The Regulation of Mitochondrial Replacement Techniques Around the World.

Mitochondrial replacement techniques (MRTs, also referred to as mitochondrial replacement therapies) have given hope to many women who wish to have genetically related children but have mitochondrial DNA mutations in their eggs. MRTs have also spurred deep ethical disagreements and led to different regulatory approaches worldwide. In this review, we discuss the current regulation of MRTs across several countries. After discussing the basics of the science, we describe the current law and policy directions in seven countries: the United Kingdom, the United States, Canada, Australia, Germany, Israel, and Singapore. We also discuss the emerging phenomenon of medical tourism (also called medical travel) for MRTs to places like Greece, Spain, Mexico, and Ukraine. We then pull out some key findings regarding similarities and differences in regulatory approaches around the world.

Genealogical obscurement: mitochondrial replacement techniques and genealogical research.

Mitochondrial replacement techniques (MRTs) are a new group of biotechnologies that aim to aid women whose eggs have disease-causing deleteriously mutated mitochondria to have genetically related healthy children. These techniques have also been used to aid women with poor oocyte quality and poor embryonic development, to have genetically related children. Remarkably, MRTs create humans with DNA from three sources: nuclear DNA from the intending mother and father, and mitochondrial DNA from the egg donor. In a recent publication Françoise Baylis argued that MRTs are detrimental for genealogical research via mitochondrial DNA because they would obscure the lines of individual descent. In this paper, I argue that MRTs do not obscure genealogical research, but rather that MRT-conceived children can have two mitochondrial lineages. I argue for this position by showing that MRTs are reproductive in nature and, thus, they create genealogy.

Ethical heuristics for pandemic allocation of ventilators across hospitals.

In response to the COVID-19 pandemic philosophers and governments have proposed scarce resource allocation guidelines. Their purpose is to advise healthcare professionals on how to ethically allocate scarce medical resources. One challenging feature of the pandemic has been the large numbers of patients needing mechanical ventilatory support. Guidelines have paradigmatically focused on the question of what doctors should do if they have fewer ventilators than patients who need respiratory support: which patient should get the ventilator? There is, however, an important higher level allocation problem. Namely, how are we to ethically distribute newly obtained ventilators across hospitals: which hospital should get the ventilator(s)? In this paper, we identify a set of principles for allocating newly obtained ventilators across hospitals. We focus particularly on low and middle income countries, who frequently have limited pre-existing intensive care capacity, and have needed to source additional ventilators. We first provide some background. Second, we argue that the main population healthcare aim during the COVID-19 pandemic should be to save the most lives. Next, we assess a series of potential heuristics or principles that could be used to guide allocation: allocation to the most densely populated cities, random allocation, allocation based on the ratio of patients to ICU personnel, prioritisation in terms of intrahospital mortality, prioritisation of younger populations, and prioritisation in terms of population mortality. We conclude by providing a plausible ranking of the principles, while noting a number of epistemological challenges, in terms of how they best further the aim of increasing the probability of saving the most lives.

Reproductive genome editing interventions are therapeutic, sometimes.

In this paper I argue that some human reproductive genome editing interventions can be therapeutic in nature, and thus that it is false that all such interventions just create healthy individuals. I do this by showing that the conditions established by a therapy definition are met by certain reproductive genome editing interventions. I then defend this position against two objections: (a) reproductive genome editing interventions do not attain one of the two conditions for something to be a therapy, and (b) some reproductive genome editing interventions are therapeutic but in a nonstandard way. In the Conclusion I call for a more nuanced discussion of the nature of reproductive genome editing interventions.

Beyond Individual Triage: Regional Allocation of Life-Saving Resources such as Ventilators in Public Health Emergencies.

In the first wave of the COVID-19 pandemic, healthcare workers in some countries were forced to make distressing triaging decisions about which individual patients should receive potentially life-saving treatment. Much of the ethical discussion prompted by the pandemic has concerned which moral principles should ground our response to these individual triage questions. In this paper we aim to broaden the scope of this discussion by considering the ethics of broader structural allocation decisions raised by the COVID-19 pandemic. More specifically, we consider how nations ought to distribute a scarce life-saving resource across healthcare regions in a public health emergency, particularly in view of regional differences in projected need and existing capacity. We call this the regional triage question. Using the case study of ventilators in the COVID-19 pandemic, we show how the moral frameworks that we might adopt in response to individual triage decisions do not translate straightforwardly to this regional-level triage question. Having outlined what we take to be a plausible egalitarian approach to the regional triage question, we go on to propose a novel way of operationalising the 'save the most lives' principle in this context. We claim that the latter principle ought to take some precedence in the regional triage question, but also note important limitations to the extent of the influence that it should have in regional allocation decisions.

