Correcting misperceptions of exponential coronavirus growth increases support for social distancing.

The most effective way to stem the spread of a pandemic such as coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) is social distancing, but the introduction of such measures is hampered by the fact that a sizeable part of the population fails to see their need. Three studies conducted during the mass spreading of the virus in the United States toward the end of March 2020 show that this results partially from people's misperception of the virus's exponential growth in linear terms and that overcoming this bias increases support for social distancing. Study 1 shows that American participants mistakenly perceive the virus's exponential growth in linear terms (conservatives more so than liberals). Studies 2 and 3 show that instructing people to avoid the exponential growth bias significantly increases perceptions of the virus's growth and thereby increases support for social distancing. Together, these results show the importance of statistical literacy to recruit support for fighting pandemics such as the coronavirus.

Power Affects Sexual Assertiveness and Sexual Esteem Equally in Women and Men.

Common stereotypes hold that men and women differ strongly in their attitudes toward sex and that such differences are amplified by social power. In contrast, an emerging literature suggests that social power affects both sexes similarly, thus potentially attenuating differences between the sexes. Four samples obtained in the Netherlands, the U.S., Britain, and South-East Asia (total N = 1985) test the effect of social power (operationalized as self-reported amount of power over others at the work place) on validated self-report measures of sexual assertiveness and sexual esteem. Across all samples, power was associated with greater sexual assertiveness and sexual esteem-equally for men and women. Furthermore, effects of power were larger and more consistent than differences between men and women. These findings add to an emerging literature, suggesting that often-observed differences between male and female sexuality actually reflect power differences. This suggests that such differences decrease with greater social equality.

Past-focused environmental comparisons promote proenvironmental outcomes for conservatives.

Conservatives appear more skeptical about climate change and global warming and less willing to act against it than liberals. We propose that this unwillingness could result from fundamental differences in conservatives' and liberals' temporal focus. Conservatives tend to focus more on the past than do liberals. Across six studies, we rely on this notion to demonstrate that conservatives are positively affected by past- but not by future-focused environmental comparisons. Past comparisons largely eliminated the political divide that separated liberal and conservative respondents' attitudes toward and behavior regarding climate change, so that across these studies conservatives and liberals were nearly equally likely to fight climate change. This research demonstrates how psychological processes, such as temporal comparison, underlie the prevalent ideological gap in addressing climate change. It opens up a promising avenue to convince conservatives effectively of the need to address climate change and global warming.

Increasing ideological tolerance in social psychology.

We argue that recognizing current ideological diversity in social psychology and promoting tolerance of minority views is just as important as increasing the number of non-liberal researchers. Increasing tolerance will allow individuals in the minority to express dissenting views, which will improve psychological science by reducing bias. We present four recommendations for increasing tolerance.

Collective nostalgia and political ideology.

Collective nostalgia is a form of nostalgia that is contingent upon thinking of oneself in terms of a particular social identity. Research has focused in particular on collective nostalgia for a nation's past. Here, I propose that conservatives and others on the right side of the political spectrum experience stronger collective nostalgia for their nation's past than liberals and those on the left. I first explain the roots of this prediction in conservative political philosophy, review empirical evidence in favor of that idea, and summarize findings that show the significance of this link for policy support. Finally, I review and discuss evidence that qualifies the link between conservatism and collective nostalgia.

Leading and Working From Home in Times of COVID-19: On the Perceived Changes in Leadership Behaviors.

Due to the COVID-19 crisis, managers and employees in many organizations suddenly are forced to work from home. Although working from home (WFH) is not a new phenomenon, it is new in its current scale and scope because of COVID-19. Against this background, we investigate the effect of WFH during the COVID-19 crisis on changes in leadership behaviors, and associated changes in perceived manager quality and productivity, at different hierarchical levels in organizations. Based on the literature, we develop two predictions in opposite directions. On the one hand, implementing WFH may force managers to show less direction and control and especially more delegation. On the other hand, research into the effects of exogenous shocks such as COVID-19, suggests that managers may become more controlling and delegate less. Consistent with the first prediction, we find that managers perceive they execute significantly less control and delegate more. Employees also perceive a significant decrease in control, however they perceive on average no change in delegation. Furthermore, and in line with the second prediction, employees of lower-level managers even report a significant decrease in delegation. Finally, our results show that increased delegation is associated with increased perceived productivity and higher manager quality. Together, these results suggest that in the context of the COVID-19 crisis, the effectiveness of WFH might be hampered by the fact that required changes in leadership behaviors, in particular in delegation, are difficult to realize in times of crisis.

