Collective memories serve similar functions to autobiographical memories.

People from the same country often hold shared, culturally-shaped memories about important events from that country's history, known as collective memories. Although empirical research has started to shed light on the properties of these memories, none has systematically examined the functions these memories. To what extent do collective memories serve functions? We hypothesised that collective memories serve functions for a collective similar to those that autobiographical memories serve for individuals-directive, identity, and social functions. We conducted two experiments using adapted versions of the Thinking About Life Experiences questionnaire (TALE) in which we asked people to rate the functions of their collective memories. Across both experiments, we found evidence that collective memories serve directive, identity, and social functions for the collective. These results suggest collective memories perform important roles in their collectives.

Rethinking the distinction between episodic and semantic memory: Insights from the past, present, and future.

On the 50th anniversary of Tulving's introduction of the celebrated distinction between episodic and semantic memory, it seems more than fitting to revisit his proposal in light of recent conceptual and methodological advances in the field. This Special Issue of Memory & Cognition brings together researchers doing cutting-edge work at the intersection between episodic and semantic memory to showcase studies directly probing this psychological distinction, as well as articles that seek to provide conceptual and theoretical accounts to understand their interaction. The 14 articles presented here highlight the need to critically examine the way in which we conceptualize not only the relationship between episodic and semantic memory, but also the interplay between declarative and non-declarative memory, and the myriad implications of such conceptual changes. In many ways, we suggest this Special Issue might serve as a call to action for our field, inspiring future work to challenge pre-existing conceptions and stimulate new directions in this fast-moving field.

Memories people no longer believe in can still affect them in helpful and harmful ways.

People can come to "remember" experiences they never had, and these false memories-much like memories for real experiences-can serve a variety of helpful and harmful functions. Sometimes, though, people realize one of their memories is false, and retract their belief in it. These "retracted memories" continue to have many of the same phenomenological characteristics as their believed memories. But can they also continue to serve functions? Across four experiments, we asked subjects to rate the extent to which their retracted memories serve helpful and harmful functions and compared these functions with those served by "genuine" autobiographical memories. People rated their retracted memories as serving both helpful and harmful functions, much like their genuine memories. In addition, we found only weak relationships between people's belief in their memories and the extent to which those memories served perceived functions. These results suggest memories can serve functions even in the absence of belief and highlight the potential for false memories to affect people's thinking and behavior even after people have retracted them.

Using the phenomenology of memory for recent events to bridge the gap between episodic and semantic memory.

Public events such as celebrity news, tragedies, and political events are widely experienced. Initially at least, memories of these events are "episodic" in nature; however, these events are also stored in associative networks similar to the semantic organization of knowledge (N. R. Brown, 1990, Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 119[3], 297-314). Thus, these memories provide a novel way of examining how episodically experienced events might become semanticized and integrated into the knowledge base. Younger and older adults rated their subjective memory strength for and answered questions about details of events occurring over the previous 12 years. Participants also rated their phenomenological experience using a modified remember/know paradigm, in which no instructions about usage of the terms were provided. Interestingly, remembered and known items were equal in terms of subjective strength. Know responses were highly accurate, and more so than remember responses. Older and younger adults performed similarly. Participants' own definitions of remember, know, and just familiar revealed that knowing is associated with retrieval from semantic memory, whereas remembering and just familiarity are more associated with event/episodic memory. These results suggest that memory for public events shares phenomenological features with both episodic/event memory and semantic memory. Public events thus allow researchers to examine the complex ways in which storage of novel information can be jointly maintained in both episodic and semantic memory.

Memory of where predicts confidence in when: the role of spatial information in dating autobiographical events.

