Developmental Roots of Human Self-consciousness.

Human consciousness is considered in the perspective of early development. Infants and young children remind us that at its core, the problem of consciousness is primarily a problem of identity, in particular a problem of self-identity with others in mind. It is about how we feel and construe ourselves as an entity among other entities. It is about becoming co-conscious: Aware of oneself through the evaluative eyes of others. This development unfolds in the first 18 months of life, following major steps that are described, and arguably considered as a human trademark.

What motivates early lies? Deception in 2½- to 5-year-olds.

What motivates young children to produce early lies? A total of 217 2½- to 5-year-old children (Mage = 44.5 months, SD = 8.45; 54% girls; 61.7% White) from the southeastern United States were tested using a modified third-party transgression paradigm to examine the motivation behind their deception. Children were assigned to one of three conditions-baseline, self-motivated, or other-motivated condition-and their propensity to lie was captured through both verbal and nonverbal measures. Results show that children's early lies are primarily driven by a self-serving motivation. However, the motivation to lie diversifies by 4 years of age, when children begin to lie for both self-serving and other-serving motivations.

Altruism and hyperaltruism in children of three cultures.

Children's inclination to prioritize others' welfare over their own (hyperaltruism) was investigated from a developmental and cross-cultural perspective. The distribution of rewarding or aversive items to self and another child was probed in 3- to 14-year-old children (final sample: N = 158; 87 girls) from urban China (n = 51; Mage = 9.1 years, SD = 1.81; 27 girls), urban United States (n = 55; Mage = 8.89 years, SD = 2.18; 30 girls), and rural Samoa (n = 52; Mage = 8.6 years, SD = 2.61; 30 girls). In two counterbalanced conditions, the children were first asked to split either rewards (stickers or treats) or potentially harmful insects (biting bugs) with another child. In a third condition, children were asked to choose various levels of hypothetical pain to be inflicted on either themselves or another child in exchange for commensurate rewards. Results indicated that in conditions where children distributed rewards, older children were more egalitarian (i.e., gave an equal number of candies to self and other) compared with younger children. However, in conditions where they needed to allocate potential harm, older children displayed more altruism (taking more harm onto themselves so that others could be spared). These results varied by culture, where Chinese children showed more altruism, U.S. children were more egalitarian, and Samoan children showed no clear patterns of either egalitarianism or altruism. The results show that although there are some universal trends toward egalitarian and altruistic ways of sharing, significant group differences exist.

Primordial feeling of possession in development.

Boyer's minimalist model of human ownership psychology overlooks important cues that children provide in their development leading them from pre-conceptual to conceptual (symbolic) expressions of the basic feeling experience of control over things, qua ownership in the most basic psychological sense. Appeal for innate core knowledge and evolutionary logic blows out the light of this rich and unique ontogenetic progression.

Children's cost-benefit assessment of lies across three cultures.

We examined 4- to 11-year-old children's evaluation of six types of lies arranged along a cost-benefit assessment scale factoring both the lie teller and the lie recipient. Children were from three distinct cultural environments: rural Samoa (n = 99), urban China (n = 49), and urban United States (n = 109). Following the simple script of six different stories involving a lie teller and a lie recipient, children were asked to evaluate the character who lied and whether it deserved reward or punishment using a child-friendly Likert scale. From the age when children produce both antisocial and prosocial lies, our results show that their evaluation of lies rests on a cost-benefit analysis of both the lie teller and the lie recipient. Such analysis varies depending on age, type of lie, and the child's cultural environment. In general, Samoan children tended to rate lies more negatively, and they were less differential in their evaluation of the different types of lies compared with both Chinese and U.S. children. We interpret these results as reflecting the differences across cultures in explicit moral teaching and children's relative experience in resource allocation.

Clinical pointers from developing self-awareness.

Seven typical developmental steps are described as cardinal changes leading children from implicit embodied self-awareness at birth, self-consciousness by 2 years, and the adoption of an ethical stance toward others by the preschool years (3-5y). This development may be a useful benchmark for clinicians. In this review, some clinical pointers are outlined in relation to each developmental step, but with a particular focus on the testing of self-awareness in children with developmental disorders, including autism spectrum disorder, cerebral palsy, and intellectual disability. WHAT THIS PAPER ADDS: There are seven major steps in early self and social awareness. Clinical pointers related to each of the seven steps are provided.

The Uncanny Valley Phenomenon and the Temporal Dynamics of Face Animacy Perception.