Why People Hate Congress but Love Their Own Congressperson: An Information Processing Explanation.

Citizens in Western democracies often have negative attitudes toward political bodies, yet consistently re-elect their own representatives to these same political bodies. They hate Congress, but love their own congressperson. In contrast to resource-based explanations, we propose that this Paradox of Congressional Support is partly due to the wide availability of negative information about politicians in open societies combined with basic processes of information processing. Five studies found that unrelated negative political information decreases attitudes toward political categories such as U.S. governors but has no effect on attitudes of familiar, individual politicians (e.g., one's own governor); additional studies further identify familiarity as the critical process. Importantly, we demonstrate that this effect generalizes to all U.S. regions and remains when controlling for and is not moderated by political ideology. These results place a presumed macrolevel political paradox within the domain of cognitive mechanisms of basic information processing.

Power increases infidelity among men and women.

Data from a large survey of 1,561 professionals were used to examine the relationship between power and infidelity and the process underlying this relationship. Results showed that elevated power is positively associated with infidelity because power increases confidence in the ability to attract partners. This association was found for both actual infidelity and intentions to engage in infidelity in the future. Gender did not moderate these results: The relationship between power and infidelity was the same for women as for men, and for the same reason. These findings suggest that the common assumption (and often-found effect) that women are less likely than men to engage in infidelity is, at least partially, a reflection of traditional gender-based differences in power that exist in society.

More threatening and more diagnostic: How moral comparisons differ from social comparisons.

The current research tests how comparisons in the moral domain differ from other social comparisons in three ways. First, an initial experience-sampling study shows that people compare downward more strongly in the moral domain than in most other domains (Study 1, N = 454), because people like to feel moral and present themselves as moral. Second, the classic threat principle of social comparison holds that people choose downward comparisons to improve their well-being after a threat to their self-esteem. We propose that in the moral domain the threat principle is intensified because morality is a uniquely important and central comparison domain. Across seven experiments (Experiments 2a and 2b, 3a-3c, 4a and 4b), we find that people search for downward comparisons much more than in other domains. This effect is so strong that people are willing to forgo money and incur time costs to avoid upward moral comparisons when threatened. Third, another classic principle of social comparison holds that people only consider comparisons that are diagnostic (i.e., close or similar) and therefore self-relevant, while dismissing extreme or dissimilar comparisons as irrelevant. We propose that this diagnosticity principle is attenuated because morality is a binding code that applies equally to all humans. Across four experiments (Experiments 5a and 5b, 6a and 6b), we find that even the most extreme and dissimilar moral (but not other) comparisons are deemed relevant and potentially threatening. Together, these twelve studies (total N = 5,543) demonstrate how moral comparisons are a ubiquitous but fundamentally distinct form of social comparison with altered basic principles. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

How vertical elevation affects self-other integration as measured by the joint Simon effect.

Earlier findings suggest that positions of power decrease self-other integration and increase psychological distance to others. Until now, however, evidence for this relation rests exclusively on subjective measures. The current research instead employed a vertical joint Simon task to measure self-other integration. This task assesses the extent to which people represent their own actions in reference to their co-actor's, also referred to as the joint Simon effect. Building on cultural associations between power and vertical elevation, we manipulated whether participants were in an elevated (high-power) or lower (low-power) seating position. Experiments 1a and 1b reanalyzed existing datasets and found that elevated (vs. lower) seating position decreased the joint Simon effect, consistent with predictions. Experiment 2 provides a high-powered replication of this finding. Yet, further analyses revealed that feelings of power - measured as a manipulation check and indeed demonstrating that the manipulation was successful - did not mediate or moderate the effect of seating position on the joint Simon effect. Therefore, it is possible that the effect of seating elevation was driven through other aspects of that manipulation than feelings of power. We discuss these and suggest ways to test these alternative explanations.

Power increases hypocrisy: moralizing in reasoning, immorality in behavior.

