Psychosocial functioning in the balance between autism and psychosis: evidence from three populations.

Functional impairment is a core feature of both autism and schizophrenia spectrum disorders. While diagnostically independent, they can co-occur in the same individual at both the trait and diagnostic levels. The effect of such co-occurrence is hypothesized to worsen functional impairment. The diametric model, however, suggests that the disorders are etiologically and phenotypically diametrical, representing the extreme of a unidimensional continuum of cognition and behavior. A central prediction of this model is that functional impairment would be attenuated in individuals with mixed symptom expressions or genetic liability to both disorders. We tested this hypothesis in two clinical populations and one healthy population. In individuals with chronic schizophrenia and in individuals with first episode psychosis we evaluated the combined effect of autistic traits and positive psychotic symptoms on psychosocial functioning. In healthy carriers of alleles of copy number variants (CNVs) that confer risk for both autism and schizophrenia, we also evaluated whether variation in psychosocial functioning depended on the combined risk conferred by each CNV. Relative to individuals with biased symptom/CNV risk profiles, results show that functional impairments are attenuated in individuals with relatively equal levels of positive symptoms and autistic traits-and specifically stereotypic behaviors-, and in carriers of CNVs with relatively equal risks for either disorder. However, the pattern of effects along the "balance axis" varied across the groups, with this attenuation being generally less pronounced in individuals with high-high symptom/risk profile in the schizophrenia and CNV groups, and relatively similar for low-low and high-high individuals in the first episode psychosis group. Lower levels of functional impairments in individuals with "balanced" symptom profile or genetic risks would suggest compensation across mechanisms associated with autism and schizophrenia. CNVs that confer equal risks for both disorders may provide an entry point for investigations into such compensatory mechanisms. The co-assessment of autism and schizophrenia may contribute to personalized prognosis and stratification strategies.

Willing and able? Theory of mind, social motivation, and social competence in middle childhood and early adolescence.

This study investigated the links between theory of mind, social motivation, and children's social competence in middle childhood and early adolescence. Two hundred and sixty four children (136 girls, 128 boys) aged between 8 and 13 years (M Age = 10.88 years, SD = 1.45) completed theory-of-mind tests and self-report questionnaires measuring social motivation. Teachers rated children's social competence at school. Teacher-rated social competence was associated with individual differences in both theory of mind and children's motivation to develop and maintain social relationships. Results suggest that while individual differences in social motivation and theory of mind are partially overlapping, both theory of mind ability and social motivation contribute to successful social interaction at school.

Reading fiction and reading minds in early adolescence: A longitudinal study.

Reading fiction is argued to have benefits for our understanding of others' thoughts, feelings and desires, referred to as 'theory of mind'(ToM). We aimed to test this assumption by examining whether children's reading experience is longitudinally associated with later ToM. We examined reading experience and ToM in 236 children between the ages of 11-13 years. Participants were asked to report on their time spent reading both fiction and non-fiction at ages 11 and 13, ToM was measured at age 13. Verbal ability, reading comprehension, and reading motivation were included as control variables in all analyses. Results showed that children's self-reported fiction, but not their non-fiction reading was associated with ToM. Further, the association was concurrent but not longitudinal: fiction reading and ToM at age 13 were associated but fiction reading at age 11 did not predict ToM at age 13. Our findings motivate further research on what types of reading materials might be beneficial, and the level of exposure to fiction that is needed for measurable benefits for later ToM.

EEG and fMRI evidence for autobiographical memory reactivation in empathy.

Empathy relies on the ability to mirror and to explicitly infer others' inner states. Theoretical accounts suggest that memories play a role in empathy, but direct evidence of reactivation of autobiographical memories (AM) in empathy is yet to be shown. We addressed this question in two experiments. In Experiment 1, electrophysiological activity (EEG) was recorded from 28 participants. Participants performed an empathy task in which targets for empathy were depicted in contexts for which participants either did or did not have an AM, followed by a task that explicitly required memory retrieval of the AM and non-AM contexts. The retrieval task was implemented to extract the neural fingerprints of AM and non-AM contexts, which were then used to probe data from the empathy task. An EEG pattern classifier was trained and tested across tasks and showed evidence for AM reactivation when participants were preparing their judgement in the empathy task. Participants self-reported higher empathy for people depicted in situations they had experienced themselves as compared to situations they had not experienced. A second independent fMRI experiment replicated this behavioural finding and showed increased activation for AM compared to non-AM in the brain networks underlying empathy: precuneus, posterior parietal cortex, superior and inferior parietal lobule, and superior frontal gyrus. Together, our study reports behavioural, electrophysiological, and fMRI evidence that robustly supports AM reactivation in empathy.