Human replicas highly resembling people tend to elicit eerie sensations-a phenomenon known as the uncanny valley. To test whether this effect is attributable to people's ascription of mind to (i.e., mind perception hypothesis) or subtraction of mind from androids (i.e., dehumanization hypothesis), in Study 1, we examined the effect of face exposure time on the perceived animacy of human, android, and mechanical-looking robot faces. In Study 2, in addition to exposure time, we also manipulated the spatial frequency of faces, by preserving either their fine (high spatial frequency) or coarse (low spatial frequency) information, to examine its effect on faces' perceived animacy and uncanniness. We found that perceived animacy decreased as a function of exposure time only in android but not in human or mechanical-looking robot faces (Study 1). In addition, the manipulation of spatial frequency eliminated the decrease in android faces' perceived animacy and reduced their perceived uncanniness (Study 2). These findings link perceived uncanniness in androids to the temporal dynamics of face animacy perception. We discuss these findings in relation to the dehumanization hypothesis and alternative hypotheses of the uncanny valley phenomenon.

Origins of social fusion.

Do instances of extreme self-sacrifice represent a valid paradigm to capture what makes typical individuals fuse with others? Probably not, because they can be viewed as aberrant phenomena. To understand the origins and mechanisms of human social fusion, one should first look at the development of babies and young children. Typical development represents the best alternative to Whitehouse's extreme model of social fusion.

Innate valuation, existential framing, and one head for multiple moral hats.

We support John Doris's criticism of "reflectivism" but identify three shortcomings: (1) his neglect of humans' evolved predispositions and tendencies, (2) his failure to appreciate that identity and responsibility arise first from parsing our world ontologically, in a process we call "existential framing," and (3) a potentially alarming implication of his "dialogic" model of identity formation: if identity is negotiated across diverse social situations, why isn't dissociative identity disorder more common?

Human Perception of Animacy in Light of the Uncanny Valley Phenomenon.

The uncanny valley hypothesis by Japanese roboticist Masahiro Mori posits a nonlinear relation between human replicas' human likeness and the emotional responses they elicit. In three studies, we corroborated the uncanny valley hypothesis, using the uncanny phenomenon as a vehicle to shed a new light on human animacy perception. In Study 1, 62 participants rated emotional responses and human likeness of 89 artificial and human faces. In Study 2, another 62 participants conducted a visual looming task with the same 89 faces allowing for the measurement of perceived threat. Results support the uncanny valley hypothesis, suggesting that the uncanny feeling may serve a function to wary humans of the potential danger of entities crossing the animate-inanimate boundary. In Study 3, 36 participants sorted faces as either real or unreal as quickly as possible in a reaction time sorting task allowing for the measurement of categorical uncertainty associated with animacy perception. Faces associated with longer sorting reaction times were also those associated with the highest ratings of negative emotions, suggesting that categorical uncertainty in animacy detection is related to the uncanny feeling. Results are discussed in light of human animacy perception and new directions for future research are suggested.

Similarities and Differences in Maternal Responsiveness in Three Societies: Evidence From Fiji, Kenya, and the United States.

The first relationship between an infant and her caregiver, typically the mother, lays the foundation for cognitive, social, and emotional development. Maternal responsiveness and affect mirroring have been studied extensively in Western societies yet very few studies have systematically examined these caregiving features in non-Western settings. Sixty-six mother-infant dyads (7 months, SD = 3.1) were observed in a small-scale, rural island society in Fiji, a village in Kenya, and an urban center in the United States. Mothers responded similarly to infant bids overall, but differences were found across societies in the ways mothers selectively respond to affective displays. This has implications for understanding early emotion socialization as well as understanding variation in infant social ecologies across the globe.

Empathy ≠ sharing: Perspectives from phenomenology and developmental psychology.

We argue that important insights regarding the topic of sharing can be gathered from phenomenology and developmental psychology; insights that in part challenge widespread ideas about what sharing is and where it can be found. To be more specific, we first exemplify how the notion of sharing is being employed in recent discussions of empathy, and then argue that this use of the notion tends to be seriously confused. It typically conflates similarity and sharing and, more generally speaking, fails to recognize that sharing proper involves reciprocity. As part of this critical analysis, we draw on sophisticated analyses of the distinction between empathy and emotional sharing that can be found in early phenomenology. Next, we turn to developmental psychology. Sharing is not simply one thing, but a complex and many-layered phenomenon. By tracing its early developmental trajectory from infancy and beyond, we show how careful psychological observations can help us develop a more sophisticated understanding of sharing than the one currently employed in many discussions in the realm of neuroscience. In our conclusion, we return to the issue of empathy and argue that although empathy does not involve or entail sharing, empathy understood as a basic sensitivity to and understanding of others (rather than as a special prosocial concern for others) might be a precondition for sharing.

Ego function of morality and developing tensions that are "within".

