Multiculturalism and Colorblindness as Threats to the Self: A Framework for Understanding Dominant and Non-Dominant Group Members' Responses to Interethnic Ideologies.

Both multiculturalism (which involves recognizing and appreciating differences) and racial/ethnic colorblindness (which can involve emphasizing similarities or individual characteristics) are intended to promote intergroup harmony. Nevertheless, these ideologies can backfire when salient. Although this work has sometimes been interpreted to suggest that dominant group members may perceive salient multiculturalism, and non-dominant group members may perceive salient colorblindness, as threatening, it is unclear what about these interethnic ideologies poses a threat and why. The present article draws upon theories of the self-concept to introduce a framework of Multiculturalism and Colorblindness as Threats to the Self. Specifically, it is proposed that multiculturalism (colorblindness) is potentially threatening to dominant (non-dominant) group members' collective, relational, and personal selves. Dispositional and contextual variables that may moderate perceptions of threat among members of dominant and non-dominant groups, alternative interethnic ideologies to multiculturalism and colorblindness, and potential future research directions are discussed.

Jewish Americans' identity salience and effects on attitudes toward diversity.

Although Jewish people in the US are often racialized (i.e., perceived by others) as White, Jewish Americans vary in the extent to which they consider themselves White, and in how strongly they identify with being Jewish. Based on prior findings that identifying with a White ethnic subgroup (e.g., Irish, Italian) can reduce prejudice toward racial and ethnic minorities, we predicted that strongly identified Jewish Americans would exhibit less intergroup bias than weakly identified Jewish Americans. For the present research, we recruited participants whose religious affiliation was Jewish but who self-identified as racially White. In a preregistered correlational study, Jewish identification was associated with lower bias, whereas White identification was associated with greater bias, toward Whites relative to racial/ethnic minorities. The relationship between Jewish identification and intergroup bias was accounted for by high Jewish identifiers' perceptions that they could personally contribute to diversity in groups and organizations. Across three meta-analyzed experiments, participants whose religious minority (Jewish) identity was made salient exhibited less intergroup bias than did control participants, and in one preregistered experiment, perceived personal contributions to diversity mediated the effect of condition on intergroup bias. Implications for the forms of ethnic identity that predict more versus less intergroup bias in an increasingly multicultural society are discussed.

Science on the mind: Examining question ordering effects when asking about science on large-scale surveys.

Previous research has examined people's attitudes toward science and scientists, highlighting how religious identities, beliefs, or behavior shapes these attitudes. However, survey design choices have been previously shown to influence individuals' attitudes toward religion and science. We investigated the extent to which question ordering (i.e. presenting questions about science before questions about religion or the paranormal) in a large-scale survey would influence respondents' attitudes toward science and religion. Utilizing an experimental design, we found that responding to science questions first led to (1) more interest in science, (2) more confidence in the scientific community, (3) increased agreement that science is a way of knowing truth, (4) more confidence in responding to science knowledge items, (5) more agreement to scientific statements, and (6) more trust in scientists. We discuss the implications of question ordering when analyzing attitudes toward science and religion within the same surveys and future directions for research.

Do Demographic Increases in LGBT and Nonreligious Americans Increase Threat?

Building on previous research demonstrating that demographic growth of racial minorities increases realistic threat and prejudice among majority group members, we examined whether demographic increases of groups associated with symbolic threat (lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender [LGBT] and nonreligious groups) increased realistic threat, symbolic threat, and/or prejudice. In a single-paper meta-analysis across four studies, participants who read that LGBT groups were becoming more prevalent in the United States exhibited heightened perceptions of realistic threat and (especially) symbolic threat from these groups, which in turn predicted anti-LGBT prejudice. Two similar studies examining the growth of nonreligious groups demonstrated weaker effects. Implications for America's growing diversity and future directions for studying these effects are discussed.

Christianity-science compatibility beliefs increase nonreligious individuals' perceptions of Christians' intelligence and scientific ability.

