On the relation between mind wandering, PTSD symptomology, and self-control.

Here we examined the association between mind wandering, post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) symptomology, and self-control. In a large undergraduate sample (N = 5,387), we assessed trait-levels of spontaneous and deliberate mind wandering, self-control, and PTSD symptomology. Results indicated that, while PTSD symptomology was uniquely positively associated with spontaneous mind wandering, it was negatively associated with deliberate mind wandering and self-control. These findings suggest that the mechanism(s) underlying everyday mind wandering may also underlie PTSD symptomology and traumatic intrusions. Moreover, the unique negative association between PTSD symptomatology and self-control suggests that PTSD is characterized not only by impairments in inhibiting unwanted thoughts (as indexed by mind wandering), but also by impairments in inhibiting other unwanted behaviors.

Re-examining the effect of motivation on intentional and unintentional task-unrelated thought: accounting for thought constraint produces novel results.

It has been proposed that motivating participants to perform well on a cognitive task ought to lead to decreases in rates of intentional, but not unintentional, task-unrelated thought (TUT; a commonly studied variety of mind wandering). However, at odds with this prediction, research has found that increasing motivation results in decreases in both intentional and unintentional TUTs. One possible explanation for this surprising finding is that standard assessments of TUT may inadvertently conflate TUTs with another variety of mind wandering: unconstrained thought. If so, then deconfounding task-unrelated and unconstrained varieties of mind wandering might produce the predicted effect of a decrease in intentional, but not unintentional, TUT when motivation is increased. To explore this possibility, in the present study, participants completed a sustained-attention task after receiving standard instructions (normal-motivation condition) or instructions informing them that they could leave the study early if they achieved a certain level of performance (motivated condition). Throughout the task, we assessed rates of TUT (both intentional and unintentional) and unconstrained thoughts. Consistent with prior work, the results indicated that motivated participants reported being on-task significantly more frequently than non-motivated participants. However, unlike previous work, we found that when deconfounding TUTs and unconstrained thoughts, participants in the motivation condition reported significantly fewer bouts of intentional TUT than those in the non-motivation condition, but no differences in rates of unintentional TUT were observed between groups. These results suggest that (a) motivation specifically targets intentional TUT and (b) standard assessments of TUT conflate task-relatedness and thought constraint.

The relation between task-unrelated media multitasking and task-related motivation.

In two experiments, we explored the relation between participants' (a) levels of motivation to complete a task and (b) task-unrelated media multitasking. In Experiment 1, we examined the extent to which participants' levels of motivation to complete a task influenced their tendency to engage in task-unrelated media multitasking. Participants completed a 1-back task, while having the opportunity to turn on and off an unrelated, optional video. Results showed that participants who were told they would finish the experiment early if they achieved a sufficient level of performance (the motivated group) were significantly less likely to play the optional video during the 1-back task than those who were not given the opportunity to finish early (control condition). In Experiment 2, we examined the extent to which engaging in task-unrelated media multitasking affected task-related motivation. Three groups of participants completed a 1-back task, while (a) no video was presented, (b) a video was continuously played, or (c) participants could turn on and off a video at their leisure (as in Experiment 1). At both the beginning and the end of Experiment 2, participants were asked to indicate their level of motivation to complete the task. Interestingly, results revealed that continuously having the video playing helped sustain task-related motivation. Thus, although greater motivation to perform a task reduces the likelihood of engaging in task-unrelated media multitasking, such media multitasking also appears to increase levels of motivation.

Dissociating the freely-moving thought dimension of mind-wandering from the intentionality and task-unrelated thought dimensions.

