Behavior- and Modality-General Representation of Confidence in Orbitofrontal Cortex.

Every decision we make is accompanied by a sense of confidence about its likely outcome. This sense informs subsequent behavior, such as investing more-whether time, effort, or money-when reward is more certain. A neural representation of confidence should originate from a statistical computation and predict confidence-guided behavior. An additional requirement for confidence representations to support metacognition is abstraction: they should emerge irrespective of the source of information and inform multiple confidence-guided behaviors. It is unknown whether neural confidence signals meet these criteria. Here, we show that single orbitofrontal cortex neurons in rats encode statistical decision confidence irrespective of the sensory modality, olfactory or auditory, used to make a choice. The activity of these neurons also predicts two confidence-guided behaviors: trial-by-trial time investment and cross-trial choice strategy updating. Orbitofrontal cortex thus represents decision confidence consistent with a metacognitive process that is useful for mediating confidence-guided economic decisions.

Metacognition, public health compliance, and vaccination willingness.

Metacognition, our ability to reflect on our own beliefs, manifests itself in the confidence we have in these beliefs, and helps us guide our behavior in complex and uncertain environments. Here, we provide empirical tests of the importance of metacognition during the pandemic. Bayesian and frequentist analyses demonstrate that citizens with higher metacognitive sensitivity-where confidence differentiates correct from incorrect COVID-19 beliefs-reported higher willingness to vaccinate against COVID-19, and higher compliance with recommended public health measures. Notably, this benefit of accurate introspection held controlling for the accuracy of COVID-19 beliefs. By demonstrating how vaccination willingness and compliance may relate to insight into the varying accuracy of beliefs, rather than only the accuracy of the beliefs themselves, this research highlights the critical role of metacognitive ability in times of crisis. However, we do not find sufficient evidence to conclude that citizens with higher metacognitive sensitivity were more likely to comply with recommended public health measures when controlling for the absolute level of the confidence citizens had in their COVID-19 beliefs.

Distinct neural markers of evidence accumulation index metacognitive processing before and after simple visual decisions.

Perceptual decision-making is affected by uncertainty arising from the reliability of incoming sensory evidence (perceptual uncertainty) and the categorization of that evidence relative to a choice boundary (categorical uncertainty). Here, we investigated how these factors impact the temporal dynamics of evidence processing during decision-making and subsequent metacognitive judgments. Participants performed a motion discrimination task while electroencephalography was recorded. We manipulated perceptual uncertainty by varying motion coherence, and categorical uncertainty by varying the angular offset of motion signals relative to a criterion. After each trial, participants rated their desire to change their mind. High uncertainty impaired perceptual and metacognitive judgments and reduced the amplitude of the centro-parietal positivity, a neural marker of evidence accumulation. Coherence and offset affected the centro-parietal positivity at different time points, suggesting that perceptual and categorical uncertainty affect decision-making in sequential stages. Moreover, the centro-parietal positivity predicted participants' metacognitive judgments: larger predecisional centro-parietal positivity amplitude was associated with less desire to change one's mind, whereas larger postdecisional centro-parietal positivity amplitude was associated with greater desire to change one's mind, but only following errors. These findings reveal a dissociation between predecisional and postdecisional evidence processing, suggesting that the CPP tracks potentially distinct cognitive processes before and after a decision.

Metacognition and Confidence: A Review and Synthesis.

Determining the psychological, computational, and neural bases of confidence and uncertainty holds promise for understanding foundational aspects of human metacognition. While a neuroscience of confidence has focused on the mechanisms underpinning subpersonal phenomena such as representations of uncertainty in the visual or motor system, metacognition research has been concerned with personal-level beliefs and knowledge about self-performance. I provide a road map for bridging this divide by focusing on a particular class of confidence computation: propositional confidence in one's own (hypothetical) decisions or actions. Propositional confidence is informed by the observer's models of the world and their cognitive system, which may be more or less accurate-thus explaining why metacognitive judgments are inferential and sometimes diverge from task performance. Disparate findings on the neural basis of uncertainty and performance monitoring are integrated into a common framework, and a new understanding of the locus of action of metacognitive interventions is developed.

