RESUMEN
BACKGROUND: West African governments, the WHO and wider international community were caught unprepared for the world's largest Ebola outbreak of 2014-16. This was an unprecedented challenge to local services and international agencies, since the emergency required high-tech molecular diagnostic services operated by specialist staff and a coordinated emergency response in addition to humanitarian support, which was not available at the beginning of the outbreak. Public Health England (PHE), as a new national public health agency was well placed to provide support for these needs. After the outbreak, PHE supported reconstruction to ensure diagnostic and emergency planning capability remained in place in the immediate aftermath of the outbreak and build necessary public health infrastructure for the future. The article describes the role PHE played as a national public health agency supporting reconstruction and long-term development through the UK Government (Department for International Development) programme called 'Resilient Zero'. SOURCES OF DATA: Public Health England (PHE), UK Government's Department for International Development, WHO, US Centers for Communicable Diseases (CDC), China Centre for Communicable Diseases (China CDC). AREAS OF AGREEMENT: The need for reliable, sustainable, in country molecular diagnostics, together with a programme to strengthen in country Emergency Planning, Preparedness and Response (EPRR). AREAS OF CONTROVERSY: Providing high tech molecular capability in a resource-poor West African country with variable provision of basic diagnostic equipment, intermittent power supply, ineffective supply chains and maintaining training capacity for emergency planning in the long term. Emergency planning models from the West needed to be adapted for the countries' context. Short term aid projects as a model did not suite this development requirement. GROWING POINTS: PHE had strong local and international political support to reconstruct three Government regional laboratories and deploy molecular technology. Significant learning by PHE as a national public health agency and sharing this will be of benefit to other national public health agencies. UK staff reported increased levels of satisfaction and experience relevant to public health practice. The Sierra Leonean Government and officials requested long-term levels of commitment. It is important for agencies such as PHE to constantly learn, develop long-term institutional partnerships and play a bigger role with other similar agencies internationally. AREAS TIMELY FOR DEVELOPING RESEARCH: How best to support sustainable high-tech molecular technology in West Africa and modules for emergency planning relevant to the context; evidence for long term versus short-term support for highly complex diagnostic capabilities; relevance to maintaining individual country public health infrastructure to ensuring global health security; benefits of overseas work for employee of a national agency.
Asunto(s)
Fiebre Hemorrágica Ebola/epidemiología , Administración en Salud Pública , África Occidental/epidemiología , Planificación en Desastres/organización & administración , Brotes de Enfermedades , Urgencias Médicas , Fiebre Hemorrágica Ebola/diagnóstico , Humanos , Laboratorios/organización & administración , Técnicas de Diagnóstico Molecular/métodosRESUMEN
BACKGROUND: In November 2019, an outbreak of Lassa Fever occurred among health workers in a non-endemic district in Sierra Leone. The outbreak resulted in five cases, including two that were exported to the Netherlands. The outbreak tested multiple technical capacities in the International Health Regulations (2005) in a real-life setting. As such, an after action review (AAR) was undertaken as recommended by World Health Organization. We report on the findings of the AAR including best practices and lessons learnt. METHODS: A two stage review process was employed. The first stage involved national pillar level reviews for each technical pillar and one review of the district level response. The second stage brought together all pillars, including participants from the national and sub-national level as well as health sector partners. National guidelines were used as references during the deliberations. A standardized template was used to report on the key findings on what happened, what was supposed to happen, what went well and lessons learnt. RESULTS: This was a hospital associated outbreak that likely occurred due to a breach in infection prevention and control (IPC) practices resulting in three health workers being infected during a surgical operation. There was a delay in detecting the outbreak on time due to low index of suspicion among clinicians. Once detected, the outbreak response contained the outbreak within one incubation period. Areas that worked well included coordination, contact tracing, active case search and ring IPC. Notable gaps included delays in accessing local emergency funding and late distribution of IPC and laboratory supplies. CONCLUSIONS: The incident management system worked optimally to contain this outbreak. The core technical gaps identified in surveillance, IPC and delay in deployment of resources should be addressed through systemic changes that can mitigate future outbreaks.