Sources of Cognitive Conflict and Their Relevance to Theory-of-Mind Proficiency in Healthy Aging: A Preregistered Study.

Age-related decline in theory of mind (ToM) may be due to waning executive control, which is necessary for resolving conflict when reasoning about other individuals' mental states. We assessed how older (n = 50) and younger (n = 50) adults were affected by three theoretically relevant sources of conflict within ToM: competing self-other perspectives, competing cued locations, and outcome knowledge. We examined which best accounted for age-related difficulty with ToM. Our data show unexpected similarity between age groups when people are representing a belief incongruent with their own. Individual differences in attention and response speed best explained the degree of conflict experienced through incompatible self-other perspectives. However, older adults were disproportionately affected by managing conflict between cued locations. Age and spatial working memory were most relevant for predicting the magnitude of conflict elicited by conflicting cued locations. We suggest that previous studies may have underestimated older adults' ToM proficiency by including unnecessary conflict in ToM tasks.

Re-imaging the intentional stance.

The commonly used paradigm to investigate Dennet's 'intentional stance' compares neural activation when participants compete with a human versus a computer. This paradigm confounds whether the opponent is natural or artificial and whether it is intentional or an automaton. This functional magnetic resonance imaging study is, to our knowledge, the first to investigate the intentional stance by orthogonally varying perceptions of the opponents' intentionality (responding actively or passively according to a script) and embodiment (human or a computer). The mere perception of the opponent (whether human or computer) as intentional activated the mentalizing network: the temporoparietal junction (TPJ) bilaterally, right temporal pole, anterior paracingulate cortex (aPCC) and the precuneus. Interacting with humans versus computers induced activations in a more circumscribed right lateralized subnetwork within the mentalizing network, consisting of the TPJ and the aPCC, possibly reflective of the tendency to spontaneously attribute intentionality to humans. The interaction between intentionality (active versus passive) and opponent (human versus computer) recruited the left frontal pole, possibly in response to violations of the default intentional stance towards humans and computers. Employing an orthogonal design is important to adequately capture Dennett's conception of the intentional stance as a mentalizing strategy that can apply equally well to humans and other intentional agents.

How is mindreading really like reading?

I suggest an alternative basis for Heyes' analogy between cultural learning of mindreading and text reading. Unlike text reading, mindreading does not entail decoding of observable stimuli. Like text reading, mindreading requires relevant inferences. Identification of relevant inferences is a deeply challenging problem, and the most important contribution of cultural learning to mindreading may be an apprenticeship in thinking like a mindreader.

The cognitive demands of remembering a speaker's perspective and managing common ground size modulate 8- and 10-year-olds' perspective-taking abilities.

Using "theory of mind" to successfully accommodate differing perspectives during communication requires much more than just acquiring basic theory of mind understanding. Evidence suggests that children's ability to adopt a speaker's perspective continues to develop throughout childhood to adolescence until adulthood. The current study examined the cognitive factors that could account for variations in children's abilities to use a speaker's perspective during language comprehension and whether the same factors contribute to age-related improvements. Our study incorporated into a commonly used communication task two types of memory demands that are frequently present in our everyday communication but have been overlooked in the previous literature: remembering a speaker's perspective and the amount of common ground information. Findings from two experiments demonstrated that both 8- and 10-year-olds committed more egocentric errors when each of these memory demands was high. Our study also found some supporting evidence for the age-related improvement in children's perspective use, with 10-year-olds generally committing fewer egocentric errors compared with 8-year-olds. Interestingly, there was no clear evidence that the memory factors that affected children's perspective use in our experiments were also the factors that drove age-related improvement.

