The misplaced embryo: legal parenthood in 'embryo mix-up' cases.

Recently in Israel, a woman was mistakenly implanted with an embryo that is genetically related to another couple. Unfortunately, this case is not an isolated occurrence, as other cases of embryo mix-ups have been reported in several countries, including the USA, China, the UK and various other countries within the European Union. Cases of mixed-up embryos are ethically and legally complex: the woman who carried the pregnancy and the woman who is genetically related to the resulting child-both of whom endured emotionally and physically demanding infertility treatments-along with their partners, may be unwilling to relinquish parental rights over the child.This article explores four possible approaches, found in numerous common law jurisdictions, which can be used to address cases involving embryo mix-ups. Our analysis reveals several avenues through which legal parentage can be established. It can be done through gestation and the marital presumption, genetic connections, by adhering to the principle of the best interests of the child, or by recognising multiple individuals as legal parents. We review the advantages and disadvantages of each approach, but we have one clear recommendation: resolving embryo mix-up cases should be done proactively through the establishment of legislation and guidelines, rather than relying on post hoc individual court decisions. Such legislation and guidelines should guarantee the consistency of values throughout diverse reproductive contexts and mandate that fertility clinics and medical professionals provide individuals with comprehensive information regarding the potential risks associated with assisted reproductive treatments.

Rewriting the genetic bond: Gene editing and our understanding of genetic parenthood.

One of the most prominent justifications for the use of germline gene editing (GGE) is that it would allow parents to have a "genetically related child" while preventing the transmission of genetic disorders. However, we argue that since future uses of GGE may involve large-scale genetic modifications, they may affect the genetic relatedness between parents and offspring in a meaningful way: Due to certain genetic modifications, children may inherit much less than 50% of their DNA from each parent. We show that the reduction in genetic relatedness between parents and offspring has three important social and legal implications. First, the desire for a genetically related child may end up not being the strong justification it is currently thought to be for the use of GGE. Second, prospective parents may be reluctant to use GGE because of a potential loss of genetic relatedness. Third, in some jurisdictions, parents who would not pass on "enough" DNA to their child may not be recognized as the child's legal parents. We further argue that the reduction in genetic relatedness challenges current conceptions of genetic parenthood that rely on the quantity of DNA shared with the child or on whether the child was directly derived from the parent's genes. We suggest that genetic parenthood should instead be determined based on the nature of the genetic modifications and whether the child's numerical identity has been preserved after the editing process.

Malleable Morality: Re-Shaping Moral Judgments in Health Policymaking.

When confronted with moral dilemmas related to health, governments frequently turn to "moral experts," such as bioethicists and moral philosophers, for guidance and advice. They commonly assume that these experts' moral judgments are primarily a product of deliberate reasoning. The article challenges this assumption, arguing that experts' moral judgments may instead be primarily a product of moral intuitions which, often subconsciously, respond to the social setting.

Creating life after death: should posthumous reproduction be legally permissible without the deceased's prior consent?

Scientific advances enable to retrieve and use gametes of a deceased person, thereby creating a child after the death of a genetic parent. This article reviews and compares legislation governing posthumous reproduction in the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, and Israel. It shows that each country has its own distinctive features, yet three common elements exist-legal ambiguity, a requirement for prior consent, and permission for the partner, but not the parents, to retrieve and use the deceased's gametes. The article demonstrates that courts often do not follow the legal requirements, and thus there are no clear guiding principles regarding posthumous reproduction. The article then discusses three justifications for permitting posthumous reproduction in the absence of the deceased's prior consent. The first justification relates to an interest in 'genetic continuity', which reflects people's desire in leaving a 'piece' of themselves in the world and maintaining a chain of continuity. The second justification concerns the 'respect-for-wishes' model of autonomy, according to which people must be treated in a way that we assume they would want to be treated. The third justification touches upon the interests of the deceased's partner and parents, as well as of the resulting child.