Rodents monitor their error in self-generated duration on a single trial basis.

A fundamental question in neuroscience is what type of internal representation leads to complex, adaptive behavior. When faced with a deadline, individuals' behavior suggests that they represent the mean and the uncertainty of an internal timer to make near-optimal, time-dependent decisions. Whether this ability relies on simple trial-and-error adjustments or whether it involves richer representations is unknown. Richer representations suggest a possibility of error monitoring, that is, the ability for an individual to assess its internal representation of the world and estimate discrepancy in the absence of external feedback. While rodents show timing behavior, whether they can represent and report temporal errors in their own produced duration on a single-trial basis is unknown. We designed a paradigm requiring rats to produce a target time interval and, subsequently, evaluate its error. Rats received a reward in a given location depending on the magnitude of their timing errors. During the test trials, rats had to choose a port corresponding to the error magnitude of their just-produced duration to receive a reward. High-choice accuracy demonstrates that rats kept track of the values of the timing variables on which they based their decision. Additionally, the rats kept a representation of the mapping between those timing values and the target value, as well as the history of the reinforcements. These findings demonstrate error-monitoring abilities in evaluating self-generated timing in rodents. Together, these findings suggest an explicit representation of produced duration and the possibility to evaluate its relation to the desired target duration.

Preserved Metacognition for Undetected Visuomotor Deviations.

Humans can successfully correct deviations of movements without conscious detection of such deviations, suggesting limited awareness of movement details. We ask whether such limited awareness impairs confidence (metacognition). We recorded functional magnetic resonance imaging data while 31 human female and male participants detected cursor deviations during a visuomotor reaching task and rated their confidence retrospectively. We show that participants monitor a summary statistic of the unfolding visual feedback (the peak cursor error) to detect visuomotor deviations and adjust their confidence ratings, even when they report being unaware of a deviation. Crucially, confidence ratings were as metacognitively efficient for aware and unaware deviations. At the neural level, activity in the ventral striatum tracks high confidence, whereas a broad network encodes cursor error but not confidence. These findings challenge the notion of limited conscious action monitoring and uncover how humans monitor their movements as they unfold, even when unaware of ongoing deviations.SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT We are unaware of the small corrections we apply to our movements as long as our goals are achieved. Here, although we replicate the finding that participants deny perceiving small deviations they correct, we show that their confidence reliably reflects the presence or absence of a deviation. This observation shows they can metacognitively monitor the presence of a deviation, even when they deny perceiving it. We also describe the hemodynamic correlates of confidence ratings. Our study questions the extent to which humans are unaware of the details of their movements; describes a plausible mechanism for metacognition in a visuomotor task, along with its neural correlates; and has important implications for the construction of the sense of self.

Two Oscillatory Correlates of Attention Control in the Alpha-Band with Distinct Consequences on Perceptual Gain and Metacognition.

Behavioral consequences and neural underpinnings of visuospatial attention have long been investigated. Classical studies using the Posner paradigm have found that visual perception systematically benefits from the use of a spatially informative cue pointing to the to-be-attended spatial location, compared with a noninformative cue. Lateralized α amplitude modulation during visuospatial attention shifts has been suggested to account for such perceptual gain. However, recent studies on spontaneous fluctuations of prestimulus α amplitude have challenged this notion. These studies showed that spontaneous fluctuations of prestimulus α amplitude were associated with the subjective appreciation of stimulus occurrence, while objective accuracy was instead best predicted by the frequency of α oscillations, with faster prestimulus α frequency accounting for better perceptual performance. Here, in male and female humans, by using an informative cue in anticipation of lateralized stimulus presentation, we found that the predictive cue not only modulates preparatory α amplitude but also α frequency in a retinotopic manner. Behaviorally, the cue significantly impacted subjective performance measures (metacognitive abilities [meta-d']) and objective performance gain (d'). Importantly, α amplitude directly accounted for confidence levels, with ipsilateral synchronization and contralateral desynchronization coding for high-confidence responses. Crucially, the contralateral α amplitude selectively predicted interindividual differences in metacognitive abilities (meta-d'), thus anticipating decision strategy and not perceptual sensitivity, probably via excitability modulations. Instead, higher perceptual accuracy both within and across participants (d') was associated with faster contralateral α frequency, likely by implementing higher sampling at the attended location. These findings provide critical new insights into the neural mechanisms of attention control and its perceptual consequences.SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT Prior knowledge serves the anticipation of sensory input to reduce sensory ambiguity. The growing interest in the neural mechanisms governing the integration of sensory input into our internal representations has highlighted a pivotal role of brain oscillations. Here we show that distinct but interacting oscillatory mechanisms are engaged during attentional deployment: one relying on α amplitude modulations and reflecting internal decision processes, associated with subjective perceptual experience and metacognitive abilities; the other relying on α frequency modulations and enabling mechanistic sampling of the sensory input at the attended location to influence objective performance. These insights are crucial for understanding how we reduce sensory ambiguity to maximize the efficiency of our conscious experience, but also in interpreting the mechanisms of atypical perceptual experiences.

