely store HHCD patient specimens. Ten HLIUs (31%) had at least one test they would conduct within the patient isolation room. The high-risk nature of HHCDs and the occupational exposures that may occur in clinical laboratories demand advanced preparation and risk assessment of work practices, laboratory equipment, and instrumentation by HLIU laboratories. Although risk analyses of clinical laboratory testing and equipment that HLIUs have conducted have likely focused on those for Ebola virus, HLIUs must be prepared to revise their current procedures for other HHCDs.

Personnel Management and Biosecurity of U.S. High-Level Isolation Units.

OBJECTIVE: To describe strategies used by US high-level isolation units (HLIUs) to recruit, train, and sustain a full team of multidisciplinary staff and identify how units are secured. BACKGROUND: Fifty-six US hospitals have been designated HLIUs, capable of providing safe care to patients with highly infectious disease. METHODS: An electronic survey was administered to the 56 HLIUs in spring of 2016. Responses were collected via a fillable PDF and analyzed using descriptive statistics. RESULTS: Thirty-six HLIUs (64%) responded; 33 completed surveys, and 3 reported no longer being a designated HLIU. HLIUs reported large numbers of multidisciplinary staff, primarily consisting of RNs and critical care clinicians. Nearly all HLIUs (94%) required orientation training, although hours varied. CONCLUSIONS: Over a short period, HLIUs recruited and trained significant numbers of staff with little guidance. Costs of ongoing trainings are considerable, and it remains unclear how HLIUs will continue funding these activities.

US State Public Health Departments Special Pathogen Planning.

CONTEXT: US state public health departments played key roles in planning for and responding to confirmed and suspected cases of Ebola virus disease (EVD) during the 2014-2016 outbreak, including designating select hospitals as high-level isolation units (HLIUs) for EVD treatment in conjunction with the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. OBJECTIVE: To identify existing guidelines and perspectives of state health departments pertaining to the management and transport of patients with EVD and other highly hazardous communicable diseases (HHCDs). DESIGN: An electronic 8-question survey with subquestions was administered as a fillable PDF. SETTING: The survey was distributed to publicly accessible e-mails of state health department employees. PARTICIPANTS: State epidemiologists, emergency preparedness directors, or chief medical officers from each of the 50 states and the District of Columbia were contacted; a representative from 36 states and the District of Columbia responded (73%). MAIN OUTCOME MEASURES: Descriptive statistics were used to identify the proportion of state health departments with various existing protocols. RESULTS: A majority of states reported that they would prefer patients confirmed with viral hemorrhagic fevers (eg, EVD, Marburg fever) and smallpox be transported to an HLIU for treatment rather than remain at the initial hospital of diagnosis. While most (89%) states had written guidelines for the safe transportation of patients with HHCDs, only 6 (16%) had written protocols for the management of accidents or other travel disruptions that may occur during HHCD transport within the state. Twenty-two state health departments (59%) had operationally exercised transport of a patient to an HLIU. CONCLUSIONS: Nearly half of states in the United States lack an HLIU, yet most prefer to have patients with HHCDs treated in high-level isolation. Recent budget cuts and uncertainty of future funding threaten the abilities of health departments to devote the necessary resources and staff to prepare for and deliver the desired care to HHCD cases. The lack of HLIUs in some states may complicate transport to a geographically proximate HLIU. Moreover, limited guidance on diseases that warrant high-level isolation may cause disagreement in HHCD patient placement between health departments, diagnosing facilities, and HLIUs.

Sustainability of High-Level Isolation Capabilities among US Ebola Treatment Centers.

To identify barriers to maintaining and applying capabilities of US high-level isolation units (HLIUs) used during the Ebola virus disease outbreak, during 2016 we surveyed HLIUs. HLIUs identified sustainability challenges and reported the highly infectious diseases they would treat. HLIUs expended substantial resources in development but must strategize models of sustainability to maintain readiness.

A gap analysis of the United States death care sector to determine training and education needs pertaining to highly infectious disease mitigation and management.

PURPOSE: A United States industry-specific gap analysis survey of the death care sector-which comprises organizations and businesses affiliated with the funeral industry and the handling of human remains- was developed, the results analyzed, and training and education needs in relation to highly infectious disease mitigation and management were explored in an effort to identify where occupational health and safety can be enhanced in this worker population. METHODS: Collaborating national death care organizations distributed the 47-question electronic survey. N = 424 surveys were initiated and results recorded. The survey collected death care sector-specific information pertaining to the comfortability and willingness to handle highly infectious remains; perceptions of readiness, current policies and procedures in place to address highly infectious diseases; current highly infectious disease training levels, available resources, and personal protective equipment. RESULTS: One-third of respondents have been trained on how to manage highly infectious remains. There was a discrepancy between Supervisor/Management and Employee/Worker perceptions on employees' willingness and comfortability to manage potentially highly infectious remains. More than 40% of respondents did not know the correct routes of transmission for viral hemorrhagic fevers. CONCLUSIONS: Results suggest death care workers could benefit from increasing up-to-date industry-specific training and education on highly infectious disease risk mitigation and management. Professional death care sector organizations are positioned to disseminate information, training, and best practices.

