Striosomes Mediate Value-Based Learning Vulnerable in Age and a Huntington's Disease Model.

Learning valence-based responses to favorable and unfavorable options requires judgments of the relative value of the options, a process necessary for species survival. We found, using engineered mice, that circuit connectivity and function of the striosome compartment of the striatum are critical for this type of learning. Calcium imaging during valence-based learning exhibited a selective correlation between learning and striosomal but not matrix signals. This striosomal activity encoded discrimination learning and was correlated with task engagement, which, in turn, could be regulated by chemogenetic excitation and inhibition. Striosomal function during discrimination learning was disturbed with aging and severely so in a mouse model of Huntington's disease. Anatomical and functional connectivity of parvalbumin-positive, putative fast-spiking interneurons (FSIs) to striatal projection neurons was enhanced in striosomes compared with matrix in mice that learned. Computational modeling of these findings suggests that FSIs can modulate the striosomal signal-to-noise ratio, crucial for discrimination and learning.

Neuronal Activity in the Gustatory Cortex during Economic Choice.

An economic choice entails computing and comparing the values of individual offers. Offer values are represented in the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC)-an area that participates in value comparison-but it is unknown where offer values are computed in the first place. One possibility is that this computation takes place in OFC. Alternatively, offer values might be computed upstream of OFC. For choices between edible goods, a primary candidate is the gustatory region of the anterior insula (gustatory cortex, GC). Here we recorded from the GC of male rhesus monkeys choosing between different juice types. As a population, neurons in GC represented the flavor, the quantity, and the subjective value of the juice chosen by the animal. These variables were represented by distinct groups of cells and with different time courses. Specifically, chosen value signals emerged shortly after offer presentation, while neurons encoding the chosen juice and the chosen quantity peaked after juice delivery. Surprisingly, neurons in GC did not represent individual offer values in a systematic way. In a computational sense, the variables encoded in GC follow the process of value comparison. Thus our results argue against the hypothesis that offer values are computed in GC. At the same time, signals representing the subjective value of the expected reward indicate that responses in GC are not purely sensory. Thus neuronal responses in GC appear consummatory in nature.

Neurobiological substrates of the dread of future losses.

When anticipating future losses, people respond by exhibiting 1 of 2 starkly distinct behavioral decision patterns: the dread of future losses (DFL) and the preference of future losses (vs. immediate losses). Yet, how to accurately discriminate between those who exhibit dread vs. preference and uncover the potential neurobiological substrates underlying these 2 groups remain understudied. To address this, we designed a novel experimental task in which the DFL group was defined as selecting immediate-loss options >50% in the trials with approximate subjective value in immediate and delayed options (n = 16), otherwise coding as the preference of future losses (PFL). At the behavioral level, DFL exhibited higher weight for delayed losses than immediate losses via the logistic regression model. At the neural level, DFL manifested hypoactivations on subjective valuations of delayed losses, atypical brain pattern when choosing immediate-loss options, and decreased functional coupling between the valuation and choice-systems when making decisions related to immediate-loss alternatives compared with PFL. Moreover, both these brain activations subserving distinct decision processes and their interactions predicted individual decisions and behavioral preferences. Furthermore, morphological analysis also revealed decreased right precuneus volume in DFL compared with PFL, and brain activations related to valuation and choice process mediated the associations between this region volume and behavioral performances. Taken together, these findings help to clarify potential cognitive and neural mechanisms underlying the DFL and provide a clear discrimination strategy.

Economic Choices under Simultaneous or Sequential Offers Rely on the Same Neural Circuit.

