The cognitive foundations of misinformation on science: What we know and what scientists can do about it.

Mis information and misunderstanding of science can partially explained by cognitive processes rooted in our evolutionary past. Science communication can use this knowledge to overcome these cognitive limits.

Causality and continuity close the gaps in event representations.

Imagine you see a video of someone pulling back their leg to kick a soccer ball, and then a soccer ball soaring toward a goal. You would likely infer that these scenes are two parts of the same event, and this inference would likely cause you to remember having seen the moment the person kicked the soccer ball, even if that information was never actually presented (Strickland & Keil, 2011, Cognition, 121[3], 409-415). What cues trigger people to "fill in" causal events from incomplete information? Is it due to the experience they have had with soccer balls being kicked toward goals? Is it the visual similarity of the object in both halves of the video? Or is it the mere spatiotemporal continuity of the event? In three experiments, we tested these different potential mechanisms underlying the "filling-in" effect. Experiment 1 showed that filling in occurs equally in familiar and unfamiliar contexts, indicating that familiarity with specific event schemas is unnecessary to trigger false memory. Experiment 2 showed that the visible continuation of a launched object's trajectory is all that is required to trigger filling in, regardless of other occurrences in the second half of the scene. Finally, Experiment 3 found that, using naturalistic videos, this filling-in effect is more heavily affected if the object's trajectory is discontinuous in space/time compared with if the object undergoes a noticeable transformation. Together, these findings indicate that the spontaneous formation of causal event representations is driven by object representation systems that prioritize spatiotemporal information over other object features.

Event representations constrain the structure of language: Sign language as a window into universally accessible linguistic biases.

According to a theoretical tradition dating back to Aristotle, verbs can be classified into two broad categories. Telic verbs (e.g., "decide," "sell," "die") encode a logical endpoint, whereas atelic verbs (e.g., "think," "negotiate," "run") do not, and the denoted event could therefore logically continue indefinitely. Here we show that sign languages encode telicity in a seemingly universal way and moreover that even nonsigners lacking any prior experience with sign language understand these encodings. In experiments 1-5, nonsigning English speakers accurately distinguished between telic (e.g., "decide") and atelic (e.g., "think") signs from (the historically unrelated) Italian Sign Language, Sign Language of the Netherlands, and Turkish Sign Language. These results were not due to participants' inferring that the sign merely imitated the action in question. In experiment 6, we used pseudosigns to show that the presence of a salient visual boundary at the end of a gesture was sufficient to elicit telic interpretations, whereas repeated movement without salient boundaries elicited atelic interpretations. Experiments 7-10 confirmed that these visual cues were used by all of the sign languages studied here. Together, these results suggest that signers and nonsigners share universally accessible notions of telicity as well as universally accessible "mapping biases" between telicity and visual form.

Categories and Constraints in Causal Perception.

When object A moves adjacent to a stationary object, B, and in that instant A stops moving and B starts moving, people irresistibly see this as an event in which A causes B to move. Real-world causal collisions are subject to Newtonian constraints on the relative speed of B following the collision, but here we show that perceptual constraints on the relative speed of B (which align imprecisely with Newtonian principles) define two categories of causal events in perception. Using performance-based tasks, we show that triggering events, in which B moves noticeably faster than A, are treated as being categorically different from launching events, in which B does not move noticeably faster than A, and that these categories are unique to causal events (Experiments 1 and 2). Furthermore, we show that 7- to 9-month-old infants are sensitive to this distinction, which suggests that this boundary may be an early-developing component of causal perception (Experiment 3).

The texture of causal construals: Domain-specific biases shape causal inferences from discourse.

We conducted five sets of experiments asking whether psychological and physical events are construed in broadly different manners concerning the underlying textures of their causes. In Experiments 1a-1d, we found a robust tendency to estimate fewer causes (but not effects) for psychological than for physical events; Experiment 2 showed a similar pattern of results when participants were asked to generate hypothetical causes and effects; Experiment 3 revealed a greater tendency to ascribe linear chains of causes (but not effects) to physical events; Experiment 4 showed that the expectation of linear chains was related to intuitions about deterministic processes; and Experiment 5 showed that simply framing a given ambiguous event in psychological versus physical terms is sufficient to induce changes in the patterns of causal inferences. Adults therefore consistently show a tendency to think about psychological and physical events as being embedded in different kinds of causal structures.