[Bioethics guide on scarce medical resource allocation in Mexico]. / Guía bioética de asignación de recursos de medicina crítica del Consejo de Salubridad General en México.

The bioethical inquiry about allocating fairly scarce health resources is not new, all countries around the world that were seriously afflicted by SARS-CoV-2 have issued triage guidelines in order to address the dilemmas raised by the pandemic. There is no question about the need to create bioethical guidelines, since its creation provides a degree of certainty that fair and ethical decisions are taken. This also prevents that decisions are made in solitary and maybe motivated by corrupted actions. In Mexico, the creation of this guideline was a proactive and preventive measure to what was unavoidable, the exponential contagion phase of the pandemical scenario caused by Covid-19. On April 30, 2020 the General Sanitary Council published the Bioethical Guide to Allocate Scarce Resources on Critical Care Medicine in Emergency Situation. This guide has at its core that principle of utmost importance in social justice which main thesis is: "All lives have the same value". The aim of this contribution is to provide the ethical and legal principles established in the aforementioned bioethi-cal guideline. In sum, a brief exploration of the ethical reasons that support a specific way to allocate scarce health resources is provided, as well as the foundations of the procedural part from a human rights-based approach.

El tema bioético sobre la asignación de recursos escasos no es nuevo, todos los países que han sido gravemente afectados por el SARS-CoV-2 han tenido que desarrollar y utilizar guías de triaje. Esto resulta más adecuado pues así la asignación de recursos limitados se hace de manera ética y justa, y no de manera discrecional y abierta a la corrupción. En México, en anticipación a la fase exponencial de la pandemia por SARS-CoV-2, el 30 de abril el Consejo de Salubridad General publicó la Guía bioética para asignación de recursos limitados de medicina crítica en situación de emergencia. Dicha guía tiene como base criterios de justicia social y parte de la tesis: todas las vidas tienen el mismo valor. Este texto tiene como objetivo propor-cionar las razones bioéticas y biojurídicas que conforman esta guía de triaje en nuestro país. En resumen, proporciona una breve exploración de las razones éticas que justifican cierta manera específica de asignar recursos escasos en medicina crítica, así como del sustento procedimental apegado a los estándares en materia de derechos humanos.

'Yes' to mitochondrial replacement techniques and lesbian motherhood: a reply to Françoise Baylis.

In a recent paper - Lesbian motherhood and mitochondrial replacement techniques: reproductive freedom and genetic kinship - we argued that lesbian couples who wish to have children who are genetically related to both of them should be allowed access to mitochondrial replacement techniques (MRTs). Françoise Baylis wrote a reply to our paper -'No' to lesbian motherhood using human nuclear genome transfer- where she challenges our arguments on the use of MRTs by lesbian couples, and on MRTs more generally. In this reply we respond to her claims and further clarify our position.

Genetic parenthood and causation: An objection to Douglas and Devolder's modified direct proportionate genetic descent account.

In a recent publication Tom Douglas and Katrien Devolder have proposed a new account of genetic parenthood, building on the work of Heidi Mertes. Douglas and Devolder's account aims to solve, among other things, the question of who are the genetic parents of an individual created through somatic cell nuclear transfer (i.e. cloning): (a) the nuclear DNA provider or (b) the progenitors of the nuclear DNA provider. Such a question cannot be answered by simply appealing to the folk account of genetic parenthood, according to which the genetic parents of an individual are those individuals who produced the egg and sperm, respectively, which fused to create the embryo. It cannot be so as in cloning there is no fertilization as such. In this article I critically examine Douglas and Devolder's new account of genetic parenthood and demonstrate that it is vulnerable to counterexamples that exploit the lack of a condition specifying that genetic parents should cause a child's coming into existence.

Mexico and mitochondrial replacement techniques: what a mess.

Background: The first live birth following the use of a new reproductive technique, maternal spindle transfer (MST), which is a mitochondrial replacement technique (MRT), was accomplished by dividing the execution of the MST procedure between two countries, the USA and Mexico. This was done in order to avoid US legal restrictions on this technique. Sources of data: Academic articles, news articles, documents obtained through freedom of information requests, laws, regulations and national reports. Areas of agreement: MRTs are new reproductive techniques that present novel ethical and legal challenges, since genetic material from three people is employed to create a child. Areas of controversy: Could the first MST procedure that culminated in a live birth negatively impact reproductive medicine in Mexico? Growing points: The USA and Mexico need specific and clear legislation on MRTs, in order for such techniques not to be governed by prior existing legislation on assisted reproduction that is inadequate for dealing with the new challenges that these techniques present. Areas timely for developing research: There is a pressing need for work to be done on the international governance of new reproductive techniques.