A series of studies in which monkeys chose between two juices offered in variable amounts identified in the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) different groups of neurons encoding the value of individual options (offer value), the binary choice outcome (chosen juice), and the chosen value. These variables capture both the input and the output of the choice process, suggesting that the cell groups identified in OFC constitute the building blocks of a decision circuit. Several lines of evidence support this hypothesis. However, in previous experiments offers were presented simultaneously, raising the question of whether current notions generalize to when goods are presented or are examined in sequence. Recently, Ballesta and Padoa-Schioppa (2019) examined OFC activity under sequential offers. An analysis of neuronal responses across time windows revealed that a small number of cell groups encoded specific sequences of variables. These sequences appeared analogous to the variables identified under simultaneous offers, but the correspondence remained tentative. Thus, in the present study, we examined the relation between cell groups found under sequential versus simultaneous offers. We recorded from the OFC while monkeys chose between different juices. Trials with simultaneous and sequential offers were randomly interleaved in each session. We classified cells in each choice modality, and we examined the relation between the two classifications. We found a strong correspondence; in other words, the cell groups measured under simultaneous offers and under sequential offers were one and the same. This result indicates that economic choices under simultaneous or sequential offers rely on the same neural circuit.SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT Research in the past 20 years has shed light on the neuronal underpinnings of economic choices. A large number of results indicates that decisions between goods are formed in a neural circuit within the orbitofrontal cortex. In most previous studies, subjects chose between two goods offered simultaneously. Yet, in daily situations, goods available for choice are often presented or examined in sequence. Here we recorded neuronal activity in the primate orbitofrontal cortex alternating trials under simultaneous and under sequential offers. Our analyses demonstrate that the same neural circuit supports choices in the two modalities. Hence, current notions on the neuronal mechanisms underlying economic decisions generalize to choices under sequential offers.

The dorsomedial prefrontal cortex represents subjective value across effort-based and risky decision-making.

Decisions that require taking effort costs into account are ubiquitous in real life. The neural common currency theory hypothesizes that a particular neural network integrates different costs (e.g., risk) and rewards into a common scale to facilitate value comparison. Although there has been a surge of interest in the computational and neural basis of effort-related value integration, it is still under debate if effort-based decision-making relies on a domain-general valuation network as implicated in the neural common currency theory. Therefore, we comprehensively compared effort-based and risky decision-making using a combination of computational modeling, univariate and multivariate fMRI analyses, and data from two independent studies. We found that effort-based decision-making can be best described by a power discounting model that accounts for both the discounting rate and effort sensitivity. At the neural level, multivariate decoding analyses indicated that the neural patterns of the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC) represented subjective value across different decision-making tasks including either effort or risk costs, although univariate signals were more diverse. These findings suggest that multivariate dmPFC patterns play a critical role in computing subjective value in a task-independent manner and thus extend the scope of the neural common currency theory.

The neural correlates of value representation: From single items to bundles.

One of the core questions in Neuro-economics is to determine where value is represented. To date, most studies have focused on simple options and identified the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC) as the common value region. We report the findings of an fMRI study in which we asked participants to make pairwise comparisons involving options of varying complexity: single items (Control condition), bundles made of the same two single items (Scaling condition) and bundles made of two different single items (Bundling condition). We construct a measure of choice consistency to capture how coherent the choices of a participant are with one another. We also record brain activity while participants make these choices. We find that a common core of regions involving the left VMPFC, the left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), regions associated with complex visual processing and the left cerebellum track value across all conditions. Also, regions in the DLPFC, the ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (VLPFC) and the cerebellum are differentially recruited across conditions. Last, variations in activity in VMPFC and DLPFC value-tracking regions are associated with variations in choice consistency. This suggests that value based decision-making recruits a core set of regions as well as specific regions based on task demands. Further, correlations between consistency and the magnitude of signal change with lateral portions of the PFC suggest the possibility that activity in these regions may play a causal role in decision quality.

Value certainty and choice confidence are multidimensional constructs that guide decision-making.

The degree of certainty that decision-makers have about their evaluations of available choice alternatives and their confidence about selecting the subjectively best alternative are important factors that affect current and future value-based choices. Assessments of the alternatives in a given choice set are rarely unidimensional; their values are usually derived from a combination of multiple distinct attributes. For example, the taste, texture, quantity, and nutritional content of a snack food may all be considered when determining whether to consume it. We examined how certainty about the levels of individual attributes of an option relates to certainty about the overall value of that option as a whole and/or to confidence in having chosen the subjectively best available option. We found that certainty and confidence are derived from unequally weighted combinations of attribute certainties rather than simple, equal combinations of all sources of uncertainty. Attributes that matter more in determining choice outcomes also are weighted more in metacognitive evaluations of certainty or confidence. Moreover, we found that the process of deciding between two alternatives leads to refinements in both attribute estimations and the degree of certainty in those estimates. Attributes that are more important in determining choice outcomes are refined more during the decision process in terms of both estimates and certainty. Although certainty and confidence are typically treated as unidimensional, our results indicate that they, like value estimates, are subjective, multidimensional constructs.

A comparison of reward processing during Becker-DeGroot-Marschak and Vickrey auctions: An ERP study.