The recently forwarded family-resemblances framework of mind-wandering argues that mind-wandering is a multidimensional construct consisting of a variety of exemplars. On this view, membership in the mind-wandering family is graded along various dimensions that define more or less prototypical instances of mind-wandering. In recent work, three dimensions that have played a prominent role in defining prototypicality within the mind-wandering family include: (a) task-relatedness (i.e., how related the content of a thought is to an ongoing task), (b) intentionality (i.e., whether thought is deliberately or spontaneously engaged), and (c) thought constraint (i.e., how much attention constrains thought dynamics). One concern, however, is that these dimensions may be redundant with each other. The utility of distinguishing among these different dimensions of mind-wandering rests upon a demonstration that they are dissociable. To shed light on this issue, we indexed the task-relatedness, intentionality, and constraint dimensions of thought during the completion of a laboratory task to evaluate how these dimensions relate to each other. We found that 56% of unconstrained thoughts were "on-task" and that 23% of constrained thoughts were "off-task." Moreover, we found that rates of off-task thought, but not "freely-moving" (i.e., unconstrained) thought, varied as a function of expected changes in task demands, confirming that task-relatedness and thought constraint are separable dimensions. Participants also reported 21% of intentional off-task thoughts that were freely moving and 9% of unintentional off-task thoughts that were constrained. Finally, off-task thoughts were more likely to be freely-moving than unintentional. Taken together, the results suggest that these three dimensions of mind-wandering are not redundant with one another.

Boredom in the COVID-19 pandemic: Trait boredom proneness, the desire to act, and rule-breaking.

The state of boredom presents a conundrum: When bored, we want to engage with an activity, but we don't want to engage with whatever is currently available. This conflict is exacerbated when external factors impose restrictions on the range of behaviors we can engage in, which is precisely the scenario we are currently facing, at a global level, during this period of social isolation in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. We collected data from 924 North American participants (530 Male, Mean age = 37.7 years) using the internet-based Mturk platform to examine the relation between self-reports of boredom proneness (using the Short Boredom-Proneness Scale) and individual responses to questions about compliance with social-distancing requirements during the COVID-19 pandemic. Our sample replicated recent findings in boredom research, including a negative correlation between boredom proneness and self-control. We also provide novel evidence that highly boredom prone people have been more likely to break the rules of social isolation in a variety of ways (e.g., fewer hours spent in social isolation, poor adherence to social distancing as evidenced by increased likelihood of holding a social gathering and coming into proximity with more people than recommended). We further demonstrated that boredom proneness substantially mediates the association between self-control and rule-breaking. These results indicate that boredom proneness is a critical factor to consider when encouraging adherence to social isolation.

Volitional media multitasking: awareness of performance costs and modulation of media multitasking as a function of task demand.

In two experiments, we sought to determine whether (a) people are aware of the frequently observed performance costs associated with engaging in media multitasking (Experiment 1), and (b) if so, whether they modulate the extent to which they engage in multitasking as a function of task demand (Experiment 2). In Experiment 1, participants completed a high-demand task (2-back) both independently and while a video was simultaneously presented. To determine whether people were sensitive to the impact that the concurrent video had on primary-task performance, subjective estimates of performance were collected following both trial types (No-Video vs. Video trials), as were explicit beliefs about the influence of the video on performance. In Experiment 2, we modified our paradigm by allowing participants to turn the video on and off at their discretion, and had them complete either a high-demand task (2-back) or a low-demand task (0-back). Findings from Experiment 1 indicated that people are sensitive to the magnitude of the decrement that media multitasking has on primary-task performance. In addition, findings from Experiment 2 indicated that people modulate the extent to which they engage in media multitasking in accordance with the demands of their primary task. In particular, participants completing the high-demand task were more likely to turn off the optional video stream compared to those completing the low-demand task. The results suggest that people media multitask in a strategic manner by balancing considerations of task performance with other potential concerns.

Intellectual humility and perceptions of political opponents.

OBJECTIVE: Intellectual humility (IH) refers to the recognition that personal beliefs might be wrong. We investigate possible interpersonal implications of IH for how people perceive the intellectual capabilities and moral character of their sociopolitical opponents and for their willingness to associate with those opponents. METHOD: In four initial studies (N = 1,926, Mage  = 38, 880 females, 1,035 males), we measured IH, intellectual and moral derogation of opponents, and willingness to befriend opponents. In two additional studies (N = 568, Mage  = 40, 252 females, 314 males), we presented participants with a specific opponent on certain sociopolitical issues and several social media posts from that opponent in which he expressed his views on the issue. We then measured IH, intellectual, and moral derogation of the opponent, participants' willingness to befriend the opponent, participants' willingness to "friend" the opponent on social media, and participants' willingness to "follow" the opponent on social media. RESULTS: Low-IH relative to high-IH participants were more likely to derogate the intellectual capabilities and moral character of their opponents, less willing to befriend their opponents, and less willing to "friend" and "follow" an opponent on social media. CONCLUSIONS: IH may have important interpersonal implications for person perception, and for understanding social extremism and polarization.