Does egg donation for mitochondrial replacement techniques generate parental responsibilities?

Children created through mitochondrial replacement techniques (MRTs) are commonly presented as possessing 50% of their mother's nuclear DNA, 50% of their father's nuclear DNA and the mitochondrial DNA of an egg donor. This lab-engineered genetic composition has prompted two questions: Do children who are the product of an MRT procedure have three genetic parents? And, do MRT egg donors have parental responsibilities for the children created? In this paper, I address the second question and in doing so I also address the first one. First, I present a brief account of mitochondrial diseases and MRTs. Second, I examine how MRTs affect the numerical identity of eggs and zygotes. Third, I investigate two genetic accounts of parenthood and MRT egg donation. Fourth, I explore three causal accounts of parenthood and MRT egg donation. My conclusion is that, under the appropriate circumstances, MRT egg donors are parentally responsible for the children created under genetic accounts of parenthood and under causal accounts of parenthood.

Lesbian motherhood and mitochondrial replacement techniques: reproductive freedom and genetic kinship.

In this paper, we argue that lesbian couples who wish to have children who are genetically related to both of them should be allowed access to mitochondrial replacement techniques (MRTs). First, we provide a brief explanation of mitochondrial diseases and MRTs. We then present the reasons why MRTs are not, by nature, therapeutic. The upshot of the view that MRTs are non-therapeutic techniques is that their therapeutic potential cannot be invoked for restricting their use only to those cases where a mitochondrial DNA disease could be 'cured'. We then argue that a positive case for MRTs is justified by an appeal to reproductive freedom, and that the criteria to access these techniques should hence be extended to include lesbian couples who wish to share genetic parenthood. Finally, we consider a potential objection to our argument: that the desire to have genetically related kin is not a morally sufficient reason to allow lesbian couples to access MRTs.

Chimeras intended for human gamete production: an ethical alternative?

Human eggs for basic, fertility and stem-cell research are in short supply. Many experiments that require their use cannot be carried out at present, and, therefore, the benefits that could emerge from these are either delayed or never materialise. This state of affairs is problematic for scientists and patients worldwide, and it is a matter that needs our attention. Recent advances in chimera research have opened the possibility of creating human/non-human animal chimeras intended for human gamete production (chimeras-IHGP). In this paper, I examine four arguments against the creation of such chimeras and prove that all of them are found wanting. I conclude by showing that there is a strong moral reason for scientists to pursue this research avenue.

Ethics of Mitochondrial Replacement Techniques: A Habermasian Perspective.

Jürgen Habermas is regarded as a central bioconservative commentator in the debate on the ethics of human prenatal genetic manipulations. While his main work on this topic, The Future of Human Nature, has been widely examined in regard to his position on prenatal genetic enhancement, his arguments regarding prenatal genetic therapeutic interventions have for the most part been overlooked. In this work I do two things. First, I present the three necessary conditions that Habermas establishes for a prenatal genetic manipulation to be regarded as morally permissible. Second, I examine if mitochondrial replacement techniques meet these necessary conditions. I investigate, specifically, the moral permissibility of employing pronuclear transfer and maternal spindle transfer. I conclude that, according to a Habermasian perspective on prenatal genetic manipulation, maternal spindle transfer (without using a preselected sperm and egg) and pronuclear transfer are morally impermissible. Maternal spindle transfer is, in principle, morally permissible, but only when we have beforehand preselected a sperm and an egg for our reproductive purpose. These findings are relevant for bioconservatives, both for those who hold a Habermasian stance and for those who hold something akin to a Habermasian stance, because they answer the question: what should bioconservatives do regarding mitochondrial replacement techniques? In fact, the answer to this question does not only normatively prescribe what bioconservatives should do in terms of their personal morality, but it also points towards what kind of legislation regulating mitochondrial replacement techniques they should aim at.

Are there moral differences between maternal spindle transfer and pronuclear transfer?

This paper examines whether there are moral differences between the mitochondrial replacement techniques that have been recently developed in order to help women afflicted by mitochondrial DNA diseases to have genetically related children absent such conditions: maternal spindle transfer (MST) and pronuclear transfer (PNT). Firstly, it examines whether there is a moral difference between MST and PNT in terms of the divide between somatic interventions and germline interventions. Secondly, it considers whether PNT and MST are morally distinct under a therapy/creation optic. Finally, it investigates whether there is a moral difference between MST and PNT from a human embryo destruction point of view. I conclude, contra recent arguments, that regarding the first two points there is no moral differences between PNT and MST; and that regarding the third one MST is morally preferable to PNT, but only if we hold a gradualist account of the moral value of human embryos where zygotes have slight moral value.

