Selective effects of motor expertise in mental body rotation tasks: comparing object-based and perspective transformations.

Brain imaging studies provide strong evidence for the involvement of the human mirror system during the observation of complex movements, depending on the individual's motor expertise. Here, we ask the question whether motor expertise not only affects perception while observing movements, but also benefits perception while solving mental rotation tasks. Specifically, motor expertise should only influence the performance in mental body rotation tasks (MBRT) with left-right judgment, evoking a perspective transformation, whereas motor expertise should not affect the MBRT with same-different judgment, evoking an object-related transformation. Participants with and without motor expertise for rotational movements were tested in these two conditions in the MBRT. Results showed that motor experience selectively affected performance in the MBRT with the left-right judgment, but not with same-different judgment. More precisely, motor expertise only benefited performance when human figures were presented in (for non-experts) unfamiliar, upside-down body orientations.

Self-leadership and volition: distinct and potentially supplemental constructs?

Self-leadership and volition are conceptually similar concepts. Both propose self-influence strategies that aim to improve the motivation and self-direction necessary to perform well. The present study assesses whether self-leadership strategies maintain construct-specific variance when compared with the similar strategies of volition. Results from a questionnaire study (N=320) indicate that self-leadership and volitional strategies are distinguishable and only moderately (r = .33) correlated. Self-leadership, therefore, supplements volition during goal attainment. Findings are discussed in light of the Rubicon model of action phases.

Who is causing what? The sense of agency is relational and efferent-triggered.

The sense of agency ("I did that") is a basic feature of our subjective experience. Experimental studies usually focus on either its attributional aspects (the "I" of "I did that") or on its motoric aspects (the "did" aspect of "I did that"). Here, we combine both aspects and focus on the subjective experience of the time between action and effect. Previous studies [Haggard, P., Aschersleben, G., Gehrke, J., & Prinz, W. (2002a). Action, binding and awareness. In W. Prinz, & B. Hommel (Eds.), Common mechanisms in perception and action: Attention and performance (Vol. XIX, pp. 266-285). Oxford: Oxford University Press] have shown a temporal attraction in the perceived times of actions and effects, but did directly not study the relation between them. In three experiments, time estimates of an interval between an action and its subsequent sensory effect were obtained. The actions were either voluntary key press actions performed by the participant or kinematically identical movements applied passively to the finger. The effects were either auditory or visual events or a passive movement induced to another finger. The results first indicated a shortening of the interval between one's own voluntary action and a subsequent effect, relative to passive movement conditions. Second, intervals initiated by observed movements, either of another person or of an inanimate object, were always perceived like those involving passive movements of one's own body, and never like those involving active movements. Third, this binding effect was comparable for auditory, somatic and visual effects of action. Our results provide the first direct evidence that agency involves a generalisable relation between actions and their consequences, and is triggered by efferent motor commands.

Agency, subjective time, and other minds.

Intentional binding refers to a temporal attraction in the perceived times of actions and effects. So far, it has solely been investigated using judgments of the perceived time of actions or their effects. The authors report 3 experiments using an alternative method: the estimation of a time interval between a voluntary action and its subsequent effect. Interval estimates were obtained for intervals bounded by different kinds of actions and effects: The actions were either performed by the participants themselves or by the experimenter. The effects, in turn, were movements either applied to the body of the participant or to the experimenter. First, the results validated interval estimation as a method for exploring action awareness. Second, intentional binding was stronger for self-generated compared with observed actions, indicating that private information about the action contributes to action awareness. In contrast, intentional binding did not depend on whether a somatic effect was applied to the participant's or to another person's body. Third, for self-generated actions, external events gave rise to a stronger intentional binding than did somatic effects. This finding indicates that intentional binding especially links actions with their consequences in the external world.

The effects of therapeutic climbing in patients with chronic low back pain: a randomized controlled study.

STUDY DESIGN: A randomized controlled study investigated the effects of therapeutic climbing in patients with chronic low back pain. Before and after 4 weeks of training, physical and mental well-being were measured by two questionnaires (36-Item Short Form Health Survey [SF-36]; Hannover Functional Ability Questionnaire for measuring back pain-related disability [FFbH-R]). OBJECTIVE: Therapeutic climbing has been suggested to increase muscular strength and perceived physical and mental well-being. This study focused on the psychological effects of therapeutic climbing and compared it with standard exercise therapy. SUMMARY OF BACKGROUND DATA: Therapeutic climbing has become increasingly popular in rehabilitation and its effects on muscular strengthening have been shown. Therapeutic climbing has also been suggested to yield psychological effects such as changes in attentional focus from pain to physical capabilities. To date, no controlled clinical trial has investigated these psychological effects and it is unclear whether therapeutic climbing is comparable or superior to other forms of exercise. METHODS: Twenty-eight patients with chronic low back pain conducted either a therapeutic climbing or a standard exercise regime. Each program took 4 weeks, including four guided training sessions per week. Before and after the program, patients answered two questionnaires assessing their physical and mental well-being. RESULTS: For the Hannover Functional Ability Questionnaire for measuring back pain-related disability, there was no difference before versus after or between the treatments. For the SF-36, both treatments showed significant improvements in 3/8 subscales of the SF-36. In 2/8 subscales, only the participants of the therapeutic climbing improved and in 1/8 subscales the converse was true. Comparing both groups, significantly larger improvements were found after therapeutic climbing in two subscales of the SF-36: physical functioning and general health perception. CONCLUSION: The benefits of therapeutic climbing were comparable with those of a standard exercise regime. In two subscales of the SF-36, the benefits of therapeutic climbing exceeded those of standard exercise therapy, primarily in perceived health and physical functioning of the patients. This finding demonstrates that therapeutic climbing is equivalent and partly superior to standard exercise therapy for patients with chronic low back pain.

Intentions and expectations in temporal binding.

Recently, it has been shown that the perceived times of voluntary movements and their effects are perceived as shifted towards each other. This temporal binding phenomenon was explained by an integrated representation of movement and effect, facilitating operant learning and the experience of intentionality. Here, we investigated whether temporal binding depends on explicit intentional attributions. In Experiment 1, participants intended to either produce or avoid producing an effect (a tone) by the timing of their movements, with the ratio of success being fixed at 2:1. In Experiments 2 and 3, the influence of the action-effect contingency ratio on temporal binding was controlled for by removing the intentional attribution of the effect. The results indicate that temporal binding is a general associative mechanism that facilitates the learning of movement-effect contingencies. Beyond that, temporal binding is sensitive to explicit intentional attributions, which selectively enhance the link between an intentional movement and the effect a moving agent intends to produce.

Intentionality as a constituting condition for the own self--and other selves.

Introspectively, the awareness of actions includes the awareness of the intentions accompanying them. Therefore, the awareness of self-generated actions might be expected to differ from the awareness of other-generated actions to the extent that access to one's own and to other's intentions differs. However, we recently showed that the perceived onset times of self- vs. other-generated actions are similar, yet both are different from comparable events that are conceived as being generated by a machine. This similarity raises two interesting possibilities. First we could infer the intentions of others from their actions. Second and more radically, we could equally infer our own intentions from the actions we perform rather than sense them. We present two new experiments which investigate the role of action effects in the awareness of self- and other-generated actions by means of measuring the estimated onset time. The results show that the presence of action effects is necessary for the similarity of awareness of self- and other-generated actions.