Vagally Mediated Heart Rate Variability and Mood States in Patients with Chronic Pain Receiving Prolonged Expiration Regulated Breathing: A Randomized Controlled Trial.

Reduced vagally mediated heart rate variability (VmHRV) has been reported in patients with chronic pain. In healthy persons, breathing with longer expiration relative to inspiration increases VmHRV at 12 breaths per minute. The present study aimed to determine the immediate effect of breathing with longer expiration relative to inspiration on VmHRV and mood states in patients with chronic pain. Fifty patients with chronic pain aged between 20 and 67 years were prospectively randomized as two groups with an allocation ratio of 1:1. The interventional group practiced breathing with metronome based visual cues, maintaining an inspiration to expiration ratio of 28:72 (i/e ratio, 0.38) at a breath rate of 12 breaths per minute. The average i/e ratio they attained based on strain gauge respiration recording was 0.685 (SD 0.48). The control group, which looked at the metronome without conscious breath modification had an average i/e ratio of 0.745 (SD 0.69). The VmHRV, respiration and self-reported mood states (using the Brief Mood Introspection Scale (BMIS)) were assessed. There was a significant increase in HF-HRV and RMSSD during low i/e breathing (repeated measures ANCOVA, Bonferroni adjusted post-hoc test, p < 0.05; in all cases). Self-reported mood states changed as follows: (i) following low i/e breathing positive-mood states increased while the aroused mood state decreased whereas (ii) following the control intervention the aroused mood state increased (repeated measure ANOVA, p < 0.05; in all cases). Hence breathing with prolonged expiration is possibly useful to increase VmHRV and improve self- reported mood states in patients with chronic pain.

Strengthened, and weakened, by belief.

This paper discusses a set of observations, many of which are novel, concerning differences between the adjectival modals certain and possible and their adverbial counterparts certainly and possibly. It argues that the observations can be derived from a standard interpretation of certain/certainly as universal and possible/possibly as existential quantifiers over possible worlds, in conjunction with the hypothesis that the adjectives quantify over knowledge and the adverbs quantify over belief. The claims on which the argument relies include the following: (i) knowledge implies belief, (ii) agents have epistemic access to their belief, (iii) relevance is closed under speakers' belief, and (iv) commitment is pragmatically inconsistent with explicit denial of belief.

InFoRM (Indicate-Follow-Replay-Me): A novel method to measure perceptual multistability dynamics using continuous data tracking and validated estimates of visual introspection.

Perceptual multistability, e.g. Binocular Rivalry, has been intensively used as a tool to study visual consciousness. Current methods to assess multistability do not capture all potentially occurring perceptual states, provide no estimate of introspection, and lack continuous, high-temporal resolution to resolve perceptual changes between states and within mixed perceptual states. We introduce InFoRM (Indicate-Follow-Replay-Me), a four-phase method that (1) trains a participant to self-generate estimates of perceptual introspection-maps that are (2) validated during a physical mimic task, (3) gathers perceptual multistability data, and (4) confirms their validity during a physical replay. 28 condition-blinded adults performed InFoRM while experiencing binocular rivalry evoked with orthogonal sinusoidal gratings. A 60 Hz joystick (3600 data samples/minute) was used to indicate continuously changes across six perceptual states within each 1 min trial. A polarized monitor system was used to present the stimuli dichoptically. Three contrast conditions were investigated: low vs low, high vs high, and low vs high. InFoRM replicates standard outcome measures, i.e. alternation rate, mean and relative proportions of perception, and distribution of exclusive percepts that are well fitted with gamma functions. Furthermore, InFoRM generates novel outcomes that deliver new insights in visual cognition via estimates of introspection maps, in ocular dominance via perceptual-state-specific dominance scores, in transitory dynamics between and within perceptual states, via techniques adopted from eye-tracking, and in rivalry-zone-size estimates utilizing InFoRM's ability to simulate piecemeal perception. The replay phase (physical replay of perceptual rivalry) confirmed good overall agreement (73% ±5 standard deviation). InFoRM can be applied to other multistable paradigms and can be used to study visual consciousness in typical and neuro-atypical populations.

Do perpetrators and victims rely on different information when judging whether aggressive behaviors are justified?