Vickrey auctions (VA) and Becker-DeGroot-Marschak auctions (BDM) are strategically equivalent demand-revealing mechanisms, differentiated only by a human opponent in the VA, and a random-number-generator opponent in the BDM. Game parameters are such that players are incentivized to reveal their private subjective values (SV) and behavior should be identical in both tasks. However, this has been repeatedly shown not to be the case. In this study, the neural correlates of outcome feedback processing during VA and BDM were directly compared using electroencephalography. Twenty-eight healthy participants bid for household products which were then divided into high- and low-SV categories. The VA included a human opponent deception to induce a social environment, while in reality a random-number-generator was used in both tasks. A P3 component peaking at 336 ms over midline parietal sites showed more positive amplitudes for high bid values, and for win outcomes in the VA but not the BDM. Both auctions also elicited a Reward Positivity potential, maximal at 275 ms along the central midline electrodes, that was not modulated by auction task or SV. Further, an exploratory N170 potential in the right occipitotemporal electrodes and a vertex positive potential component were stronger in the VA relative to the BDM. Results point to an enhanced cortical response to bid outcomes during VA task in a potential component associated with emotional control, and to the occurrence of face-sensitive potentials in VA but not in BDM auction. These findings suggest modulation of bid outcome processing by the social-competitive aspect of auction tasks. Directly comparing two prominent auction paradigms affords the opportunity to isolate the impact of social environment on competitive, risky decision-making. Findings suggest that feedback processing as early as 176 ms is facilitated by the presence of a human competitor, and later processing is modulated by social context and subjective value.

Rational transformative decision-making.

According to L. A. Paul (2014), transformative experiences pose a challenge for decision theory, as their subjective value is not epistemically accessible. However, several authors propose that the subjective values of options are often irrelevant to their ranking; in many cases, all we need for rational transformative decision-making are the known non-subjective values. This stance is in conflict with Paul's argument that the subjective value can always swamp the non-subjective value. The approach presented in this paper takes Paul's argument into account and shows how potential swamping can be controlled given that one desires the transformative outcome: If one knows from previous decisions that desired transformative outcomes are associated with positive subjective value and if, in addition, testimony confirms this association for the current decision situation, one can infer that a desired outcome's expected subjective value has a positive valence. Accordingly, one can rationally choose the desired transformative option if its non-subjective value is no lower than the overall value of any other option.

Hypothalamic interaction with reward-related regions during subjective evaluation of foods.

The reward system implemented in the midbrain, ventral striatum, orbitofrontal cortex, and ventromedial prefrontal cortex evaluates and compares various types of rewards given to the organisms. It has been suggested that autonomic factors influence reward-related processing via the hypothalamus, but how the hypothalamus modulates the reward system remains elusive. In this functional magnetic resonance imaging study, the hypothalamus was parcellated into individual hypothalamic nuclei performing different autonomic functions using boundary mapping parcellation analyses. The effective interaction during subjective evaluation of foods in a reward task was then investigated between the human hypothalamic nuclei and the reward-related regions. We found significant brain activity decrease in the paraventricular nucleus (PVH) and lateral nucleus in the hypothalamus in food evaluation compared with monetary evaluation. A psychophysiological interaction analysis revealed dual interactions between the PVH and (1) midbrain region and (2) ventromedial prefrontal cortex, with the former correlated with the stronger tendency of participants toward food-seeking. A dynamic causal modeling analysis further revealed unidirectional interactions from the PVH to the midbrain and ventromedial prefrontal cortex. These results suggest that the PVH in the human hypothalamus interacts with the reward-related regions in the cerebral cortex via multiple pathways (i.e., the midbrain pathway and ventromedial prefrontal pathway) to evaluate rewards for subsequent decision-making.

Neuronal Activity in the Primate Amygdala during Economic Choice.

