A Systematic Investigation of Tobacco Industry Sourced Data Relating to Illicit Tobacco Trade Featured in Pakistan's Media Coverage (2015-2020).

INTRODUCTION: Previous evidence suggests the tobacco industry uses media to disseminate misleading narratives relating to illicit tobacco trade (ITT) as part of efforts to influence policy outcomes. Such evidence is largely high-income countries (HIC) focused, resulting in a literature gap for low- and middle-income countries (LMICs). Pakistan and its annual budget cycle are used as a case study for addressing this gap. AIMS AND METHODS: Electronic English-language articles from newspapers in Pakistan (328) were sourced from LexisNexis and a sub-sample of Urdu-language electronic articles (12) were identified through internet searches. The articles were published between 2015 and 2020 and included claims/estimates relating to ITT, which were coded to identify cited data sources. Changes in media coverage before and after Pakistan's annual budget announcements were explored via Wilcoxon signed rank and Poisson regression tests. RESULTS: Of the 357 claims/estimates analyzed, 66 (20%) were industry-funded. The most prevalent sources were national government bodies (36.6%) and tobacco companies or their representatives (15.1%). Wilcoxon signed-rank and Poisson regression tests on the frequency of English-language articles both created a p-value of < .05 for the frequency of relevant articles between the months of April and May, compared to the other months, indicating statistical significance. CONCLUSIONS: There was a statistically significant increase in the number of English-language articles featuring claims/estimates relating to Pakistan's ITT in the months leading up to the annual budget each year. The government should consider measures to improve transparency standards within media coverage and promote factcheck journalism to safeguard against industry tactics to manipulate public discourses. IMPLICATIONS: This paper is, to the best of our knowledge, the largest exploration of the use of data sourced from the tobacco industry within a country's media that has been undertaken to date, utilizing a team of seven coders across the United Kingdom and Pakistan. Our findings reveal weaknesses within media coverage of ITT in Pakistan, both in English and Urdu language publications. We encourage the government to consider new standards to enhance transparency and promote factcheck journalism within media coverage in the country.

Analysis of Philip Morris International's 'aspirational' target for its 2025 cigarette shipments.

BACKGROUND: Philip Morris International (PMI) claims to be transforming and has committed to a 'smoke-free' future. In 2020, it announced an 'aspirational' target for reduced cigarette shipments by 2025. METHODS: PMI cigarette shipment data are taken from PMI quarterly financial reports 2008-2023. Trends in these data before and after the 2020 announcement are analysed using linear regression, and auto regressive integrated moving average and error, trend, seasonal time-series models to assess if PMI's 2025 target would be met on pre-existing trends, and if the trend changed after the announcement. These trends are also compared with the global retail market for cigarettes, using sales data from Euromonitor. RESULTS: Findings were consistent across all three models. PMI's shipment target of 550 billion cigarette sticks by 2025 would readily have been met given pre-existing shipment trends. Following the 2020 announcement, the decline in PMI cigarette shipments stalled markedly with a statistically significant change in trend (p<0.001). The current and projected trend to 2025 is consistent with no further decline in cigarette volumes, meaning PMI is unlikely to hit its target. This mirrors a global pattern in which declines in cigarette sales have stalled since 2020. CONCLUSIONS: PMI's 2025 target was not 'aspirational' but highly conservative-it would have been met based on pre-existing trends in declining cigarette shipments. Yet PMI will nonetheless fail to meet that target providing evidence it is not transforming. Stalling of the decline of PMI and global cigarette sales raises significant concerns about progress in global tobacco control.

Improving estimates of the illicit cigarette trade through collaboration: lessons from two studies of Malaysia.

This paper critically analyses contrasting estimates of Malaysia's illicit cigarette trade in 2011, 2015 and 2019 by Bui et al and Koya et al who previously produced independent estimates at about the same time using tax gap analysis. Collaboration between the two authors' teams emerged due to the discrepancies in their results, generating this paper to explore the methodological issues identified and hence produce revised estimates of the rate of illicit. Key issues identified were: Bui et al's assessment of legally imported cigarettes impacting all years; their exclusion of ad valorem duty affecting the 2011 and 2015 estimates; Koya et al overlooked the value of cigarettes for export market in their ad valorem calculation and used the sales value of imported tobacco/tobacco products, not just cigarettes, both of which impact estimates for 2011 and 2015. Recalculations using Koya et al's consumption data reveal that in 2019, illicit cigarettes accounted for about 70% of the market, which is higher than Bui et al's estimate (38%) but slightly lower than Koya et al's (72%). For 2011 and 2015 where ad valorem applied, the corrected estimates show a share of the illicit cigarette market of approximately 41.1% and 52.7%, respectively, differing from Bui et al's 0% in 2011 and 29.6% in 2015, and Koya et al's 51% in 2011 and 55% in 2015. This paper provides essential lessons for addressing methodological issues between authors' teams and updated estimates of Malaysia's illicit cigarette trade, verifying that Malaysia faces a substantial illicit cigarette trade problem.