Perpetrators perceive their aggressive behaviors as more justified than victims do. This difference in perception may be due to each person relying heavily on their private thoughts and experiences, which effectively means that perpetrators and victims consider different information, and value that information differently, when judging whether an aggressive behavior is justified. The current manuscript contains four studies that tested these ideas. When judging whether an aggressive behavior is justified, perpetrators reported relying heavily on their thoughts and motives (Studies 1-3) and victims reported relying heavily on their experience of being harmed (Study 2). Further, as people considered the perpetrator's thoughts that led to the aggressive behavior, perpetrators, but not victims, became more confident in their judgments (Study 3). Finally, when judging their aggressive behavior, people felt their judgments were less biased than a "typical person's" judgments would be (Study 4). Collectively, these studies demonstrate some of the cognitive reasons that perpetrators and victims disagree on their judgments about whether an aggressive behavior is justified and, consequently, some of the cognitive barriers that need to be overcome for successful conflict resolution to occur.

Training naive subjects in using micro-phenomenological self-inquiry to investigate pain and suffering during headaches.

Micro-phenomenology is a method that generates rich and reliable reports of singular experiences in their pre-reflective dimension. Usually it is employed using a second-person interviewer. In this study we attempted to train naïve subjects in using self-inquiry version of the method. 13 subjects met twice over the course of one week, investigating their experiences of headaches, looking specifically into the pain experience itself, the experience of suffering, and the experience of absence of suffering. The analysis showed that the subject reports increase the richness of description, measured by the increase in the amount of categories described and the number of words needed to give an on target description. The analysis, informed by the participant's ideas, showed that it was possible to distinguish the experience of pain from the experience of suffering. We compare the analysis to other phenomenological studies of headaches. This reveals the strength and weakness of the micro-phenomenological method: By de-focusing on contextual factors it enables in-depth descriptions of singular moments of experience, but the bracketing of interpretations may result in overlooking overarching meaning dimensions. We conclude that micro-phenomenological self-inquiry may potentially be employed successfully in a clinical setting with initially untrained subjects for describing certain kinds of experiences and answering complex phenomenological questions.

How to Interpret Resting-State fMRI: Ask Your Participants.

Resting-state fMRI (rsfMRI) reveals brain dynamics in a task-unconstrained environment as subjects let their minds wander freely. Consequently, resting subjects navigate a rich space of cognitive and perceptual states (i.e., ongoing experience). How this ongoing experience shapes rsfMRI summary metrics (e.g., functional connectivity) is unknown, yet likely to contribute uniquely to within- and between-subject differences. Here we argue that understanding the role of ongoing experience in rsfMRI requires access to standardized, temporally resolved, scientifically validated first-person descriptions of those experiences. We suggest best practices for obtaining those descriptions via introspective methods appropriately adapted for use in fMRI research. We conclude with a set of guidelines for fusing these two data types to answer pressing questions about the etiology of rsfMRI.

Fish self-awareness: limits of current knowledge and theoretical expectations.

Animal self-awareness is divided into three levels: bodily, social, and introspective self-awareness. Research has focused mainly on the introspection of so-called higher organisms such as mammals. Herein, we turn our attention to fish and provide opinions on their self-awareness based on a review of the scientific literature. Our specific aims are to discuss whether fish (A) could have a neural substrate supporting self-awareness and whether they display signs of (B) social and (C) introspective self-awareness. The present knowledge does not exclude the possibility that fish could have a simple neocortex or other structures that support certain higher cognitive processes, as the function of the primate cerebral cortex can be replaced by other neurological structures. Fish are known to display winner, loser, and audience effects, which could be interpreted as signs of social self-awareness. The audience effect may be explained not only by ethological cost and benefit theory but also by the concept of public self-awareness, which comes from human studies. The behavioural and neural manifestations of depression may be induced in fish under social subordination and may be viewed as certain awareness of a social status. The current findings on fish introspective self-awareness have been debated in the scientific community and, therefore, demand replication to provide more evidence. Further research is needed to verify the outlined ideas; however, the current knowledge indicates that fish are capable of certain higher cognitive processes, which raises questions and implications regarding ethics and welfare in fish-related research and husbandry.

A heterodox defense of the actualist higher-order thought theory.