Multiple lines of evidence link economic choices to the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC), but other brain regions may contribute to the computation and comparison of economic values. A particularly strong candidate is the basolateral amygdala (BLA). Amygdala lesions impair performance in reinforcer devaluation tasks, suggesting that the BLA contributes to value computation. Furthermore, previous studies of the BLA have found neuronal activity consistent with a value representation. Here, we recorded from the BLA of two male rhesus macaques choosing between different juices. Offered quantities varied from trial to trial, and relative values were inferred from choices. Approximately one-third of BLA cells were task-related. Our analyses revealed the presence of three groups of neurons encoding variables offer value, chosen value, and chosen juice In this respect, the BLA appeared similar to the OFC. The two areas differed for the proportion of neurons in each group, as the fraction of chosen value cells was significantly higher in the BLA. Importantly, the activity of these neurons reflected the subjective nature of value. Firing rates in the BLA were sustained throughout the trial and maximal after juice delivery. In contrast, firing rates in the OFC were phasic and maximal shortly after offer presentation. Our results suggest that the BLA supports economic choice and reward expectation.SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT Economic choices rely on the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC), but other brain regions may contribute to this behavior. A strong candidate is the basolateral amygdala (BLA). Previous results are consistent with a neuronal representation of value, but the role of the BLA in economic decisions remains unclear. Here, we recorded from monkeys choosing between juices. Neurons in the BLA encoded three decision variables: offer value, chosen value, and chosen juice These variables were also identified in the OFC. The two areas differed in the proportion of cells encoding each variable and in the activation timing. In the OFC, firing rates peaked shortly after offer presentation; in the BLA, firing rates were sustained and peaked after juice delivery. These results suggest that the BLA supports choices and reward expectation.

The Subjective Value of Cognitive Effort is Encoded by a Domain-General Valuation Network.

Cognitive control is necessary for goal-directed behavior, yet people treat cognitive control demand as a cost, which discounts the value of rewards in a similar manner as other costs, such as delay or risk. It is unclear, however, whether the subjective value (SV) of cognitive effort is encoded in the same putatively domain-general brain valuation network implicated in other cost domains, or instead engages a distinct frontoparietal network, as implied by recent studies. Here, we provide rigorous evidence that the valuation network, with core foci in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex and ventral striatum, also encodes SV during cognitive effort-based decision-making in healthy, male and female adult humans. We doubly dissociate this network from frontoparietal regions that are instead recruited as a function of decision difficulty. We show that the domain-general valuation network jointly and independently encodes both reward benefits and cognitive effort costs. We also demonstrate that cognitive effort SV signals predict choice and are influenced by state and trait motivation, including sensitivity to reward and anticipated task performance. These findings unify cognitive effort with other cost domains, and suggest candidate neural mechanisms underlying state and trait variation in willingness to expend cognitive effort.SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT Subjective effort costs are increasingly understood to diminish cognitive control over task performance and can thus undermine functioning across health and disease. Yet, we are only beginning to understand how decisions about cognitive effort are made. A key question is how subjective values are computed. Recent work suggests that the value of cognitive effort might be computed by networks that are distinct from those involved in other domains like intertemporal and risky decision-making, implying distinct mechanisms. Here we demonstrate that the domain-general network also encodes effort-discounted value, linking cognitive effort closely with other domains. Our results thus elucidate key mechanisms supporting decisions about cognitive effort, and point to candidate neural targets for intervention in disorders involving impaired cognitive motivation.

Partial Adaptation to the Value Range in the Macaque Orbitofrontal Cortex.

Values available for choice in different behavioral contexts can vary immensely. To compensate for this variability, neuronal circuits underlying economic decisions undergo adaptation. In orbitofrontal cortex (OFC), neurons encode the subjective value of offered and chosen goods in a quasilinear way. Previous experiments found that the gain of the encoding is lower when the value range is wider. However, the parameters OFC neurons adapted to remained unclear. Furthermore, previous studies did not examine additive changes in neuronal responses. Computational considerations indicate that these factors can directly impact choice behavior. Here we investigated how OFC neurons adapt to changes in the value range. We recorded from two male rhesus monkeys during a juice choice task. Each session was divided into two blocks of trials. In each block, juices were offered within a set range of values, and ranges changed between blocks. Across blocks, neuronal responses adapted to both the maximum and the minimum value, but only partially. As a result, the minimum neural activity was elevated in some value ranges relative to others. Through simulation of a linear decision model, we showed that increasing the minimum response increases choice variability, lowering the expected payoff. This effect is modulated by the balance between cells with positive and negative encoding. The presence of these two populations induces a non-monotonic relationship between the value range and choice efficacy, such that the expected payoff is highest for decisions in an intermediate value range.SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT Economic decisions are thought to rely on the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC). The values available for choice vary enormously in different contexts. Previous work showed that neurons in OFC encode values in a linear way, and that the gain of encoding is inversely related to the range of available values. However, the specific parameters driving adaptation remained unclear. Here we show that OFC neurons adapt to both the maximum and minimum value in the current context. However, adaptation is partial, leading to contextual changes in the response offset. Interestingly, increasing the activity offset negatively affects choices in a simulated network. Partial adaptation may allow the circuit to maintain information about context value at the cost of slightly reduced payoff.