Rich environments, dull experiences: how environment can exacerbate the effect of constraint on the experience of boredom.

We examined the hypothesis that boredom is likely to occur when opportunity costs are high; that is, when there is a high potential value of engaging in activities other than the researcher-assigned activity. To this end, participants were either placed in a room with many possible affordances (e.g. a laptop, puzzle, etc.; affordances condition; n = 121), or they were ushered into an empty room (control condition; n = 107). In both conditions participants were instructed to entertain themselves with only their thoughts (hence, participants in the affordances condition were to refrain from engaging with the available options). As predicted, participants in the affordances condition reported higher levels of boredom compared with those in the control condition. Results suggest that under some conditions, environments that afford alternative activities may be more boring than those that are void of such activities.

Increasing participant motivation reduces rates of intentional and unintentional mind wandering.

We explored the possibility that increasing participants' motivation to perform well on a focal task can reduce mind wandering. Participants completed a sustained-attention task either with standard instructions (normal motivation), or with instructions informing them that they could be excused from the experiment early if they achieved a certain level of performance (higher motivation). Throughout the task, we assessed rates of mind wandering (both intentional and unintentional types) via thought probes. Results showed that the motivation manipulation led to significant reductions in both intentional and unintentional mind wandering as well as improvements in task performance. Most critically, we found that our simple motivation manipulation led to a dramatic reduction in probe-caught mind-wandering rates (49%) compared to a control condition (67%), which suggests the utility of motivation-based methods to reduce people's propensity to mind-wander.

Thinking about the past and future in daily life: an experience sampling study of individual differences in mental time travel.

Remembering the past and imagining the future are hallmarks of mental time travel. We provide evidence that such experiences are influenced by individual differences in temporal and affective biases in cognitive style, particularly brooding rumination (a negative past-oriented bias) and optimism (a positive future-oriented bias). Participants completed a 7-day, cellphone-based experience-sampling study of temporal orientation and mental imagery. Multilevel models showed that individual differences in brooding rumination predicted less vivid and positive past- and future-oriented thoughts, even after controlling for depressed mood. People high in brooding rumination were also more likely to report thinking about a past experience when probed at random during the day. Conversely, optimists were more likely to report more vivid and positive future-oriented, but not past-oriented thoughts, although they did not report thinking more or less often about the past and future. The results suggest that temporal and affective biases in cognitive style influence how people think about the past and future in daily life.

On the Clock: Evidence for the Rapid and Strategic Modulation of Mind Wandering.

We examined the hypothesis that people can modulate their mind wandering on the basis of their expectations of upcoming challenges in a task. To this end, we developed a novel paradigm in which participants were presented with an analog clock, via a computer monitor, and asked to push a button every time the clock's hand was pointed at 12:00. Importantly, the time at which the clock's hand was pointed at 12:00 was completely predictable and occurred at 20-s intervals. During some of the 20-s intervals, we presented thought probes to index participants' rates of mind wandering. Results indicated that participants decreased their levels of mind wandering as they approached the predictable upcoming target. Critically, these results suggest that people can and do modulate their mind wandering in anticipation of changes in task demands.

The role of task difficulty in theoretical accounts of mind wandering.

Recent research has indicated that reducing the difficulty of a task by increasing the predictability of critical stimuli produces increases in intentional mind wandering, but, contrary to theoretical expectations, decreases in unintentional mind wandering. Here, we sought to determine whether reducing task difficulty by reducing working-memory load would yield similar results. Participants completed an easy (Choice Response Time; CRT) task and a relatively difficult (Working Memory; WM) task, and intermittently responded to thought probes asking about intentional and unintentional mind wandering. As in prior studies, we found higher rates of intentional mind wandering during the easy compared to the more difficult task. However, we also found more unintentional mind wandering during the difficult compared to the easy task. We discuss these results in the context of theoretical accounts of mind wandering.

