The saving enhanced memory effect can be observed when only a subset of items are saved.

Saving one list of words, such as on a computer or by writing them down, can improve a person's ability to learn and remember a second list of words that are not saved. This phenomenon, known as the saving enhanced memory effect, is typically observed by comparing the recall of nonsaved items when other items are saved versus when they are not saved. In past research, the effect has been shown to occur when participants save an entire list before learning a new list. In the current research, we examined whether the effect can be observed when participants save a subset of items within a single list. The results of two experiments confirmed that partial saving can lead to a saving enhanced memory effect, with the effect observed regardless of whether participants saved items by clicking a button on the computer or writing them out by hand. The effect was observed on an item-specific cued-recall test (Experiment 1) as well as a free recall test that did not control the order of output (Experiment 2). However, the effect size did vary as a function of how participants attempted to recall the items on the final test. Specifically, participants who initiated their output by recalling nonsaved items exhibited a significantly larger saving enhanced memory effect than those who initiated their output by reproducing saved items. Together, these findings expand our understanding of the saving enhanced memory effect and shine new light on the impacts of cognitive offloading on human memory.

Examining the effect size and duration of retrieval-induced facilitation.

Under certain conditions, the retrieval of some information can increase the recall of other information, a phenomenon known as retrieval-induced facilitation. Chan (Journal of Memory and Language 61:153-170, 2009) proposed two moderating factors to account for why retrieval causes facilitation in some situations and forgetting in others: (1) integration at the time of encoding and (2) the delay between retrieval practice and final test. Chan found a 9-11% facilitation effect when the materials were well integrated and the final test occurred after a 24-h delay. Two sets of experiments sought to replicate and extend Chan's study by examining retrieval-induced facilitation not only following a 24-h delay but after longer delays (i.e., 1 or 2 weeks). A meta-analysis including these replications and the original experiments was also conducted. The results provide additional evidence of retrieval-induced facilitation, with no evidence that the effect varies as a function of the final delay. However, the size of the effect was found to be somewhat smaller than previously observed.

Acute exercise on memory: application of the retrieval-induced forgetting paradigm.

Accumulating research has shown that acute exercise can enhance memory function. Although counterintuitive, acute exercise may also facilitate aspects of forgetting. Specifically, retrieving a subset of items from memory can facilitate the retention of retrieved items (retrieval practice) and inhibit the subsequent retrieval of non-retrieved items from the same category (retrieval-induced forgetting; RIF). Given that acute exercise has been shown to enhance cognition-related inhibition, acute exercise may facilitate RIF, which was evaluated in three experiments. In Experiment 1, a sample of 180 young adults completed either a control (N = 60), moderate-intensity acute exercise (N = 57), or vigorous-intensity acute exercise session (N = 63). Both acute exercise sessions lasted 20 min and occurred prior to the study list. Participants then completed a standard RIF protocol, with the final test occurring via a recognition task. Acute exercise, regardless of intensity, had no effect on RIF. Experiment 2 (N = 225) was similar to Experiment 1 but used a cued recall final test, and also showed no effects of acute exercise on RIF. In Experiment 3 (N = 158), two cued recall tests were implemented, with acute exercise occurring between the two tests. Acute exercise, but not a control scenario, preserved the RIF effect across the cued recall assessments. These findings suggest that acute exercise prior to study may not influence RIF, but when positioned between two recall assessments, acute exercise may preserve the RIF effect over time.

Relearning can eliminate the effect of retrieval-induced forgetting.

The retrieval of a subset of items can cause the forgetting of other, non-retrieved items, a phenomenon known as retrieval-induced forgetting. Initial work suggested that giving people the opportunity to restudy non-retrieved items following retrieval practice is sufficient to eliminate the effect of retrieval-induced forgetting, but more recent work has suggested otherwise. If retrieval-induced forgetting is not eliminated by restudy, then such a finding would have important implications for understanding the theoretical nature of retrieval-induced forgetting. It would suggest, for example, that retrieval-induced forgetting reflects more than the temporary reduction in the accessibility of non-retrieved items in memory. The two experiments reported here sought to clarify this issue, with the results suggesting that retrieval-induced forgetting can be eliminated by restudy. Indeed, retrieval-induced forgetting was eliminated by restudy even when the forgetting effect was produced by three rounds of retrieval practice instead of one round of retrieval practice. These findings are consistent with the idea that retrieval-induced forgetting, at least under the conditions of the current experiments, reflects a temporary reduction in the accessibility of non-retrieved items in memory.

Pretesting can be beneficial even when using the internet to answer questions.

