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Common Error Pathways in CyberKnife™ Radiation Therapy.
Mullins, Brandon T; Mazur, Lukasz; Dance, Michael; McGurk, Ross; Schreiber, Eric; Marks, Lawrence B; Shen, Colette J; Lawrence, Michael V; Chera, Bhishamjit S.
Afiliação
  • Mullins BT; Department of Radiation Oncology, University of North Carolina Hospitals, Chapel Hill, NC, United States.
  • Mazur L; Division of Healthcare Engineering, Department of Radiation Oncology, University of North Carolina School of Medicine, Chapel Hill, NC, United States.
  • Dance M; Carolina Health Informatics Program, School of Information and Library Science, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, NC, United States.
  • McGurk R; Department of Radiation Oncology, University of North Carolina Hospitals, Chapel Hill, NC, United States.
  • Schreiber E; Department of Radiation Oncology, University of North Carolina Hospitals, Chapel Hill, NC, United States.
  • Marks LB; Department of Radiation Oncology, University of North Carolina Hospitals, Chapel Hill, NC, United States.
  • Shen CJ; Department of Radiation Oncology, University of North Carolina Hospitals, Chapel Hill, NC, United States.
  • Lawrence MV; Department of Radiation Oncology, University of North Carolina Hospitals, Chapel Hill, NC, United States.
  • Chera BS; Department of Radiation Oncology, University of North Carolina Hospitals, Chapel Hill, NC, United States.
Front Oncol ; 10: 1077, 2020.
Article em En | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-32733802
Purpose/Objectives: Stereotactic radiosurgery (SRS) and stereotactic body radiation therapy (SBRT) may be considered "high risk" due to the high doses per fraction. We analyzed CyberKnife™ (CK) SRS and SBRT-related incidents that were prospectively reported to our in-house incident learning system (ILS) in order to identify severity, contributing factors, and common error pathways. Material and Methods: From 2012 to 2019, 221 reported incidents related to the 4,569 CK fractions delivered (5.8%) were prospectively analyzed by our multi-professional Quality and Safety Committee with regard to severity, contributing factors, as well as the location where the incident occurred (tripped), where it was discovered (caught), and the safety barriers that were traversed (crossed) on the CK process map. Based on the particular step in the process map that incidents tripped, we categorized incidents into general error pathways. Results: There were 205 severity grade 1-2 (did not reach patient or no clinical impact), 11 grade 3 (clinical impact unlikely), 5 grade 4 (altered the intended treatment), and 0 grade 5-6 (life-threatening or death) incidents, with human performance being the most common contributing factor (79% of incidents). Incidents most commonly tripped near the time when the practitioner requested CK simulation (e.g., pre-CK simulation fiducial marker placement) and most commonly caught during the physics pre-treatment checklist. The four general error pathways included pre-authorization, billing, and scheduling issues (n= 119); plan quality (n= 30); administration of IV contrast during simulation or pre-medications during treatment (n= 22); and image guidance (n= 12). Conclusion: Most CK incidents led to little or no patient harm and most were related to billing and scheduling issues. Suboptimal human performance appeared to be the most common contributing factor to CK incidents. Additional study is warranted to develop and share best practices to reduce incidents to further improve patient safety.
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Texto completo: 1 Coleções: 01-internacional Base de dados: MEDLINE Tipo de estudo: Guideline / Prognostic_studies Idioma: En Revista: Front Oncol Ano de publicação: 2020 Tipo de documento: Article País de afiliação: Estados Unidos

Texto completo: 1 Coleções: 01-internacional Base de dados: MEDLINE Tipo de estudo: Guideline / Prognostic_studies Idioma: En Revista: Front Oncol Ano de publicação: 2020 Tipo de documento: Article País de afiliação: Estados Unidos