Individual Differences in Children's Corepresentation of Self and Other in Joint Action.

Previous research has shown that children aged 4-5 years, but not 2-3 years, show adult-like interference from a partner when performing a joint task (Milward, Kita, & Apperly, 2014). This raises questions about the cognitive skills involved in the development of such "corepresentation (CR)" of a partner (Sebanz, Knoblich, & Prinz, 2003). Here, individual differences data from one hundred and thirteen 4- to 5-year-olds showed theory of mind (ToM) and inhibitory control (IC) as predictors of ability to avoid CR interference, suggesting that children with better ToM abilities are more likely to succeed in decoupling self and other representations in a joint task, while better IC is likely to help children avoid interference from a partner's response when selecting their own response on the task.

Resting state morphology predicts the effect of theta burst stimulation in false belief reasoning.

When required to represent a perspective that conflicts with one's own, functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) suggests that the right ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (rvlPFC) supports the inhibition of that conflicting self-perspective. The present task dissociated inhibition of self-perspective from other executive control processes by contrasting belief reasoning-a cognitive state where the presence of conflicting perspectives was manipulated-with a conative desire state wherein no systematic conflict existed. Linear modeling was used to examine the effect of continuous theta burst stimulation (cTBS) to rvlPFC on participants' reaction times in belief and desire reasoning. It was anticipated that cTBS applied to rvlPFC would affect belief but not desire reasoning, by modulating activity in the Ventral Attention System (VAS). We further anticipated that this effect would be mediated by functional connectivity within this network, which was identified using resting state fMRI and an unbiased model-free approach. Simple reaction-time analysis failed to detect an effect of cTBS. However, by additionally modeling individual measures from within the stimulated network, the hypothesized effect of cTBS to belief (but, importantly, not desire) reasoning was demonstrated. Structural morphology within the stimulated region, rvlPFC, and right temporoparietal junction were demonstrated to underlie this effect. These data provide evidence that inconsistencies found with cTBS can be mediated by the composition of the functional network that is being stimulated. We suggest that the common claim that this network constitutes the VAS explains the effect of cTBS to this network on false belief reasoning. Hum Brain Mapp 37:3502-3514, 2016. © 2016 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.

Language complexity modulates 8- and 10-year-olds' success at using their theory of mind abilities in a communication task.

Basic competence in theory of mind is acquired during early childhood. Nonetheless, evidence suggests that the ability to take others' perspectives in communication improves continuously from middle childhood to the late teenage years. This indicates that theory of mind performance undergoes protracted developmental changes after the acquisition of basic competence. Currently, little is known about the factors that constrain children's performance or that contribute to age-related improvement. A sample of 39 8-year-olds and 56 10-year-olds were tested on a communication task in which a speaker's limited perspective needed to be taken into account and the complexity of the speaker's utterance varied. Our findings showed that 10-year-olds were generally less egocentric than 8-year-olds. Children of both ages committed more egocentric errors when a speaker uttered complex sentences compared with simple sentences. Both 8- and 10-year-olds were affected by the demand to integrate complex sentences with the speaker's limited perspective and to a similar degree. These results suggest that long after children's development of simple visual perspective-taking, their use of this ability to assist communication is substantially constrained by the complexity of the language involved.

Perspective-taking abilities in the balance between autism tendencies and psychosis proneness.

Difficulties with the ability to appreciate the perspective of others (mentalizing) is central to both autism and schizophrenia spectrum disorders. While the disorders are diagnostically independent, they can co-occur in the same individual. The effect of such co-morbidity is hypothesized to worsen mentalizing abilities. The recent influential 'diametric brain theory', however, suggests that the disorders are etiologically and phenotypically diametrical, predicting opposing effects on one's mentalizing abilities. To test these contrasting hypotheses, we evaluated the effect of psychosis and autism tendencies on the perspective-taking (PT) abilities of 201 neurotypical adults, on the assumption that autism tendencies and psychosis proneness are heritable dimensions of normal variation. We show that while both autism tendencies and psychosis proneness induce PT errors, their interaction reduced these errors. Our study is, to our knowledge, the first to observe that co-occurring autistic and psychotic traits can exert opposing influences on performance, producing a normalizing effect possibly by way of their diametrical effects on socio-cognitive abilities. This advances the notion that some individuals may, to some extent, be buffered against developing either illness or present fewer symptoms owing to a balanced expression of autistic and psychosis liability.