How do we know when a remembered event took place? Contemporary theories suggest that temporal landmarks, conventional time patterns, transitions, and lifetime periods, among other strategies, help reconstruct the date of an event. Spatial information plays a privileged role in participants' experiences of reliving and vividness during remembering. Given its influence on these key properties, we conducted two experiments with undergraduate students (nStudy 1 = 151, nStudy 2 = 141) to test whether spatial information may also contribute uniquely to confidently dating a memory. Results from the two experiments revealed (1) higher levels of spatial details while remembering predicted greater confidence when dating memories and (2) spatial information is used to reconstruct dates of events by extending prior work that previously subsumed spatial information into the broader category of contextual details (e.g., Ben Malek et al., 2017). Participants utilised spatial information to date 26.6% of their memories; confirming previous work, they also utilised temporal landmarks, lifetime periods, and contextual details often to date events. Overall, spatial information is an important factor in dating autobiographical memories that had not been explored independently until this investigation. We discuss the implications for theories regarding the dating of memories and event memory.

Competing national memories of World War II.

We assessed the knowledge of 1,338 people from 11 countries (8 former Allied and 3 former Axis) about World War II. When asked what percentage their country contributed to the war effort, across Allied countries, estimates totaled 309%, and Axis nations' estimates came to 140%. People in 4 nations claimed more than 50% responsibility for their country (Germany, Russia, United Kingdom, and United States). The overclaiming of responsibility reflected in these percentages was moderated when subjects were asked to consider the contributions of other countries; however, Russians continued to claim great responsibility, the only country that remained well over 50% in its claim of responsibility for the Allied victory. If deaths in the war are considered a proxy of a nation's contributions, the Soviet Union did carry much of the burden. This study points to sharp differences in national memory even across nations who fought on the same side in the war. Differing national perspectives shape diverse memories of the same complex event.

A database of general knowledge question performance in older adults.

General knowledge questions are used across a variety of research and clinical settings to measure cognitive processes such as metacognition, knowledge acquisition, retrieval processes, and intelligence. Existing norms only report performance in younger adults, rendering them of limited utility for cognitive aging research because of well-documented differences in semantic memory and knowledge as a function of age. Specifically, older adults typically outperform younger adults in tasks assessing retrieval of information from the knowledge base. Here we present older adult performance on 421 general knowledge questions across a range of difficulty levels. Cued recall data, including data on the phenomenology of retrieval failures, and multiple-choice data are available. These norms will allow researchers to identify questions that are not likely to be known by older adult participants to examine learning or acquisition processes, or to select questions within a range of marginal accessibility, for example. Comparisons with young adult data from prior databases confirms previous findings of greater knowledge in older adults and indicates there is preservation of knowledge from early adulthood into older adulthood.

Recent study, but not retrieval, of knowledge protects against learning errors.

Surprisingly, people incorporate errors into their knowledge bases even when they have the correct knowledge stored in memory (e.g., Fazio, Barber, Rajaram, Ornstein, & Marsh, 2013). We examined whether heightening the accessibility of correct knowledge would protect people from later reproducing misleading information that they encountered in fictional stories. In Experiment 1, participants studied a series of target general knowledge questions and their correct answers either a few minutes (high accessibility of knowledge) or 1 week (low accessibility of knowledge) before exposure to misleading story references. In Experiments 2a and 2b, participants instead retrieved the answers to the target general knowledge questions either a few minutes or 1 week before the rest of the experiment. Reading the relevant knowledge directly before the story-reading phase protected against reproduction of the misleading story answers on a later general knowledge test, but retrieving that same correct information did not. Retrieving stored knowledge from memory might actually enhance the encoding of relevant misinformation.

Ageing and the Moses illusion: older adults fall for Moses but if asked directly, stick with Noah.

Many people respond "two" to the question "How many animals of each kind did Moses take on the ark?", even though they know the reference should be to Noah. The Moses Illusion demonstrates a failure to apply stored knowledge (Erickson & Mattson, 1981). Of interest was whether older adults' robust knowledge bases would protect them from vulnerability to this illusion. Of secondary interest were any age differences in the memorial consequences of the illusion, and whether older adults' prior knowledge would protect them from later reproducing information from distorted questions (e.g., later saying that Moses took two animals of each kind on the ark). Surprisingly, older adults fell for the Moses Illusion more often than did younger adults. However, falling for the illusion did not affect older adults' later memory; they were less suggestible than young adults. Most importantly, older adults were more likely to recover from exposure to distorted questions and respond correctly. Explanations of these findings, drawing on theories of cognitive ageing, are discussed.