How pervasive is mind wandering, really?

Recent claims that people spend 30-50% of their waking lives mind wandering (Killingsworth & Gilbert, 2010; Kane et al., 2007) have become widely accepted and frequently cited. While acknowledging attention to be inconstant and wavering, and mind wandering to be ubiquitous, we argue and present evidence that such simple quantitative estimates are misleading and potentially meaningless without serious qualification. Mind-wandering estimates requiring dichotomous judgments of inner experience rely on questionable assumptions about how such judgments are made, and the resulting data do not permit straightforward interpretation. We present evidence that estimates of daily-life mind wandering vary dramatically depending on the response options provided. Offering participants a range of options in estimating task engagement yielded variable mind-wandering estimates, from approximately 60% to 10%, depending on assumptions made about how observers make introspective judgments about their mind-wandering experiences and how they understand what it means to be on- or off-task.

Validating a visual version of the metronome response task.

The metronome response task (MRT)-a sustained-attention task that requires participants to produce a response in synchrony with an audible metronome-was recently developed to index response variability in the context of studies on mind wandering. In the present studies, we report on the development and validation of a visual version of the MRT (the visual metronome response task; vMRT), which uses the rhythmic presentation of visual, rather than auditory, stimuli. Participants completed the vMRT (Studies 1 and 2) and the original (auditory-based) MRT (Study 2) while also responding to intermittent thought probes asking them to report the depth of their mind wandering. The results showed that (1) individual differences in response variability during the vMRT are highly reliable; (2) prior to thought probes, response variability increases with increasing depth of mind wandering; (3) response variability is highly consistent between the vMRT and the original MRT; and (4) both response variability and depth of mind wandering increase with increasing time on task. Our results indicate that the original MRT findings are consistent across the visual and auditory modalities, and that the response variability measured in both tasks indexes a non-modality-specific tendency toward behavioral variability. The vMRT will be useful in the place of the MRT in experimental contexts in which researchers' designs require a visual-based primary task.

Individual variation in intentionality in the mind-wandering state is reflected in the integration of the default-mode, fronto-parietal, and limbic networks.

Mind-wandering has a controversial relationship with cognitive control. Existing psychological evidence supports the hypothesis that episodes of mind-wandering reflect a failure to constrain thinking to task-relevant material, as well the apparently alternative view that control can facilitate the expression of self-generated mental content. We assessed whether this apparent contradiction arises because of a failure to consider differences in the types of thoughts that occur during mind-wandering, and in particular, the associated level of intentionality. Using multi-modal magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) analysis, we examined the cortical organisation that underlies inter-individual differences in descriptions of the spontaneous or deliberate nature of mind-wandering. Cortical thickness, as well as functional connectivity analyses, implicated regions relevant to cognitive control and regions of the default-mode network for individuals who reported high rates of deliberate mind-wandering. In contrast, higher reports of spontaneous mind-wandering were associated with cortical thinning in parietal and posterior temporal regions in the left hemisphere (which are important in the control of cognition and attention) as well as heightened connectivity between the intraparietal sulcus and a region that spanned limbic and default-mode regions in the ventral inferior frontal gyrus. Finally, we observed a dissociation in the thickness of the retrosplenial cortex/lingual gyrus, with higher reports of spontaneous mind-wandering being associated with thickening in the left hemisphere, and higher repots of deliberate mind-wandering with thinning in the right hemisphere. These results suggest that the intentionality of the mind-wandering state depends on integration between the control and default-mode networks, with more deliberation being associated with greater integration between these systems. We conclude that one reason why mind-wandering has a controversial relationship with control is because it depends on whether the thoughts emerge in a deliberate or spontaneous fashion.

Mind-wandering and task stimuli: Stimulus-dependent thoughts influence performance on memory tasks and are more often past- versus future-oriented.