Representation, control, or reasoning? Distinct functions for theory of mind within the medial prefrontal cortex.

The medial pFC (mPFC) is frequently reported to play a central role in Theory of Mind (ToM). However, the contribution of this large cortical region in ToM is not well understood. Combining a novel behavioral task with fMRI, we sought to demonstrate functional divisions between dorsal and rostral mPFC. All conditions of the task required the representation of mental states (beliefs and desires). The level of demands on cognitive control (high vs. low) and the nature of the demands on reasoning (deductive vs. abductive) were varied orthogonally between conditions. Activation in dorsal mPFC was modulated by the need for control, whereas rostral mPFC was modulated by reasoning demands. These findings fit with previously suggested domain-general functions for different parts of mPFC and suggest that these functions are recruited selectively in the service of ToM.

The puzzling difficulty of tool innovation: why can't children piece their knowledge together?

Tool innovation-designing and making novel tools to solve tasks-is extremely difficult for young children. To discover why this might be, we highlighted different aspects of tool making to children aged 4 to 6 years (N=110). Older children successfully innovated the means to make a hook after seeing the pre-made target tool only if they had a chance to manipulate the materials during a warm-up. Older children who had not manipulated the materials and all younger children performed at floor. We conclude that children's difficulty is likely to be due to the ill-structured nature of tool innovation problems, in which components of a solution must be retrieved and coordinated. Older children struggled to bring to mind components of the solution but could coordinate them, whereas younger children could not coordinate components even when explicitly provided.

Mindreading quality versus quantity: A theoretically and empirically motivated two-factor structure for individual differences in adults' mindreading.

Existing methods for studying individual differences in adults' mindreading often lack good psychometric characteristics. Moreover, it remains unclear, even in theory, how mindreading varies in adults who already possess an understanding of mental states. In this pre-registered study, it was hypothesised that adults vary in their motivation for mindreading and in the degree to which their answers on mindreading tasks are appropriate (context-sensitive). These factors are confounded in existing measures as they do not differentiate between the frequency of mental state terms (MST), indicative of motivation, and the quality of an explanation. Using an innovative scoring system, the current study examined whether individual differences in adult undergraduate psychology students' (N = 128) answer quality and / or quantity of explicit references to others' mental states on two open-ended response mindreading tasks were separable constructs, accounted for by mindreading motivation, and related differentially to measures previously linked with mindreading (e.g., religiosity, loneliness, social network size). A two-factor and one-factor model both provided acceptable fit. Neither model showed significant associations with mindreading motivation. However, a two-factor model (with MST and response appropriateness loading onto separate factors) provided greater explanatory power. Specifically, MST was positively associated with religiosity and response appropriateness was negatively associated with religiosity, whilst the one-factor solution did not predict any socially relevant outcomes. This provides some indication that mindreading quantity and mindreading quality may be distinguishable constructs in the structure of individual differences in mindreading.

It is not all about you: Communicative cooperation is determined by your partner's theory of mind abilities as well as your own.

We investigated the relationship between Theory of Mind (ToM) and communicative cooperation. Specifically, we examined whether communicative cooperation is affected by the ToM ability of one's cooperative partner as well as their own. ToM is the attribution of mental states to oneself and others; cooperation is the joint action that leads to achieving a shared goal. We measured cooperation using a novel communicative cooperation game completed by participants in pairs. ToM was measured via the Movies for Assessment of Social Cognition (MASC) task and fluid intelligence via the Raven task. Findings of 350 adults show that ToM scores of both players were predictors of cooperative failure, whereas Raven scores were not. Furthermore, participants were split into low- and high-ToM groups through a median split of the MASC scores: high-ToM individuals committed significantly fewer cooperative errors compared to their low-ToM counterparts. Therefore, we found a direct relationship between ToM and cooperation. Interestingly, we also examined how ToM scores of paired participants determine cooperation. We found that pairs with two high-ToM individuals committed significantly fewer errors compared to pairs with two low-ToM individuals. We speculate that reduced cooperation in low-low ToM pairs is a result of less efficient development of conceptual alignment and recovery from misalignment, compared to high-high ToM dyads. For the first time, we thus demonstrate that it is not all about you; both cooperative partners make key, independent, contributions to cooperative outcomes. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

Measures of individual differences in adult theory of mind: A systematic review.

