Value Estimation versus Effort Mobilization: A General Dissociation between Ventromedial and Dorsomedial Prefrontal Cortex.

Deciding on a course of action requires both an accurate estimation of option values and the right amount of effort invested in deliberation to reach sufficient confidence in the final choice. In a previous study, we have provided evidence, across a series of judgment and choice tasks, for a dissociation between the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC), which would represent option values, and the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC), which would represent the duration of deliberation. Here, we first replicate this dissociation and extend it to the case of an instrumental learning task, in which 24 human volunteers (13 women) choose between options associated with probabilistic gains and losses. According to fMRI data recorded during decision-making, vmPFC activity reflects the sum of option values generated by a reinforcement learning model and dmPFC activity the deliberation time. To further generalize the role of the dmPFC in mobilizing effort, we then analyze fMRI data recorded in the same participants while they prepare to perform motor and cognitive tasks (squeezing a handgrip or making numerical comparisons) to maximize gains or minimize losses. In both cases, dmPFC activity is associated with the output of an effort regulation model, and not with response time. Taken together, these results strengthen a general theory of behavioral control that implicates the vmPFC in the estimation of option values and the dmPFC in the energization of relevant motor and cognitive processes.

Effort avoidance as a core mechanism of apathy in frontotemporal dementia.

Apathy is a core symptom in patients with behavioural variant frontotemporal dementia (bvFTD). It is defined by the observable reduction in goal-directed behaviour, but the underlying mechanisms are poorly understood. According to decision theory, engagement in goal-directed behaviour depends on a cost-benefit optimization trading off the estimated effort (related to the behaviour) against the expected reward (related to the goal). In this framework, apathy would thus result from either a decreased appetence for reward, or from an increased aversion to effort. Here, we phenotyped the motivational state of 21 patients with bvFTD and 40 matched healthy controls using computational analyses of behavioural responses in a comprehensive series of behavioural tasks, involving both expression of preference (comparing reward value and effort cost) and optimization of performance (adjusting effort production to the reward at stake). The primary finding was an elevated aversion to effort, consistent across preference and performance tasks in patients with bvFTD compared to controls. Within the bvFTD group, effort avoidance was correlated to cortical atrophy in the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex and to apathy score measured on a clinical scale. Thus, our results highlight elevated effort aversion (not reduced reward appetence) as a core dysfunction that might generate apathy in patients with bvFTD. More broadly, they provide novel behavioural tests and computational tools to identify the dysfunctional mechanisms producing motivation deficits in patients with brain damage.

A shared brain system forming confidence judgment across cognitive domains.

Confidence is typically defined as a subjective judgment about whether a decision is right. Decisions are based on sources of information that come from various cognitive domains and are processed in different brain systems. An unsettled question is whether the brain computes confidence in a similar manner whatever the domain or in a manner that would be idiosyncratic to each domain. To address this issue, human participants performed two tasks probing confidence in decisions made about the same material (history and geography statements), but based on different cognitive processes: semantic memory for deciding whether the statement was true or false, and duration perception for deciding whether the statement display was long or short. At the behavioral level, we found that the same factors (difficulty, accuracy, response time, and confidence in the preceding decision) predicted confidence judgments in both tasks. At the neural level, we observed using functional magnetic resonance imaging that confidence judgments in both tasks were associated to activity in the same brain regions: positively in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex and negatively in a prefronto-parietal network. Together, these findings suggest the existence of a shared brain system that generates confidence judgments in a similar manner across cognitive domains.

Value, confidence, deliberation: a functional partition of the medial prefrontal cortex demonstrated across rating and choice tasks.