Neural mechanisms underpinning metacognitive shifts driven by non-informative predictions.

Humans constantly make predictions and such predictions allow us to prepare for future events. Yet, such benefits may come with drawbacks as premature predictions may potentially bias subsequent judgments. Here we examined how prediction influences our perceptual decisions and subsequent confidence judgments, on scenarios where the predictions were arbitrary and independent of the identity of the upcoming stimuli. We defined them as invalid and non-informative predictions. Behavioral results showed that, such non-informative predictions biased perceptual decisions in favor of the predicted choice, and such prediction-induced perceptual bias further increased the metacognitive efficiency. The functional MRI results showed that activities in the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) and subgenual anterior cingulate cortex (sgACC) encoded the response consistency between predictions and perceptual decisions. Activity in mPFC predicted the strength of this congruency bias across individuals. Moreover, the parametric encoding of confidence in putamen was modulated by prediction-choice consistency, such that activity in putamen was negatively correlated with confidence rating after inconsistent responses. These findings suggest that predictions, while made arbitrarily, orchestrate the neural representations of choice and confidence judgment.

Learning to discriminate the eye-of-origin during continuous flash suppression.

Helmholtz asked whether one could discriminate which eye is the origin of one's perception merely based on the retinal signals. Studies to date showed that participants' ability to tell the eye-of-origin most likely depends on contextual cues. Nevertheless, it has been shown that exogenous attention can enhance performance for monocularly presented stimuli. We questioned whether adults can be trained to discriminate the eye-of-origin of their perceptions and if this ability depends on the strength of the monocular channels. We used attentional feed-forward training to improve the subject's eye-of-origin discrimination performance with voluntary attention. During training, participants received a binocular cue to inform them of the eye-of-origin of an upcoming target. Using continuous flash suppression, we also measured the signal strength of the monocular targets to see any possible modulations related to the cues. We collected confidence ratings from the participants about their eye-of-origin judgements to study in further detail whether metacognition has access to this information. Our results show that, even though voluntary attention did not alter the strength of the monocular channels, eye-of-origin discrimination performance improved following the training. A similar pattern was observed for confidence. The results from the feedforward attentional training and the increase in subjective confidence point towards a high-level decisional mechanism being responsible for the eye-of-origin judgements. We propose that this high-level process is informed by subtle sensory cues such as the differences in luminance or contrast in the two monocular channels.

The neural representation of metacognition in preferential decision-making.

Humans regularly assess the quality of their judgements, which helps them adjust their behaviours. Metacognition is the ability to accurately evaluate one's own judgements, and it is assessed by comparing objective task performance with subjective confidence report in perceptual decisions. However, for preferential decisions, assessing metacognition in preference-based decisions is difficult because it depends on subjective goals rather than the objective criterion. Here, we develop a new index that integrates choice, reaction time, and confidence report to quantify trial-by-trial metacognitive sensitivity in preference judgements. We found that the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC) and the right anterior insular were more activated when participants made bad metacognitive evaluations. Our study suggests a crucial role of the dmPFC-insula network in representing online metacognitive sensitivity in preferential decisions.

Neural Signatures of Evidence Accumulation Encode Subjective Perceptual Confidence Independent of Performance.

