Resolving content moderation dilemmas between free speech and harmful misinformation.

In online content moderation, two key values may come into conflict: protecting freedom of expression and preventing harm. Robust rules based in part on how citizens think about these moral dilemmas are necessary to deal with this conflict in a principled way, yet little is known about people's judgments and preferences around content moderation. We examined such moral dilemmas in a conjoint survey experiment where US respondents (N = 2, 564) indicated whether they would remove problematic social media posts on election denial, antivaccination, Holocaust denial, and climate change denial and whether they would take punitive action against the accounts. Respondents were shown key information about the user and their post as well as the consequences of the misinformation. The majority preferred quashing harmful misinformation over protecting free speech. Respondents were more reluctant to suspend accounts than to remove posts and more likely to do either if the harmful consequences of the misinformation were severe or if sharing it was a repeated offense. Features related to the account itself (the person behind the account, their partisanship, and number of followers) had little to no effect on respondents' decisions. Content moderation of harmful misinformation was a partisan issue: Across all four scenarios, Republicans were consistently less willing than Democrats or independents to remove posts or penalize the accounts that posted them. Our results can inform the design of transparent rules for content moderation of harmful misinformation.

Overconfidence in news judgments is associated with false news susceptibility.

We examine the role of overconfidence in news judgment using two large nationally representative survey samples. First, we show that three in four Americans overestimate their relative ability to distinguish between legitimate and false news headlines; respondents place themselves 22 percentiles higher than warranted on average. This overconfidence is, in turn, correlated with consequential differences in real-world beliefs and behavior. We show that overconfident individuals are more likely to visit untrustworthy websites in behavioral data; to fail to successfully distinguish between true and false claims about current events in survey questions; and to report greater willingness to like or share false content on social media, especially when it is politically congenial. In all, these results paint a worrying picture: The individuals who are least equipped to identify false news content are also the least aware of their own limitations and, therefore, more susceptible to believing it and spreading it further.

Vaccine attributes and vaccine uptake in Hungary: evidence from a conjoint experiment.

BACKGROUND: In an ongoing public health crisis, the question of why some people are unwilling to take vaccines with particular attributes is an especially pertinent one, since low rates of vaccination mean that it will take longer for many nations to exit the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic. METHODS: In this article, we conduct a pre-registered conjoint experiment in Hungary (N = 2512), where respondents were asked about their attitudes towards hypothetical COVID-19 vaccines whose characteristics varied across a number of attributes. RESULTS: Results indicate that vaccine attributes matter for the likelihood of uptake when it comes to the prevalence of severe side effects, efficacy and country of origin. Moreover, we find that our pre-treatment measure of institutional trust moderates the effect of our treatment, as differences in vaccine attributes are larger for those with robust levels of institutional trust compared to those with weaker levels. CONCLUSION: Our findings suggest that institutional trust matters when it comes to understanding the relationship between vaccine attributes and likelihood of uptake.

A digital media literacy intervention increases discernment between mainstream and false news in the United States and India.

Widespread belief in misinformation circulating online is a critical challenge for modern societies. While research to date has focused on psychological and political antecedents to this phenomenon, few studies have explored the role of digital media literacy shortfalls. Using data from preregistered survey experiments conducted around recent elections in the United States and India, we assess the effectiveness of an intervention modeled closely on the world's largest media literacy campaign, which provided "tips" on how to spot false news to people in 14 countries. Our results indicate that exposure to this intervention reduced the perceived accuracy of both mainstream and false news headlines, but effects on the latter were significantly larger. As a result, the intervention improved discernment between mainstream and false news headlines among both a nationally representative sample in the United States (by 26.5%) and a highly educated online sample in India (by 17.5%). This increase in discernment remained measurable several weeks later in the United States (but not in India). However, we find no effects among a representative sample of respondents in a largely rural area of northern India, where rates of social media use are far lower.

Validity testing of the conspiratorial thinking and anti-expert sentiment scales during the COVID-19 pandemic across 24 languages from a large-scale global dataset.

