The reminiscence bump and the self: evidence from five studies on positive and negative memories.

A plethora of studies have shown that people persistently remember public and personal events experienced during adolescence and early adulthood, particularly with a positive valence. In five studies, we investigate the reminiscence bump (RB) for positive and negative memories of public events (Studies 1 and 2), private events (Study 3), music-related events (Study 4), and cross-cultural memory differences (i.e., China and US) (Study 5). Participants retrieved either one positive or one negative memory, indicated their Age of Encoding, and provided secondary measures, i.e., memory vividness and rehearsal (Studies 1 and 3) and emotional intensity (Studies 2 and 4). About 10,000 memories were collected and positive memories appeared generally older than negative recollections, but the RB emerged for both positive and negative memories. Furthermore, the peak was earlier for positive memories of public events (<15 years old) than for negative memories (20-40 years), while no differences were found for private events or music-related experiences (15-25 years). Chinese had their RB later than US respondents. Finally, autobiographical recollections have moderate to low associations with secondary measures of phenomenological features of memory. These findings are consistent with the identity-formation theory, providing additional and important information on the development of the Self.

In my life: memory, self and The Beatles.

In a large-scale study, we asked people for their memories of The Beatles. Over four thousand respondents completed an online questionnaire. The memory could be related to a song, album, event, TV, film, or even a personal encounter. Respondents judged the age at which the event remembered had occurred and rated the memory for vividness, emotional intensity, valence and rehearsal. We found 38% of the memories were classified as "seeing The Beatles live", 25% "buying Beatles music", 20% "love of The Beatles" and 17% of the memories were "listening to Beatles songs with other people" - what we refer to as cascading memories. Among the younger respondents (aged 26 and under), 84% of the memories were cascading in nature. The memories dated to what we term the "self-defining period" in autobiographical memory (previously termed "the reminiscence bump"), with a mean age-at-encoding of 13.6 years, which is consistent with other studies of memories associated with music. We propose that these memories reflect the formation of generational identity [Mannheim, K. (1952). The problem of generations. In K. Mannheim (Ed.), Essays on the sociology knowledge (pp. 276-321). Routledge & Keegan Paul].

Memory construction: a brief and selective history.

In this short article, we provide a brief introduction to the idea that memory involves constructive processes. The importance of constructive processes in memory has a rich history, one that stretches back more than 125 years. This historical context provides a backdrop for the articles appearing in this special issue of Memory, articles that outline the current thinking about the constructive nature of memory. We argue that memory construction, either implicitly or explicitly, represents the current framework in which modern memory research is embedded.

Mnemoscape: Supporting Older Adults' Event Memory Using Wearable Camera Photographs on an Immersive Interface.

BACKGROUND: Wearable camera photographs have been shown to be an effective memory aid in people with and without memory impairment. Most studies using wearable cameras as a memory aid have presented photographs on a computer monitor and used a written diary or no review as a comparison. In this pioneering study, we took a new and innovative approach to wearable camera photograph review that embeds the photographs within a virtual landscape. This approach may enhance these benefits by reinstating the original environmental context to increase participants' sense of re-experiencing the event. OBJECTIVE: We compare the traditional computer monitor presentation of wearable camera photographs and actively taken digital photographs with the presentation of wearable camera photographs in a new immersive interface that reinstates the spatiotemporal context. METHODS: Healthy older adults wore wearable or took digital photographs during a staged event. The next day and 2 weeks later, they viewed wearable camera photographs on a computer monitor or in context on an immersive interface, or digital photographs. RESULTS: Participants who viewed wearable camera photographs in either format recalled more details during photo viewing and subsequent free recall than participants who viewed digital photographs they had taken themselves. CONCLUSION: Wearable camera photographs are an effective support for event memory, regardless of whether they are presented in context in an experience-near format.

Cultural self-goals influence how much is remembered from early childhood events.