Deciding about courses of action involves minimizing costs and maximizing benefits. Decision neuroscience studies have implicated both the ventral and dorsal medial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC and dmPFC) in signaling goal value and action cost, but the precise functional role of these regions is still a matter of debate. Here, we suggest a more general functional partition that applies not only to decisions but also to judgments about goal value (expected reward) and action cost (expected effort). In this conceptual framework, cognitive representations related to options (reward value and effort cost) are dissociated from metacognitive representations (confidence and deliberation) related to solving the task (providing a judgment or making a choice). We used an original approach aiming at identifying consistencies across several preference tasks, from likeability ratings to binary decisions involving both attribute integration and option comparison. fMRI results in human male and female participants confirmed the vmPFC as a generic valuation system, its activity increasing with reward value and decreasing with effort cost. In contrast, more dorsal regions were not concerned with the valuation of options but with metacognitive variables, confidence being reflected in mPFC activity and deliberation time in dmPFC activity. Thus, there was a dissociation between the effort attached to choice options (represented in the vmPFC) and the effort invested in deliberation (represented in the dmPFC), the latter being expressed in pupil dilation. More generally, assessing commonalities across preference tasks might help reaching a unified view of the neural mechanisms underlying the cost/benefit tradeoffs that drive human behavior.Significance statementDecision neuroscience studies have implicated the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) in forming the cognitive representations that drive human choice behavior. However, different studies using different tasks have suggested somewhat inconsistent links between precise computational variables and specific brain regions. Here, we use fMRI to demonstrate a robust functional partition of the mPFC that generalizes across tasks involving an estimation of goal value and/or action cost to provide a judgement or make a choice. This general functional partition makes a critical dissociation between neural representations of decisional factors (the expected costs and benefits attached to a given option) and metacognitive estimates (confidence in the judgment or choice, and effort invested in the deliberation process).

Order matters: How covert value updating during sequential option sampling shapes economic preference.

Standard neuroeconomic decision theory assumes that choice is based on a value comparison process, independent from how information about alternative options is collected. Here, we investigate the opposite intuition that preferences are dynamically shaped as options are sampled, through iterative covert pairwise comparisons. Our model builds on two lines of research, one suggesting that a natural frame of comparison for the brain is between default and alternative options, the other suggesting that comparisons spread preferences between options. We therefore assumed that during sequential option sampling, people would 1) covertly compare every new alternative to the current best and 2) update their values such that the winning (losing) option receives a positive (negative) bonus. We confronted this "covert pairwise comparison" model to models derived from standard decision theory and from known memory effects. Our model provided the best account of human choice behavior in a novel task where participants (n = 92 in total) had to browse through a sequence of items (food, music or movie) of variable length and ultimately select their favorite option. Consistently, the order of option presentation, which was manipulated by design, had a significant influence on the eventual choice: the best option was more likely to be chosen when it came earlier in the sequence, because it won more covert comparisons (hence a greater total bonus). Our study provides a mechanistic understanding of how the option sampling process shapes economic preference, which should be integrated into decision theory.

Sour grapes and sweet victories: How actions shape preferences.

Classical decision theory postulates that choices proceed from subjective values assigned to the probable outcomes of alternative actions. Some authors have argued that opposite causality should also be envisaged, with choices influencing subsequent values expressed in desirability ratings. The idea is that agents may increase their ratings of items that they have chosen in the first place, which has been typically explained by the need to reduce cognitive dissonance. However, evidence in favor of this reverse causality has been the topic of intense debates that have not reached consensus so far. Here, we take a novel approach using Bayesian techniques to compare models in which choices arise from stable (but noisy) underlying values (one-way causality) versus models in which values are in turn influenced by choices (two-way causality). Moreover, we examined whether in addition to choices, other components of previous actions, such as the effort invested and the eventual action outcome (success or failure), could also impact subsequent values. Finally, we assessed whether the putative changes in values were only expressed in explicit ratings, or whether they would also affect other value-related behaviors such as subsequent choices. Behavioral data were obtained from healthy participants in a rating-choice-rating-choice-rating paradigm, where the choice task involves deciding whether or not to exert a given physical effort to obtain a particular food item. Bayesian selection favored two-way causality models, where changes in value due to previous actions affected subsequent ratings, choices and action outcomes. Altogether, these findings may help explain how values and actions drift when several decisions are made successively, hence highlighting some shortcomings of classical decision theory.

Why not try harder? Computational approach to motivation deficits in neuro-psychiatric diseases.

Motivation deficits, such as apathy, are pervasive in both neurological and psychiatric diseases. Even when they are not the core symptom, they reduce quality of life, compromise functional outcome and increase the burden for caregivers. They are currently assessed with clinical scales that do not give any mechanistic insight susceptible to guide therapeutic intervention. Here, we present another approach that consists of phenotyping the behaviour of patients in motivation tests, using computational models. These formal models impose a precise and operational definition of motivation that is embedded in decision theory. Motivation can be defined as the function that orients and activates the behaviour according to two attributes: a content (the goal) and a quantity (the goal value). Decision theory offers a way to quantify motivation, as the cost that patients would accept to endure in order to get the benefit of achieving their goal. We then review basic and clinical studies that have investigated the trade-off between the expected cost entailed by potential actions and the expected benefit associated with potential rewards. These studies have shown that the trade-off between effort and reward involves specific cortical, subcortical and neuromodulatory systems, such that it may be shifted in particular clinical conditions, and reinstated by appropriate treatments. Finally, we emphasize the promises of computational phenotyping for clinical purposes. Ideally, there would be a one-to-one mapping between specific neural components and distinct computational variables and processes of the decision model. Thus, fitting computational models to patients' behaviour would allow inferring of the dysfunctional mechanism in both cognitive terms (e.g. hyposensitivity to reward) and neural terms (e.g. lack of dopamine). This computational approach may therefore not only give insight into the motivation deficit but also help personalize treatment.