Nonreligious individuals stereotype Christians as unscientific and see Christianity and science as conflicting. The present studies examined how perceptions of incompatibility between Christianity and science influence nonreligious individuals' stereotypes of Christians in science in the US context. We measured (Study 1) and manipulated (Study 2) participants' beliefs about the compatibility or incompatibility of Christianity and science. In Study 1 (N = 365), nonreligious participants (n = 214), more so than Christian participants (n = 151), perceived Christianity and science as incompatible, which in turn predicted perceptions of Christians as less intelligent and less scientifically able. In Study 2 (N = 799; 520 Christians, 279 nonreligious), manipulating perceived Christianity-science compatibility reduced negative perceptions of Christians' scientific ability and general intellect among nonreligious participants. Implications for mitigating negative stereotypes of Christians in science, increasing Christians' representation in scientific fields, and improving relations between Christians and nonreligious groups are discussed.

Distrusted disclosures: Deception drives anti-transgender but not anti-atheist prejudice.

Introduction: Transgender individuals face high levels of prejudice in interpersonal relationships. However, limited experimental research has examined the role of identity disclosure on anti-transgender prejudice. Methods: Drawing upon research on distrust and identity disclosure, two between-participants experiments (total n = 802) examined the role of intentional and unintentional identity disclosure on negative attitudes (Studies 1 & 2), perceived deception (Studies 1 & 2) and distrust (Study 2) toward two potentially concealable and historically distrusted identities (transgender and atheist). Specifically, the current studies examine the impact of a target's stigmatized identity (transgender or atheist) and method of disclosure (intentional or unintentional) on perceptions of the target, perceived deceptiveness, and distrust toward the target. Results: Our findings demonstrated that compared to atheists, transgender targets elicited greater levels of prejudice and were viewed as more deceptive, and that this effect was amplified if the target did not intentionally reveal their identity. Study 2 demonstrated that perceived deception mediated the relationship between reveal type (i.e., intentional vs. unintentional) and prejudice toward participants who read about a transgender (but not atheist) target. Discussion: We discuss the implications of these findings for reducing prejudice toward binary transgender individuals, particularly those who do not voluntarily disclose their identity.

Examining Christians' Reactions to Reminders of Religion-Science Conflict: Stereotype Threat versus Disengagement.

Stereotypes of religion (particularly Christianity) as incompatible with science are widespread, and prior findings show that Christians perform worse than non-Christians on scientific reasoning tasks following reminders of such stereotypes. The present studies (N = 1,456) examine whether these reminders elicit stereotype threat (i.e., fear of confirming negative societal stereotypes about one's group), disengagement (i.e., distancing oneself from a domain perceived as incongruent with the values of one's group), or both. In Studies 1 and 2, Christians demonstrated lower task performance and greater subjective feelings of stereotype threat (but did not spend less time on the task) relative to non-Christians when beliefs about Christianity-science incompatibility were chronic or made salient. Furthermore, the effects of incompatibility stereotypes on performance were most pronounced among Christians who identified strongly with science and hence worried most about confirming negative stereotypes (Studies 3-4). Implications for Christians' responses to religion-science conflict narratives and participation in science are discussed.

Secularism in science: The role of religious affiliation in assessments of scientists' trustworthiness.

With controversies surrounding numerous science topics, including vaccinations and climate change, science skepticism in the United States is of growing concern. Some skepticism of science may stem from the perceived association between science and atheism, as well as stereotypes of religious individuals as prosocial. Three studies examine how scientists' religious affiliation (or lack thereof) influences perceptions of their warmth and trustworthiness among Christian participants. (Study 1 also includes atheist participants for comparison purposes.) Whereas atheist participants evaluate atheist scientists as more trustworthy than scientists from various religious groups (e.g. Christian, Jewish, and Muslim), Christian participants consistently evaluate atheist scientists as less trustworthy and less warm than religious scientists, and not exclusively Christian scientists. These effects are explained, in part, by Christian participants' perceptions that atheist scientists are less motivated by prosociality compared to religiously affiliated scientists and, as Study 3 demonstrates, have a negative association with trust in scientists in general.

Shaping Responses to Torture: What You Call It Matters.

Although torture is largely ineffective for gaining information from terrorism suspects, nearly half of Americans support its use. Building upon previous work examining predictors of responses to such tactics and willingness to label them as "torture," this research tested whether the "torture" label itself can influence attitudes. Across five experiments using two different populations, both politically liberal and conservative participants showed more negative attitudes toward "torture" than "enhanced interrogation," even given identical descriptions of the tactics. This greater negativity in response to "torture" extended to actual behavior (signing a petition) and was driven by cognitive appraisals of severity as well as feelings of personal distress and other-directed empathic concern. Furthermore, there was a small but significant effect for such effects to be stronger among conservatives than liberals. These findings have implications for the underpinnings of attitudes toward torture, potential ways to shift such attitudes, and the psychological consequences of labels.