Confidence is an adaptive computation when environmental feedback is absent, yet there is little consensus regarding how perceptual confidence is computed in the brain. Difficulty arises because confidence correlates with other factors, such as accuracy, response time (RT), or evidence quality. We investigated whether neural signatures of evidence accumulation during a perceptual choice predict subjective confidence independently of these factors. Using motion stimuli, a central-parietal positive-going electroencephalogram component (CPP) behaves as an accumulating decision variable that predicts evidence quality, RT, accuracy, and confidence (Experiment 1, N = 25 adults). When we psychophysically varied confidence while holding accuracy constant (Experiment 2, N = 25 adults), the CPP still predicted confidence. Statistically controlling for RT, accuracy, and evidence quality (Experiment 3, N = 24 adults), the CPP still explained unique variance in confidence. The results indicate that a predecision neural signature of evidence accumulation, the CPP, encodes subjective perceptual confidence in decision-making independent of task performance.

Manipulating Prior Beliefs Causally Induces Under- and Overconfidence.

Humans differ vastly in the confidence they assign to decisions. Although such under- and overconfidence relate to fundamental life outcomes, a computational account specifying the underlying mechanisms is currently lacking. We propose that prior beliefs in the ability to perform a task explain confidence differences across participants and tasks, despite similar performance. In two perceptual decision-making experiments, we show that manipulating prior beliefs about performance during training causally influences confidence in healthy adults (N = 50 each; Experiment 1: 8 men, one nonbinary; Experiment 2: 5 men) during a test phase, despite unaffected objective performance. This is true when prior beliefs are induced via manipulated comparative feedback and via manipulated training-phase difficulty. Our results were accounted for within an accumulation-to-bound model, explicitly modeling prior beliefs on the basis of earlier task exposure. Decision confidence is quantified as the probability of being correct conditional on prior beliefs, causing under- or overconfidence. We provide a fundamental mechanistic insight into the computations underlying under- and overconfidence.

Effects of metacognitive training (MCT) on social cognition for schizophrenia spectrum and related psychotic disorders: a systematic review and meta-analysis.

BACKGROUND: Individuals with schizophrenia spectrum and related psychotic disorders (SSD) experience significant impairments in social cognition that impede functioning. Social cognition is a multidimensional construct consisting of four domains: 1. theory of mind, 2. emotion processing, 3. attributional style and 4. social perception. Metacognitive training (MCT) is an intervention designed to target cognitive biases in psychosis containing two modules addressing social cognition. METHODS: A systematic review and meta-analysis was conducted to investigate the effects of MCT on social cognition and two of its domains: theory of mind and emotion processing. Ten electronic databases were scoured from 2007 to 1 February 2022 for MCT studies reporting social cognition outcomes for people with SSD (1050 identified, 282 assessed). Effect sizes were calculated using Cohen's d in R. RESULTS: Nine studies were included in the meta-analysis (nMCT = 212, ncontrol = 194). MCT had a small but positive effect on global social cognition (d = 0.28 [95% CI 0.07-0.49]) and theory of mind (d = 0.27 [95% CI 0.01-0.52]). MCT showed no evidence of an effect on emotion processing (d = 0.03 [95% CI -0.26 to 0.32]). CONCLUSION: MCT has a small but significant effect on social cognition for people with SSD. Our results add to other recent meta-analyses showing significant effects of MCT on clinically relevant outcomes such as positive symptoms, cognitive biases and cognitive insight. We recommend that future studies on MCT report outcomes on all four domains of social cognition. TRIAL REGISTRATION: PROSPERO (in the process of registration) available at https://www.crd.york.ac.uk/prospero/#recordDetails.

Do metacognitive therapies for schizophrenia-spectrum disorders work? A meta-analytic investigation.