The categorical role of structurally iconic signs.

Goldin-Meadow & Brentari (G-M&B) argue that, for sign language users, gesture - in contrast to linguistic sign - is iconic, highly variable, and similar to spoken language co-speech gesture. We discuss two examples (telicity and absolute gradable adjectives) that challenge the use of these criteria for distinguishing sign from gesture.

Non-signing children's assessment of telicity in sign language.

Adults with no knowledge of sign languages can perceive distinctive markers that signal event boundedness (telicity), suggesting that telicity is a cognitively natural semantic feature that can be marked iconically (Strickland et al., 2015). This study asks if non-signing children (5-year-olds) can also link telicity to iconic markers in sign. Experiment 1 attempted three close replications of Strickland et al. (2015) and found only limited success. However, Experiment 2 showed that children can both perceive the relevant visual feature and can succeed at linking the visual property to telicity semantics when allowed to filter their answer through their own linguistic choices. Children's performance demonstrates the cognitive naturalness and early availability of the semantics of telicity, supporting the idea that telicity helps guide the language acquisition process.

The Pulfrich solidity illusion: a surprising demonstration of the visual system's tolerance of solidity violations.

Physical objects behave following the principle of solidity: One solid object cannot pass through another. To what extent does the visual system integrate this physical regularity as a prior constraint? A new variant of the Pulfrich effect demonstrates a surprising degree of tolerance for violations of solidity when pitted against motion and depth cues. When adult participants view a pendulum swinging in the fronto-parallel plane with both eyes (one of which was covered by a light-attenuating filter), they falsely perceive the pendulum as swinging in an elliptical path (known as the "Pulfrich effect"). Here, we show that even when the pendulum's motion takes place entirely behind a solid horizontal bar, observers nevertheless see the pendulum pass through the bar while moving in an ellipse. This illusion suggests that the Pulfrich effect and the underlying stereoscopic depth cues can be robust to object solidity.

Moralization and extremism robustly amplify myside sharing.

We explored whether moralization and attitude extremity may amplify a preference to share politically congruent ("myside") partisan news and what types of targeted interventions may reduce this tendency. Across 12 online experiments (N = 6,989), we examined decisions to share news touching on the divisive issues of gun control, abortion, gender and racial equality, and immigration. Myside sharing was systematically observed and was consistently amplified when participants (i) moralized and (ii) were attitudinally extreme on the issue. The amplification of myside sharing by moralization also frequently occurred above and beyond that of attitude extremity. These effects generalized to both true and fake partisan news. We then examined a number of interventions meant to curb myside sharing by manipulating (i) the audience to which people imagined sharing partisan news (political friends vs. foes), (ii) the anonymity of the account used (anonymous vs. personal), (iii) a message warning against the myside bias, and (iv) a message warning against the reputational costs of sharing "mysided" fake news coupled with an interactive rating task. While some of those manipulations slightly decreased sharing in general and/or the size of myside sharing, the amplification of myside sharing by moral attitudes was consistently robust to these interventions. Our findings regarding the robust exaggeration of selective communication by morality and extremism offer important insights into belief polarization and the spread of partisan and false information online.

Boundaries in space and time: Iconic biases across modalities.

The idea that the form of a word reflects information about its meaning has its roots in Platonic philosophy, and has been experimentally investigated for concrete, sensory-based properties since the early 20th century. Here, we provide evidence for an abstract property of 'boundedness' that introduces a systematic, iconic bias on the phonological expectations of a novel lexicon. We show that this abstract property is general across events and objects. In Experiment 1, we show that subjects are systematically more likely to associate sign language signs that end with a gestural boundary with telic verbs (denoting events with temporal boundaries, e.g., die, arrive) and with count nouns (denoting objects with spatial boundaries, e.g., ball, coin). In Experiments 2-3, we show that this iconic mapping acts on conceptual representations, not on grammatical features. Specifically, the mapping does not carry over to psychological nouns (e.g. people are not more likely to associate a gestural boundary with idea than with knowledge). Although these psychological nouns are still syntactically encoded as either count or mass, they do not denote objects that are conceived of as having spatial boundaries. The mapping bias thus breaks down. Experiments 4-5 replicate these findings with a new set of stimuli. Finally, in Experiments 6-11, we explore possible extensions to a similar bias for spoken language stimuli, with mixed results. Generally, the results here suggest that 'boundedness' of words' referents (in space or time) has a powerful effect on intuitions regarding the form that the words should take.