In this study, we tested the validity across two scales addressing conspiratorial thinking that may influence behaviours related to public health and the COVID-19 pandemic. Using the COVIDiSTRESSII Global Survey data from 12 261 participants, we validated the 4-item Conspiratorial Thinking Scale and 3-item Anti-Expert Sentiment Scale across 24 languages and dialects that were used by at least 100 participants per language. We employed confirmatory factor analysis, measurement invariance test and measurement alignment for internal consistency testing. To test convergent validity of the two scales, we assessed correlations with trust in seven agents related to government, science and public health. Although scalar invariance was not achieved when measurement invariance test was conducted initially, we found that both scales can be employed in further international studies with measurement alignment. Moreover, both conspiratorial thinking and anti-expert sentiments were significantly and negatively correlated with trust in all agents. Findings from this study provide supporting evidence for the validity of both scales across 24 languages for future large-scale international research.

The politics of vaccine hesitancy in Europe.

BACKGROUND: Vaccine hesitancy threatens public health. Some evidence suggests that vaccine hesitancy in Europe may be linked with the success of populist parties, but more systematic analysis is needed. METHODS: We examine the prevalence of individual-level vaccine hesitancy across the European Union (EU) and its association with political orientations. We also analyze whether success of populist parties is linked with vaccine hesitancy and uptake. We draw on individual-level Eurobarometer data from 2019, with a total of 27 524 respondents across the EU. We also rely on national and regional-level populist party vote shares. Finally, for a time-series analysis, we rely on aggregated populist party support as measured in the European Social Survey waves 1-9 (2002-18), and national immunization coverage rates from the WHO from 2002 to 2018. RESULTS: While vaccine hesitancy is confined to a minority of the population, this group is large enough to risk herd immunity. Political orientations on a left-right dimension are not strongly linked to vaccine hesitancy. Instead, vaccine hesitancy is associated with anti-elite world views and culturally closed rather than cosmopolitan positions. CONCLUSIONS: Vaccine hesitancy is not only present in all EU member states but also maps on broader dimensions of cultural conflict. Hesitancy is rooted in a broader worldview, rather than misperceptions about health risks. Pro-vaccine interventions need to consider the underlying worldview, rather than simply targeting misperceptions.

Not Just Asking Questions: Effects of Implicit and Explicit Conspiracy Information About Vaccines and Genetic Modification.

While conspiracy ideation has attracted overdue attention from social scientists in recent years, little work focuses on how different pro-conspiracy messages affect the take-up of conspiracy beliefs. In this study, we compare the effect of explicit and implicit conspiracy cues on the adoption of conspiracy beliefs. We also examine whether corrective information can undo conspiracy cues, and whether there are differences in the effectiveness of corrective information based on whether a respondent received an explicit or implicit conspiracy cue. We examine these questions using a real-world but low-salience conspiracy theory concerning Zika, GM mosquitoes, and vaccines. Using a preregistered experiment (N = 1018: https://osf.io/hj2pw/), we find that both explicit and implicit conspiracy cues increase conspiracy beliefs, but in both cases corrections are generally effective. We also find reception of an explicit conspiracy cue and its correction is conditional on feelings toward the media and pharmaceutical companies. Finally, we find that examining open-ended conspiracy belief items reveals similar patterns, but with a few key differences. These findings have implications for how news media cover controversial public health issues going forward.

When experts matter: Variations in consensus messaging for vaccine and genetically modified organism safety.

Does consensus messaging about contested science issues influence perceptions of consensus and/or personal beliefs? This question remains open, particularly for topics other than climate change and samples outside the United States. In a Spanish national sample (N = 5087), we use preregistered survey experiments to examine differential efficacy of variations in consensus messaging for vaccines and genetically modified organisms. We find that no variation of consensus messaging influences vaccine beliefs. For genetically modified organisms, about which misperceptions are particularly prevalent in our sample, we find that scientific consensus messaging increases perception of consensus and personal belief that genetically modified organisms are safe, and decreases support for a ban. Increasing degree of consensus did not have consistent effects. Although individual differences (e.g. a conspiratorial worldview) predict these genetically modified organism beliefs, they do not undercut consensus message effects. While we observe relatively modest effect sizes, consensus messaging may be able to improve the accuracy of beliefs about some contentious topics.