Ecological validity of don't remember and don't know for distinguishing accessibility- versus availability-based retrieval failures in older and younger adults: knowledge for news events.

With pursuit of incremental progress and generalizability of findings in mind, we examined a possible boundary for older and younger adults' metacognitive distinction between what is not stored in memory versus merely inaccessible with materials that are not process pure to knowledge or events: information regarding news events. Participants were asked questions about public events such as celebrity news, tragedies, and political events that were widely experienced in the previous 10-12 years, responding "I don't know" (DK) or "I don't remember" (DR) when retrieval failed. Memories of these events are relatively recently acquired in rich, naturalistic contexts and are likely not fully separated from episodic details. When retrieval failed, DR items were recognized with higher accuracy than DK items, both immediately and 2 years later, confirming that self-reported not remembering reflects failures of accessibility, whereas not knowing better captures a lack of availability. In fact, older adults distinguished between the causes of retrieval failures more precisely than younger adults. Together, these findings advance the reliability, validity, and generalizability of using DR and DK as a metacognitive tool to address the phenomenological experience and behavioral consequences of retrieval failures of information that contains both semantic and episodic features. Implications for metacognition in aging and related constructs like familiarity, remembering, and knowing are discussed.

Lay Definitions of Intelligence, Knowledge, and Memory: Inter- and Independence of Constructs.

The present study examined how lay participants define the following concepts used widely in psychology: being intelligent, knowing, and remembering. In the scientific community, knowledge overlaps with the contents of semantic memory, crystallized intelligence reflects the accumulation of knowledge, knowledge and event memory interact, and fluid intelligence and working memory correlate. Naturally, the lay public has implicit theories of these constructs. These theories mainly distinguish between intelligent and unintelligent behaviors and tend to include characteristics outside psychometric studies of intelligence, such as emotional intelligence. Here, we asked lay participants from the online platform Prolific to explain "what does being intelligent mean to you?" as well as "knowing" and "remembering" to understand their degree of alignment with theoretical conceptualizations in the research community. Qualitative coding of participant definitions showed that intelligence and knowledge are closely related, but asymmetrically-when defining what it means to be intelligent, participants reference knowledge, but intelligence is not considered in explaining knowing. Although participants note that intelligence is multi-faceted and related to problem-solving, there is an emphasis (in terms of frequency of mentions) on the crystallized side of intelligence (i.e., knowledge). A deeper understanding of lay participants' mental models of these constructs (i.e., their metacognitions) is essential for bridging gaps between experts and the general public.

The influence of general knowledge test performance on self-ratings of and perceived relationships between intelligence, knowledge, and memory.

The present study examined how taking a general knowledge (GK) test affects perceptions of one's intelligence, memory, and knowledge and the relationship between these three constructs. Participants rated their abilities on each construct and the strength of the relationships between them before and after completing an easy or hard GK test or control task. In Experiment 1, participants were (mis)informed that GK questions were correctly answered by 50% of the population; in Experiment 2, no such information was provided. Regardless of (mis)information about others' performance, participants in the Hard condition believed they had a worse memory, were less knowledgeable, and were less intelligent post-task. However, the strength of the perceived relationship between GK and intelligence decreased only when participants were misled. Judgments of one's intelligence, memory, and knowledge can be manipulated by taking a GK test, and individuals engage in self-protective behavior to reduce the potential threat to one's self-concept.

Older adults recover more marginal knowledge and use feedback more effectively than younger adults: evidence using "I don't know" vs. "I don't remember" for general knowledge questions.