Research on the pretesting effect has shown that attempting to retrieve or generate information, even when unsuccessful, can potentiate the subsequent learning and remembering of that information. In the current research, we tested the hypothesis that when information can be accessed online, people may be less likely to retrieve or generate information on their own, thus making them less likely to benefit from the pretesting effect. The results of two experiments failed to provide support for this hypothesis. Participants remembered pretested information better than non-pretested information regardless of whether they were required to attempt to retrieve answers from memory or search for the answers using Google. The results suggest that the benefits of pretesting can be observed even when people rely on the internet to answer the questions they encounter.

Saved information is remembered less well than deleted information, if the saving process is perceived as reliable.

Prior research has shown that people are more likely to remember information that is deleted from a computer than information that is saved on a computer, presumably because saving serves as a form of cognitive offloading. Given recent concerns about the robustness and replicability of this "Google Effect," we conducted two experiments seeking to replicate and extend the phenomenon by identifying a potential boundary condition for when it is observed. In Experiment 1, we replicated the Google Effect, but only when participants experienced a practice phase demonstrating the reliability of the saving process. No evidence of a Google Effect was observed when participants experienced a practice phase demonstrating the saving process to be unreliable. In Experiment 2, we replicated the results of Experiment 1 in the reliable condition, while demonstrating the effect to be robust across 10 different topics of trivia statements. Taken together, these results suggest that the Google Effect is a replicable phenomenon, but that the perceived reliability of the saving process is critical for determining whether it is observed.

A little can go a long way: giving learners some context can enhance the benefits of pretesting.

Tests given to learners before they study new information can enhance the learning of that information. When responding to these pretests, learners typically generate answers that are incorrect but that are nevertheless helpful for improving the learning of the correct answers. The present research examined how providing learners with context prior to pretesting can enhance the benefits of pretesting. Across two experiments, participants were given a pretest for half of the to-be-learned information and then asked to read a passage about a fictional topic, an alien civilisation known as Yoffas (Experiment 1 and Experiment 2), or a unique fruit called the Anona (Experiment 2). Participants who read a short paragraph contextualising the to-be-learned information exhibited a significantly larger pretesting effect than participants who did not, with this interaction being observed regardless of whether memory was tested after a 5-min delay or 1-week delay, and regardless of whether contextualisation was manipulated between-subjects or within-subjects. These results suggest that what learners know prior to a pretest can have an impact on the extent to which learners benefit from that pretest.

That's a good idea, but let's keep thinking! Can we prevent our initial ideas from being forgotten as a consequence of thinking of new ideas?

Four experiments examined participants' ability to remember their own ideas in a modified Alternative Uses Task. Participants were asked to generate uses for objects, and on half of the trials participants were then asked to think of more uses. Memory for the initial uses they generated was then tested via a cued-recall task. Results demonstrated that participants forgot their initial uses as a consequence of thinking of new uses (referred to as the thinking-induced forgetting effect), and this effect persisted even when participants chose the subset of uses they thought were the most creative and to be remembered. The only scenario in which uses were protected from forgetting was when they were required to use their uses as hints for generating more ideas. Together, these findings demonstrate that one's own ideas are susceptible to forgetting when additional ideas must be generated, indicating that thinking is a modifier of memory despite one's motivation to preserve their ideas.

Using the Internet to access information inflates future use of the Internet to access other information.

The ways in which people learn, remember, and solve problems have all been impacted by the Internet. The present research explored how people become primed to use the Internet as a form of cognitive offloading. In three experiments, we show that using the Internet to retrieve information alters a person's propensity to use the Internet to retrieve other information. Specifically, participants who used Google to answer an initial set of difficult trivia questions were more likely to decide to use Google when answering a new set of relatively easy trivia questions than were participants who answered the initial questions from memory. These results suggest that relying on the Internet to access information makes one more likely to rely on the Internet to access other information.

Do learners predict a shift from recency to primacy with delay?

The shift from recency to primacy with delay reflects a fundamental observation in the study of memory. As time passes, the accessibility of earlier-learned representations tends to increase relative to the accessibility of later-learned representations. In three experiments involving participants' memory for text materials, we examined whether participants understood that there might be such a shift with retention interval. In marked contrast to their actual performance, participants predicted recency effects at both shorter and longer retention intervals. Our findings add to the evidence that the storage and retrieval dynamics of the human memory system, though adaptive overall from a statistics-of-use standpoint, are both complex and poorly understood by users of the system.

Improving encoding strategies as a function of test knowledge and experience.