Turning a threat into an opportunity: British American Tobacco's weakening of the Protocol to Eliminate Illicit Trade in Tobacco Products.

BACKGROUND: Previous research has outlined transnational tobacco company (TTC) efforts to undermine implementation of the Protocol to Eliminate Illicit Trade in Tobacco Products (Protocol) and evidence of ongoing TTC complicity in the illicit tobacco trade (ITT). However, the industry's views on the Protocol and role in its development are not well understood. METHODS: Systematic searching and analysis of leaked documents-approximately 15 000 from British American Tobacco (BAT) and 35 from Philip Morris International, triangulated via searches of online resources and interviews with five stakeholders across academia, international organisations, governments, civil society and the private sector. FINDINGS: Evidence indicates that after privately viewing the Protocol as a significant threat (2003), BAT worked to influence its content, while publicly signalling support for it (2007-2012), and was largely satisfied with the final text. BAT successfully pushed for a non-prescriptive text which enabled further country-level TTC influence during the Protocol's implementation phase. The final text also reflected other BAT policy preferences, including preventing outright bans on duty-free sales and intermingling, and making it difficult to sanction and hold tobacco companies accountable for ongoing involvement in the ITT. TTC representatives were present during early Protocol negotiations, despite rules against this, and BAT obtained draft texts before they were public and paid at least one delegate to support its position. CONCLUSIONS: BAT's primary interest in shaping the Protocol was to minimise its financial and legal costs for BAT while maximising potential costs to small competitors. These findings raise concern about the Protocol's ability to control the ITT, particularly given TTCs' intention to influence ongoing national implementation. An effective Protocol is vital to controlling both the ITT and ongoing tobacco industry involvement in it and, in turn, governments' ability to increase tobacco taxes and thereby save lives.

Understanding the long-term policy influence strategies of the tobacco industry: two contemporary case studies.

OBJECTIVE: This paper explores transnational tobacco companies' (TTCs) long-term policy influence strategies using two case studies, harm reduction and illicit tobacco, to identify lessons for the tobacco control movement and wider efforts to address the commercial determinants of health. METHODS: Evidence from a broad combination of sources including leaked documents and findings from over two decades of TTC monitoring were reviewed for each case study and categorised using the Policy Dystopia Model, focusing on the primary discursive strategy and key instrumental (action-based) strategies used. RESULTS: In both case studies, TTCs seek to advance their interests by engaging primarily in reputation management, coalition management and information management strategies over the long-term to propagate their over-riding discursive strategy-'we've changed, we are part of the solution'-despite clear evidence from both case studies that this is not the case. These strategies are globally coordinated and attempt primarily to reshape norms towards TTC involvement in tobacco control policy and delivery. Findings also suggest that industry denormalisation and the advent of Article 5.3 have led to the TTCs growing use of increasingly complex and opaque 'webs of influence'. CONCLUSIONS: The tobacco control community must develop its own proactive long-term strategies which should include industry denormalisation, new ways to fund research that reduce industry control, and improved transparency measures for research and policy. These findings, including TTC adaptations to Article 5.3, also indicate the need for more structural solutions, addressing corporate power and the underlying political and economic system. These lessons can be applied to other unhealthy commodity industries.

Analysis of submissions to the EU's public consultation on tobacco traceability and security features.

BACKGROUND: The Protocol to Eliminate Illicit Trade in Tobacco Products requires all parties to establish a tobacco track and trace (T&T) system. In 2016, the European Commission held a public consultation on T&T implementation where parties were asked to respond online to 22 multiple-choice questions and were given additional opportunities to leave comments. In May 2019, the European Union's (EU) T&T system became operational. This paper explores tobacco industry influence over and policy positions within the consultation process. METHODS: We identified consultation respondents and investigated any financial links with the tobacco industry and if these were transparent. Respondent's answers to the consultation's multiple-choice questions were collated to explore whether industry-linked respondents held the same policy positions as transnational tobacco companies (TTCs). Associations between policy positions and respondent's financial link status were tested using χ2 and Cranmer's V tests. FINDINGS: Of the 197 consultation respondents identified, 131 (66.4%) had financial links to the industry; 29 (22.1%) were not transparent about these links. A large number of trade associations responded (87), the majority of which (74/87) had financial links to the industry. There was a clear divide in the policy preferences of respondents with and without a financial link. Collectively, respondents with a financial link supported an industry-operated T&T solution. CONCLUSIONS: There was an extensive lobbying effort by the tobacco industry over the EU's T&T system, with TTCs' interests being represented repeatedly through multiple trade associations. The transparency requirements regarding consultation respondents' affiliations with relevant stakeholders (eg, tobacco manufacturers) should be improved for future consultations.

