The relationship between the price and demand of alcohol, tobacco, unhealthy food, sugar-sweetened beverages, and gambling: an umbrella review of systematic reviews.

BACKGROUND: The WHO highlight alcohol, tobacco, unhealthy food, and sugar-sweetened beverage (SSB) taxes as one of the most effective policies for preventing and reducing the burden of non-communicable diseases. This umbrella review aimed to identify and summarise evidence from systematic reviews that report the relationship between price and demand or price and disease/death for alcohol, tobacco, unhealthy food, and SSBs. Given the recent recognition as gambling as a public health problem, we also included gambling. METHODS: The protocol for this umbrella review was pre-registered (PROSPERO CRD42023447429). Seven electronic databases were searched between 2000-2023. Eligible systematic reviews were those published in any country, including adults or children, and which quantitatively examined the relationship between alcohol, tobacco, gambling, unhealthy food, or SSB price/tax and demand (sales/consumption) or disease/death. Two researchers undertook screening, eligibility, data extraction, and risk of bias assessment using the ROBIS tool. RESULTS: We identified 50 reviews from 5,185 records, of which 31 reported on unhealthy food or SSBs, nine reported on tobacco, nine on alcohol, and one on multiple outcomes (alcohol, tobacco, unhealthy food, and SSBs). We did not identify any reviews on gambling. Higher prices were consistently associated with lower demand, notwithstanding variation in the size of effect across commodities or populations. Reductions in demand were large enough to be considered meaningful for policy. CONCLUSIONS: Increases in the price of alcohol, tobacco, unhealthy food, and SSBs are consistently associated with decreases in demand. Moreover, increasing taxes can be expected to increase tax revenue. There may be potential in joining up approaches to taxation across the harm-causing commodities.

Availability of Alcohol on an Online Third-Party Delivery Platform Across London Boroughs, England: Exploratory Cross-Sectional Study.

BACKGROUND: Higher availability of alcohol is associated with higher levels of alcohol consumption and harm. Alcohol is increasingly accessible online, with rapid delivery often offered by a third-party driver. Remote delivery and online availability are important from a public health perspective, but to date, relatively little research has explored the availability of alcohol offered by online platforms. OBJECTIVE: This cross-sectional exploratory study describes the availability of alcohol on the third-party platform Deliveroo within London, England. METHODS: We extracted the number of outlets offering alcohol on Deliveroo for each London borough and converted these into crude rates per 1000 population (18-64 years). Outlets were grouped as outlets exclusively selling alcohol, off-licenses, and premium. We calculated Pearson correlation coefficients to explore the association between borough's crude rate of outlets per 1000 population and average Indices of Multiple Deprivation (IMD) 2019 scores. We extracted the number of outlets also selling tobacco or e-cigarettes and used non-Deliveroo drivers. We searched addresses of the top 20 outlets delivering to the most boroughs by outlet type (60 total) to determine their associated premise. RESULTS: We identified 4277 total Deliveroo-based outlets offering alcohol across London, including outlets delivering in multiple boroughs. The crude rate of outlets per 1000 population aged 18-64 years was 0.73 and ranged from 0.22 to 2.29 per borough. Most outlets exclusively sold alcohol (3086/4277, 72.2%), followed by off-licenses (770/4277, 18.0%) and premium (421/4277, 9.8%). The majority of outlets exclusively selling alcohol sold tobacco or e-cigarettes (2951/3086, 95.6%) as did off-licenses to a lesser extent (588/770, 76.4%). Most outlets exclusively offering alcohol used drivers not employed by Deliveroo (2887/3086, 93.6%), and the inverse was true for premium outlets (50/421, 11.9%) and off-licenses (73/770, 9.5%). There were 1049 unique outlets, of which 396 (37.8%) were exclusively offering alcohol-these outlets tended to deliver across multiple boroughs unlike off-licenses and premium outlets. Of outlets with confirmed addresses, self-storage units were listed as the associated premise for 85% (17/20) of outlets exclusively offering alcohol, 11% (2/19) of off-licenses, and 12% (2/17) of premium outlets. We found no significant relationship between borough IMD scores and crude rate of outlets per 1000 population overall (P=.87) or by any outlet type: exclusively alcohol (P=.41), off-license (P=.58), and premium (P=.18). CONCLUSIONS: London-based Deliveroo outlets offering alcohol are common and are sometimes operating from self-storage units that have policies prohibiting alcohol storage. This and the potential for increased alcohol accessibility online have implications for public health given the relationship between alcohol's availability and consumption or harm. There is a need to ensure that regulations for delivery are adequate for protecting children and vulnerable adults. The Licensing Act 2003 may require modernization in the digital age. Future research must explore a relationship between online alcohol availability and deprivation.