RESUMO
The treatment of patients with cancer who test positive for severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) poses unique challenges. In this commentary, the authors describe the ethical rationale and implementation details for the creation of a novel, multidisciplinary treatment prioritization committee, including physicians, frontline staff, an ethicist, and an infectious disease expert. Organizational obligations to health care workers also are discussed. The treatment prioritization committee sets a threshold of acceptable harm to patients from decreased cancer control that is justified to reduce risk to staff. The creation of an ethical, consistent, and transparent decision-making process involving such frontline stakeholders is essential as departments across the country are faced with decisions regarding the treatment of SARS-CoV-2-positive patients with cancer.
Assuntos
Betacoronavirus , Infecções por Coronavirus/complicações , Atenção à Saúde/ética , Pessoal de Saúde/ética , Neoplasias/complicações , Pandemias/ética , Pneumonia Viral/complicações , Qualidade da Assistência à Saúde/ética , Assistência Ambulatorial/ética , Assistência Ambulatorial/organização & administração , COVID-19 , Tomada de Decisão Clínica , Infecções por Coronavirus/virologia , Atenção à Saúde/organização & administração , Pessoal de Saúde/organização & administração , Humanos , Neoplasias/radioterapia , Segurança do Paciente , Pneumonia Viral/virologia , Qualidade da Assistência à Saúde/organização & administração , SARS-CoV-2RESUMO
OBJECTIVES: Stereotactic body radiation therapy (SBRT) can improve therapeutic ratios and patient convenience, but delivering higher doses per fraction increases the potential for patient harm. Incident learning systems (ILSs) are being increasingly adopted in radiation oncology to analyze reported events. This study used an ILS coupled with a Human Factor Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) and barriers management to investigate the origin and detection of SBRT events and to elucidate how safeguards can fail allowing errors to propagate through the treatment process. METHODS: Reported SBRT events were reviewed using an in-house ILS at 4 institutions over 2014-2019. Each institution used a customized care path describing their SBRT processes, including designated safeguards to prevent error propagation. Incidents were assigned a severity score based on the American Association of Physicists in Medicine Task Group Report 275. An HFACS system analyzed failing safeguards. RESULTS: One hundred sixty events were analyzed with 106 near misses (66.2%) and 54 incidents (33.8%). Fifty incidents were designated as low severity, with 4 considered medium severity. Incidents most often originated in the treatment planning stage (38.1%) and were caught during the pretreatment review and verification stage (37.5%) and treatment delivery stage (31.2%). An HFACS revealed that safeguard failures were attributed to human error (95.2%), routine violation (4.2%), and exceptional violation (0.5%) and driven by personnel factors 32.1% of the time, and operator condition also 32.1% of the time. CONCLUSIONS: Improving communication and documentation, reducing time pressures, distractions, and high workload should guide proposed improvements to safeguards in radiation oncology.