Tracking and tracing the tobacco industry: potential tobacco industry influence over the EU's system for tobacco traceability and security features.

BACKGROUND: Subsequent to the transnational tobacco companies' (TTC) history of involvement in tobacco smuggling, the Illicit Trade Protocol (ITP) requires that tobacco tracking and tracing (T&T) systems be established independent of the industry. In response, TTCs developed a T&T system, originally called Codentify, promoting it via an elaborate set of front groups to create a false impression of independence. The European Union (EU) is one of the first and largest jurisdictions to operationalise T&T. We explore how industry efforts to influence T&T have evolved. METHODS: Analysis of tobacco industry documents, policy documents, submissions to a relevant consultation and relationships between the tobacco industry and organisations proposed by it and approved by the European Commission to provide a data repository function within the EU's T&T system. FINDINGS: 17 months after TTCs sold Codentify to Inexto and Philip Morris International claimed Inexto was independent, leaked documents suggest TTCs and Inexto continued to have a financial and operational relationship. Inexto's meetings with TTCs, engagement with EU Member States and promotion of industry-favoured technical standards suggest TTCs influenced Inexto's activities, using the company to undermine EU T&T. The EU's T&T system appears to be inconsistent with the ITP due to its 'mixed' governance and seven of eight organisations approved as data repository providers having pre-existing industry business links. CONCLUSIONS: TTC's efforts to maximise their control and minimise external scrutiny of T&T systems seriously limit attempts to address tobacco smuggling. Countries implementing T&T should be alert to such efforts and should not replicate the EU system.

Tobacco industry's elaborate attempts to control a global track and trace system and fundamentally undermine the Illicit Trade Protocol.

BACKGROUND: The Illicit Trade Protocol (ITP) requires a global track and trace (T&T) system to reduce tobacco smuggling. Given the tobacco industry's (TI) historical involvement in tobacco smuggling, it stipulates that T&T 'shall not be performed by or delegated to the tobacco industry'. This paper explores the rationale for & nature of the TI's effors to influence the ITP & its T&T system. METHODS: Analysis of leaked TI documents and publicly available data; ,investigation of front groups, trademark and patent ownership. FINDINGS: Growing & diverse sources of evidence indicate that the TI remains involved in tobacco smuggling and that TI cigarettes account for around two-thirds of the illicit cigarette market. The TI therefore has a vested interest in controlling the global T&T system aimed to curtail this behaviour. To this end, Philip Morris International (PMI) adapted its pack marker system, Codentify, to meet T&T requirements, licensed it for free to its three major competitors who then collectively promoted it to governments using front groups and third parties including companies claiming to be independent despite clear TI links. PMI also sought to suggest Codentify was independent by selling some parts of its intellectual property on Codentify while retaining others, leaving a complex web of shared interests. In Africa, British American Tobacco used payments to obtain data suggesting its smaller competitor companies were evading taxes and secure influence with tax authorities. Regulatory capture has been enhanced by a public relations effort involving TI funding for conferences, training, research, and international police and anti-corruption organisations. Collectively this has created public messaging and a powerful network of organisations supportive of the TI's misleading postion on illicit. CONCLUSIONS: Governments should assume the TI seeks to control T&T systems in order to avoid scrutiny and minimise excise tax payments and that any T&T system based on Codentify, on intellectual property currently or previously owned by the TI, or being promoted or implemented by companies with TI links, is incompatible with the ITP and would not serve to reduce illicit trade.

Tobacco industry data on illicit tobacco trade: a systematic review of existing assessments.

OBJECTIVE: To examine the quality of tobacco industry-funded data on the illicit tobacco trade (ITT) through a systematic review of existing assessments of industry-funded data on ITT. DATA SOURCES: Papers and reports assessing tobacco industry-funded data on ITT were obtained via searches of 8 academic databases, Google searches and correspondence with ITT experts. STUDY SELECTION: Inclusion criteria identified 35 English-language papers containing an original assessment of tobacco industry-funded data. DATA EXTRACTION: Using a coding framework, information was extracted from the assessments regarding the quality of tobacco industry data. Documents were second-coded, achieving 94% intercoder reliability with all disagreements resolved. DATA SYNTHESIS: Of the 35 assessments reviewed, 31 argued that tobacco industry estimates were higher than independent estimates. Criticisms identified problems with data collection (29), analytical methods (22) and presentation of results (21), which resulted in inflated ITT estimates or data on ITT that were presented in a misleading manner. Lack of transparency from data collection right through to presentation of findings was a key issue with insufficient information to allow replication of the findings frequently cited. CONCLUSIONS: Tobacco industry data on ITT are not reliable. At present, the tobacco industry continues to fund and disseminate ITT research through initiatives such as PMI IMPACT. If industry data on ITT cannot meet the standards of accuracy and transparency set by high-quality research publications, a solution may be to tax tobacco companies and administer the resulting funds to experts, independent of the tobacco industry, who use previously developed reliable models for measuring ITT.