Toolbox of individual-level interventions against online misinformation.

The spread of misinformation through media and social networks threatens many aspects of society, including public health and the state of democracies. One approach to mitigating the effect of misinformation focuses on individual-level interventions, equipping policymakers and the public with essential tools to curb the spread and influence of falsehoods. Here we introduce a toolbox of individual-level interventions for reducing harm from online misinformation. Comprising an up-to-date account of interventions featured in 81 scientific papers from across the globe, the toolbox provides both a conceptual overview of nine main types of interventions, including their target, scope and examples, and a summary of the empirical evidence supporting the interventions, including the methods and experimental paradigms used to test them. The nine types of interventions covered are accuracy prompts, debunking and rebuttals, friction, inoculation, lateral reading and verification strategies, media-literacy tips, social norms, source-credibility labels, and warning and fact-checking labels.

The hazards of correcting myths about health care reform.

CONTEXT: Misperceptions are a major problem in debates about health care reform and other controversial health issues. METHODS: We conducted an experiment to determine if more aggressive media fact-checking could correct the false belief that the Affordable Care Act would create "death panels." Participants from an opt-in Internet panel were randomly assigned to either a control group in which they read an article on Sarah Palin's claims about "death panels" or an intervention group in which the article also contained corrective information refuting Palin. FINDINGS: The correction reduced belief in death panels and strong opposition to the reform bill among those who view Palin unfavorably and those who view her favorably but have low political knowledge. However, it backfired among politically knowledgeable Palin supporters, who were more likely to believe in death panels and to strongly oppose reform if they received the correction. CONCLUSIONS: These results underscore the difficulty of reducing misperceptions about health care reform among individuals with the motivation and sophistication to reject corrective information.

Subscriptions and external links help drive resentful users to alternative and extremist YouTube channels.

Do online platforms facilitate the consumption of potentially harmful content? Using paired behavioral and survey data provided by participants recruited from a representative sample in 2020 (n = 1181), we show that exposure to alternative and extremist channel videos on YouTube is heavily concentrated among a small group of people with high prior levels of gender and racial resentment. These viewers often subscribe to these channels (prompting recommendations to their videos) and follow external links to them. In contrast, nonsubscribers rarely see or follow recommendations to videos from these channels. Our findings suggest that YouTube's algorithms were not sending people down "rabbit holes" during our observation window in 2020, possibly due to changes that the company made to its recommender system in 2019. However, the platform continues to play a key role in facilitating exposure to content from alternative and extremist channels among dedicated audiences.

Partisanship and anti-elite worldviews as correlates of science and health beliefs in the multi-party system of Spain.

In a national sample of 5087 Spaniards, we examine the prevalence of 10 specific misperceptions over five separate science and health domains (climate change, 5G technology, genetically modified foods, vaccines, and homeopathy). We find that misperceptions about genetically modified foods and general health risks of 5G technology are particularly widespread. While we find that partisan affiliation is not strongly associated with any of the misperceptions aside from climate change, we find that two distinct dimensions of an anti-elite worldview-anti-expert and conspiratorial mindsets-are better overall predictors of having science and health misperceptions in the Spanish context. These findings help extend our understanding of polarization around science beyond the most common contexts (e.g. the United States) and support recent work suggesting anti-elite sentiments are among the most important predictors of factual misperceptions.

Correlates of support for international vaccine solidarity during the COVID-19 pandemic: Cross-sectional survey evidence from Germany.