Through three experiments, we examined older and younger adults' metacognitive ability to distinguish between what is not stored in the knowledge base versus merely inaccessible. Difficult materials were selected to test this ability when retrieval failures were very frequent. Of particular interest was the influence of feedback (and lack thereof) in potential new learning and recovery of marginal knowledge across age groups. Participants answered short-answer general knowledge questions, responding "I do not know" (DK) or "I do not remember" (DR) when retrieval failed. After DKs, performance on a subsequent multiple-choice (Exp. 1) and short-answer test following correct-answer feedback (Exp. 2) was lower than after DRs, supporting self-reported not remembering reflects failures of accessibility whereas not knowing captures a lack of availability. Yet, older adults showed a tendency to answer more DK questions correctly on the final tests than younger adults. Experiment 3 was a replication and extension of Experiment 2 including two groups of online participants in which one group was not provided correct answer feedback during the initial short-answer test. This allowed us to examine the degree to which any new learning and recovery of access to marginal knowledge was occurring across the age groups. Together, the findings indicate that (1) metacognitive awareness regarding underlying causes of retrieval failures is maintained across different distributions of knowledge accessibility, (2) older adults use correct answer feedback more effectively than younger adults, and (3) in the absence of feedback, older adults spontaneously recover marginal knowledge.

Using verification feedback to correct errors made on a multiple-choice test.

A key educational challenge is how to correct students' errors and misconceptions so that they do not persist. Simply labelling an answer as correct or incorrect on a short-answer test (verification feedback) does not improve performance on later tests; error correction requires receiving answer feedback. We explored the generality of this conclusion and whether the effectiveness of verification feedback depends on the type of test with which it is paired. We argue that, unlike for short-answer tests, learning whether one's multiple-choice selection is correct or incorrect should help participants narrow down the possible answers and identify specific lures as false. To test this proposition we asked participants to answer a series of general knowledge multiple-choice questions. They received no feedback, answer feedback, or verification feedback, and then took a short-answer test immediately and two days later. Verification feedback was just as effective as answer feedback for maintaining correct answers. Importantly, verification feedback allowed learners to correct more of their errors than did no feedback, although it was not as effective as answer feedback. Overall, verification feedback conveyed information to the learner, which has both practical and theoretical implications.

Face Validity of Remembering and Knowing: Empirical Consensus and Disagreement Between Participants and Researchers.

Ever since Endel Tulving first distinguished between episodic and semantic memory, the remember/know paradigm has become a standard means of probing the phenomenology of participants' memorial experiences by memory researchers, neuropsychologists, neuroscientists, and others. However, this paradigm has not been without its problems and has been used to capture many different phenomenological experiences, including retrieval from episodic versus semantic memory, recollection versus familiarity, strength of memory traces, and so on. We first conducted a systematic review of its uses across the literature and then examined how memory experts, other cognitive psychology experts, experts in other areas of psychology, and lay participants (Amazon Mechanical Turk workers) define what it means when one says "I remember" and "I know." From coding their open-ended responses using a number of theory-bound dimensions, it seems that lay participants do not see eye to eye with memory experts in terms of associating "I remember" responses with recollection and "I know" responses with familiarity. However, there is general consensus with Tulving's original distinction, linking remembering with memory for events and knowing with semantic memory. Recommendations and implications across fields are discussed.

Scenes enable a sense of reliving: Implications for autobiographical memory.

Autobiographical memory has been defined by the phenomenological properties of reliving, vividness, and belief that an event occurred. Neuropsychological damage that results in the inability to recall the layout of a scene also results in amnesia suggesting a possible milder effect in people without such neurological damage. Based on this and other observations, we hypothesized that the degree to which the layout of a scene is recalled will correlate positively with ratings of reliving, vividness, and belief, and will explain more variance in multiple regressions than recalling the scene's contents. We also hypothesized that a lack of layout underlies nonspecific autobiographical memories which are common in aging, future events, and clinical disorders, whereas currently such memories are most commonly measured by reports of extended duration. We tested these theory-driven novel hypotheses in three studies to replicate our results. In each study, approximately 200 participants rated the layout, content, and other properties of personal events. Correlational analyses in each study and a structural equation model for the combined studies provide strong support for the role of mental scene construction in an integrative neurocognitive approach to clarify cognitive theory and clinical phenomena.