Topic prediction for tobacco control based on COP9 tweets using machine learning techniques.

The prediction of tweets associated with specific topics offers the potential to automatically focus on and understand online discussions surrounding these issues. This paper introduces a comprehensive approach that centers on the topic of "harm reduction" within the broader context of tobacco control. The study leveraged tweets from the period surrounding the ninth Conference of the Parties to review the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (COP9) as a case study to pilot this approach. By using Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA)-based topic modeling, the study successfully categorized tweets related to harm reduction. Subsequently, various machine learning techniques were employed to predict these topics, achieving a prediction accuracy of 91.87% using the Random Forest algorithm. Additionally, the study explored correlations between retweets and sentiment scores. It also conducted a toxicity analysis to understand the extent to which online conversations lacked neutrality. Understanding the topics, sentiment, and toxicity of Twitter data is crucial for identifying public opinion and its formation. By specifically focusing on the topic of "harm reduction" in tweets related to COP9, the findings offer valuable insights into online discussions surrounding tobacco control. This understanding can aid policymakers in effectively informing the public and garnering public support, ultimately contributing to the successful implementation of tobacco control policies.

Extent of illicit cigarette market from single stick sales in Ghana: findings from a cross-sectional survey.

OBJECTIVE: This study aims to measure the extent of illicit cigarette consumption from single stick sales, to determine the nature and types of illicit cigarettes present in Ghana, and to identify the factors associated with illicit cigarette consumption in Ghana. DESIGN: A cross-sectional study using empty cigarette packs generated by 1 day's single stick cigarette sales collected from cigarette vendors. SETTING: Five large cities (Accra, Kumasi, Takoradi, Tamale and Bolgatanga) and three border towns (Aflao, Paga/Hamele and Elubo) in the northern, middle and coastal belt of Ghana. PROCEDURE AND PARTICIPANTS: Ten areas were randomly selected in each city/town, and all shops selling cigarettes within 1 km of the central point were surveyed. OUTCOME MEASURES: (1) Estimates of the share of illicit cigarette packs in the total cigarette sales from vendors selling single stick cigarettes in Ghana; (2) nature and types of illicit cigarette packs; (3) factors associated with illicit cigarette sales in Ghana. RESULTS: Of a total of 4461 packs, about 20% (95% CI 18.3 to 20.7) were found to be illicit. Aflao (Ghana-Togo border) and Tamale (Ghana-Burkina Faso border) had the highest percentage of illicit cigarette sales at 99% and 46%, respectively (p<0.001). Over half of the illicit packs originated from Togo (51%), followed by Nigeria (15%) and then Cote d'Ivoire (10%). Adjusted and unadjusted logistic regression models indicated that convenience stores, border towns, pack price and the northern zone had higher odds of illicit cigarette sales. CONCLUSION: To effectively tackle illicit cigarettes, market surveillance and strengthening supply chain control are required, particularly at the border towns and the northern region of the country.

What does Brexit mean for UK tobacco control?

In January 2020 the UK left the European Union (EU), although a transition period extends EU rules/regulations until the end of 2020 while a longer-term relationship agreement is negotiated. After almost 50 years of membership the UK economy is tightly integrated into that of the EU single market, and many UK laws and regulations have their origins in the EU, including those concerning tobacco. This paper provides an overview of potential implications of Brexit for UK tobacco control. We examine the key areas of the supply, cost, taxation, and regulation of tobacco products, and the impact of commitments in regards to the border between Ireland and Northern Ireland (NI). We find that Brexit provides an opportunity for improved tobacco control with potential for particular enhancements in the areas of taxation and product regulation. However, commitments in regards to NI mean these benefits either won't extend to NI (which will continue to follow EU rules), or could lead to the whole UK having to follow most EU rules/regulations despite no longer being involved in the decision making process. The details of any future deal will be important, especially since virtually all UK tobacco products come from the EU, and hence would be subject to disruption/considerable new tariffs (i.e. taxation on imports) without a trade deal. We conclude that political will by the UK government to secure conditions which protect the UK's world leading tobacco control measures will be key to whether Brexit helps or hinders tobacco control in the UK. In this regards the signs are mixed.