I defend the actualist higher-order thought theory against four objections. The first objection contends that the theory is circular. The second one contends that the theory is unable to account for the alleged epistemic position we are in with respect to our own conscious mental states. The third one contends that the theory is unable to account for the evidence we have for the proposition that all conscious mental states are represented. The fourth one contends that the theory does not accommodate the intimacy we have with our own conscious mental states. To some extent, my defense will be heterodox, in the sense that I will show that some objections are satisfactorily answerable even if we concede to the objectors a point that higher-order theorists do not seem to be willing to concede, that is, that the theory is the result of conceptual analysis.

Guardians of Childhood, Sentinels of Soul.

This article builds on an address delivered in New York City in March of 2020 to the National Conference of the College of Pastoral Supervision and Psychotherapy, a professional society of clinical pastoral educators. Interweaving narrative reflections of noted authors, poets, filmmakers, and other artists with pastoral theological literature and recent genetic and social scientific research, the essay explores parameters of the soul or psyche as comprising the unique center of the self. It invites readers to a recovery of soul by means of arduous acts of introspection-revisiting lost childhood wonder, hope, memories, and dreams-and an embrace of pluralism and individual difference.

I know better! Emerging metacognition allows adolescents to ignore false advice.

Adolescents aspire for independence. Successful independence means knowing when to rely on one's own knowledge and when to listen to others. A critical prerequisite thus is a well-developed metacognitive ability to accurately assess the quality of one's own knowledge. Little is known about whether the strive to become an independent decision maker in adolescence is underpinned by the necessary metacognitive skills. Here, we demonstrate that metacognition matures from childhood to adolescence (N = 107) and that this process coincides with greater independent decision-making. We show that adolescents, in contrast to children, take on others' advice less often, but only when the advice is misleading. Finally, we demonstrate that adolescents' reduced reliance on others' advice is explained by their increased metacognitive skills, suggesting that a developing ability to introspect may support independent decision-making in adolescence.

Measuring the mental.

Many philosophers have argued that the subjective character of conscious experience results in a fundamental deficit of third-person (henceforth: extrospective) access to first-person experience. By comparing extrospective measurement techniques with measurement techniques in the natural sciences, we will argue that extrospective methods suffer from no such deficit. After a rejection of some principled objections against extrospective methods, a historical comparison with the development of measurement techniques in the natural sciences will show that extrospective measuring methods are still in an early stage of development. However, they can be significantly improved by way of a bootstrapping strategy, similar to that which has proven successful in the development of physical measurement techniques. One reason to expect such improvement is the availability of multiple sources of evidence, which should allow for substantial advances in extrospective measurement techniques. Finally, we will discuss new developments in pain measurement in order to show that the bootstrapping strategy is already bearing fruit.

Introspective False Negative Prediction for Black-Box Object Detectors in Autonomous Driving.

Object detection plays a critical role in autonomous driving, but current state-of-the-art object detectors will inevitably fail in many driving scenes, which is unacceptable for safety-critical automated vehicles. Given the complexity of the real traffic scenarios, it is impractical to guarantee zero detection failure; thus, online failure prediction is of crucial importance to mitigate the risk of traffic accidents. Of all the failure cases, False Negative (FN) objects are most likely to cause catastrophic consequences, but little attention has been paid to the online FN prediction. In this paper, we propose a general introspection framework that can make online prediction of FN objects for black-box object detectors. In contrast to existing methods which rely on empirical assumptions or handcrafted features, we facilitate the FN feature extraction by an introspective FN predictor we designed in this framework. For this purpose, we extend the original concept of introspection to object-wise FN predictions, and propose a multi-branch cooperation mechanism to address the distinct foreground-background imbalance problem of FN objects. The effectiveness of the proposed framework is verified through extensive experiments and analysis, and the results show that our method successfully predicts the FN objects with 81.95% precision for 88.10% recall on the challenging KITTI Benchmark, and effectively improves object detection performance by taking FN predictions into consideration.

Mnemonic Introspection in Macaques Is Dependent on Superior Dorsolateral Prefrontal Cortex But Not Orbitofrontal Cortex.