Primate Ventromedial Prefrontal Cortex Neurons Continuously Encode the Willingness to Engage in Reward-Directed Behavior.

To survive in their complex environment, primates must integrate information over time and adjust their actions beyond immediate events. The underlying neurobiological processes, however, remain unclear. Here, we assessed the contribution of the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC), a brain region important for value-based decision-making. We recorded single VMPFC neurons in monkeys performing a task where obtaining fluid rewards required squeezing a grip. The willingness to perform the action was modulated not only by visual information about Effort and Reward levels but also by contextual factors such as Trial Number (i.e., fatigue and/or satiety) or behavior in recent trials. A greater fraction of VMPFC neurons encoded contextual information, compared with visual stimuli. Moreover, the dynamics of VMPFC firing was more closely related to slow changes in motivational states driven by these contextual factors rather than rapid responses to individual task events. Thus, the firing of VMPFC neurons continuously integrated contextual information and reliably predicted the monkeys's willingness to perform the task. This function might be critical when animals forage in a complex environment and need to integrate information over time. Its relation with motivational states also resonates with the VMPFC's implication in the "default mode" or in mood disorders.

Neural mechanisms underlying the impact of daylong cognitive work on economic decisions.

The ability to exert self-control is key to social insertion and professional success. An influential literature in psychology has developed the theory that self-control relies on a limited common resource, so that fatigue effects might carry over from one task to the next. However, the biological nature of the putative limited resource and the existence of carry-over effects have been matters of considerable controversy. Here, we targeted the activity of the lateral prefrontal cortex (LPFC) as a common substrate for cognitive control, and we prolonged the time scale of fatigue induction by an order of magnitude. Participants performed executive control tasks known to recruit the LPFC (working memory and task-switching) over more than 6 h (an approximate workday). Fatigue effects were probed regularly by measuring impulsivity in intertemporal choices, i.e., the propensity to favor immediate rewards, which has been found to increase under LPFC inhibition. Behavioral data showed that choice impulsivity increased in a group of participants who performed hard versions of executive tasks but not in control groups who performed easy versions or enjoyed some leisure time. Functional MRI data acquired at the start, middle, and end of the day confirmed that enhancement of choice impulsivity was related to a specific decrease in the activity of an LPFC region (in the left middle frontal gyrus) that was recruited by both executive and choice tasks. Our findings demonstrate a concept of focused neural fatigue that might be naturally induced in real-life situations and have important repercussions on economic decisions.

A Selective Role for Dopamine in Learning to Maximize Reward But Not to Minimize Effort: Evidence from Patients with Parkinson's Disease.

Instrumental learning is a fundamental process through which agents optimize their choices, taking into account various dimensions of available options such as the possible reward or punishment outcomes and the costs associated with potential actions. Although the implication of dopamine in learning from choice outcomes is well established, less is known about its role in learning the action costs such as effort. Here, we tested the ability of patients with Parkinson's disease (PD) to maximize monetary rewards and minimize physical efforts in a probabilistic instrumental learning task. The implication of dopamine was assessed by comparing performance ON and OFF prodopaminergic medication. In a first sample of PD patients (n = 15), we observed that reward learning, but not effort learning, was selectively impaired in the absence of treatment, with a significant interaction between learning condition (reward vs effort) and medication status (OFF vs ON). These results were replicated in a second, independent sample of PD patients (n = 20) using a simplified version of the task. According to Bayesian model selection, the best account for medication effects in both studies was a specific amplification of reward magnitude in a Q-learning algorithm. These results suggest that learning to avoid physical effort is independent from dopaminergic circuits and strengthen the general idea that dopaminergic signaling amplifies the effects of reward expectation or obtainment on instrumental behavior.SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT Theoretically, maximizing reward and minimizing effort could involve the same computations and therefore rely on the same brain circuits. Here, we tested whether dopamine, a key component of reward-related circuitry, is also implicated in effort learning. We found that patients suffering from dopamine depletion due to Parkinson's disease were selectively impaired in reward learning, but not effort learning. Moreover, anti-parkinsonian medication restored the ability to maximize reward, but had no effect on effort minimization. This dissociation suggests that the brain has evolved separate, domain-specific systems for instrumental learning. These results help to disambiguate the motivational role of prodopaminergic medications: they amplify the impact of reward without affecting the integration of effort cost.