Science-religion compatibility beliefs across Middle Eastern and American young adult samples: The role of cross-cultural exposure.

Research shows that people in predominantly Christian cultures tend to perceive a basic tension between science and religion, which is not reflected in predominantly Muslim cultures. In this cross-cultural study comparing Christian university students in the United States and Muslim university students in the United Arab Emirates, we examined time spent in Western countries (for UAE students) or overseas (for American students) as predictors of perceived religion-science compatibility. Drawing upon the notion that science is viewed as more secular in Christianity than in Islam, we hypothesized and found that among UAE students, number of weeks per year spent in the West correlated negatively with religion-science compatibility beliefs. This relationship held even when controlling for science knowledge, suggesting that it results not from epistemological opposition to science but from an increasing exposure to the idea that science should be seen as a secular institution. Among American students, number of weeks per year spent overseas and religion-science compatibility beliefs were not associated. Implications for perceptions of science among different religious groups and in different cultural contexts are discussed.

Is science for atheists? Perceived threat to religious cultural authority explains U.S. Christians' distrust in secularized science.

A history of perceived conflict between religion and science persists in the U.S. "culture wars" that juxtapose religious and secular worldviews. As modern societies grow increasingly secular, religion is often deemed an impediment to science-based policy-making, whereas science is increasingly associated with atheism. In the present research, we addressed how perceived science-atheism associations affect U.S. Christians' attitudes toward science. In study 1, participants' own estimates of atheists' prevalence in science uniquely predicted distrust in science, and study 2 revealed a causal effect of perceived prevalence of atheists on distrust in science. Studies 3-4 (the latter preregistered) manipulated the concept of science-atheism associations more generally, revealing the same effects. These effects were mediated by the belief that scientists are anti-religion, not by moral distrust toward atheists or fundamentalist religious beliefs. Hence, Christians' institutional distrust in secularized science may derive largely from a perceived threat to the cultural status of religion.

The Relationship Between Future Time Perspective and Self-Esteem: A Cross-Cultural Study of Chinese and American College Students.

The present study explored cross-cultural differences in future time perspective (FTP) and self-esteem and investigated whether the relationship between FTP and self-esteem differs between China and America. The FTP Scale and Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale were administered to 460 Chinese and 340 American undergraduates. Results showed that American undergraduates scored higher on the future-negative, future-positive, future-confusion, future-perseverant, and future-perspicuity subscales than did Chinese undergraduates; American undergraduates also had higher self-esteem than did Chinese undergraduates. The dimensions of FTP (future-negative, future-positive, future-confusion, and future-perseverant) significantly predicted self-esteem in both the Chinese and American samples. These results broaden our understanding of cross-cultural differences in FTP and self-esteem. Implications and future directions are discussed.

Self-Uncertainty and the Influence of Alternative Goals on Self-Regulation.

The current research examines factors that facilitate or undermine goal pursuit. Past research indicates that attempts to reduce self-uncertainty can result in increased goal motivation. We explore a critical boundary condition of this effect-the presence of alternative goals. Though self-regulatory processes usually keep interest in alternative goals in check, uncertainty reduction may undermine these self-regulatory efforts by (a) reducing conflict monitoring and (b) increasing valuation of alternative goals. As such, reminders of alternative goals will draw effort away from focal goals for self-uncertain (but not self-certain) participants. Across four studies and eight supplemental studies, using different focal goals (e.g., academic achievement, healthy eating) and alternative goals (e.g., social/emotional goals, attractiveness, indulgence), we found that alternative goal salience does not negatively influence goal-directed behavior among participants primed with self-certainty, but that reminders of alternative goals undermine goal pursuit among participants primed with self-uncertainty.

Wanting to Be Different Predicts Nonmotivated Change: Actual-Desired Self-Discrepancies and Susceptibility to Subtle Change Inductions.

Actual-desired discrepancies in people's self-concepts represent structural incongruities in their self-representations that can lead people to experience subjective conflict. Theory and research suggest that structural incongruities predict susceptibility to subtle influences like priming and conditioning. Although typically examined for their motivational properties, we hypothesized that because self-discrepancies represent structural incongruities in people's self-concepts, they should also predict susceptibility to subtle influences on people's active self-views. Across three studies, we found that subtle change inductions (self-evaluative conditioning and priming) exerted greater impact on active self-perceptions and behavior as actual-desired self-discrepancies increased in magnitude. Exploratory analyses suggested that these changes occurred regardless of the compatibility of the change induction with individuals' desired self-views.

