Despite Excellent Test Characteristics of the cobas 4800 CT/NG Assay, Detection of Oropharyngeal Chlamydia trachomatis and Neisseria gonorrhoeae Remains Challenging.

Oropharyngeal Chlamydia trachomatis (CT) infections and, especially, Neisseria gonorrhoeae (NG) infections are common, but few commercial nucleic acid amplification tests (NAATs) specify extragenital samples for intended use. The test characteristics of the cobas 4800 CT/NG assay were evaluated for oropharyngeal swabs. The technical validation included analysis of the specificity, sensitivity, dynamic range, linearity, efficiency, and precision. The probability of detection curve combined with historical data enabled the estimation of potentially missed diagnoses. A clinical evaluation was performed on a subset of 2,798 clinical samples available from routine diagnostics. Results of the cobas 4800 were compared with those from in-house C. trachomatis/N. gonorrhoeae PCR assays. Discrepant samples were tested with resolver assays, and these results were considered decisive. No cross-reactivity was seen in the analytical specificity analysis. High linearity (R2 ≥ 0.983), efficiency (89% to 99%), and precision (cycle threshold [CT ] value of 0.1 to 0.9) were seen for both C. trachomatis and N. gonorrhoeae The limit of detection in oropharyngeal samples was 3.2 × 102 inclusion-forming units (IFU)/ml for C. trachomatis and 6.7 × 102 CFU/ml for N. gonorrhoeae Estimates on potentially missed diagnoses were up to 7.2% for C. trachomatis and up to 24.7% for N. gonorrhoeae Clinical sensitivity and specificity were evaluated with 25 C. trachomatis-positive, 86 N. gonorrhoeae-positive, and 264 negative samples, resulting in 100% and 99.6% for C. trachomatis and 100% and 96.7% for N. gonorrhoeae, respectively. The findings in this study demonstrate the utility of the cobas 4800 CT/NG assay for oropharyngeal samples. Despite its being a highly accurate test, the range of reported CT values, especially for N. gonorrhoeae, suggests relatively low oropharyngeal loads. Hence, consistent detection over the full range of oropharyngeal loads could be impaired.

Analysis of two sequential SARS-CoV-2 outbreaks on a haematology-oncology ward and the role of infection prevention.

Two SARS-CoV-2 nosocomial outbreaks occurred on the haematology ward of our hospital. Patients on the ward were at high risk for severe infection because of their immunocompromised status. Whole Genome Sequencing proved transmission of a particular SARS-CoV-2 variant in each outbreak. The first outbreak (20 patients/31 healthcare workers (HCW)) occurred in November 2020 and was caused by a variant belonging to lineage B.1.221. At that time, there were still uncertainties on mode of transmission of SARS-CoV-2, and vaccines nor therapy were available. Despite HCW wearing II-R masks in all patient contacts and FFP-2 masks during aerosol generating procedures (AGP), the outbreak continued. Therefore, extra measures were introduced. Firstly, regular PCR-screening of asymptomatic patients and HCW; positive patients were isolated and positive HCW were excluded from work as a rule and they were only allowed to resume their work if a follow-up PCR CT-value was ≥30 and were asymptomatic or having only mild symptoms. Secondly, the use of FFP-2 masks was expanded to some long-lasting, close-contact, non-AGPs. After implementing these measures, the incidence of new cases declined gradually. Thirty-seven percent of patients died due to COVID-19. The second outbreak (10 patients/2 HCW) was caused by the highly transmissible omicron BA.1 variant and occurred in February 2022, where transmission occurred on shared rooms despite the extra infection control measures. It was controlled much faster, and the clinical impact was low as the majority of patients was vaccinated; no patients died and symptoms were relatively mild in both patients and HCW.

Controlling a human parainfluenza virus-3 outbreak in a haematology ward in a tertiary hospital: the importance of screening strategy and molecular diagnostics in relation to clinical symptoms.

BACKGROUND: The human parainfluenza virus 3 (HPIV-3) outbreak at the haemato-oncology ward of the Maastricht University Medical Centre in the summer of 2016. AIM: To describe an effective strategy to control the largest reported HPIV-3 outbreak at an adult haematology-oncology ward in the Netherlands by implementing infection control measures and molecular epidemiology investigation. METHODS: Clinical, patient and diagnostic data were both pro- and retrospectively collected. HPIV-3 real-time polymerase chain reaction (HPIV-3 RT-PCR) was validated using oropharyngeal rinse samples. Screening of all new and admitted patients was implemented to identify asymptomatic infection or prolonged shedding of HPIV-3 allowing cohort isolation. FINDINGS: The HPIV-3 outbreak occurred between 9 July and 28 September 2016 and affected 53 patients. HPIV-3 RT-PCR on oropharyngeal rinse samples demonstrated an up to 10-fold higher sensitivity compared with pharyngeal swabs. Monitoring showed that at first positive PCR, 20 patients (38%) were asymptomatic (of which 11 remained asymptomatic) and the average duration of shedding was 14 days (range 1-58). Asymptomatic patients had lower viral load, shorter period of viral shedding (≤14 days) and were mostly immune-competent oncology patients. The outbreak was under control five weeks after implementation of screening of asymptomatic patients. CONCLUSION: Implementation of a sensitive screening method identified both symptomatic and asymptomatic patients which had lower viral loads and allowed early cohort isolation. This is especially important in a ward that combines patients with varying immune status, because both immunocompromised and immune-competent patients are likely to spread the HPIV-3 virus, either through prolonged shedding or through asymptomatic course of disease.

Role of the environment in transmission of Gram-negative bacteria in two consecutive outbreaks in a haematology-oncology department.

In 2019-2020, two subsequent outbreaks caused by phenotypically identical ESBL-producing Enterobacter cloacae and multi-drug-resistant (MDR) Pseudomonas putida were detected in respectively 15 and 9 patients of the haematology-oncology department. Both bacterial species were resistant to piperacillin-tazobactam, used empirically in (neutropenic) sepsis in our hospital, and ciprofloxacin, used prophylactically in selective digestive decontamination for haematology patients. The E. cloacae outbreak was identified in clinical cultures of blood and urine. Despite intensified infection control measures, new cases were found in weekly point-prevalence screening cultures. Environmental samples of sinks and shower drains appeared positive in 18.1%. To diminish the environmental contamination burden, all siphons of sinks were replaced, and disinfection of sinks and shower drains was intensified using chlorine and soda on a daily basis. Replacement of shower drains was not possible. The outbreak of P. putida remained limited to rectal cultures only, and disappeared spontaneously without interventions. During both outbreaks, multiple strains of the incriminated bacterium were found simultaneously (demonstrated by Amplified-Fragment Length Polymorphism and/or Whole-Genome Multi-locus Sequencing Typing) in patients as well as the environment. It was experimentally shown that a biofilm on the toilet edge may act as a source for nosocomial transmission of Gram-negative bacteria. In conclusion, the drainage system of the hospital is an important reservoir of MDR bacteria, threatening the admitted patients. In existing hospitals, biofilms in the drainage systems cannot be removed. Therefore, it is important that in (re)building plans for hospitals a plan for prevention of nosocomial transmission from environment to patients is incorporated.