Stalling or oiling the engines of diagnosis? Shifting perspectives on the DSM and categorical diagnosis in psychiatry.

Diagnosis in psychiatry and its precursors has long attracted debate and dissent. Attempts to discipline professional praxis are associated especially with the American Psychiatric Association's (APA) Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM). In this article, I explore how social actors with the institutional power to contribute in important ways to shaping psychiatric contexts construct the problems with and purposes of the DSM and of diagnosis in psychiatry. I suggest that despite common assumptions that influential psychiatrists and related stakeholders uncritically adopt the DSM and other tools of categorical diagnosis, their relationship with these is rather more nuanced, ambivalent, and even fraught. However, I will also show that critiques can themselves be folded into particular styles of psychiatric thought in ways that do little to impact wider concerns about biomedicalisation and pharmaceuticalisation-and might even further accelerate these processes. Moreover, since professional critiques of the DSM often underscore its ubiquity and entrenchment, when positioned against implicit or explicit justifications of the ongoing use of this text they might inadvertently contribute to a 'discourse of inevitability'-acting to 'oil' rather than 'stall' what Annemarie Jutel terms the 'engines of diagnosis'.

How and why to use 'vulnerability': an interdisciplinary analysis of disease risk, indeterminacy and normality.

In recent years, 'vulnerability' has been getting more traction in theoretical, professional and popular spaces as an alternative or complement to the concept of risk. As a group of science and technology studies scholars with different disciplinary orientations yet a shared concern with biomedicine, self and society, we investigate how vulnerability has become a salient and even dominant idiom for discussing disease and disease risk. We argue that this is at least partly due to an inherent indeterminacy in what 'vulnerability' means and does, both within and across different discourses. Through a review of feminist and disability theory, and a discussion of how vulnerability and disease both get recruited into a binary conceptualisation of normal versus abnormal, we argue that vulnerability's indeterminacy is, in fact, its strength, and that it should be used differently than risk. Using COVID-19 management in the UK as an illustration of the current ambivalence and ambiguity in how vulnerability versus risk is applied, we suggest that instead of being codified or quantified, as it has started to be in some biomedical and public health applications, vulnerability and its remedies should be determined in conjunction with affected communities and in ways that are polyvalent, flexible and nuanced. The concept of vulnerability encapsulates an important precept: we must recognise inequality as undesirable while not attempting to 'solve' it in deterministic ways. Rather than becoming fixed into labels, unidirectional causalities or top-down universalising metrics, vulnerability could be used to insist on relational, context-specific understandings of disease and disease risk-in line with contemporary social justice movements that require non-hierarchical and non-universal approaches to problems and solutions.

A consideration of the social dimensions and implications of neuroimaging research in global health, as related to the theory-ladened and theory-generating aspects of technology.

Drawing on insights from sociology, anthropology, and the history of science and medicine, this paper considers some of the social dimensions and implications for neuroimaging research undertaken within low- and middle-income countries (LMICs). It highlights three key inter-connected issues: (1) technologies for enhancing understandings of ill-health are theory-laden; (2) such technologies are theory-generating; and (3) studies of mental ill-health can also introduce new idioms for understanding subjective distress. The paper unpacks and explores these issues. It argues that the use of neuroimaging technologies in population research has the potential to contribute to solidifying - or even introducing - a biological (and specifically brain-based) understanding of mental ill-health within the communities under study. Examples from studies of neuroscience and society in various high-income countries (HICs) where neuroimaging is popular within public discourse illustrates how this can happen, and with what effects. The social dimensions and implications of neuroimaging are issues that all researchers using these technologies need to not only anticipate, but also explicitly plan for (and potentially seek to mitigate). Without adequate consideration, neuroimaging research carries with it particular risks in relation to extending the epistemological coloniality associated with HIC-sponsored studies conducted within LMIC settings.

Children's understanding of epilepsy: A qualitative study.

