Lack of Antibodies to Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) in a Large Cohort of Previously Infected Persons.

BACKGROUND: Reports suggest that some persons previously infected with severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) lack detectable immunoglobulin G (IgG) antibodies. We aimed to determine the proportion IgG seronegative and predictors for seronegativity among persons previously infected with SARS-CoV-2. METHODS: We analyzed serologic data collected from healthcare workers and first responders in New York City and the Detroit metropolitan area with a history of a positive SARS-CoV-2 reverse-transcription polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) test result and who were tested for IgG antibodies to SARS-CoV-2 spike protein at least 2 weeks after symptom onset. RESULTS: Of 2547 persons with previously confirmed SARS-CoV-2 infection, 160 (6.3%) were seronegative. Of 2112 previously symptomatic persons, the proportion seronegative slightly increased from 14 to 90 days post symptom onset (P = .06). The proportion seronegative ranged from 0% among 79 persons previously hospitalized to 11.0% among 308 persons with asymptomatic infections. In a multivariable model, persons who took immunosuppressive medications were more likely to be seronegative (31.9%; 95% confidence interval [CI], 10.7%-64.7%), while participants of non-Hispanic Black race/ethnicity (vs non-Hispanic White; 2.7%; 95% CI, 1.5%-4.8%), with severe obesity (vs under/normal weight; 3.9%; 95% CI, 1.7%-8.6%), or with more symptoms were less likely to be seronegative. CONCLUSIONS: In our population with previous RT-PCR-confirmed infection, approximately 1 in 16 persons lacked IgG antibodies. Absence of antibodies varied independently by illness severity, race/ethnicity, obesity, and immunosuppressive drug therapy. The proportion seronegative remained relatively stable among persons tested up to 90 days post symptom onset.

Prevalence of SARS-CoV-2 Antibodies in First Responders and Public Safety Personnel, New York City, New York, USA, May-July 2020.

We conducted a serologic survey in public service agencies in New York City, New York, USA, during May-July 2020 to determine prevalence of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) infection among first responders. Of 22,647 participants, 22.5% tested positive for SARS-CoV-2-specific antibodies. Seroprevalence for police and firefighters was similar to overall seroprevalence; seroprevalence was highest in correctional staff (39.2%) and emergency medical technicians (38.3%) and lowest in laboratory technicians (10.1%) and medicolegal death investigators (10.8%). Adjusted analyses demonstrated association between seropositivity and exposure to SARS-CoV-2-positive household members (adjusted odds ratio [aOR] 3.52 [95% CI 3.19-3.87]), non-Hispanic Black race or ethnicity (aOR 1.50 [95% CI 1.33-1.68]), and severe obesity (aOR 1.31 [95% CI 1.05-1.65]). Consistent glove use (aOR 1.19 [95% CI 1.06-1.33]) increased likelihood of seropositivity; use of other personal protective equipment had no association. Infection control measures, including vaccination, should be prioritized for frontline workers.

Preassessment of Community-Based Organization Preparedness in Two Sectors, Human Services and Faith Based: New York City, 2016.

Objectives. To determine the level of preparedness among New York City community-based organizations by using a needs assessment.Methods. We distributed online surveys to 582 human services and 6017 faith-based organizations in New York City from March 17, 2016 through May 11, 2016. We calculated minimal indicators of preparedness to determine the proportion of organizations with preparedness indicators. We used bivariate analyses to examine associations between agency characteristics and minimal preparedness indicators.Results. Among the 210 human service sector respondents, 61.9% reported emergency management plans and 51.9% emergency communications systems in place. Among the 223 faith-based respondents, 23.9% reported emergency management plans and 92.4% emergency communications systems in place. Only 10.0% of human services and 18.8% of faith-based organizations reported having funds allocated for emergency response. Only 2.9% of human services sector and 39.5% of faith-based sector respondents reported practicing emergency communication alerts.Conclusions. New York City human service and faith-based sector organizations are striving to address emergency preparedness concerns, although notable gaps are evident.Public Health Implications. Our results can inform the development of metrics for community-based organizational readiness.

Participation in Community Preparedness Programs in Human Services Organizations and Faith-Based Organizations - New York City, 2018.

Community-based organizations have a long history of engagement with public health issues; these relationships can contribute to disaster preparedness (1,2). Preparedness training improves response capacity and strengthens overall resilience (1). Recognizing the importance of community-based organizations in community preparedness, the Office of Emergency Preparedness and Response in New York City's (NYC's) Department of Health and Mental Hygiene (DOHMH) launched a community preparedness program in 2016 (3), which engaged two community sectors (human services and faith-based). To strengthen community preparedness for public health emergencies in human services organizations and faith-based organizations, the community preparedness program conducted eight in-person preparedness trainings. Each training focused on preparedness topics, including developing plans for 1) continuity of operations, 2) emergency management, 3) volunteer management, 4) emergency communications, 5) emergency notification systems, 6) communication with persons at risk, 7) assessing emergency resources, and 8) establishing dedicated emergency funds (2,3). To evaluate training effectiveness, data obtained through online surveys administered during June-September 2018 were analyzed using multivariate logistic regression. Previously described preparedness indicators among trained human services organizations and faith-based organizations were compared with those of organizations that were not trained (3). Participation in the community preparedness program training was associated with increased odds of meeting preparedness indicators. NYC's community preparedness program can serve as a model for other health departments seeking to build community preparedness through partnership with community-based organizations.