Evaluating suggestibility to additive and contradictory misinformation following explicit error detection in younger and older adults.

In 2 experiments, we assessed age-related suggestibility to additive and contradictory misinformation (i.e., remembering of false details from an external source). After reading a fictional story, participants answered questions containing misleading details that were either additive (misleading details that supplemented an original event) or contradictory (errors that changed original details). On a final test, suggestibility was greater for additive than contradictory misinformation, and older adults endorsed fewer false contradictory details than younger adults. To mitigate suggestibility in Experiment 2, participants were warned about potential errors, instructed to detect errors, or instructed to detect errors after exposure to examples of additive and contradictory details. Again, suggestibility to additive misinformation was greater than contradictory, and older adults endorsed less contradictory misinformation. Only after detection instructions with misinformation examples were younger adults able to reduce contradictory misinformation effects and reduced these effects to the level of older adults. Additive misinformation however, was immune to all warning and detection instructions. Thus, older adults were less susceptible to contradictory misinformation errors, and younger adults could match this misinformation rate when warning/detection instructions were strong. (PsycINFO Database Record

Competing cues: Older adults rely on knowledge in the face of fluency.

Consumers regularly encounter repeated false claims in political and marketing campaigns, but very little empirical work addresses their impact among older adults. Repeated statements feel easier to process, and thus more truthful, than new ones (i.e., illusory truth). When judging truth, older adults' accumulated general knowledge may offset this perception of fluency. In two experiments, participants read statements that contradicted information stored in memory; a post-experimental knowledge check confirmed what individual participants knew. Unlike young adults, older adults exhibited illusory truth only when they lacked knowledge about claims. This interaction between knowledge and fluency extends dual-process theories of aging. (PsycINFO Database Record

Understanding the cognitive processes involved in writing to learn.

Writing is often used as a tool for learning. However, empirical support for the benefits of writing-to-learn is mixed, likely because the literature conflates diverse activities (e.g., summaries, term papers) under the single umbrella of writing-to-learn. Following recent trends in the writing-to-learn literature, the authors focus on the underlying cognitive processes. They draw on the largely independent writing-to-learn and cognitive psychology learning literatures to identify important cognitive processes. The current experiment examines learning from 3 writing tasks (and 1 nonwriting control), with an emphasis on whether or not the tasks engaged retrieval. Tasks that engaged retrieval (essay writing and free recall) led to better final test performance than those that did not (note taking and highlighting). Individual differences in structure building (the ability to construct mental representations of narratives; Gernsbacher, Varner, & Faust, 1990) modified this effect; skilled structure builders benefited more from essay writing and free recall than did less skilled structure builders. Further, more essay-like responses led to better performance, implicating the importance of additional cognitive processes such as reorganization and elaboration. The results highlight how both task instructions and individual differences affect the cognitive processes involved when writing-to-learn, with consequences for the effectiveness of the learning strategy. (PsycINFO Database Record

Age differences in suggestibility to contradictions of demonstrated knowledge: the influence of prior knowledge.

People maintain intact general knowledge into very old age and use it to support remembering. Interestingly, when older and younger adults encounter errors that contradict general knowledge, older adults suffer fewer memorial consequences: Older adults use fewer recently-encountered errors as answers for later knowledge questions. Why do older adults show this reduced suggestibility, and what role does their intact knowledge play? In three experiments, I examined suggestibility following exposure to errors in fictional stories that contradict general knowledge. Older adults consistently demonstrated more prior knowledge than younger adults but also gained access to even more across time. Additionally, they did not show a reduction in new learning from the stories, indicating lesser involvement of episodic memory failures. Critically, when knowledge was stably accessible, older adults relied more heavily on that knowledge compared to younger adults, resulting in reduced suggestibility. Implications for the broader role of knowledge in aging are discussed.