Recent reviews and meta-analyses of metacognitive therapy for schizophrenia-spectrum disorder (SSD) have included uncontrolled studies, single-session interventions, and/or analyses limited to a single form of metacognitive therapy. We sought to evaluate the efficacy of metacognitive therapies more broadly based on controlled trials (CT) of sustained treatments. We conducted a pre-registered meta-analysis of controlled trials that investigated the effects of meta-cognitive therapies on primary positive symptom outcomes, and secondary symptom, function and/or insight measures. Electronic databases were searched up to March 2022 using variants of the keywords, 'metacognitive therapy', 'schizophrenia', and 'controlled trial'. Studies were identified and screened according to PRISMA guidelines. Outcomes were assessed with random effects models and sample, intervention, and study quality indices were investigated as potential moderators. Our search identified 44 unique CTs with usable data from 2423 participants. Data were extracted by four investigators with reliability >98%. Results revealed that metacognitive therapies produced significant small-to-moderate effects on delusions (g = 0.32), positive symptoms (g = 0.30) and psychosocial function (g = 0.31), and significant, small effects on cognitive bias (g = 0.25), negative symptoms (g = 0.24), clinical insight (g = 0.29), and social cognition (g = 0.27). Findings were robust in the face of sample differences in age, education, gender, antipsychotic dosage, and duration of illness. Except for social cognition and negative symptoms, effects were evident even in the most rigorous study designs. Thus, results suggest that metacognitive therapies for SSD benefit people, and these benefits transfer to function and illness insight. Future research should modify existing treatments to increase the magnitude of treatment benefits.

Metacognition in Japanese macaques (Macaca fuscata): does impulsivity explain unnecessary looks in the tubes task?

Potential metacognitive abilities, such as monitoring and controlling cognitive processes, have been revealed in some primate species. In the tubes task, apes and macaques showed higher content-checking behavior when unaware of a reward's location, but they also periodically inspected the tubes when aware, especially when a more appealing reward was involved. Some attribute this to the pleasure of looking at the reward. This study investigates whether the unnecessary tube-checking behavior observed in nine wild Japanese macaques, previously tested for metacognition using the tubes task, can be solely attributed to impulsivity. The macaques' propensity to look inside a single tube containing food they cannot immediately reach was measured and compared to their behavior in the tubes task. Results indicated that looking inside the baited tube increased as reward quality improved. However, macaques displaying unnecessary tube inspections in metacognitive tests showed less impulsivity to look. This intriguing result counters the notion that excessive looking in the tubes task is solely due to impulsive looking, prompting us to advocate for further research into the relationship between inhibition and metacognitive performance.

Metacognition in wild Japanese macaques: cost and stakes influencing information-seeking behavior.

Metacognition allows us to evaluate memories and knowledge, thus enabling us to distinguish between what we know and what we do not. Studies have shown that species other than humans may possess similar abilities. However, the number of species tested was limited. Testing ten free-ranging Japanese macaques (Macaca fuscata) on a task in which they had to find food hidden inside one of the four opaque tubes, we investigated whether these subjects would seek information when needed. The monkeys could look inside the tubes before selecting one. We varied three parameters: the baiting process, the cost that monkeys had to pay to look inside the tubes, and the reward at stake. We assessed whether and how these parameters would affect the monkeys' tendency to look inside the tube before selecting one. When they were not shown which tube contained the reward, nine monkeys looked significantly more frequently in at least one condition. Half of them tended to reduce their looks when the cost was high, but only when they already knew the location of the reward. When a high-quality reward was at stake, four monkeys tended to look more inside the tubes, even though they already knew the reward's location. Our results are consistent with those of rhesus macaques, suggesting that metacognitive-like abilities may be shared by Cercopithecidae, and that, at least some monkeys may be aware of their lack of knowledge.

What's in a sample? Epistemic uncertainty and metacognitive awareness in risk taking.

In a fundamentally uncertain world, sound information processing is a prerequisite for effective behavior. Given that information processing is subject to inevitable cognitive imprecision, decision makers should adapt to this imprecision and to the resulting epistemic uncertainty when taking risks. We tested this metacognitive ability in two experiments in which participants estimated the expected value of different number distributions from sequential samples and then bet on their own estimation accuracy. Results show that estimates were imprecise, and this imprecision increased with higher distributional standard deviations. Importantly, participants adapted their risk-taking behavior to this imprecision and hence deviated from the predictions of Bayesian models of uncertainty that assume perfect integration of information. To explain these results, we developed a computational model that combines Bayesian updating with a metacognitive awareness of cognitive imprecision in the integration of information. Modeling results were robust to the inclusion of an empirical measure of participants' perceived variability. In sum, we show that cognitive imprecision is crucial to understanding risk taking in decisions from experience. The results further demonstrate the importance of metacognitive awareness as a cognitive building block for adaptive behavior under (partial) uncertainty.