Saccade vigor and the subjective economic value of visual stimuli.

Decisions are made based on the subjective value that the brain assigns to options. However, subjective value is a mathematical construct that cannot be measured directly, but rather is inferred from choices. Recent results have demonstrated that reaction time, amplitude, and velocity of movements are modulated by reward, raising the possibility that there is a link between how the brain evaluates an option and how it controls movements toward that option. Here, we asked people to choose among risky options represented by abstract stimuli, some associated with gain (points in a game), and others with loss. From their choices we estimated the subjective value that they assigned to each stimulus. In probe trials, a single stimulus appeared at center, instructing subjects to make a saccade to a peripheral target. We found that the reaction time, peak velocity, and amplitude of the peripherally directed saccade varied roughly linearly with the subjective value that the participant had assigned to the central stimulus: reaction time was shorter, velocity was higher, and amplitude was larger for stimuli that the participant valued more. Naturally, participants differed in how much they valued a given stimulus. Remarkably, those who valued a stimulus more, as evidenced by their choices in decision trials, tended to move with shorter reaction time and greater velocity in response to that stimulus in probe trials. Overall, the reaction time of the saccade in response to a stimulus partly predicted the subjective value that the brain assigned to that stimulus.NEW & NOTEWORTHY Behavioral economics relies on subjective evaluation, an abstract quantity that cannot be measured directly but must be inferred by fitting decision models to the choice patterns. Here, we present a new approach to estimate subjective value: with nothing to fit, we show that it is possible to estimate subjective value based on movement kinematics, providing a modest ability to predict a participant's preferences without prior measurement of their choice patterns.

Corticostriatal Circuits Encode the Subjective Value of Perceived Control.

The ability to perceive and exercise control over an outcome is both desirable and beneficial to our well-being. It has been shown that animals and humans alike exhibit behavioral bias towards seeking control and that such bias recruits the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) and striatum. Yet, this bias remains to be quantitatively captured and studied neurally. Here, we employed a behavioral task to measure the preference for control and characterize its neural underpinnings. Participants made a series of binary choices between having control and no-control over a game for monetary reward. The mere presence of the control option evoked activity in the ventral striatum. Importantly, we manipulated the expected value (EV) of each choice pair to extract the pairing where participants were equally likely to choose either option. The difference in EV between the options at this point of equivalence was inferred as the subjective value of control. Strikingly, perceiving control inflated the reward value of the associated option by 30% and this value inflation was tracked by the vmPFC. Altogether, these results capture the subjective value of perceived control inherent in decision making and highlight the role of corticostriatal circuitry in the perception of control.

The Psychophysics of Terror Attack Casualty Counts.

In communicating the risk that terror attacks pose to the public, government agencies and other organizations must understand which characteristics of an attack contribute to the public's perception of its severity. An attack's casualty count is one of the most commonly used metrics of a terror attack's severity, yet it is unclear whether the public responds to information about casualty count when forming affective and cognitive reactions to terror attacks. This study sought to characterize the "psychophysical function" relating terror attack casualty counts to the severity of the affective and cognitive reactions they elicit. We recruited n = 684 Mechanical Turk participants to read a realistic vignette depicting either a biological or radiological terror attack, whose death toll ranged from 20 to 50,000, and rated their levels of fear and anger along with the attack's severity. Even when controlling for the perceived plausibility of the scenarios, participants' severity ratings of each attack were logarithmic with respect to casualty count, while ratings of fear and anger did not significantly depend on casualty count. These results were consistent across attack weapon (biological vs. radiological) and time horizon of the casualties (same-day or anticipated to occur over several years). These results complement past work on life loss valuation and highlight a potential bifurcation between the public's affective and cognitive evaluations of terror attacks.

An amygdala-cingulate network underpins changes in effort-based decision making after a fitness program.