PURPOSE: To use a qualitative research approach to determine children's understandings of epilepsy and their epilepsy treatment. METHODS: Children aged 7-16 years with physician-confirmed active epilepsy (i.e., having had an epileptic seizure in the past year and or currently taking antiepileptic drugs (AEDs), and not known to have an intellectual disability, were invited to participate. Children had semi-structured interviews separately on two occasions. Between the first and second interviews, an observation of a routine epilepsy clinic appointment of individual children was conducted, and was then discussed during the second interview. Participatory research tools were used in both child interviews to facilitate discussions. Interviews were audio recorded and transcribed, pseudonymized and entered into NVivo (version 12, QSR International). Data were analyzed using a thematic approach. RESULTS: Twenty-three children of mean age 10.1 years (range 8-14), mean duration of epilepsy of 4.6 years (range 2-10) were enrolled. Twelve were 12 female; 7 had focal, 14 had generalized, and 2 had combined epilepsy; 20 were on monotherapy; and 16 had tried previous AEDs. All had an initial (first) interview; 20 were observed during a clinic appointment and had a second interview. Five broad themes emerged: understanding of epilepsy; understanding of seizures; understanding of medication; understanding of children's role in clinical appointments; influences on children's understanding. Children spoke about what epilepsy meant by describing the physical sensations of having a seizure or through the act of taking medication. Children described the role they had, or felt they should have, but reported challenges in being meaningfully involved in clinical appointments. While healthcare professionals were initial information nodes, epilepsy information from parents appeared to be more significant for children. CONCLUSIONS: The perspectives of children with epilepsy are valuable for clinicians to understand; assumptions should not be made that children's views can be accessed via parents. Clinicians need to be constantly aware of children's views and ways of understanding and communicating about their epilepsy. To support this, the research - drawing on children's words, meanings, and stories - was used to inform an easily accessible, gender-neutral, animation about epilepsy that provides information about the condition, seizures, and medication (https://youtu.be/MO7xXL2ZXP8).

Negotiating Novelty: Constructing the Novel within Scientific Accounts of Epigenetics.

Epigenetics is regarded by many as a compelling domain of biomedicine. The purported novelty of epigenetics has begun to have various societal ramifications, particularly in relation to processes of responsibilisation. Within sociology, it has stimulated hopeful debate about conceptual rapprochements between the biomedical and social sciences. This article is concerned with how novelty is socially produced and negotiated. The article engages directly with scientists' talk and writings about epigenetics (as process and field of study). I aim to advance an explicitly sociological analysis about the novelty of epigenetics that underscores its social production rather than an account which participates in its reification. I attend to definitional skirmishes, comparisons with genetics, excitement and intrigue, and considerations of the ethical dimensions of epigenetics. Any assertions that epigenetics is exciting or important should not inadvertently elide reflexive consideration of how such characterisations might be part of the machinery by which they become real.

Uncertainty work as ontological negotiation: adjudicating access to therapy in clinical psychology.

Across the UK, wide-ranging efforts have been made to enhance citizen access to psychological therapy. Clinical psychologists are key providers of and gatekeepers for therapy. This article is concerned with how clinical psychologists foster access (or not) to psychological care. More specifically, it interrogates how psychologists manage, and make decisions around, patient referrals. Following a referral, psychologists must resolve an uncertain situation: should they accept a referral and continue with an assessment? Thereafter, they must decide whether a patient is suitable for their service - and for therapy more generally. Certainty is synthesised against a backdrop of sometimes powerful pressures to meet service targets. Taking cues from medical sociology and science and technology studies (STS), this article interrogates some of the uncertainties around access to psychological therapy, and how decisions made by clinical psychologists involve negotiations of patient, service and professional ontologies. To do so, it draws on interviews with 40 psychologists across England and Scotland. The paper spotlights a professional group that is often absent from or only dimly lit within sociological observation and analysis: clinical psychology. Through attending to the discourses of psychologists, I extend conversations about uncertainty through a distinctive case study.

Neurobiological limits and the somatic significance of love: Caregivers' engagements with neuroscience in Scottish parenting programmes.