Choose, rate or squeeze: Comparison of economic value functions elicited by different behavioral tasks.

A standard view in neuroeconomics is that to make a choice, an agent first assigns subjective values to available options, and then compares them to select the best. In choice tasks, these cardinal values are typically inferred from the preference expressed by subjects between options presented in pairs. Alternatively, cardinal values can be directly elicited by asking subjects to place a cursor on an analog scale (rating task) or to exert a force on a power grip (effort task). These tasks can vary in many respects: they can notably be more or less costly and consequential. Here, we compared the value functions elicited by choice, rating and effort tasks on options composed of two monetary amounts: one for the subject (gain) and one for a charity (donation). Bayesian model selection showed that despite important differences between the three tasks, they all elicited a same value function, with similar weighting of gain and donation, but variable concavity. Moreover, value functions elicited by the different tasks could predict choices with equivalent accuracy. Our finding therefore suggests that comparable value functions can account for various motivated behaviors, beyond economic choice. Nevertheless, we report slight differences in the computational efficiency of parameter estimation that may guide the design of future studies.

Computational Dissection of Dopamine Motor and Motivational Functions in Humans.

UNLABELLED: Motor dysfunction (e.g., bradykinesia) and motivational deficit (i.e., apathy) are hallmarks of Parkinson's disease (PD). Yet, it remains unclear whether these two symptoms arise from a same dopaminergic dysfunction. Here, we develop a computational model that articulates motor control to economic decision theory, to dissect the motor and motivational functions of dopamine in humans. This model can capture different aspects of the behavior: choice (which action is selected) and vigor (action speed and intensity). It was used to characterize the behavior of 24 PD patients, tested both when medicated and unmedicated, in two behavioral tasks: an incentive motivation task that involved producing a physical effort, knowing that it would be multiplied by reward level to calculate the payoff, and a binary choice task that involved choosing between high reward/high effort and low reward/low effort options. Model-free analyses in both tasks showed the same two effects when comparing unmedicated patients to medicated patients: dopamine depletion (1) decreased the amount of effort that patients were willing to produce for a given reward and (2) slowed down the production of this effort, regardless of reward level. Model-based analyses captured these effects with two independent parameters, namely reward sensitivity and motor activation rate. These two parameters were respectively predictive of medication effects on clinical measures of apathy and motor dysfunction. More generally, we suggest that such computational phenotyping might help characterizing deficits and refining treatments in neuropsychiatric disorders. SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT: Many neurological conditions are characterized by motor and motivational deficits, which both result in reduced behavior. It remains extremely difficult to disentangle whether these patients are simply unable or do not want to produce a behavior. Here, we propose a model-based analysis of the behavior produced in tasks that involve trading physical efforts for monetary rewards, to quantify parameters that capture motor dynamics as well as sensitivity to reward, effort, and fatigue. Applied to Parkinson's disease, this computational analysis revealed two independent effects of dopamine enhancers, which predicted clinical improvement in motor and motivational deficits. Such computational profiling might provide a useful explanatory level, between neural dysfunction and clinical manifestations, for characterizing neuropsychiatric disorders and personalizing treatments.

Neural mechanisms underlying contextual dependency of subjective values: converging evidence from monkeys and humans.

A major challenge for decision theory is to account for the instability of expressed preferences across time and context. Such variability could arise from specific properties of the brain system used to assign subjective values. Growing evidence has identified the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC) as a key node of the human brain valuation system. Here, we first replicate this observation with an fMRI study in humans showing that subjective values of painting pictures, as expressed in explicit pleasantness ratings, are specifically encoded in the VMPFC. We then establish a bridge with monkey electrophysiology, by comparing single-unit activity evoked by visual cues between the VMPFC and the orbitofrontal cortex. At the neural population level, expected reward magnitude was only encoded in the VMPFC, which also reflected subjective cue values, as expressed in Pavlovian appetitive responses. In addition, we demonstrate in both species that the additive effect of prestimulus activity on evoked activity has a significant impact on subjective values. In monkeys, the factor dominating prestimulus VMPFC activity was trial number, which likely indexed variations in internal dispositions related to fatigue or satiety. In humans, prestimulus VMPFC activity was externally manipulated through changes in the musical context, which induced a systematic bias in subjective values. Thus, the apparent stochasticity of preferences might relate to the VMPFC automatically aggregating the values of contextual features, which would bias subsequent valuation because of temporal autocorrelation in neural activity.