Information that is produced or generated during learning is better remembered than information that is passively read, a phenomenon known as the generation effect. Prior research by deWinstanley and Bjork (Memory & Cognition, 32, 945-955, 2004) has shown that learners, after experiencing the memorial benefits of generation in the context of a fill-in-the-blank test following the study of a text passage containing both to-be-read and to-be-generated items, become more effective encoders of to-be-read items on a second passage, thus eliminating the generation effect on a subsequent memory test. Current explanations of this phenomenon assume that learners need to actually experience the generation advantage on the test of the first passage to become more effective encoders of to-be-read items on the second passage. The results of the present research, however, suggest otherwise. Although experiencing a test of the first passage does appear to be critical for leading participants to become better encoders on the second passage, experiencing a generation advantage on the test for the first passage is not. More generally, these results shine new light on the generation effect as well as how and why taking tests has the potential to improve subsequent learning.

Retrieval-practice task affects relationship between working memory capacity and retrieval-induced forgetting.

Retrieving a subset of items from memory can cause forgetting of other items in memory, a phenomenon referred to as retrieval-induced forgetting (RIF). Individuals who exhibit greater amounts of RIF have been shown to also exhibit superior working memory capacity (WMC) and faster stop-signal reaction times (SSRTs), results which have been interpreted as suggesting that RIF reflects an inhibitory process that is mediated by the processes of executive control. Across four experiments, we sought to further elucidate this issue by manipulating the way in which participants retrieved items during retrieval practice and examining how the resulting effects of forgetting correlated with WMC (Experiments 1-3) and SSRT (Experiment 4). Significant correlations were observed when participants retrieved items from an earlier study phase (within-list retrieval practice), but not when participants generated items from semantic memory (extra-list retrieval practice). These results provide important new insight into the role of executive-control processes in RIF.

Saving-enhanced memory: the benefits of saving on the learning and remembering of new information.

With the continued integration of technology into people's lives, saving digital information has become an everyday facet of human behavior. In the present research, we examined the consequences of saving certain information on the ability to learn and remember other information. Results from three experiments showed that saving one file before studying a new file significantly improved memory for the contents of the new file. Notably, this effect was not observed when the saving process was deemed unreliable or when the contents of the to-be-saved file were not substantial enough to interfere with memory for the new file. These results suggest that saving provides a means to strategically off-load memory onto the environment in order to reduce the extent to which currently unneeded to-be-remembered information interferes with the learning and remembering of other information.

Overcoming fixation with repeated memory suppression.

Fixation (blocks to memories or ideas) can be alleviated not only by encouraging productive work towards a solution, but, as the present experiments show, by reducing counterproductive work. Two experiments examined relief from fixation in a word-fragment completion task. Blockers, orthographically similar negative primes (e.g., ANALOGY), blocked solutions to word fragments (e.g., A_L_ _GY) in both experiments. After priming, but before the fragment completion test, participants repeatedly suppressed half of the blockers using the Think/No-Think paradigm, which results in memory inhibition. Inhibiting blockers did not alleviate fixation in Experiment 1 when conscious recollection of negative primes was not encouraged on the fragment completion test. In Experiment 2, however, when participants were encouraged to remember negative primes at fragment completion, relief from fixation was observed. Repeated suppression may nullify fixation effects, and promote creative thinking, particularly when fixation is caused by conscious recollection of counterproductive information.

Escaping mental fixation: incubation and inhibition in creative problem solving.

The inhibition underlying retrieval-induced forgetting has been argued to play a crucial role in the ability to overcome interference in memory and cognition. Supporting this conjecture, recent research has found that participants who exhibit greater levels of retrieval-induced forgetting are better at overcoming fixation on the Remote Associates Test (RAT) than are participants who exhibit reduced levels of retrieval-induced forgetting. If the ability to inhibit inappropriate responses improves the ability to solve fixated RAT problems, then reducing the fixation caused by inappropriate responses should reduce the correlation between retrieval-induced forgetting and problem solving. We tested this hypothesis by inserting an incubation period between two 30-second problem-solving attempts: half of the participants were given an incubation period (distributed condition), half were not (continuous condition). In the continuous condition retrieval-induced forgetting correlated positively with problem-solving performance during both the initial and final 30 seconds of problem solving. In the distributed condition retrieval-induced forgetting only correlated with problem-solving performance during the first 30 seconds of problem solving. This finding suggests that incubation reduces the need for inhibition by reducing the extent to which problem solvers suffer fixation.

Are you sure? Examining the potential benefits of truth-checking as a learning activity.