OBJECTIVE: Prior work examining the role of cultural self-goals on the retrieval of early memories treated the presence of self-goals; such as autonomy and relatedness, as a binary category which has led to overlooking within-group nuances. Here, based on the idea that these goals co-exist in varying degrees in individuals, we explore the relative contributions of self-goals on age-at-event and the level of detail in positive and negative early memories. METHOD: Participants (N = 119) recalled and dated two earliest positive and negative memories that they were highly confident were memories, and answered a set of questions about event-specific details. They also completed a self-construal scale. RESULTS: For positive memories, Autonomous-Related Self scores predicted both the age-at-event and the amount of detail in early memories, while. no such relationship was observed for negative memories. CONCLUSIONS: Together these findings indicate that cultural self-goals operate on the accessibility of early memories not only at the level of the boundaries of childhood amnesia but also on how much is recalled from early experiences.

Flashbulb memory: referring back to Brown and Kulik's definition.

Since Brown and Kulik's (1977. Flashbulb memories. Cognition, 5, 73-99. http://doi.org/10.1016/0010-0277(77)90018-X) seminal work, a central issue in memory literature is whether flashbulb memories (FBMs) hold a special status within autobiographical recalls. To address this issue, we refer back to Brown and Kulik's definition of FBM as a snapshot of the reception context of an important public news and propose a method to identify the contents of this snapshot. Although Brown and Kulik found that the majority of FBM's contents could be classified within six canonical categories (CCs), here we claim that assessing the presence of FBMs through guided CCs' questions - as done by most researchers in this field - can be misleading. We suggest, instead, to use free recall reports to identify the consistent perceptual elements of the snapshot. Across two test-retest studies, we show that the contents of FBMs assessed by free reports and the contents of CCs assessed by guided questions, do not exactly coincide. Moreover, a structural equation model supports results of previous research about the determinants of FBM and reveals that FBM facilitates the recall of more consistent explicitly requested CCs' contents. Theoretical implications concerning the qualitative contents of FBMs and the debate about their consistency are discussed.

Fictional First Memories.

In a large-scale survey, 6,641 respondents provided descriptions of their first memory and their age when they encoded that memory, and they completed various memory judgments and ratings. In good agreement with many other studies, where mean age at encoding of earliest memories is usually found to fall somewhere in the first half of the 3rd year of life, the mean age at encoding here was 3.2 years. The established view is that the distribution around mean age at encoding is truncated, with very few or no memories dating to the preverbal period, that is, below about 2 years of age. However, we found that 2,487 first memories (nearly 40% of the entire sample) dated to an age at encoding of 2 years and younger, with 893 dating to 1 year and younger. We discuss how such improbable, fictional first memories could have arisen and contrast them with more probable first memories, those with an age at encoding of 3 years and older.

Supporting older and younger adults' memory for recent everyday events: A prospective sampling study using SenseCam.

This study measured the effect of a wearable camera, SenseCam, on older and younger adults' memories of recently experienced everyday events. Participants used SenseCam to prospectively sample events from a typical week, which they recalled two weeks later. Recall was cued by a self-generated title only (control condition), by the title and forward-order SenseCam images, or by the title and random-order SenseCam images. In the control condition, older and younger adults' memories were comparably episodic, but older adults recalled more semantic details. Both forward- and random-order SenseCam images were associated with increased episodic and semantic recall in both groups, and there was a small but significant effect of temporal order favouring the forward-order condition. These findings suggest that SenseCam is effective in supporting retrieval of memory for recent events, and the results of the temporal order manipulation also shed light on the mechanism of SenseCam's effect.

Switching memory perspective.

The perspective in which memories were spontaneously recalled, field (original perspective) or observer (see oneself in the memory), was examined for both recent and remote memories. Recent memories were dominated by field perspective whilst remote memories were dominated by observer perspective. Further, field memories contained reliably more episodic detail than observer memories. After a 1-week interval, the same memories were recalled again but with a switched memory perspective. Switching from an observer to a field perspective did not reliably increase the amount of episodic details in a memory. Switching from field to observer perspective did, however, reliably reduce the number of episodic details. These findings suggest that memories may be represented in long-term memory with a fixed perspective, either field or observer, which can be temporarily altered sometimes changing the nature of a memory, i.e. how much detail remains accessible.