In five studies, we explored whether power increases moral hypocrisy (i.e., imposing strict moral standards on other people but practicing less strict moral behavior oneself). In Experiment 1, compared with the powerless, the powerful condemned other people's cheating more, but also cheated more themselves. In Experiments 2 through 4, the powerful were more strict in judging other people's moral transgressions than in judging their own transgressions. A final study found that the effect of power on moral hypocrisy depends on the legitimacy of the power: When power was illegitimate, the moral-hypocrisy effect was reversed, with the illegitimately powerful becoming stricter in judging their own behavior than in judging other people's behavior. This pattern, which might be dubbed hypercrisy, was also found among low-power participants in Experiments 3 and 4. We discuss how patterns of hypocrisy and hypercrisy among the powerful and powerless can help perpetuate social inequality.

Power and moral thinking.

This review synthesizes research on how feelings of power affect the processing of moral information. Although power is typically viewed as a potentially corruptive force that reduces our morality, we propose that power amplifies moral thinking - but does so in different ways that potentially run in opposite directions. Building on the Moral Orientation Scale framework [1•], we propose that power increases the tendency to deliberate about moral questions, increases the tendency to integrate feelings and cognitions, and increases the adherence to principles and rules. Feelings of power do not corrupt, but lead to a more rich, mature, and multifaceted form of morality.

Subjective status and perceived legitimacy across countries.

The relationships between subjective status and perceived legitimacy are important for understanding the extent to which people with low status are complicit in their oppression. We use novel data from 66 samples and 30 countries (N = 12,788) and find that people with higher status see the social system as more legitimate than those with lower status, but there is variation across people and countries. The association between subjective status and perceived legitimacy was never negative at any levels of eight moderator variables, although the positive association was sometimes reduced. Although not always consistent with hypotheses, group identification, self-esteem, and beliefs in social mobility were all associated with perceived legitimacy among people who have low subjective status. These findings enrich our understanding of the relationship between social status and legitimacy.

Differentiating social and personal power: opposite effects on stereotyping, but parallel effects on behavioral approach tendencies.

How does power affect behavior? We posit that this depends on the type of power. We distinguish between social power (power over other people) and personal power (freedom from other people) and argue that these two types of power have opposite associations with independence and interdependence. We propose that when the distinction between independence and interdependence is relevant, social power and personal power will have opposite effects; however, they will have parallel effects when the distinction is irrelevant. In two studies (an experimental study and a large field study), we demonstrate this by showing that social power and personal power have opposite effects on stereotyping, but parallel effects on behavioral approach.

How power influences moral thinking.

The authors conducted 5 studies to test the idea that both thinking about and having power affects the way in which people resolve moral dilemmas. It is shown that high power increases the use of rule-based (deontological) moral thinking styles, whereas low power increases reliance on outcome-based (consequentialist) moral thinking. Stated differently, in determining whether an act is right or wrong, the powerful focus on whether rules and principles are violated, whereas the powerless focus on the consequences. For this reason, the powerful are also more inclined to stick to the rules, irrespective of whether this has positive or negative effects, whereas the powerless are more inclined to make exceptions. The first 3 experiments show that thinking about power increases rule-based thinking and decreases outcome-based thinking in participants' moral decision making. A 4th experiment shows the mediating role of moral orientation in the effect of power on moral decisions. The 5th experiment demonstrates the role of self-interest by showing that the power-moral link is reversed when rule-based decisions threaten participants' own self-interests.

Empowering Mimicry: Female Leader Role Models Empower Women in Leadership Tasks Through Body Posture Mimicry.

In two studies we investigated the behavioral process through which visible female leader role models empower women in leadership tasks. We proposed that women tend to mimic the powerful (open) body postures of successful female role models, thus leading to more empowered behavior and better performance on a challenging leadership task, a process we called empowering mimicry. In Study 1, we experimentally manipulated the body posture of the male and female role models and showed that 86 Swiss college women mimicked the body posture of the female (ingroup) but not the male (outgroup) role model, thus leading to more empowered behavior and better performance on a public speaking task. In Study 2, we investigated the boundary conditions of this process and showed that empowering mimicry does not extend to exposures to non-famous female models among 50 Swiss college women. These findings suggest that nonverbal mimicry is one important mechanism through which female leader role models inspire women performing a challenging leadership task. From a practice perspective, our research underscores the importance of female leaders' visibility because visibility can drive other women's advancement in leadership by affording women the opportunity to mimic and be empowered by successful female role models.

