A Practice-Oriented Review of Health Concepts.

Whereas theories on health generally argue in favor of one specific concept, we argue that, given the variety of health practices, we need different concepts of health. We thus approach health concepts as a Wittgensteinian family of thick concepts. By discussing five concepts of health offered by (philosophical) theory, we argue that all capture something that seems relevant when we talk and think about health. Classifying these concepts reveals their family resemblances: each of these concepts differs from the others in at least one respect and resembles the others in several respects. Moreover, our classification shows that "health" always both describes a condition and evaluates that condition at the same time. Having both descriptive and evaluative dimensions, we can see health concepts as "thick concepts." It is because of this evaluative dimension that it is important to reflect on the question of what understanding of health guides specific practices. We show that the distinctions revealed by our classification can serve as a conceptual toolbox for reflection on the assumptions and purposes of particular health practices. Finally, we illustrate how such reflection could work out by briefly exploring three specific health practices.

Bringing Back a Scientific and Updated Approach to Wildlife Conservation: A Response. Reply to Beltrán, J.F.; Rodríguez-Rodríguez, E.J. Relying on Incomplete Information Can Lead to the Wrong Conclusions. Comment on "van Hassel, F.; Bovenkerk, B. How Should We Help Wild Animals Cope with Climate Change? The Case of the Iberian Lynx. Animals 2023, 13, 453".

We are pleased that our paper on the need to extend climate justice to animals [...].

How Should We Help Wild Animals Cope with Climate Change? The Case of the Iberian Lynx.

Climate change and related shifts in weather conditions result in massive biodiversity declines and severe animal suffering. This article explores the measures that can be taken to decrease animal suffering and prevent species from going extinct. Taking the Iberian lynx as a case study, we assess the extent to which it is beneficial for animal welfare and species conservation to do nothing or reduce other threats, provide food or shelter, relocate the species via assisted migration, or bring the population into captivity. We argue that, given the Iberian lynx's non-invasive characteristics, assisted migration may be the best way to protect the species while ensuring animal welfare and protecting wildness and other ecosystem values.

Not All Puppies and Sunshine: How Dog Keepers Cope with Dog-Related Problems in Dutch Society.

Zoonoses, biting incidents, hereditary problems, and other issues can threaten the welfare of both humans and dogs. The Dutch government and animal welfare organizations seem to have little effect in their campaigns to influence the behavior of (potential) dog keepers, who can experience dissonance when faced with these campaigns and use coping strategies to relieve the dissonance instead of changing their behavior. In this study, in focus group discussions, dog keepers with pedigree dogs, high-risk dogs, foreign shelter dogs, and dogs purchased at puppy farms shared their experiences with opinions on dogs and were confronted with negative opinions on their dogs. The data were analyzed using a coping strategies framework. Most coping strategies were found in all groups, but were used in response to different dilemmas, with different manifestations. These differences should be kept in mind when behavior change in dog keepers is opportune. Special attention should be given to differentiating target groups, as use of the detachment coping strategy suggests that boundaries might be set differently than expected. Broad attention on problems with and for dogs can address perceived dissonance and prompt behavior change. In dialogue with dog keepers, in influential campaigns and in policy formulation, the chances of success are greater if initiators are aware of the strategies that they may encounter.

One Health as a moral dilemma: Towards a socially responsible zoonotic disease control.

During the last decade, the concept of One Health has become the international standard for zoonotic disease control. This call for transdisciplinary collaboration between professionals in human, animal and environmental health has produced several successes in zoonotic disease control, surveillance and research. Despite the lack of a clear definition, a shared agenda or institutional governance, One Health has proven to be a fruitful idea. Due to its ambiguity, the One Health concept functions as a boundary object: by leaving room for interpretation to fit different purposes, it facilitates cooperation. In many cases, this results in the promotion of health of humans, animals and the environment. However, there are also situations in which this mutual benefit of a One Health approach is not that evident, for instance, when healthy animals are culled to protect public health. Although such a strategy could well be part of a One Health approach, it is hard to understand how this contributes to the health of concerning animals. Consequently, these practices often lead to public debate. This raises questions on how we should understand the One Health concept in zoonotic disease control. Is it really about equally improving the health of humans, animals and the environment and is this even possible? Or is it ultimately just public health that counts? In cases of conflict between different values, the lack of a universal definition of the One Health concept contributes to this complexity. Although boundary objects have many positive aspects, in the context of One Health and zoonotic disease control, this conception seems to conceal underlying normative differences. To address moral dilemmas related to a One Health approach in zoonotic disease control, it is important to reflect on moral status and the meaning of health for humans, animals and the environment.

The use of animal models in behavioural neuroscience research.

Animal models are used in experiments in the behavioural neurosciences that aim to contribute to the prevention and treatment of cognitive and affective disorders in human beings, such as anxiety and depression. Ironically, those animals that are likely to be the best models for psychopathology are also likely to be considered the ones that are most morally problematic to use, if it seems probable that (and if indeed they are initially selected as models because) they have experiences that are similar to human experiences that we have strong reasons to avoid causing, and indeed aim to alleviate (such as pain, anxiety or sadness). In this paper, against the background of contemporary discussions in animal ethics and the philosophy of animal minds, we discuss the views that it is morally permissible to use animals in these kinds of experiments, and that it is better to use less cognitively complex animals (such as zebrafish) than more complex animals (such as dogs). First, we criticise some justifications for the claim that human beings and more complex animals have higher moral status. We argue that contemporary approaches that attribute equal moral status to all beings that are capable of conscious strivings strivings (e.g. avoiding pain and anxiety; aiming to eat and play) are based on more plausible assumptions. Second, we argue that it is problematic to assume that less cognitively complex animals have a lesser sensory and emotional experience than more complex beings across the board. In specific cases, there might be good reasons to assume that more complex beings would be harmed more by a specific physical or environmental intervention, but it might also be that they sometimes are harmed less because of a better ability to cope. Determining whether a specific experiment is justified is therefore a complex issue. Our aim in this chapter is to stimulate further reflection on these common assumptions behind the use of animal models for psychopathologies. In order to be able to draw more definite conclusions, more research will have to be done on the influence of cognitive complexity on the experience of (human and non-human) animals.

Brave new birds. The use of 'animal integrity' in animal ethics.

Suppose "chicken" eggs could be produced by quasi-chickens--genetically engineered humps of living chicken-flesh that do nothing but lay eggs. Would there be anything amiss with that? Animal ethicists invoke the notion of animal integrity in order to give intellectual content to the intuition that there would be. On inspection, 'integrity' isn't everything its proponents want it to be. Yet there's enough in it to make reasoned argument possible.