Amnesia and future thinking: Exploring the role of memory in the quantity and quality of episodic future thoughts.

OBJECTIVES: To examine the impact of memory accessibility on episodic future thinking. DESIGN: Single-case study of neurological patient HCM and an age-matched comparison group of neurologically Healthy Controls. METHODS: We administered a full battery of tests assessing general intelligence, memory, and executive functioning. To assess autobiographical memory, the Autobiographical Memory Interview (Kopelman, Wilson, & Baddeley, 1990. The Autobiographical Memory Interview. Bury St. Edmunds, UK: Thames Valley Test Company) was administered. The Past Episodic and Future Episodic sections of Dalla Barba's Confabulation Battery (Dalla Barba, 1993, Cogn. Neuropsychol., 1, 1) and a specifically tailored Mental Time Travel Questionnaire were administered to assess future thinking in HCM and age-matched controls. RESULTS: HCM presented with a deficit in forming new memories (anterograde amnesia) and recalling events from before the onset of neurological impairment (retrograde amnesia). HCM's autobiographical memory impairments are characterized by a paucity of memories from Recent Life. In comparison with controls, two features of his future thoughts are apparent: Reduced episodic future thinking and outdated content of his episodic future thoughts. CONCLUSIONS: This article suggests neuropsychologists should look beyond popular conceptualizations of the past-future relation in amnesia via focussing on reduced future thinking. Investigating both the quantity and quality of future thoughts produced by amnesic patients may lead to developments in understanding the complex nature of future thinking disorders resulting from memory impairments. PRACTITIONER POINTS: We highlight the clinical importance of examining the content of future thoughts in amnesic patients, rather than only its quantitative reduction. We propose an explanation of how quantitative and qualitative aspects of future thinking could be affected by amnesia. This could provide a useful approach to understand clinical cases of impaired prospection. LIMITATIONS: Systematic group investigations are required to fully examine our hypothesis. Although the current study utilized typical future thinking measures, these may be limited and we highlight the need to develop clinically relevant measures of prospection.

Remembering, imagining, false memories & personal meanings.

The Self-Memory System encompasses the working self, autobiographical memory and episodic memory. Specific autobiographical memories are patterns of activation over knowledge structures in autobiographical and episodic memory brought about by the activating effect of cues. The working self can elaborate cues based on the knowledge they initially activate and so control the construction of memories of the past and the future. It is proposed that such construction takes place in the remembering-imagining system - a window of highly accessible recent memories and simulations of near future events. How this malfunctions in various disorders is considered as are the implication of what we term the modern view of human memory for notions of memory accuracy. We show how all memories are to some degree false and that the main role of memories lies in generating personal meanings.

Nonepisodic autobiographical memory details reflect attempts to tell a good story.

A persistent finding in the autobiographical memory (AM) literature is that older adults report more nonepisodic (or generalized/semantic) information than young adults. Since studies are usually focused on memory for episodic (or specific) autobiographical events, the reason for the age difference in nonepisodic AM remains understudied. This experiment investigated whether the higher rate of nonepisodic AM in older adults reflects (a) a difference incommunicative preferences or (b) cognitive decline, by way of either an inhibition deficit or as a means of compensating for a deficit in episodic AM. A sample of 54 young (N = 28, age range = 18-46) and older (N = 26, age range = 62-86) participants retrieved the same AM twice, under two different sets of instructions: to tell a good story for their autobiography, or to provide a detailed police witness statement. Both groups reported more general details when they were aiming to tell a good story. In addition, older adults also reported fewer specific details when the aim was to tell a good story. In a separate ranking task, young and older adults differed in their perceptions of what makes a good story; young adults ranked "detail," "grammar," and "full descriptions" more highly than older adults, whereas older ranked "linking ideas" and "explaining not just describing" more highly than young adults. The results suggest that age-related differences in nonepisodic AM might be explained by communicative preferences rather than cognitive decline. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

Remembering and knowing: using another's subjective report to make inferences about memory strength and subjective experience.