We applaud Baumard et al.'s mutualistic account of morality but detect circularity in their articulation of how morality emerged. Contra the authors, we propose that mutualism might account for a sensitivity to convention (the ways things are done within a group) rather than for a sense of fairness. An ontogenetic perspective better captures the complexity of what it means to be moral.

The Evolution of Developmental Theories Since Piaget: A Metaview.

History counts and cannot be overlooked. As a case in point, the origins of major theoretical tensions in the field of developmental psychology are traced back to Piaget (1896-1980), who paved the way to major discoveries regarding the origins and development of cognition. His theory framed much of the new ideas on early cognitive development that emerged in the 1970s, in the footsteps of the 1960s' cognitive revolution. Here, I retrace major conceptual changes since Piaget and provide a metaview on empirical findings that may have triggered the call for such changes. Nine theoretical views and intuitions are identified, all in strong reaction to some or all of the four cornerstone assumptions of Piaget's developmental account (i.e., action realism, domain generality, stages, and late representation). As a result, new and more extreme stances are now taken in the nature-versus-nurture debate. These stances rest on profoundly different, often clashing theoretical intuitions that keep shaping developmental research since Piaget.

Social awareness and early self-recognition.

Self-recognition by 86 children (14-52 months) was assessed using the mirror mark test in two different social contexts. In the classic mirror task condition, only the child was marked prior to mirror exposure (Classic condition). In the social norm condition, the child, experimenter, and accompanying parent were marked prior to the child's mirror exposure (Norm condition). Results indicate that in both conditions children pass the test in comparable proportion, with the same increase as a function of age. However, in the Norm condition, children displayed significantly more hesitation while removing the mark, often touching it without removing it or, if so, promptly putting the mark back onto their forehead. In the Classic condition, only one child showed such hesitation. These results suggest that from the outset, mirror self-recognition can refer to social awareness. This link is interpreted as the trademark of human self-consciousness, a deeply rooted "looking glass" self-awareness.

Progression of COVID-19 in a Patient on Anti-CD20 Antibody Treatment: Case Report and Literature Review.

Accumulating evidence suggests that anti-CD20 treatments are associated with a more severe course of COVID-19. We present the case of a 72-year-old woman treated with the B-cell-depleting anti-CD20 antibody rituximab for seropositive rheumatoid arthritis with severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) infection causing a clinical relapse more than 4 weeks after the first manifestation. Persistently positive reverse transcription polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) results along with a drop in cycling threshold (Ct) values, in addition to recovery of identical viral genotype by whole genome sequencing (WGS) during the disease course, argued against reinfection. No seroconversion was noted, as expected on anti-CD20 treatment. Several other case reports have highlighted potentially fatal courses of COVID-19 associated with B-cell-depleting treatments.

The self as phenotype.

Self-awareness is viewed here as the phenotypic expression of an interaction between genes and the environment. Brain and behavioral development of fetuses and newborn infants are a rich source of information regarding what might constitute minimal self-awareness. Research indicates that newborns have feeling (subjective) experience. Unlike automata, they do not just sense and respond to proximal stimulations. In light of the explosive brain growth that takes place inside and outside of the womb, first signs of feeling as opposed to sensing experience are discussed. Feeling experience is considered as the necessary condition for having minimal self-awareness. Both would co-emerge in development. However, minimal self-awareness is rapidly supplemented with an awareness that is not just perceptual, but also conceptual and ethical, primarily defined in relation to and by others.

The uncanny mirror: a re-framing of mirror self-experience.

Mirror self-experience is re-casted away from the cognitivist interpretation that has dominated discussions on the issue since the establishment of the mirror mark test. Ideas formulated by Merleau-Ponty on mirror self-experience point to the profoundly unsettling encounter with one's specular double. These ideas, together with developmental evidence are re-visited to provide a new, psychologically and phenomenologically more valid account of mirror self-experience: an experience associated with deep wariness.

Possession and morality in early development.

From the moment children say "mine!" by two years of age, objects of possession change progressively from being experienced as primarily unalienable property (i.e., something that is absolute or nonnegotiable), to being alienable (i.e., something that is negotiable in reciprocal exchanges). As possession begins to be experienced as alienable, the child enters "moral space," a socially normative and evaluative space made of perceived values that are either good or less good, and where accountability and reputation begin to play a prominent role. The aim of this chapter is to show the close developmental link between possession and morality.

What is really wrong with a priori claims of universality? Sampling, validity, process level, and the irresistible drive to reduce.

Catchy acronyms such as "WEIRD population" are good mnemonics. However, they carry the danger of distracting us from deeper issues: how to sample populations, the validity of measuring instruments, the levels of processing involved. These need to be considered when assessing claims of universality regarding how the mind works "in general" - a dominant and highly rewarded drive in the behavioral and brain sciences.