Quality of life and elective C-sections: defining limits to maternal and family interests.

The author analyzes the lessons for ethics consultants presented by McCrary and colleagues in their case, "Elective Delivery Before 39 Weeks' Gestation: Reconciling Maternal, Fetal, and Family Interests in Challenging Circumstances." Clinical ethics cases that involve different specialists representing the best interests of different parties in a case, such as this case involving neonatologists and perinatologists, are complex and time-consuming. The author concludes that ethics must insure the interests of the fetus and future person are not subsumed to the interests of those with a voice, without deliberate reflection and strong ethical justification.

Training in clinical ethics consultation: the Washington Hospital Center course.

How can one be trained to enter the evolving field of clinical ethics consultation? The classroom is not the proper place to teach clinical ethics consultation; it is best done in a clinical setting. The author maps the elements that might be included in an apprenticeship, and sets out propositions for debate regarding the training needed for clinical ethics consultants and directors of clinical ethics consultation services. I was invited to be an observer of the first Intensive Course in Clinical Ethics at the Washington Hospital Center (WHC). I had no input into the planning. Having been present at a meeting of the Clinical Ethics Consultation Affinity Group of the American Society of Bioethics and Humanities (ASBH) when the issue of a lack of training programs was discussed, I was acutely aware of the need. Knowing how popular the various four-day intensive courses in bioethics have been, held at Georgetown University first, and then in Seattle and locations in the Midwest, it seemed time to have a four-day intensive course that was devoted to clinical ethics. The differences between bioethics and clinical ethics is substantial and largely unappreciated by those in bioethics. So when the WHC team agreed to take on the task of offering an intensive in clinical ethics, it was an important step for the field.

Care versus treatment at the end of life for profoundly disabled persons.

Individuals who are profoundly mentally handicapped do not have the capacity to make their own decisions and also do not have a past record of decisions, from when they had capacity, to guide us in making decisions for them. They represent a difficult group, ethically, for surrogate decision making. Here I propose some guidelines, distinguishing between these patients and patients in a persistent vegetative state (PVS). As the life span of patients becomes shorter, or their level of consciousness becomes permanently impaired, the presumption for comfort care should become an imperative, and the standard of evidence to justify any invasive intervention should become higher. For members of this population, who have no more ability to refuse treatment than to consent to it, protection of the vulnerable must mean allowing a peaceful death as well as a comfortable life. Reasonable legal safeguards are also proposed to allow improved end-of-life decisions to be made for this population.