Softly empowering a prosocial expert in the family: lasting effects of a counter-misinformation intervention in an informational autocracy.

The present work is the first to comprehensively analyze the gravity of the misinformation problem in Hungary, where misinformation appears regularly in the pro-governmental, populist, and socially conservative mainstream media. In line with international data, using a Hungarian representative sample (Study 1, N = 991), we found that voters of the reigning populist, conservative party could hardly distinguish fake from real news. In Study 2, we demonstrated that a prosocial intervention of ~ 10 min (N = 801) helped young adult participants discern misinformation four weeks later compared to the control group without implementing any boosters. This effect was the most salient regarding pro-governmental conservative fake news content, leaving real news evaluations intact. Although the hypotheses of the present work were not preregistered, it appears that prosocial misinformation interventions might be promising attempts to counter misinformation in an informational autocracy in which the media is highly centralized. Despite using social motivations, it does not mean that long-term cognitive changes cannot occur. Future studies might explore exactly how these interventions can have an impact on the long-term cognitive processing of news content as well as their underlying neural structures.

Hungarian, lazy, and biased: the role of analytic thinking and partisanship in fake news discernment on a Hungarian representative sample.

"Why do people believe blatantly inaccurate news headlines? Do we use our reasoning abilities to convince ourselves that statements that align with our ideology are true, or does reasoning allow us to effectively differentiate fake from real regardless of political ideology?" These were the questions of Pennycook and Rand (2019), and they are more than actual three years later in Eastern Europe (especially in Hungary) in the light of the rise of populism, and the ongoing war in Ukraine - with the flood of disinformation that follows. In this study, using a representative Hungarian sample (N = 991) we wanted to answer the same questions-moving one step forward and investigating alternative models. We aimed to extend the original research with the examination of digital literacy and source salience on media truth discernment. Most of the observations of Pennycook and Rand were confirmed: people with higher analytic thinking were better at discerning disinformation. However, the results are in line with the synergistic integrative model as partisanship interacted with cognitive reflection: anti-government voters used their analytic capacities to question both concordant and discordant fake news more than pro-government voters. Furthermore, digital literacy increased detection, but source salience did not matter when perceiving disinformation.

A prosocial fake news intervention with durable effects.

The present online intervention promoted family-based prosocial values-in terms of helping family members-among young adults to build resistance against fake news. This preregistered randomized controlled trial study is among the first psychological fake news interventions in Eastern Europe, where the free press is weak and state-sponsored misinformation runs riot in mainstream media. In this intervention, participants were endowed with an expert role and requested to write a letter to their digitally less competent relatives explaining six strategies that help fake news recognition. Compared to the active control group there was an immediate effect (d = 0.32) that persisted until the follow-up four weeks later (d = 0.22) on fake news accuracy ratings of the young, advice-giving participants. The intervention also reduced the bullshit receptivity of participants both immediately after the intervention and in the long run. The present work demonstrates the power of using relevant social bonds for motivating behavior change among Eastern European participants. Our prosocial approach with its robust grounding in human psychology might complement prior interventions in the fight against misinformation.

Criminalization as a justification for violence against the homeless in Hungary.

Criminalization of social groups can create new norms for intergroup relations. An example for this is the 2018 amendment to the Hungarian Fundamental Law, which openly criminalizes homeless people. In our research, we investigated whether criminalization of homelessness can become a source of justifying violence against homeless people in the Hungarian context. We assumed that right-wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation would positively predict support for violence against the homeless, and the acceptance of a criminalizing law can serve as a justification for this. Our hypotheses were tested using a convenience (N = 196) and a representative sample of the population of Budapest (N = 674). We found that both RWA and SDO predicted support for violence, and this connection was mediated by the new law. We also found that justification was influenced by educational level, as the association between SDO and violence increased with higher levels of education.