Old by obsolescence: The paradox of aging in the digital era.

Geroscience and philosophy of aging have tended to focus their analyses on the biological and chronological dimensions of aging. Namely, one ages with the passage of time and by experiencing the cellular-molecular deterioration that accompanies this process. However, our concept of aging depends decisively on the social valuations held about it. In this article, we will argue that, if we study social aging in the contemporary world, a novel phenomenon can be identified: the paradox of aging in the digital era. If the social understanding of aging today is linked to unproductivity and obsolescence; then there is a possibility that, given the pace of change of digital technologies, we become obsolete at an early chronological and biological age, and therefore, feel old at a younger age. First, we will present the social dimension of aging based on Rowe and Kahn's model of successful aging. We will also show that their notion of social aging hardly considers structural aspects and weakens their approach. Second, departing from social aging in its structural sense, we will develop the paradox of aging in the digital era. On the one hand, we will explain how the institutionalization of aging has occurred in modern societies and how it is anchored in the concepts of obsolescence and productivity. On the other hand, we will state the kind of obsolescence that digitalization produces and argue that it can make cohorts of biologically and chronologically young individuals obsolete, and thus they would be personally and socially perceived as old.

Is ageing still undesirable? A reply to Räsänen.

We have recently stated the reasons why we claim that biological ageing is undesirable. Räsänen has responded to our article by arguing that this process has certain desirable aspects and, therefore, our position is inconsistent. Räsänen develops two arguments to defend his position. We will call the first the argument from the totality of the ageing process and the second the argument from the reduced goods of the ageing process. In this reply, we will give reasons to show that both arguments fail. The first, on the one hand, starts from a dubious conception of ageing and, on the other hand, even accepting this conception, its reformulation is morally empty. The second incurs in an absurd conclusion.

Is ageing undesirable? An ethical analysis.

The technical possibilities of biomedicine open up the opportunity to intervene in ageing itself with the aim of mitigating, reducing or eliminating it. However, before undertaking these changes or rejecting them outright, it is necessary to ask ourselves if what would be lost by doing so really has much value. This article will analyse the desirability of ageing from an individual point of view, without circumscribing this question to the desirability or undesirability of death. First, we will present the three most widely used arguments to reject biomedical interventions against ageing. We will argue that only the last of these arguments provides a consistent answer to the question of the desirability of ageing. Second, we will show that the third argument falls prey to a conceptual confusion that we will call the paradox of ageing: although ageing entails negative health effects, it leads to a life stage with valuable goods. Both valuations, one positive and the other negative, refer to two different dimensions of ageing: the chronological and the biological. We will defend that, by not adequately distinguishing these two types of ageing, it does not become apparent that all the valuable goods exclusive to ageing derive only from its chronological dimension. Third, we will argue that, if we just conceive ageing biologically, it is undesirable. We will elaborate on the two kinds of undesirable effects biological ageing has: direct and indirect. Finally, we will respond to potential objections by adducing that these are insufficient to weaken our argument.

An ageless body does not imply transhumanism: A reply to Levin.

Susan B. Levin argues that the human confidence that an ageless body would be better is irrational. She offers a Kantian-inspired argument to show that human understanding cannot rationally access the experiences of a post-human and ageless existence. We challenge this rationale with a three-step argument: first, an ageless body does not have to be post-human. One should distinguish between the transhumanist projects of life extension and accounts focused on enhancing well-being and quality of life. An existence without aging does not require a radical change in one's temporal intuitions, which makes rational discussion possible. Second, we defend that biological aging does not entail any valuable goods. These goods refer to the chronological dimension of aging. Finally, we argue that biological aging is indeed negative and one may need biotechnological interventions in aging to achieve internal transcendence. Thus, we rationally argue that an ageless body would be better.