The human PFC has been associated more with meta-perceptual as opposed to meta-memory decisions from correlational neuroimaging investigations. Recently, metacognitive abilities have also been shown to be causally dependent upon anterior and dorsal PFC in nonhuman primate lesion studies. Two studies, using postdecision wagering paradigms and reversible inactivation, challenged this meta-perceptual versus meta-memory notion and showed that dorsal and anterior prefrontal areas are associated with metamemory for experienced objects and awareness of ignorance, respectively. Causal investigations are important but scarce; nothing is known, for example, about the causal contributions of prefrontal subregions to spatial metamemory. Here, we investigated the effects of dorsal versus ventral PFC lesions on two-alternative forced-choice spatial discrimination tasks in male macaque monkeys. Importantly, we were rigorous in approach and applied three independent but complementary indices used to quantify individual animals' metacognitive ability ("Type II sensitivity") by two variants of meta-d'/d' and phi coefficient (φ). Our results were consistent across indices: while neither lesions to superior dorsolateral PFC nor orbitofrontal cortex impaired spatial recognition performance, only monkeys with superior dorsolateral PFC lesions were impaired in meta-accuracy. Together with the observation that the same orbitofrontal cortex lesioned monkeys were impaired in updating rule value in a Wisconsin Card Sorting Test analog, we therefore document a functional double-dissociation between these two PFC regions. Our study presents important causal evidence that other dimensions, namely, domain-specific processing (e.g., spatial vs nonspatial metamemory), also need considerations in understanding the functional specialization in the neural underpinnings of introspection.SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT This study demonstrates macaque monkeys' metacognitive capability of introspecting its own memory success is causally dependent on intact superior dorsolateral prefrontal cortices but not the orbitofrontal cortices. Combining neurosurgical techniques on monkeys and state-of-the-art measures of metacognition, we affirm a critical role of the PFC in supporting spatial meta-recognition memory and delineate functional specificity within PFC for distinct elements of metacognition.

Direct replication of task-dependent neural activation patterns during sadness introspection in two independent adolescent samples.

Functional neuroimaging results need to replicate to inform sound models of human social cognition and its neural correlates. Introspection, the capacity to reflect on one's thoughts and feelings, is one process required for normative social cognition and emotional functioning. Engaging in introspection draws on a network of brain regions including medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), posterior cingulate cortex (PCC), middle temporal gyri (MTG), and temporoparietal junction (TPJ). Maturation of these regions during adolescence mirrors the behavioral advances seen in adolescent social cognition, but the neural correlates of introspection in adolescence need to replicate to confirm their generalizability and role as a possible mechanism. The current study investigated whether reflecting upon one's own feelings of sadness would activate and replicate similar brain regions in two independent samples of adolescents. Participants included 156 adolescents (50% female) from the California Families Project and 119 adolescent girls from the Pittsburgh Girls Study of Emotion. All participants completed the Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (ERQ) and underwent a functional magnetic resonance imaging scan while completing the same facial emotion-processing task at age 16-17 years. Both samples showed similar whole-brain activation patterns when engaged in sadness introspection and when judging a nonemotional facial feature. Whole-brain activation was unrelated to ERQ scores in both samples. Neural responsivity to task manipulations replicated in regions recruited for socio-emotional (mPFC, PCC, MTG, TPJ) and attention (dorsolateral PFC, precentral gyri, superior occipital gyrus, superior parietal lobule) processing. These findings demonstrate robust replication of neural engagement during sadness introspection in two independent adolescent samples.

A higher-order theory of emotional consciousness.

Emotional states of consciousness, or what are typically called emotional feelings, are traditionally viewed as being innately programmed in subcortical areas of the brain, and are often treated as different from cognitive states of consciousness, such as those related to the perception of external stimuli. We argue that conscious experiences, regardless of their content, arise from one system in the brain. In this view, what differs in emotional and nonemotional states are the kinds of inputs that are processed by a general cortical network of cognition, a network essential for conscious experiences. Although subcortical circuits are not directly responsible for conscious feelings, they provide nonconscious inputs that coalesce with other kinds of neural signals in the cognitive assembly of conscious emotional experiences. In building the case for this proposal, we defend a modified version of what is known as the higher-order theory of consciousness.

Reply to Hurlburt.