A critical role for the hippocampus in the valuation of imagined outcomes.

Many choice situations require imagining potential outcomes, a capacity that was shown to involve memory brain regions such as the hippocampus. We reasoned that the quality of hippocampus-mediated simulation might therefore condition the subjective value assigned to imagined outcomes. We developed a novel paradigm to assess the impact of hippocampus structure and function on the propensity to favor imagined outcomes in the context of intertemporal choices. The ecological condition opposed immediate options presented as pictures (hence directly observable) to delayed options presented as texts (hence requiring mental stimulation). To avoid confounding simulation process with delay discounting, we compared this ecological condition to control conditions using the same temporal labels while keeping constant the presentation mode. Behavioral data showed that participants who imagined future options with greater details rated them as more likeable. Functional MRI data confirmed that hippocampus activity could account for subjects assigning higher values to simulated options. Structural MRI data suggested that grey matter density was a significant predictor of hippocampus activation, and therefore of the propensity to favor simulated options. Conversely, patients with hippocampus atrophy due to Alzheimer's disease, but not patients with Fronto-Temporal Dementia, were less inclined to favor options that required mental simulation. We conclude that hippocampus-mediated simulation plays a critical role in providing the motivation to pursue goals that are not present to our senses.

Neurocomputational account of how the human brain decides when to have a break.

No pain, no gain: cost-benefit trade-off has been formalized in classical decision theory to account for how we choose whether to engage effort. However, how the brain decides when to have breaks in the course of effort production remains poorly understood. We propose that decisions to cease and resume work are triggered by a cost evidence accumulation signal reaching upper and lower bounds, respectively. We developed a task in which participants are free to exert a physical effort knowing that their payoff would be proportional to their effort duration. Functional MRI and magnetoencephalography recordings conjointly revealed that the theoretical cost evidence accumulation signal was expressed in proprioceptive regions (bilateral posterior insula). Furthermore, the slopes and bounds of the accumulation process were adapted to the difficulty of the task and the money at stake. Cost evidence accumulation might therefore provide a dynamical mechanistic account of how the human brain maximizes benefits while preventing exhaustion.

Better get back to work: a role for motor beta desynchronization in incentive motivation.

Much research has been devoted to characterizing brain representations of reward and movement. However, the mechanisms allowing expected rewards to influence motor commands remain poorly understood. Unraveling such mechanisms is crucial to providing explanations of how behavior can be driven by goals, hence accounting for apathy cases in clinics. Here, we propose that the reduction of motor beta synchrony (MBS) before movement onset could participate in this incentive motivation process. To test this hypothesis, we recorded brain activity using magnetoencenphalography (MEG) while human participants were exerting physical effort to win monetary incentives. Knowing that the payoff was proportional to the time spent above a target force, subjects spontaneously took breaks when exhausted and resumed effort production when repleted. Behavioral data indicated that the rest periods were shorter when higher incentives were at stake. MEG data showed that the amplitude of MBS reduction correlated to both incentive level and rest duration. Moreover, the time of effort initiation could be predicted by MBS reduction measured at the beginning of rest periods. Incentive effects on MBS reduction and rest duration were also correlated across subjects. Finally, Bayesian comparison between possible causal models suggested that MBS reduction mediates the impact of incentive level on rest duration. We conclude that MBS reduction could represent a neural mechanism that speeds the initiation of effort production when the effort is more rewarded.

Learning to minimize efforts versus maximizing rewards: computational principles and neural correlates.