Artificial Intelligence.

It seems natural to think that the same prudential and ethical reasons for mutual respect and tolerance that one has vis-à-vis other human persons would hold toward newly encountered paradigmatic but nonhuman biological persons. One also tends to think that they would have similar reasons for treating we humans as creatures that count morally in our own right. This line of thought transcends biological boundaries-namely, with regard to artificially (super)intelligent persons-but is this a safe assumption? The issue concerns ultimate moral significance: the significance possessed by human persons, persons from other planets, and hypothetical nonorganic persons in the form of artificial intelligence (AI). This article investigates why our possible relations to AI persons could be more complicated than they first might appear, given that they might possess a radically different nature to us, to the point that civilized or peaceful coexistence in a determinate geographical space could be impossible to achieve.

The ethics of killing human/great-ape chimeras for their organs: a reply to Shaw et al.

The aim of this paper is to critically examine David Shaw, Wybo Dondorp, and Guido de Wert's arguments in favour of the procurement of human organs from human/nonhuman-primate chimeras, specifically from great-ape/human chimeras. My main claim is that their arguments fail and are in need of substantial revision. To prove this I first introduce the topic, and then reconstruct Shaw et al.'s position and arguments. Next, I show that Shaw et al.: (1) failed to properly apply the subsidiarity and proportionality principles; (2) neglected species overlapping cases in their ethical assessment; (3) ignored the ethics literature on borderline persons; and (4) misunderstood McMahan's two-tiered moral theory. These mistakes render an important part of their conclusions either false or problematic to the point that they would no longer endorse them. Finally I will briefly mention a possible multipolar solution to the human organ shortage problem that would reduce the need for chimeras' organs.

Mitochondrial replacement techniques: egg donation, genealogy and eugenics.

Several objections against the morality of researching or employing mitochondrial replacement techniques have been advanced recently. In this paper, I examine three of these objections and show that they are found wanting. First I examine whether mitochondrial replacement techniques, research and clinical practice, should not be carried out because of possible harms to egg donors. Next I assess whether mitochondrial replacement techniques should be banned because they could affect the study of genealogical ancestry. Finally, I examine the claim that mitochondrial replacement techniques are not transferring mitochondrial DNA but nuclear DNA, and that this should be prohibited on ethical grounds.

Substance over style: is there something wrong with abandoning the white coat?

In this paper, we address points raised by Stephanie Dancer's article in The BMJ in which she claimed that by 'dressing down', physicians fail to adhere to the dignitas of the medical profession, and damage its reputation. At the beginning of this paper, we distinguish between two different senses in which a person can be, as she terms it, 'scruffy'; and then we address Dancer's three main claims. First, we argue that in regard to the medical profession it is fallacious to assume, as she appears to do, that someone is incompetent or irresponsible when such a judgement is grounded in the fact that a physician is not dressed in a formal way. Second, we argue, contrary to her claim, that the dignified nature of the medical profession is in no coherent way linked to sartorial elegance or lack thereof, but rather, that such dignity is bound to the value of the medical practice in itself, to patients, and to society at large. Third, we examine two ways in which doctors can 'dress down' and show that 'scruffiness' does not necessarily intimates a lack of personal hygiene. Finally, we show that pointing to mere statistical correlation without causation, cannot be used as an argument against scruffiness. We conclude by suggesting that in the medical context, it is more appropriate to educate patients than to chastise practitioners for not following arbitrary cultural mores.

Human dignity and the creation of human-nonhuman chimeras.

In this work I present a detailed critique of the dignity-related arguments that have been advanced against the creation of human-nonhuman chimeras that could possess human-like mental capacities. My main claim is that the arguments so far advanced are incapable of grounding a principled objection against the creation of such creatures. I conclude that these arguments have one, or more, of the following problems: (a) they confuse the ethical assessment of the creation of chimeras with the ethical assessment of how such creatures would be treated in specific contexts (e.g. in the laboratory), (b) they misrepresent how a being could be treated solely as means towards others' ends,

The ethics of clinical photography and social media.

Clinical photography is an important tool for medical practice, training and research. While in the past clinical pictures were confined to the stringent controls of surgeries and hospitals technological advances have made possible to take pictures and share them through the internet with only a few clicks. Confronted with this possibility I explore if a case could be made for using clinical photography in tandem with social media. In order to do this I explore: (1) if patient's informed consent is required for the publication of any clinical images that depicts her, irrespective of whether the patient can be identified from the image or not, (2) if social media is an adequate place for clinical images to be displayed, and finally (3) if there are special considerations that should be taken into account when publishing clinical images on social media.