The Remember-Know paradigm is commonly used to examine experiential states during recognition. In this paradigm, whether a Know response is defined as a high-confidence state of certainty or a low-confidence state based on familiarity varies across researchers, and differences in definitions and instructions have been shown to influence participants' responding. Using a novel approach, in three internet-based questionnaires participants were placed in the role of 'memory expert' and classified others' justifications of recognition decisions. Results demonstrated that participants reliably differentiated between others' memory experiences--both in terms of confidence and other inherent differences in the justifications. Furthermore, under certain conditions, manipulations of confidence were found to shift how items were assigned to subjective experience categories (Remember, Know, Familiar, and Guess). Findings are discussed in relation to the relationship between subjective experience and confidence, and the separation of Know and Familiar response categories within the Remember-Know paradigm.

Divided attention selectively impairs memory for self-relevant information.

Information that is relevant to oneself tends to be remembered more than information that relates to other people, but the role of attention in eliciting this "self-reference effect" is unclear. In the present study, we assessed the importance of attention in self-referential encoding using an ownership paradigm, which required participants to encode items under conditions of imagined ownership by themselves or by another person. Previous work has established that this paradigm elicits a robust self-reference effect, with more "self-owned" items being remembered than "other-owned" items. Access to attentional resources was manipulated using divided-attention tasks at encoding. A significant self-reference effect emerged under full-attention conditions and was related to an increase in episodic recollection for self-owned items, but dividing attention eliminated this memory advantage. These findings are discussed in relation to the nature of self-referential cognition and the importance of attentional resources at encoding in the manifestation of the self-reference effect in memory.

On being a memory expert witness: Three cases.

I describe three legal cases in which I acted as a memory expert witness. The cases contain remarkable accounts of memories. Such memories are by no means unusual in legal cases, are often over retention intervals measured in decades, and contain details the specificity of which is highly unusual. For example, recalling from childhood verbatim conversations, clothes worn by self and others, the weather, actions that at the time could not have been understood, details that could not have been known, precise durations and calendar dates, and much more. I show how our scientific understanding of memory can help courts reach more informed decisions about such fantastical "memories" and how these memories constitute data that as researchers we should seek to understand.

Self-images and related autobiographical memories in schizophrenia.

Schizophrenia is a severe mental illness, which affects sense of identity. While the ability to have a coherent vision of the self (i.e., self-images) relies partly on its reciprocal relationships with autobiographical memories, little is known about how memories ground "self-images" in schizophrenia. Twenty-five patients with schizophrenia and 25 controls were asked to give six autobiographical memories related to four self-statements they considered essential for defining their identity. Results showed that patients' self-images were more passive than those of controls. Autobiographical memories underlying self-images were less thematically linked to these self-images in patients. We also found evidence of a weakened sense of self and a deficient organization of autobiographical memories grounding the self in schizophrenia. These abnormalities may account for the poor cohesiveness of the self in schizophrenia.

Inhibition and interference in the think/no-think task.

Five experiments using the think/no-think (TNT) procedure investigated the effect of the no-think and substitute instructions on cued recall. In Experiment 1, when unrelated A-B paired associates were studied and cued for recall with A items, recall rates were reliably enhanced in the think condition and reliably impaired below baseline in the no-think condition. In Experiments 2 and 5, final recall was cued with B items, leading to reliably higher recall rates, as compared with baseline, in both the think and no-think conditions. This pattern indicates backward priming of no-think items. In Experiments 3 and 4, the no-think instruction was replaced with a thought substitution instruction, and participants were asked to think of another word instead of the studied one when they saw the no-think cued items. As in Experiments 1 and 2, the same amount of forgetting of B items was observed when A items were the cues, but in contrast to Experiment 2, there was no increase in the recall performance of A items when B items were the cues. These results suggest that not thinking of studied items or, alternatively, thinking of a substitute item to avoid a target item may involve different processes: the former featuring inhibition and the latter interference.