Domain specificity of error monitoring: An ERP study in young and older adults.

Metacognition refers to the ability to monitor and control one's cognitive processes, which plays an important role in decision-making throughout the lifespan. It is still debated whether metacognitive abilities decline with age. Neuroimaging evidence suggests that metacognition is served by domain-specific mechanisms. These domains may differentially decline with increasing age. The current investigates whether the error-related negativity (ERN) and the error positivity (Pe) which reflect error detection and error awareness, respectively, differ across perceptual and memory domains in young and older adults. In total, 38 young adults and 37 older adults completed a classic Flanker Task (perceptual) and an adapted memory-based version. No difference in ERN amplitude was found between young and older adults and across domains. Perceptual ERN peaked earlier than Memory ERN. Memory ΔERN was larger than Perceptual ΔERN. Pe was smaller in older adults and ΔPe was larger for perceptual than memory flanker. Memory Pe peaked earlier in young as compared to older adults. Multivariate analyses of whole scalp data supported cross-domain differences. During the task, ERN decreased in young but not in older adults. Memory Pe decreased in young adults but increased in older adults while no significant change in perceptual Pe was found. The study's findings suggest that neural correlates of error monitoring differ across cognitive domains. Moreover, it was shown that error awareness declines in old age but its within-task dynamics vary across cognitive domains. Possible mechanisms underlying metacognition impairments in aging are discussed.

Awareness of errors is reduced by sleep loss.

The ability to detect and subsequently correct errors is important in preventing the detrimental consequences of sleep loss. The Error Related Negativity (ERN), and the error positivity (Pe) are established neural correlates of error processing. Previous work has shown sleep loss reduces ERN and Pe, indicating sleep loss impairs error-monitoring processes. However, no previous work has examined behavioral error awareness, in conjunction with EEG measures, under sleep loss conditions, and studies of sleep restriction are lacking. Using combined behavioral and EEG measures, we report two studies investigating the impact of total sleep deprivation (TSD) and sleep restriction (SR) on error awareness. Fourteen healthy participants completed the Error Awareness Task under conditions of TSD and 27 completed the same task under conditions of SR. It was found that TSD did not influence behavioral error awareness or ERN or Pe amplitude, however, SR reduced behavioral error awareness, increased the time taken to detect errors, and reduced Pe amplitude. Findings indicate individuals who are chronically sleep restricted are at risk for reduced recognition of errors. Reduced error awareness may be one factor contributing to the increased accidents and injuries seen in contexts where sleep loss is prevalent.

Metamemory and executive function mediate the age-related decline in memory.

OBJECTIVE: Although the effect of aging on episodic memory is relatively well studied, little is known about how aging influences metamemory. In addition, while executive function (EF) is known to mediate the age-related decline in episodic memory, the role of metamemory in aging-related memory differences beyond EF remains unknown. This study aimed to elucidate the effect of aging on metamemory and to clarify the role of metamemory in the age-related decline in memory. METHOD: One hundred and four adults aged 18-79 years (50 M, 54 F) performed several EF tasks, as well as a face-scene paired-associate learning task that required them to make judgments of learning, feeling-of-knowing judgments, and retrospective confidence judgments. RESULTS: Aging was significantly associated with poor metamemory accuracy and increased confidence across metamemory judgment types, even after controlling for EF and memory performance. A parallel mediation analysis indicated that both confidence of learning and EF performance had significant partial mediation effects on the relationship between aging and memory, albeit in different ways. Specifically, poor EF explained the age-related decline in memory, whereas increased confidence of learning served to compensate for this memory decline. CONCLUSIONS: Aging is associated with general changes (i.e., poor inferences from cues) rather than specific changes (i.e., declined activation or utilization of certain cues) in metamemory monitoring. Also, changes in confidence of learning and in EF ability contribute to the preservation and decline of memory during aging, respectively. Therefore, boosting confidence during encoding and enhancing EF skills might be complementary memory intervention strategies for older adults.