The mechanisms of reward maximization have been extensively studied at both the computational and neural levels. By contrast, little is known about how the brain learns to choose the options that minimize action cost. In principle, the brain could have evolved a general mechanism that applies the same learning rule to the different dimensions of choice options. To test this hypothesis, we scanned healthy human volunteers while they performed a probabilistic instrumental learning task that varied in both the physical effort and the monetary outcome associated with choice options. Behavioral data showed that the same computational rule, using prediction errors to update expectations, could account for both reward maximization and effort minimization. However, these learning-related variables were encoded in partially dissociable brain areas. In line with previous findings, the ventromedial prefrontal cortex was found to positively represent expected and actual rewards, regardless of effort. A separate network, encompassing the anterior insula, the dorsal anterior cingulate, and the posterior parietal cortex, correlated positively with expected and actual efforts. These findings suggest that the same computational rule is applied by distinct brain systems, depending on the choice dimension-cost or benefit-that has to be learned.

Neural mechanisms underlying motivation of mental versus physical effort.

Mental and physical efforts, such as paying attention and lifting weights, have been shown to involve different brain systems. These cognitive and motor systems, respectively, include cortical networks (prefronto-parietal and precentral regions) as well as subregions of the dorsal basal ganglia (caudate and putamen). Both systems appeared sensitive to incentive motivation: their activity increases when we work for higher rewards. Another brain system, including the ventral prefrontal cortex and the ventral basal ganglia, has been implicated in encoding expected rewards. How this motivational system drives the cognitive and motor systems remains poorly understood. More specifically, it is unclear whether cognitive and motor systems can be driven by a common motivational center or if they are driven by distinct, dedicated motivational modules. To address this issue, we used functional MRI to scan healthy participants while performing a task in which incentive motivation, cognitive, and motor demands were varied independently. We reasoned that a common motivational node should (1) represent the reward expected from effort exertion, (2) correlate with the performance attained, and (3) switch effective connectivity between cognitive and motor regions depending on task demand. The ventral striatum fulfilled all three criteria and therefore qualified as a common motivational node capable of driving both cognitive and motor regions of the dorsal striatum. Thus, we suggest that the interaction between a common motivational system and the different task-specific systems underpinning behavioral performance might occur within the basal ganglia.

How the brain decides when to work and when to rest: dissociation of implicit-reactive from explicit-predictive computational processes.

A pervasive case of cost-benefit problem is how to allocate effort over time, i.e. deciding when to work and when to rest. An economic decision perspective would suggest that duration of effort is determined beforehand, depending on expected costs and benefits. However, the literature on exercise performance emphasizes that decisions are made on the fly, depending on physiological variables. Here, we propose and validate a general model of effort allocation that integrates these two views. In this model, a single variable, termed cost evidence, accumulates during effort and dissipates during rest, triggering effort cessation and resumption when reaching bounds. We assumed that such a basic mechanism could explain implicit adaptation, whereas the latent parameters (slopes and bounds) could be amenable to explicit anticipation. A series of behavioral experiments manipulating effort duration and difficulty was conducted in a total of 121 healthy humans to dissociate implicit-reactive from explicit-predictive computations. Results show 1) that effort and rest durations are adapted on the fly to variations in cost-evidence level, 2) that the cost-evidence fluctuations driving the behavior do not match explicit ratings of exhaustion, and 3) that actual difficulty impacts effort duration whereas expected difficulty impacts rest duration. Taken together, our findings suggest that cost evidence is implicitly monitored online, with an accumulation rate proportional to actual task difficulty. In contrast, cost-evidence bounds and dissipation rate might be adjusted in anticipation, depending on explicit task difficulty.

Imaging social motivation: distinct brain mechanisms drive effort production during collaboration versus competition.

Collaborative and competitive interactions have been investigated extensively so as to understand how the brain makes choices in the context of strategic games, yet such interactions are known to influence a more basic dimension of behavior: the energy invested in the task. The cognitive mechanisms that motivate effort production in social situations remain poorly understood, and their neural counterparts have not been explored so far. A dominant idea is that the motivation provided by the social context is reducible to the personal utility of effort production, which decreases in collaboration and increases in competition. Using functional magnetic resonance imaging, we scanned human participants while they produced a physical effort in a collaborative or competitive context. We found that motivation was indeed primarily driven by personal utility, which was reflected in brain regions devoted to reward processing (the ventral basal ganglia). However, subjects who departed from utility maximization, working more in collaborative situations, showed greater functional activation and anatomical volume in a brain region implicated previously in social cognition (the temporoparietal junction). Therefore, this region might mediate a purely pro-social motivation to produce greater effort in the context of collaboration. More generally, our findings suggest that the individual propensity to invest energy in collaborative work might have an identifiable counterpart in the brain functional architecture.