Learners may be uncertain about whether encountered information is true. Uncertainty may encourage people to critically assess information's accuracy, serving as a kind of desirable difficulty that benefits learning. Uncertainty may also have negative effects, however, leading people to mistrust true information or to later misremember false information as true. In three experiments, participants read history statements. In one condition, all statements were true, and the participants knew it. In the other two conditions, some statements were true, and others were false. Participants were either told the statements' accuracy or they guessed the statements' accuracy prior to feedback, a manipulation we refer to as truth-checking. All participants were then tested on recalling the true information and on recognising true versus false statements. We observed a significant benefit of truth-checking in one of the three experiments, suggesting that truth-checking may have some potential to enhance learning, perhaps by inducing people to encode to-be-learned information more deeply than they would otherwise. Even so, the benefit may come at a cost-truth-checking took significantly longer than study alone, and it led to a greater likelihood of thinking false information was true, suggesting costs of truth-checking may tend to outweigh benefits.

Remembering what to do when the time comes: The effects of offloading in a complex prospective memory task.

Two experiments examined the effects of cognitive offloading on a complex prospective memory task. Participants underwent a simulated telehealth examination in which they learned about dry eye disease and its treatment. They were asked to email the experimenter at 7:00 p.m., 2 days later, at which point they attempted to recall the medical information about dry eye. Participants in the offload condition were instructed to set a reminder; participants in the internal condition were not. At 7:15 p.m., all participants received an email requesting them to complete the free-recall test, allowing for an assessment of memory performance even when participants failed to email the experimenter. Participants in the offload condition significantly outperformed participants in the internal condition, both in terms of emailing the experimenter on time and in terms of completing the second phase of the experiment at all. No differences were observed regarding performance on the memory test. Results related to rehearsals, metacognitive judgments, and conscientiousness are also reported. Overall, the study provides new insight into how reminders can affect performance on a complex prospective memory task and how reminders may have the potential to be used in medical contexts to optimize patient outcomes. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

Retrieval-induced forgetting predicts failure to recall negative autobiographical memories.

There is a positivity bias in autobiographical memory such that people are more likely to remember positive events from their past than they are to remember negative ones. Inhibition may promote this positivity bias by deterring negative memories from being retrieved. In our first experiment, we measured individual differences in retrieval-induced forgetting, a phenomenon believed to be the consequence of retrieval inhibition, and correlated that measure with individual differences in the recall of positive and negative autobiographical memories. Participants who exhibited lower levels of retrieval-induced forgetting recalled significantly more negative memories despite recalling fewer positive memories. In our second experiment, participants attempted to recall negative memories from childhood and from the previous month. Participants who exhibited lower levels of retrieval-induced forgetting recalled significantly more negative memories in both conditions. These results suggest that inhibition plays a key role in preventing the retrieval of negative autobiographical memories.

A progress report on the inhibitory account of retrieval-induced forgetting.

Remembering and forgetting reflect fundamentally interdependent processes in human memory (Bjork, 2011). This interdependency is particularly apparent in research on retrieval-induced forgetting, which has shown that retrieving a subset of information can cause the forgetting of other information (Anderson et al. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, & Cognition 20:1063-1087, 1994). According to one prominent theoretical account, retrieval-induced forgetting is caused by an inhibitory process that acts to resolve competition during retrieval. Specifically, when cues activate competing, contextually inappropriate responses, those responses are claimed to be inhibited in order to facilitate the retrieval of target responses (Anderson Journal of Memory and Language 49: 415-445, 2003; Levy & Anderson Trends in Cognitive Sciences 6: 299-305, 2002; Storm, 2011b). Interest in retrieval-induced forgetting has grown steadily over the past two decades. In fact, a search of the abstracts at the 5th International Conference on Memory (ICOM, York University, 2011) revealed 40 presentations specifically mentioning "retrieval-induced forgetting," and nearly twice that number referring to the concept of inhibition. Clearly, researchers are interested in the empirical phenomenon of retrieval-induced forgetting, and inhibition is gaining increasing attention as a mechanism involved in memory. The goal of the present progress report is to critically review the inhibitory account of retrieval-induced forgetting and to provide direction so that future research can have a more meaningful impact on our understanding of human memory.

Remembering the past and imagining the future: examining the consequences of mental time travel on memory.

Cognitive, neuropsychological, and neuroimaging evidence suggests that remembering the past and imagining the future rely on overlapping processes in episodic memory. The three experiments reported here examine the consequences of remembering the past and imagining the future on the accessibility of other information in memory. Participants first studied events associated with a specific context and then either (a) retrieved past autobiographical events associated with that same context or (b) imagined future autobiographical events associated with that same context. Replicating and extending evidence of retrieval-induced forgetting, remembering autobiographical events from the past caused participants to forget the related studied events. However, imagining future autobiographical events failed to cause participants to forget the related studied events. These results suggest an important difference in the memorial consequences of remembering and imagining.