When humans make decisions, objective rewards are mainly discounted by delay, risk and effort. Whereas recent research has demonstrated that several brain areas process costs and code subjective value in effort-based decision making, it remains obscure how neural activity patterns change when effort costs are reduced due to the acquisition of healthy habits, such as moving from sedentary to active lifestyles. Here, a sample of sedentary volunteers was behaviorally assessed and fMRI-scanned before and after completing a 3-month fitness plan. The impact of effort cost on decisions, measured as the constant defining a hyperbolic decaying function, was reduced after the plan. A logistic mixed model demonstrated that the explanatory power of effort decreased with time. At a neural level, there was a marginally significant disruption of effort-cost related functional activity in the anterior cingulate after the plan. Functional connectivity between the amygdala and anterior cingulate cortex was strengthened after habit acquisition. In turn, this interaction was stronger in those participants with lower effort discounting. Thus, we show for the first time changes in value-based decision making after moving from a sedentary to an active lifestyle, which points to the relevance of the amygdala-cingulate interplay when the impact of effort on decisions fades away.

Neural tracking of subjective value under riskand ambiguity in adolescence.

Although many neuroimaging studies on adolescent risk taking have focused on brain activation during outcome valuation, less attention has been paid to the neural correlates of choice valuation. Subjective choice valuation may be particularly influenced by whether a choice presents risk (known probabilities) or ambiguity (unknown probabilities), which has rarely been studied in developmental samples. Therefore, we examined the neural tracking of subjective value during choice under risk and ambiguity in a large sample of adolescents (N = 188, 12-22 years). Specifically, we investigated which brain regions tracked subjective value coding under risk and ambiguity. A model-based approach to estimate individuals' risk and ambiguity attitudes showed prominent variation in individuals' aversions to risk and ambiguity. Furthermore, participants subjectively experienced the ambiguous options as being riskier than the risky options. Subjective value tracking under risk was coded by activation in ventral striatum and superior parietal cortex. Subjective value tracking under ambiguity was coded by dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (PFC) and superior temporal gyrus activation. Finally, overlapping activation in the dorsomedial PFC was observed for subjective value under both conditions. Overall, this is the first study to chart brain activation patterns for subjective choice valuation under risk and ambiguity in an adolescent sample, which shows that the building blocks for risk and ambiguity processing are already present in early adolescence. Finally, we highlight the potential of combining behavioral modeling with fMRI for investigating choice valuation in adolescence, which may ultimately aid in understanding who takes risks and why.

Cash vs. vouchers vs. gifts in web surveys of a mature panel study--Main effects in a long-term incentives experiment across three panel waves.

In this study, we evaluate short- and long-term effects of three different prepaid incentives: a ballpoint-pen (gift worth approximately 2 Swiss francs), a voucher (cash card worth 10 Swiss francs) and cash (a 10-Swiss-francs' banknote) on young panellists' cooperation and response rate in three waves of a mature panel study with a sequential multi-mode design (web-based online survey, CATI, and PAPI). The survey experiment involved an alternative procedure to analyse the effect of different types of prepaid incentives, taking selective attrition into account as well as considering problems related to causal inference. The subjects were students, from randomly-selected school classes, who had finished their compulsory school in 2013. The findings are clear: cash provides the strongest direct, positive effect on the overall response rate and also on the latency until response after first contact. The other incentives did not work as efficiently as did cash. Additionally, cash is the most likely to minimise social selectivity in response. Finally, cash provides the potential to convert refusals in previous waves into cooperation.

Contributions of the Medial Prefrontal Cortex to Social Influence in Economic Decision-Making.

Economic decisions are guided by highly subjective reward valuations (SVs). Often these SVs are over-ridden when individuals conform to social norms. Yet, the neural mechanisms that underpin the distinct processing of such normative reward valuations (NVs) are poorly understood. The dorsomedial and ventromedial portions of the prefrontal cortex (dmPFC/vmPFC) are putatively key regions for processing social and economic information respectively. However, the contribution of these regions to economic decisions guided by social norms is unclear. Using functional magnetic resonance imaging and computational modeling we examine the neural mechanisms underlying the processing of SVs and NVs. Subjects (n = 15) indicated either their own economic preferences or made similar choices based on a social norm-learnt during a training session. We found that that the vmPFC and dmPFC make dissociable contributions to the processing of SV and NV. Regions of the dmPFC processed "only" the value of rewards when making normative choices. In contrast, we identify a novel mechanism in the vmPFC for the coding of value. This region signaled both subjective and normative valuations, but activity was scaled positively for SV and negatively for NV. These results highlight some of the key mechanisms that underpin conformity and social influence in economic decision-making.