Hurlburt (2018) states that Brouwers et al. (2018) find a much lower frequency of reported inner speech while reading than we find in Moore and Schwitzgebel (2018), and he attributes the difference to methodological shortcomings in Moore and Schwitzgebel's method. However, the method in Brouwers et al. has complementary shortcomings, and an apples-to-apples comparison of the data between the two studies shows a considerably smaller difference in results than the top-line percentages that Hurlburt emphasizes.

The experience of reading.

What do people consciously experience when they read? There has been almost no rigorous research on this question, and opinions diverge radically among both philosophers and psychologists. We describe three studies of the phenomenology of reading and its relationship to memory of textual detail and general cognitive abilities. We find three main results. First, there is substantial variability in reports about reading experience, both within and between participants. Second, reported reading experience varies with passage type: passages with dialogue prompted increased reports of inner speech, while passages with vivid visual detail prompted increased reports of visual imagery. Third, reports of visual imagery experiences, inner speech experiences, and experiences of conscious visual perception of the words on the page were at best weakly related to general cognitive abilities and memory of visual and auditory details.

Merging with the path not taken: Wilhelm Wundt's work as a precursor to the embedded-processes approach to memory, attention, and consciousness.

Early research on memory was dominated by two researchers forging different paths: Hermann Ebbinghaus, interested in principles of learning and recall, and Wilhelm Wundt, founder of the first formal laboratory of experimental psychology, who was interested in empirical evidence to interpret conscious experience. Whereas the work of Ebbinghaus is a much-heralded precursor of modern research on long-term memory, the work of Wundt appears to be a mostly-forgotten precursor to research on working memory. We show how his scientific perspective is germane to more recent investigations, with emphasis on the embedded-processes approaches of Nelson Cowan and Klaus Oberauer, and how it is in contrast with most other recent theoretical approaches. This investigation is important because the embedded-process theorists, apparently like most modern researchers, have recognized few of Wundt's specific contributions. We explore commonalities between the approaches and suggest that an appreciation of these commonalities might enrich the field going forward.

Psychiatry, Cultural Competency, and the Care of Ultra-Orthodox Jews: Achieving Secular and Theocentric Convergence Through Introspection.

Several socio-cultural factors complicate mental health care in the ultra-Orthodox Jewish population. These include societal stigma, fear of the influence of secular ideas, the need for rabbinic approval of the method and provider, and the notion that excessive concern with the self is counter-productive to religious growth. Little is known about how the religious beliefs of this population might be employed in therapeutic contexts. One potential point of convergence is the Jewish philosophical tradition of introspection as a means toward personal, interpersonal, and spiritual growth. We reviewed Jewish religious-philosophical writings on introspection from antiquity (the Babylonian Talmud) to the Middle Ages (Duties of the Heart), the eighteenth century (Path of the Just), the early Hasidic movement (the Tanya), and modernity (Alei Shur, Halakhic Man). Analysis of these texts indicates that: (1) introspection can be a religiously acceptable reaction to existential distress; (2) introspection might promote alignment of religious beliefs with emotions, intellect and behavior; (3) some religious philosophers were concerned about the demotivating effects of excessive introspection and self-critique on religious devotion and emotional well-being; (4) certain religious forms of introspection are remarkably analogous to modern methods of psychiatry and psychology, particularly psychodynamic psychotherapy and cognitive-behavioral therapy. We conclude that homology between religious philosophy of emotion and secular methods of psychiatry and psychotherapy may inform the choice and method of mental health care, foster the therapist-patient relationship, and thereby enable therapeutic convergence.

Libet's experiment: Questioning the validity of measuring the urge to move.

The time of subjectively registered urge to move (W) constituted the central point of most Libet-style experiments. It is therefore crucial to verify the W validity. Our experiment was based on the assumption that the W time is inferred, rather than introspectively perceived. We used the rotating spot method to gather the W reports together with the reports of the subjective timing of actual movement (M). The subjects were assigned the tasks in two different orders. When measured as first in the respective session, no significant difference between W and M values was found, which suggests that uninformed subjects tend to confuse W for M reports. Moreover, we found that W values measured after the M task were significantly earlier than W values measured before M. This phenomenon suggests that the apparent difference between W and M values is in fact caused by the subjects' previous experience with M measurements.