Past-focused temporal communication overcomes conservatives' resistance to liberal political ideas.

Nine studies and a meta-analysis test the role of past-focused temporal communication in reducing conservatives' disagreement with liberal political ideas. We propose that conservatives are more prone to warm, affectionate, and nostalgic feelings for past society. Therefore, they are more likely to support political ideas-including those expressing liberal values-that can be linked to a desirable past state (past focus), rather than a desirable future state (future focus) of society. Study 1 supports our prediction that political conservatives are more nostalgic for the past than liberals. Building on this association, we demonstrate that communicating liberal ideas with a past focus increases conservatives' support for leniency in criminal justice (Studies 2a and 2b), gun control (Study 3), immigration (Study 4), social diversity (Study 5), and social justice (Study 6). Communicating messages with a past focus reduced political disagreement (compared with a future focus) between liberals and conservatives by between 30 and 100% across studies. Studies 5 and 6 identify the mediating role of state and trait nostalgia, respectively. Study 7 shows that the temporal communication effect only occurs under peripheral (and not central) information processing. Study 8 shows that the effect is asymmetric; a future focus did not increase liberals' support for conservative ideas. A mixed-effects meta-analysis across all studies confirms that appealing to conservatives' nostalgia with a past-focused temporal focus increases support for liberal political messages (Study 9). A large portion of the political disagreement between conservatives and liberals appears to be disagreement over style, and not content of political issues. (PsycINFO Database Record

Power and Attraction to the Counternormative Aspects of Infidelity.

Previous research shows that powerful people are more likely than those lacking power to engage in infidelity. One possible explanation holds (a) that power psychologically releases people from the inhibiting effects of social norms and thus increases their appetite for counternormative forms of sexuality. Two alternative explanations are (b) that power increases appetite for any form of sexuality, normative or counternormative, and (c) that power makes men (but not women) seem more attractive to others and thus increases their access to potential mating opportunities. The current research tested these explanations using correlational data from 610 Dutch men and women. Supporting the first explanation, power's relationship with infidelity was statistically mediated by increased attraction to the secrecy associated with infidelity. Inconsistent with the second explanation, power was linked with infidelity but not with casual sex among singles (a more normative form of sexuality). Inconsistent with the third explanation, the link between power and infidelity was observed just as strongly in women as in men. Findings suggest that power may be associated with infidelity because power draws people to the counternormative aspects of infidelity. Implications for theories of power, sexuality, and gender are discussed.

To Have Control Over or to Be Free From Others? The Desire for Power Reflects a Need for Autonomy.

The current research explores why people desire power and how that desire can be satisfied. We propose that a position of power can be subjectively experienced as conferring influence over others or as offering autonomy from the influence of others. Conversely, a low-power position can be experienced as lacking influence or lacking autonomy. Nine studies show that subjectively experiencing one's power as autonomy predicts the desire for power, whereas the experience of influence over others does not. Furthermore, gaining autonomy quenches the desire for power, but gaining influence does not. The studies demonstrated the primacy of autonomy across both experimental and correlational designs, across measured mediation and manipulated mediator approaches, and across three different continents (Europe, United States, India). Together, these studies offer evidence that people desire power not to be a master over others, but to be master of their own domain, to control their own fate.

When status is grabbed and when status is granted: Getting ahead in dominance and prestige hierarchies.

What type of behaviour affords status, agentic, or communal? Research to date has yielded inconsistent answers. In particular, the conflict view holds that agentic behaviour permits the imperious to grab status through overt force, whereas the functional view holds that communal behaviour permits the talented to earn status through popular appeal. Here, we synthesize both views by taking into account the moderating role played by group hierarchy. Group hierarchy can range from being dominance based (where status is grabbed) to prestige based (where status is granted). In a field study (Study 1), and a laboratory experiment (Study 2), we demonstrate that in different groups, status can be achieved in different ways. Specifically, agentic behaviour promotes status regardless of hierarchy type, whereas the effect of communal behaviour on status is moderated by hierarchy type: it augments it in more prestige-based hierarchies but diminishes it in more dominance-based hierarchies.