Honesty through repeated interactions.
J Theor Biol
; 395: 238-244, 2016 Apr 21.
Article
en En
| MEDLINE
| ID: mdl-26869213
ABSTRACT
In the study of signaling, it is well known that the cost of deception is an essential element for stable honest signaling in nature. In this paper, we show how costs for deception can arise endogenously from repeated interactions between individuals. Utilizing the Sir Philip Sidney game as an illustrative case, we show that repeated interactions can sustain honesty with no observable signal costs, even when deception cannot be directly observed. We provide a number of potential experimental tests for this theory which distinguish it from the available alternatives.
Palabras clave
Texto completo:
1
Colección:
01-internacional
Banco de datos:
MEDLINE
Asunto principal:
Transducción de Señal
/
Modelos Biológicos
Idioma:
En
Revista:
J Theor Biol
Año:
2016
Tipo del documento:
Article
País de afiliación:
Estados Unidos