During the COVID-19 pandemic, many residents of high-income countries (HICs) were eligible for COVID-19 vaccine boosters, while many residents of lower-income countries (LICs) had not yet received a first dose. HICs made some efforts to contribute to COVID-19 vaccination efforts in LICs, but these efforts were limited in scale. A new literature discusses the normative importance of an international redistribution of vaccines. Our analysis contributes an empirical perspective on the willingness of citizens in a HIC to contribute to such efforts (which we term international vaccine solidarity). We analyse the levels and predictors of international vaccine solidarity. We surveyed a representative sample of German adults (n = 2019) who participated in a two-wave YouGov online survey (w1: Sep 13-21, 2021 and w2: Oct 4-13, 2021). International vaccine solidarity is measured by asking respondents preferences for sharing vaccine supplies internationally versus using that supply as boosters for the domestic population. We examine a set of pre-registered hypotheses. Almost half of the respondents in our sample (48%) prioritize giving doses to citizens in less developed countries. A third of respondents (33%) prefer to use available doses as boosters domestically, and a fifth of respondents (19%) did not report a preference. In line with our hypotheses, respondents higher in cosmopolitanism and empathy, and those who support domestic redistribution exhibit more support for international dose-sharing. Older respondents (who might be more at risk) do not consistently show less support for vaccine solidarity. These results help us to get a better understanding of the way citizens' form preferences about a mechanism that redistributes medical supplies internationally during a global crisis.

Estimating the size of "anti-vax" and vaccine hesitant populations in the US, UK, and Canada: comparative latent class modeling of vaccine attitudes.

Vaccine hesitancy is a significant impediment to global efforts to vaccinate against the SARS-CoV-2 virus at levels that generate herd immunity. In this article, we show the utility of an inductive approach - latent class analysis (LCA) - that allows us to characterize the size and nature of different vaccine attitude groups; and to compare how these groups differ across countries as well as across demographic subgroups within countries. We perform this analysis using original survey data collected in the US, UK, and Canada. We also show that these classes are strongly associated with SARS-CoV-2 vaccination intent and perceptions of the efficacy and safety of the COVID-19 vaccines, suggesting that attitudes about vaccines to fight the novel coronavirus pandemic are well explained by latent vaccine attitudes that precede the pandemic. More specifically, we find four substantive classes of vaccine attitudes: strong supporters, supporters with concerns, vaccine hesitant, and "anti-vax" as well as a fifth measurement error class. The strong "anti-vax" sentiment class is small in all three countries, while the strong supporter class is the largest across all three countries. We observe different distributions of class assignments in different demographic groups - most notably education and political leaning (partisanship and ideology).

Which vaccine attributes foster vaccine uptake? A cross-country conjoint experiment.

Why do people prefer one particular COVID-19 vaccine over another? We conducted a pre-registered conjoint experiment (n = 5,432) in France, Germany, and Sweden in which respondents rated the favorability of and chose between pairs of hypothetical COVID-19 vaccines. Differences in effectiveness and the prevalence of side-effects had the largest effects on vaccine preferences. Factors with smaller effects include country of origin (respondents are less favorable to vaccines of Chinese and Russian origin), and vaccine technology (respondents exhibited a small preference for hypothetical mRNA vaccines). The general public also exhibits sensitivity to additional factors (e.g. how expensive the vaccines are). Our data show that vaccine attributes are more important for vaccine preferences among those with higher vaccine favorability and higher risk tolerance. In our conjoint design, vaccine attributes-including effectiveness and side-effect prevalence-appear to have more muted effects among the most vaccine hesitant respondents. The prevalence of side-effects, effectiveness, country of origin and vaccine technology (e.g., mRNA vaccines) determine vaccine acceptance, but they matter little among the vaccine hesitant. Vaccine hesitant people do not find a vaccine more attractive even if it has the most favorable attributes. While the communication of vaccine attributes is important, it is unlikely to convince those who are most vaccine hesitant to get vaccinated.

The ephemeral effects of fact-checks on COVID-19 misperceptions in the United States, Great Britain and Canada.

Widespread misperceptions about COVID-19 and the novel coronavirus threaten to exacerbate the severity of the pandemic. We conducted preregistered survey experiments in the United States, Great Britain and Canada examining the effectiveness of fact-checks that seek to correct these false or unsupported beliefs. Across three countries with differing levels of political conflict over the pandemic response, we demonstrate that fact-checks reduce targeted misperceptions, especially among the groups who are most vulnerable to these claims, and have minimal spillover effects on the accuracy of related beliefs. However, these reductions in COVID-19 misperception beliefs do not persist over time in panel data even after repeated exposure. These results suggest that fact-checks can successfully change the COVID-19 beliefs of the people who would benefit from them most but that their effects are ephemeral.