Cost comparison of 2 mass vaccination campaigns against influenza A H1N1 in New York City.

Objectives. We estimated and compared total costs and costs per dose administered for 2 influenza A 2009 monovalent vaccine campaigns in New York City: an elementary school-located campaign targeting enrolled children aged 4 years and older, and a community-based points-of-dispensing campaign for anyone aged 4 years and older. Methods. We determined costs from invoices or we estimated costs. We obtained vaccination data from the Citywide Immunization Registry and reports from the community points of dispensing. Results. The school campaign delivered approximately 202,089 vaccines for $17.9 million and $88 per dose. The community campaign delivered 49,986 vaccines for $7.6 million and $151 per dose. At projected capacity, the school campaign could have delivered 371,827 doses at $53 each or $13 each when we excluded the value of in-kind resources. The community points of dispensing could have administered 174,000 doses at $51 each or $24 each when we excluded the value of in-kind resources. Conclusions. The school campaign delivered vaccines at a lower cost per dose than did the community campaign. Had demand been higher, both campaigns may have delivered vaccine at lower, more comparable cost per dose.

Description of a large urban school-located 2009 pandemic H1N1 vaccination campaign, New York City 2009-2010.

In the spring of 2009, New York City (NYC) experienced the emergence and rapid spread of pandemic influenza A H1N1 virus (pH1N1), which had a high attack rate in children and caused many school closures. During the 2009 fall wave of pH1N1, a school-located vaccination campaign for elementary schoolchildren was conducted in order to reduce infection and transmission in the school setting, thereby reducing the impact of pH1N1 that was observed earlier in the year. In this paper, we describe the planning and outcomes of the NYC school-located vaccination campaign. We compared consent and vaccination data for three vaccination models (school nurse alone, school nurse plus contract nurse, team). Overall, >1,200 of almost 1,600 eligible schools participated, achieving 26.8% consent and 21.5% first-dose vaccination rates, which did not vary significantly by vaccination model. A total of 189,902 doses were administered during two vaccination rounds to 115,668 students at 998 schools included in the analysis; vaccination rates varied by borough, school type, and poverty level. The team model achieved vaccination of more children per day and required fewer vaccination days per school. NYC's campaign is the largest described school-located influenza vaccination campaign to date. Despite substantial challenges, school-located vaccination is feasible in large, urban settings, and during a public health emergency.

Using Health Information Exchange to Improve Family Reunification After a Mass Casualty Incident.

From the Field is a semi-regular column that explores what it means to be a local health professional on the front lines of an emergency. Typically, National Association of County and City Health Officials (NACCHO) members share their stories of preparing for and responding to disasters, epidemics, and other major health issues. Through exploring the analysis of the challenges faced and the solutions developed, readers can learn how these public health champions keep their communities safe even in extreme situations. Readers may submit topics of interest to the column's editor, Meghan McGinty, PhD, MPH, MBA, at mmcginty@naccho.org.

Protecting the Public from H1N1 through Points of Dispensing (PODs).

In fall 2009, the New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene (DOHMH) operated 58 points of dispensing (PODs) over 5 weekends to provide influenza A (H1N1) 2009 monovalent vaccination to New Yorkers. Up to 7 sites were opened each day across the 5 boroughs, with almost 50,000 New Yorkers being vaccinated. The policies and protocols used were based on those developed for New York City's POD Plan, the cornerstone of the city's mass prophylaxis planning. Before the H1N1 experience, NYC had not opened more than 5 PODs simultaneously and had only experienced the higher patient volume seen with the H1N1 PODs on 1 prior occasion. Therefore, DOHMH identified factors that contributed to the success of POD operations, as well as areas for improvement to inform future mass prophylaxis planning and response. Though this was a relatively small-scale, preplanned operation, during which a maximum of 7 PODs were operated on a given day, the findings have implications for larger-scale mass prophylaxis planning for emergencies.

The danger of declining funds: Public Health Preparedness in NYC.

Since 2001, the New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene (NYC DOHMH) has built a strong public health preparedness foundation, made possible in large part by funding from the Public Health Emergency Preparedness (PHEP) Cooperative Agreement provided by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. While this funding has allowed NYC DOHMH to make great progress in areas such as all-hazards planning, risk communication, disease surveillance, and lab capacity, the erosion of federal preparedness dollars for all-hazards preparedness has the potential to reverse these gains. Since the initiation of the PHEP grant in 2002, PHEP funding has steadily declined nationwide. Specifically, the total federal allocation has decreased approximately 20%, from $862,777,000 in 2005 to $688,914,546 in 2009. With city and state budgets at an all-time low, federal funding cuts will have a significant impact on public health preparedness programs nationwide. In this time of strict budgetary constraints, the nation would be better served by strategically awarding federal preparedness funds to areas at greatest risk. The absence of risk-based funding in determining PHEP grant awards leaves the nation's highest-risk areas, like New York City, with insufficient resources to prepare for and respond to public health emergencies. This article examines the progress New York City has made and what is at stake as federal funding continues to wane.