U.S. Ebola Treatment Center Clinical Laboratory Support.

Fifty-five hospitals in the United States have been designated Ebola treatment centers (ETCs) by their state and local health authorities. Designated ETCs must have appropriate plans to manage a patient with confirmed Ebola virus disease (EVD) for the full duration of illness and must have these plans assessed through a CDC site visit conducted by an interdisciplinary team of subject matter experts. This study determined the clinical laboratory capabilities of these ETCs. ETCs were electronically surveyed on clinical laboratory characteristics. Survey responses were returned from 47 ETCs (85%). Forty-one (87%) of the ETCs planned to provide some laboratory support (e.g., point-of-care [POC] testing) within the room of the isolated patient. Forty-four (94%) ETCs indicated that their hospital would also provide clinical laboratory support for patient care. Twenty-two (50%) of these ETC clinical laboratories had biosafety level 3 (BSL-3) containment. Of all respondents, 34 (72%) were supported by their jurisdictional public health laboratory (PHL), all of which had available BSL-3 laboratories. Overall, 40 of 44 (91%) ETCs reported BSL-3 laboratory support via their clinical laboratory and/or PHL. This survey provided a snapshot of the laboratory support for designated U.S. ETCs. ETCs have approached high-level isolation critical care with laboratory support in close proximity to the patient room and by distributing laboratory support among laboratory resources. Experts might review safety considerations for these laboratory testing/diagnostic activities that are novel in the context of biocontainment care.

Implementation of a High-Level Isolation Unit Readiness Checklist in the Irish Setting.

A high-level isolation unit (HLIU) is a specially designed biocontainment unit for suspected or confirmed high-consequence infectious diseases. For most HLIUs, maintaining readiness during times of inactivity is a challenge. In this case study, we describe a checklist approach to assess HLIU readiness to rapidly operate upon activation. This checklist includes readiness criteria in several domains, such as infrastructure, human resources, and material supplies, that are required to safely activate the unit at any time. The checklist audit tool was derived from a novel activation readiness checklist published by the biocontainment unit at The Johns Hopkins Hospital in Baltimore, Maryland. It was then adapted for the Irish healthcare setting and implemented at the Mater Misericordiae University Hospital, Ireland's current isolation facility. Results from the audit were also used to inform recommendations for the construction of a new HLIU to open in 2025. The audit tool is user friendly, practical, and focuses on the essential elements of readiness to ensure a successful rapid operation.

Building a biocontainment unit: Infrastructure and organizational experiences of the 13 regional biocontainment units in the United States.

In the United States, the system for special pathogen patient care incorporates a network of federally funded US biocontainment units that maintain operational readiness to care for patients afflicted by high-consequence infectious diseases (HCIDs). This network has expanded in number of facilities and in scope, serving as a regional resource for special pathogen preparedness. Lessons learned for maintaining these units are shared with the intent of informing new and existing biocontainment units.

The cardinal rules: Principles of personal protective equipment for high-consequence infectious disease events.

In recognition of an increasing number of high-consequence infectious disease events, a group of subject-matter experts identified core safety principles that can be applied across all donning and doffing protocols for personal protective equipment.

High-Level Isolation: A Landscape Analysis of Global Capabilities and Opportunities to Advance the Field.

High-level isolation units (HLIUs) have been established by countries to provide safe and optimal medical care for patients with high-consequence infectious diseases. We aimed to identify global high-level isolation capabilities and determine gaps and priorities of global HLIUs, using a multiple method approach that included a systematic review of published and gray literature and a review of Joint External Evaluations and Global Health Security Index reports from 112 countries. A follow-up electronic survey was distributed to identified HLIUs. The landscape analysis found 44 previously designated/self-described HLIUs in 19 countries. An additional 33 countries had potential HLIUs; however, there were not enough details on capabilities to determine if they fit the HLIU definition. An electronic survey was distributed to 36 HLIUs to validate landscape analysis findings and to understand challenges, best practices, and priorities for increased networking with a global HLIU cohort; 31 (86%) HLIUs responded. Responses revealed an additional 30 confirmed HLIUs that were not identified in the landscape analysis. To our knowledge, this was the first mapping and the largest ever survey of global HLIUs. Survey findings identified major gaps in visibility of HLIUs: while our landscape analysis initially identified 44 units, the survey unveiled an additional 30 HLIUs that had not been previously identified or confirmed. The lack of formalized regional or global coordinating organizations exacerbates these visibility gaps. The unique characteristics and capabilities of these facilities, coupled with the likelihood these units serve as core components of national health security plans, provides an opportunity for increased connection and networking to advance the field of high-level isolation and address identified gaps in coordination, build an evidence base for HLIU approaches, and inform HLIU definitions and key components.