Core cognition in adult vision: A surprising discrepancy between the principles of object continuity and solidity.

From an early age, humans intuitively expect physical objects to obey core principles, including continuity (objects follow spatiotemporally continuous paths) and solidity (two solid objects cannot occupy the same space at the same time). These 2 principles are sometimes viewed as deriving from a single overarching "persistence" principle. Indeed, violations of solidity where one solid object seemingly passes through another could theoretically be interpreted as a violation of continuity, with an object "teleporting" to switch places rather than passing through a solid obstacle. However, it is an empirical issue whether the two principles are processed distinctly or identically to one another. Here, adult participants tracked objects during dynamic events in a novel location detection task, which sometimes involved violations of the principles of continuity or solidity. Although participants explicitly noticed both types of violations and reported being equally surprised at both, they made more errors and answered more slowly after continuity violations than after solidity violations. Our results demonstrate that the two principles show different signature patterns and are thus represented distinctly in the mind. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).

The origin of pointing: Evidence for the touch hypothesis.

Pointing gestures play a foundational role in human language, but up to now, we have not known where these gestures come from. Here, we investigated the hypothesis that pointing originates in touch. We found, first, that when pointing at a target, children and adults oriented their fingers not as though trying to create an "arrow" that picks out the target but instead as though they were aiming to touch it; second, that when pointing at a target at an angle, participants rotated their wrists to match that angle as they would if they were trying to touch the target; and last, that young children interpret pointing gestures as if they were attempts to touch things, not as arrows. These results provide the first substantial evidence that pointing originates in touch.

Cross-linguistic regularities and learner biases reflect "core" mechanics.

Recent research in infant cognition and adult vision suggests that the mechanical object relationships may be more salient and naturally attention grabbing than similar but non-mechanical relationships. Here we examine two novel sources of evidence from language related to this hypothesis. In Experiments 1 and 2, we show that adults preferentially infer that the meaning of a novel preposition refers to a mechanical as opposed to a non-mechanical relationship. Experiments 3 and 4 examine cross-linguistic adpositions obtained on a large scale from machines or from experts, respectively. While these methods differ in the ease of data collection relative to the reliability of the data, their results converge: we find that across a range of diverse and historically unrelated languages, adpositions (such as prepositions) referring to the mechanical relationships of containment (e.g "in") and support (e.g. "on") are systematically shorter than closely matched but not mechanical words such as "behind," "beside," "above," "over," "out," and "off." These results first suggest that languages regularly contain traces of core knowledge representations and that cross-linguistic regularities can therefore be a useful and easily accessible form of information that bears on the foundations of non-linguistic thought.

Encoding of event roles from visual scenes is rapid, spontaneous, and interacts with higher-level visual processing.

A crucial component of event recognition is understanding event roles, i.e. who acted on whom: boy hitting girl is different from girl hitting boy. We often categorize Agents (i.e. the actor) and Patients (i.e. the one acted upon) from visual input, but do we rapidly and spontaneously encode such roles even when our attention is otherwise occupied? In three experiments, participants observed a continuous sequence of two-person scenes and had to search for a target actor in each (the male/female or red/blue-shirted actor) by indicating with a button press whether the target appeared on the left or the right. Critically, although role was orthogonal to gender and shirt color, and was never explicitly mentioned, participants responded more slowly when the target's role switched from trial to trial (e.g., the male went from being the Patient to the Agent). In a final experiment, we demonstrated that this effect cannot be fully explained by differences in posture associated with Agents and Patients. Our results suggest that extraction of event structure from visual scenes is rapid and spontaneous.