Feeling High but Playing Low: Power, Need to Belong, and Submissive Behavior.

Past research has demonstrated a causal relationship between power and dominant behavior, motivated in part by the desire to maintain the social distinctiveness created by one's position of power. In this article, we test the novel idea that some individuals respond to high-power roles by displaying not dominance but instead submissiveness. We theorize that high-power individuals who are also high in the need to belong experience the social distinctiveness associated with power as threatening, rather than as an arrangement to protect and maintain. We predict that such individuals will counter their feelings of threat with submissive behaviors to downplay their power and thereby reduce their distinctiveness. We found support for this hypothesis across three studies using different operationalizations of power, need to belong, and submissiveness. Furthermore, Study 3 illustrated the mediating role of fear of (positive) attention in the relationship between power, need to belong, and submissive behavior.

Experimental Evidence for Minorities' Hesitancy in Reporting Their Opinions: The Roles of Optimal Distinctiveness Needs and Normative Influence.

Four experiments provided evidence for when and why opinion minorities take more time than opinion majorities to report their opinions. In Study 1, participants who wrote about feeling overly different from-but not overly similar to-others were slower to report their opinions after being led to believe that they held a minority than majority opinion. In Studies 2 and 3, minority opinion holders' hesitancy was attenuated among participants with a high dispositional need for uniqueness, and this effect was mediated by low need for uniqueness individuals' beliefs that their minority opinions were less normative than their majority opinions (Study 3). In Study 4, a subtle need to belong manipulation amplified the differences in response times between opinion minorities and majorities. Together, these studies show that minorities' hesitancy in reporting their opinions depends on their motives to belong versus be unique and stems from normative influence processes.

Attitude Certainty and Conflict Style: Divergent Effects of Correctness and Clarity.

Little research has examined the properties of people's attitudes that predict how they will respond to conflict with others whose opinions differ. We propose that one aspect of attitude certainty-attitude correctness, or the perception that one's attitude is the "right" attitude to have-will predict more competitive conflict styles. This hypothesis was tested across five data sets comprising four studies. In Studies 1a and 1b, perceptions of attitude correctness (but not another form of attitude certainty, attitude clarity) predicted participants' tendencies to send competitive messages to an ostensible partner who held the opposite opinion. In Studies 2 to 4, manipulations of attitude correctness, but not attitude clarity (Study 3), also increased competitiveness in conflict, and perceived correctness mediated the effect of the correctness manipulation on conflict style (Study 4). The present research has implications for both the predictors of conflict style and the consequences of different forms of attitude certainty.

A (Creative) Portrait of the Uncertain Individual: Self-Uncertainty and Individualism Enhance Creative Generation.

Building on findings that self-uncertainty motivates attempts to restore certainty about the self, particularly in ways that highlight one's distinctiveness from others, we show that self-uncertainty, relative to uncertainty in general, increases creative generation among individualists. In Studies 1 to 3, high (but not low) individualists performed better on a creative generation task after being primed with self-uncertainty as opposed to general uncertainty. In Study 4, this effect emerged only among those who were told that the task measured creative as opposed to analytical thinking, suggesting that the positive effects of self-uncertainty on performance are specific to tasks that bolster perceptions of uniqueness. In Study 5, self-uncertain individualists experienced a restoration of self-clarity after being induced to think about themselves as more (vs. less) creative. Implications for compensatory responses to self-uncertainty and factors that influence creativity are discussed.

Pals in power armor: attribution of human-like emotions to video game characters in an ingroup/outgroup situation.

Previous research has demonstrated the tendency for humans to anthropomorphize computers-that is, to react to computers as social actors, despite knowing that the computers are mere machines. In the present research, we examined the attribution of both primary (non-uniquely human) and secondary (human-like) emotions to ingroup (teammate) and outgroup (opponent) computer-controlled characters in a video game. We found that participants perceived the teammate character as experiencing more secondary emotions than the opponent character, but that they perceived the teammate and opponent character as experiencing equal levels of primary emotions. Thus, participants anthropomorphized the ingroup character to a greater extent than the outgroup character. These results imply that computers' "emotions" are treated with a similar ingroup/outgroup social regard as the emotions of actual humans.