While parents have long received guidance on how to raise children, a relatively new element of this involves explicit references to infant brain development, drawing on brain scans and neuroscientific knowledge. Sometimes called 'brain-based parenting', this has been criticised from within sociological and policy circles alike. However, the engagement of parents themselves with neuroscientific concepts is far less researched. Drawing on 22 interviews with parents/carers of children (mostly aged 0-7) living in Scotland, this article examines how they account for their (non-)use of concepts and understandings relating to neuroscience. Three normative tropes were salient: information about children's processing speed, evidence about deprived Romanian orphans in the 1990s, and ideas relating to whether or not children should 'self-settle' when falling asleep. We interrogate how parents reflexively weigh and judge such understandings and ideas. In some cases, neuroscientific knowledge was enrolled by parents in ways that supported biologically reductionist models of childhood agency. This reductionism commonly had generative effects, enjoining new care practices and producing particular parent and infant subjectivities. Notably, parents do not uncritically adopt or accept (sometimes reductionist) neurobiological and/or psychological knowledge; rather, they reflect on whether and when it is applicable to and relevant for raising their children. Thus, our respondents draw on everyday epistemologies of parenting to negotiate brain-based understandings of infant development and behaviour, and invest meaning in these in ways that cannot be fully anticipated (or appreciated) within straightforward celebrations or critiques of the content of parenting programmes drawing on neuropsychological ideas.

Digitising psychiatry? Sociotechnical expectations, performative nominalism and biomedical virtue in (digital) psychiatric praxis.

Digital artefacts and infrastructures have been presented as ever more urgent and necessary for mental health research and practice. Telepsychiatry, mHealth, and now digital psychiatry have been promoted in this regard, among other endeavours. Smartphone apps have formed a particular focus of promissory statements regarding the improvement of epistemic and clinical work in psychiatry. This article contextualises and historicises some of these developments. In doing so, I show how purportedly novel fields have been constituted in part through practices of 'performative nominalism' (whereby articulations of a neologism in relation to established and recent developments participate in producing the referent of the new term). Central to this has been implicit and explicit extolment of what I term biomedical virtues in public-facing and professionally orientated discourse. I document how emphases on various virtues have shifted with the attention of psychiatry to different digital modalities, culminating with knowledge-production in mental health as one significant focus.

Psychiatry and the Sociology of Novelty: Negotiating the US National Institute of Mental Health "Research Domain Criteria" (RDoC).

In the United States, the National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH) is seeking to encourage researchers to move away from diagnostic tools like the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (the DSM). A key mechanism for this is the "Research Domain Criteria" (RDoC) initiative, closely associated with former NIMH Director Thomas Insel. This article examines how key figures in US (and UK) psychiatry construct the purpose, nature, and implications of the ambiguous RDoC project; that is, how its novelty is constituted through discourse. In this paper, I explore and analyze these actors' accounts of what is new, important, or (un)desirable about RDoC, demonstrating how they are constituted through institutional context and personal affects. In my interviews with mental health opinion leaders, RDoC is presented as overly reliant on neurobiological epistemologies, distant from clinical imaginaries and imperatives, and introduced in a top-down manner inconsistent with the professional norms of scientific research. Ultimately, the article aims to add empirical depth to current understandings about the epistemological and ontological politics of contemporary (US) psychiatry and to contribute to science and technology studies (STS) debates about "the new" in technoscience. Accordingly, I use discussions about RDoC as a case study in the sociology of novelty.

Developing expertise, customising sleep, enhancing study practices: exploring the legitimisation of modafinil use within the accounts of UK undergraduate students.

Introduction and aim: Increasing numbers of students are reportedly using prescription medications to enhance cognition. This study aimed to generate qualitative data on UK students' understandings and perspectives of the risks and benefits surrounding so-called 'study drugs' (particularly, modafinil). Design and methods: Fifteen undergraduate students studying biomedical science subjects were interviewed about their perspectives on study drugs. Interviews were recorded and transcribed for thematic analysis. Users and non-users were included in the sample. Results: The prescription status and comparisons to other legal and illicit stimulants informed accounts of the (lack of) risks associated with study drugs, legitimising use. The customisation of sleep(iness) and wakefulness was described as a key benefit of study drug use. Drivers of use related to university pressures and desires to increase productivity. In periods of heightened stress, such as examinations, students reported altered practices and perspectives on risk. Discussion and conclusions: We noted the contextual nature of students' use and risk appraisals, with fluctuating social contexts and pressures over time being capable of altering prior assessments and current practices (including the legitimisation of study drug consumption). Further, we highlighted the degree to which students leveraged their biomedical and experiential expertise to account for drug consumption.