Although many studies have indicated that participants frequently mind-wander during experimental tasks, relatively little research has examined the extent to which such thoughts are triggered by task stimuli (stimulus-dependent thoughts; SDTs) versus internally triggered (stimulus-independent thoughts; SITs). In the current experiment, we assessed differences in the frequency and characteristics of SDTs and SITs, as well as their associations with subsequent memory in young adults. Whereas frequency of SDTs (but not SITs) increased in a task with more meaningful stimuli, frequency of SITs (but not SDTs) increased in an easier task. Furthermore, only SDTs were more likely to be past- versus future-oriented. Finally, frequency and vividness of SDTs during a shallow, but not a deep, incidental encoding task both correlated with later memory performance for word stimuli. These results suggest that SDTs differ from SITs in several important ways.

Mindfulness and mind wandering: The protective effects of brief meditation in anxious individuals.

Mind wandering can be costly, especially when we are engaged in attentionally demanding tasks. Preliminary studies suggest that mindfulness can be a promising antidote for mind wandering, albeit the evidence is mixed. To better understand the exact impact of mindfulness on mind wandering, we had a sample of highly anxious undergraduate students complete a sustained-attention task during which off-task thoughts including mind wandering were assessed. Participants were randomly assigned to a meditation or control condition, after which the sustained-attention task was repeated. In general, our results indicate that mindfulness training may only have protective effects on mind wandering for anxious individuals. Meditation prevented the increase of mind wandering over time and ameliorated performance disruption during off-task episodes. In addition, we found that the meditation intervention appeared to promote a switch of attentional focus from the internal to present-moment external world, suggesting important implications for treating worrying in anxious populations.

What did you have in mind? Examining the content of intentional and unintentional types of mind wandering.

It has recently been argued that researchers should distinguish between mind wandering (MW) that is engaged with and without intention. Supporting this argument, studies have found that intentional and unintentional MW have behavioral/neural differences, and that they are differentially associated with certain variables of theoretical interest. Although there have been considerable inroads made into the distinction between intentional/unintentional MW, possible differences in their content remain unexplored. To determine whether these two types of MW differ in content, we had participants complete a task during which they categorized their MW as intentional or unintentional, and then provided responses to questions about the content of their MW. Results indicated that intentional MW was more frequently rated as being future-oriented and less vague than unintentional MW. These findings shed light on the nature of intentional and unintentional MW and provide support for the argument that researchers should distinguish between intentional and unintentional types.

Intrusive thoughts: linking spontaneous mind wandering and OCD symptomatology.

One recent line of research in the literature on mind wandering has been concerned with examining rates of mind wandering in special populations, such as those characterized by attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder, dysphoria, and schizophrenia. To best conceptualize mind wandering in studies examining special populations, it has recently been suggested that researchers distinguish between deliberate and spontaneous subtypes of this experience. Extending this line of research on mind wandering in special populations, in a large non-clinical sample (N = 2636), we examined how rates of deliberate and spontaneous mind wandering vary with symptoms of obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD). Results indicate that, whereas deliberate mind wandering is not associated with OCD symptomatology, spontaneous mind wandering is, with higher reports of spontaneous mind wandering being associated with higher reports of OCD symptoms. We discuss the implications of these results for understanding both mind wandering and OCD.

On the Necessity of Distinguishing Between Unintentional and Intentional Mind Wandering.

In recent years, there has been an enormous increase in the number of studies examining mind wandering. Although participants' reports of mind wandering are often assumed to largely reflect spontaneous, unintentional thoughts, many researchers' conceptualizations of mind wandering have left open the possibility that at least some of these reports reflect deliberate, intentional thought. Critically, however, in most investigations on the topic, researchers have not separately assessed each type of mind wandering; instead, they have measured mind wandering as a unitary construct, thereby conflating intentional and unintentional types. We report the first compelling evidence that an experimental manipulation can have qualitatively different effects on intentional and unintentional types of mind wandering. This result provides clear evidence that researchers interested in understanding mind wandering need to consider the distinction between unintentional and intentional occurrences of this phenomenon.