Language Reflects "Core" Cognition: A New Theory About the Origin of Cross-Linguistic Regularities.

The underlying structures that are common to the world's languages bear an intriguing connection with early emerging forms of "core knowledge" (Spelke & Kinzler, 2007), which are frequently studied by infant researchers. In particular, grammatical systems often incorporate distinctions (e.g., the mass/count distinction) that reflect those made in core knowledge (e.g., the non-verbal distinction between an object and a substance). Here, I argue that this connection occurs because non-verbal core knowledge systematically biases processes of language evolution. This account potentially explains a wide range of cross-linguistic grammatical phenomena that currently lack an adequate explanation. Second, I suggest that developmental researchers and cognitive scientists interested in (non-verbal) knowledge representation can exploit this connection to language by using observations about cross-linguistic grammatical tendencies to inspire hypotheses about core knowledge.

The Influence of Social Interaction on Intuitions of Objectivity and Subjectivity.

We present experimental evidence that people's modes of social interaction influence their construal of truth. Participants who engaged in cooperative interactions were less inclined to agree that there was an objective truth about that topic than were those who engaged in a competitive interaction. Follow-up experiments ruled out alternative explanations and indicated that the changes in objectivity are explained by argumentative mindsets: When people are in cooperative arguments, they see the truth as more subjective. These findings can help inform research on moral objectivism and, more broadly, on the distinctive cognitive consequences of different types of social interaction.

Visual perception involves event-type representations: The case of containment versus occlusion.

Recent infant cognition research suggests that core knowledge involves event-type representations: During perception, the mind automatically categorizes physical events into broad types (e.g., occlusion and containment), which then guide attention to different properties (e.g., with width processed at a younger age than height in containment events but not occlusion events). We tested whether this aspect of infant cognition also structures adults' visual processing. In 6 experiments, adults had to detect occasional changes in ongoing dynamic displays that depicted repeating occlusion or containment events. Mirroring the developmental progression, change detection was better for width versus height changes in containment events, but no such difference was found for otherwise equivalent occlusion events, even though most observers were not even aware of the subtle occlusion-containment difference. These results suggest for the first time that event-type representations exist and operate automatically and unconsciously as part of the underlying currency of adult visual cognition.

Bias neglect: a blind spot in the evaluation of scientific results.

Experimenter bias occurs when scientists' hypotheses influence their results, even if involuntarily. Meta-analyses have suggested that in some domains, such as psychology, up to a third of the studies could be unreliable due to such biases. A series of experiments demonstrates that while people are aware of the possibility that scientists can be more biased when the conclusions of their experiments fit their initial hypotheses, they robustly fail to appreciate that they should also be more sceptical of such results. This is true even when participants read descriptions of studies that have been shown to be biased. Moreover, participants take other sources of bias-such as financial incentives-into account, showing that this bias neglect may be specific to theory-driven hypothesis testing. In combination with a common style of scientific reporting, bias neglect could lead the public to accept premature conclusions.

Syntax and intentionality: an automatic link between language and theory-of-mind.

Three studies provided evidence that syntax influences intentionality judgments. In Experiment 1, participants made either speeded or unspeeded intentionality judgments about ambiguously intentional subjects or objects. Participants were more likely to judge grammatical subjects as acting intentionally in the speeded relative to the reflective condition (thus showing an intentionality bias), but grammatical objects revealed the opposite pattern of results (thus showing an unintentionality bias). In Experiment 2, participants made an intentionality judgment about one of the two actors in a partially symmetric sentence (e.g., "John exchanged products with Susan"). The results revealed a tendency to treat the grammatical subject as acting more intentionally than the grammatical object. In Experiment 3 participants were encouraged to think about the events that such sentences typically refer to, and the tendency was significantly reduced. These results suggest a privileged relationship between language and central theory-of-mind concepts. More specifically, there may be two ways of determining intentionality judgments: (1) an automatic verbal bias to treat grammatical subjects (but not objects) as intentional (2) a deeper, more careful consideration of the events typically described by a sentence.