Stamping the vaccine passport? Public support for lifting COVID-19 related restrictions for vaccinated citizens in France, Germany, and Sweden.

During theCOVID-19pandemic,manycountries implementedrestrictionsto limit the spread of the SARS-CoV-2 virus (e.g. travel restrictions and lockdowns).One path to loosening restrictions is to do so selectively only for vaccinated individuals (e.g. by implementing vaccine passports domestically or as a prerequisite for international travel).Setting different rules based on people's vaccination statusis howevera contentious issue among health policy experts, government officials, and the public. Our analysis focuses on the levels and correlates of public support for the lifting of restrictions for the vaccinatedin April 2021, i.e. at a time when restrictions were in place and aselective lifting of these restrictions just for the vaccinatedwas debated in Europe.We use representative quota samples of the populations of France (N = 1,752), Germany (N = 1,759), and Sweden (N = 1,754). We find that a slight plurality support lifting restrictions for the vaccinated in France and Germany but not in Sweden. Vaccine hesitancy emerges as strong predictor of opposition to such a policy. Additionally, individuals who are already vaccinated (in France and Germany) and who are higher in risk-seeking express more support for the lifting of restrictions for the vaccinated. We discuss implications for the debate on vaccine passports.

Minimal effects from injunctive norm and contentiousness treatments on COVID-19 vaccine intentions: evidence from 3 countries.

Does information about how other people feel about COVID-19 vaccination affect immunization intentions? We conducted preregistered survey experiments in Great Britain (5,456 respondents across 3 survey waves from September 2020 to February 2021), Canada (1,315 respondents in February 2021), and the state of New Hampshire in the United States (1,315 respondents in January 2021). The experiments examine the effects of providing accurate public opinion information to people about either public support for COVID-19 vaccination (an injunctive norm) or public beliefs that the issue is contentious. Across all 3 countries, exposure to this information had minimal effects on vaccination intentions even among people who previously held inaccurate beliefs about support for COVID-19 vaccination or its perceived contentiousness. These results suggest that providing information on public opinion about COVID vaccination has limited additional effect on people's behavioral intentions when public discussion of vaccine uptake and intentions is highly salient.

Association of vaccine hesitancy and immunization coverage rates in the European Union.

While previous studies have validated vaccine hesitancy scales with uptake behavior at the individual level, the conditions under which aggregated survey data are useful are less clear. We show that vaccine public opinion data aggregated at the subnational level can serve as a valid indicator of aggregate vaccine behaviour. We use a public opinion survey (Eurobarometer EB 91.2) with data on vaccine hesitancy for the EU in 2019. We link this information to (subnational) regional immunization coverage rates for childhood vaccines - DTP3, MCV1, and MCV2 -- obtained from the WHO for 2019. We conduct multilevel regression analyses with data for 177 regions in 20 countries. Given the variation in vaccine hesitancy and immunization rates between countries and within countries, we affirm the valuable role that surveys can play as a public health surveillance tool when it comes to vaccine behavior. We find statistically significantly lower regional vaccine immunization rates in regions where vaccine hesitancy is more pronounced. Our results suggest that different uptake rates across subnational regions are due, at least in part, to differences in attitudes towards vaccines and vaccination. The results are robust to several alternative specifications.

Some people just want to watch the world burn: the prevalence, psychology and politics of the 'Need for Chaos'.

People form political attitudes to serve psychological needs. Recent research shows that some individuals have a strong desire to incite chaos when they perceive themselves to be marginalized by society. These individuals tend to see chaos as a way to invert the power structure and gain social status in the process. Analysing data drawn from large-scale representative surveys conducted in Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States, we identify the prevalence of Need for Chaos across Anglo-Saxon societies. Using Latent Profile Analysis, we explore whether different subtypes underlie the uni-dimensional construct and find evidence that some people may be motivated to seek out chaos because they want to rebuild society, while others enjoy destruction for its own sake. We demonstrate that chaos-seekers are not a unified political group but a divergent set of malcontents. Multiple pathways can lead individuals to 'want to watch the world burn'. This article is part of the theme issue 'The political brain: neurocognitive and computational mechanisms'.