Theory of mind (ToM), the ability to understand and reason about mental states, has been extensively studied in young children and clinical populations. A growing interest in examining ToM in adults has emerged over the past two decades, but the extent to which existing measures are suitable for studying adults, especially in detecting individual differences, remains understudied. In this systematic review of 273 studies, 75 measures used to investigate individual differences in adults' ToM were identified. Their sensitivity to individual differences, reliability, and validity were examined. Results suggest that ceiling effects were prevalent, and there was limited evidence to establish the reliability or validity of these measures due to the lack of reports of psychometric properties. Interrelations among measures were inconsistent. These findings highlight the need for future empirical and theoretical work to broaden the evidence base regarding psychometric properties of measures, to develop new measures, and to lay out more specific hypotheses about the relevance of ToM for different social outcomes.

A transdiagnostic approach to neurodiversity in a representative population sample: The N+ 4 model.

Background: The concept of neurodiversity draws upon scientific research, and lessons from practice and lived experience to suggest new ways of thinking about neurodevelopmental conditions. Among the formative observations are that characteristics associated with neurodevelopmental conditions are part of a "broader phenotype" of variation across the whole population, and that there appear to be "transdiagnostic" similarities as well as differences in these characteristics. These observations raise important questions that have implications for understanding diversity in neurodevelopmental conditions and in neurocognitive phenotypes across the whole population. Method: The present work examines broader phenotypes using seven widely used self-report assessments of traits associated with autism, ADHD, dyslexia, Developmental Coordination Disorder/dyspraxia, tic disorders/Tourette's, cortical hyperexcitability associated with subclinical epilepsy, and sensory sensitivities. A representative sample of 995 adults (aged 17-77) in the UK completed self-report measures of neurodiversity, wellbeing, generalized anxiety, and depression, and cognitive abilities (nonverbal intelligence and executive functioning). Results: We used confirmatory factor analysis to test whether variation and covariation was better characterized (1) by traditional diagnostic labels, or (2) transdiagnostically according to similarities in functions, behaviours, or phenomena. Results indicated that neurodiversity characteristics were best explained using a bifactor model with one general "N" factor and four condition-specific factors. Conclusion: This was the largest examination to date of the factor structure of broader phenotypes relevant to neurodevelopmental conditions. It provides critical benchmark data, and a framework approach for asking systematic questions about the structure of neurocognitive diversities seen in the whole population and in people with one or more diagnoses.

Remembering visual and linguistic common ground in shared history.

Successful communication requires speakers and listeners to refer to information in their common ground. Shared history is one of the bases for common ground, as information from a communicative episode in the past can be referred to in future communication. However, to draw upon shared history, communicative partners need to have an accurate memory record that they can refer to. The memory mechanism for shared history is poorly understood. The current study investigated the ways in which memory for shared history is prioritised. Two experiments presented a referential communication task followed by a surprise recognition memory task, with the former task serving as an episode of shared history. Experiment 1 revealed superior memory for information that was both seen in the communicators' common ground and referred to, followed by information that was seen but not referred to, and finally by information privileged to the participants. Experiment 2 provided a replication of Experiment 1 and further demonstrated that these co-presence effects are not dependent on the presence of a speaker with a different perspective to the participant.

Three key questions to move towards a theoretical framework of visuospatial perspective taking.

What would a theory of visuospatial perspective taking (VSPT) look like? Here, ten researchers in the field, many with different theoretical viewpoints and empirical approaches, present their consensus on the three big questions we need to answer in order to bring this theory (or these theories) closer.