'It just opens up their world': autism, empathy, and the therapeutic effects of equine interactions.

Experiences of autism-spectrum disorder are now increasingly studied by social scientists. Human-animal relations have also become a major focus of social inquiry in recent years. Examining horse-assisted therapy for autistic spectrum disorders, this is the first paper that brings these fields together. Drawing on participant observation and interviews at a UK horse therapy Centre, this article examines how staff and the parents of riders account for the successes and limitations of equine therapy. To the respondents, horses 'open up' autistic children and make possible interactions that seemed impossible before. Horses were regarded as facilitating the emergence of apparently social behaviours, which included eye contact, pointing, and speech. Three key explanations emerged for therapeutic success: the sensorial, embodied experience of riding the horse; the specific movements and rhythms of the horse; and, the 'personality' of the horse. Equine therapy can be regarded as enabling a form of multispecies intersubjectivity, with the resonance between rider and horse seeming to make possible a new attunement between humans. Practices of equine therapy, and perceptions of its efficacy, serve in turn to attune social scientists to a version of empathy constituted through lively and sensorial interactions, as opposed to one that is restricted to particular kinds of humans.

The changing brain: Neuroscience and the enduring import of everyday experience.

Discourses of 'neuroplasticity' have become increasingly apparent in the neurosciences and wider society. These connect with broader narratives about the 'changing brain' throughout the life-course. Here, we explore their presence in the talk of a range of publics. Their presence is indicative of how novel neuroscience is accepted, or not, by our participants. In particular, we suggest that any acceptance of the science relates to their personal and/or professional experiences of change (to their own or others' subjectivities) rather than to some intrinsic and widely-held significance of scientific concepts per se. Accordingly, we also submit that it is in part through the congruence of some neuroscientific claims to everyday experiences and perspectives that the former are rendered legible and salient. In this respect, 'lay' knowledge has considerable import for the wider cultural authorisation of that of 'experts'.

Enhancement, ethics and society: towards an empirical research agenda for the medical humanities and social sciences.

For some time now, bioethicists have paid close attention to issues associated with 'enhancement'; specifically, the appropriate use and regulation of substances and artefacts understood by some to improve the functioning of human bodies beyond that associated with 'normal' function. Medical humanities scholars (aside from philosophers and lawyers) and social scientists have not been frequent participants in debates around enhancement, but could shine a bright light on the range of dilemmas and opportunities techniques of enhancement are purported to introduce. In this paper, we argue that empirical research into the notion and practice of enhancement is necessary and timely. Such work could fruitfully engage with-and further develop-existing conceptual repertoires within the medical humanities and social sciences in ways that would afford benefit to scholars in those disciplines. We maintain that empirical engagements could also provide important resources to bioethicists seeking to regulate new enhancements in ways that are sensitive to societal context and cultural difference. To this end, we outline an empirical agenda for the medical humanities and social sciences around enhancement, emphasising especially how science and technology studies could bring benefits to-and be benefitted by-research in this area. We also use the example of (pharmaceutical) cognitive enhancement to show how empirical studies of actual and likely enhancement practices can nuance resonant bioethical debates.

Debating DSM-5: diagnosis and the sociology of critique.

The development of the fifth edition of the American Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders-the DSM-5-has reenergised and driven further forward critical discourse about the place and role of diagnosis in mental health. The DSM-5 has attracted considerable criticism, not least about its role in processes of medicalisation. This paper suggests the need for a sociology of psychiatric critique. Sociological analysis can help map fields of contention, and cast fresh light on the assumptions and nuances of debate around the DSM-5; it underscores the importance of diagnosis to the governance of social and clinical life, as well as the wider discourses critical commentaries connect with and are activated by. More normatively, a sociology of critique can indicate which interests and values are structuring the dialogues being articulated, and just how diverse clinical opinion regarding the DSM can actually be. This has implications for the considerations of health services and policy decision-makers who might look to such debates for guidance.