The binary structure of event files generalizes to abstract features: A nonhierarchical explanation of task set boundaries for the congruency sequence effect.

Current views posit that forming and retrieving memories of ongoing events influences action control. However, the organizational structure of these memories, or event files, remains unclear. The hierarchical coding view posits a hierarchical structure, wherein task sets occupy a high level of the hierarchy. Here, the contents of an event file can be retrieved only if the task set repeats. In contrast, the binary coding view posits a nonhierarchical structure, which consists of a collection of independent, binary bindings between different feature pairs. In this view, repeating an abstract feature from a previous event (e.g., the previous trial's S-R mapping) triggers the retrieval of the associated feature from the same binding (e.g., the previous trial's congruency) even if the task set changes. To distinguish between these views, we investigated the nature of task set boundaries for the congruency sequence effect (CSE), an index of adaptive control that reflects event file formation and retrieval. Specifically, we investigated whether or not a CSE appears when the task set changes but the previous trial's S-R mapping repeats. Three experiments involving a cross-modal prime-probe task yielded a CSE under these conditions and ruled out alternative explanations. These findings show that the typical binary structure of event files generalizes from concrete features (e.g., colors and locations) to abstract features (e.g., S-R mappings and task sets). Therefore, contrary to the hierarchical coding view, they provide a nonhierarchical explanation of task set boundaries for the CSE. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

Partial repetition costs index a mixture of binding and signaling.

People respond more slowly in two-choice tasks when either a previous stimulus feature or the previous response repeats in partial repetition trials than when (a) both repeat in complete repetition trials or (b) both alternate in complete alternation trials. The binding account posits that such partial repetition costs index a memory-retrieval conflict, which occurs because partial repetition trials trigger the retrieval of a previous stimulus feature or response that conflicts with a current stimulus feature or response. However, such costs may additionally reflect a simple decision-making heuristic that uses the repetition or alternation of a previous stimulus feature as a "signal" to bias response selection toward a repetition or an alternation of the previous response. To determine whether signaling contributes to partial repetition costs, we employed a four-choice task. Here, a stimulus feature repetition still signals a response repetition, but a stimulus feature alternation does not signal which of the three remaining responses to make. Consistent with an influence of signaling, we sometimes observed complete repetition advantages without complete alternation advantages. Exploratory analyses further revealed that partial repetition costs measured more broadly were smaller in the four-choice task than in a matched two-choice task. These findings suggest that partial repetition costs index a mixture of binding and signaling.

Rethinking attentional reset: Task sets determine the boundaries of adaptive control.

Adaptive control processes that minimise distraction often operate in a context-specific manner. For example, they may minimise distraction from irrelevant conversations during a lecture but not in the hallway afterwards. It remains unclear, however, whether (a) salient perceptual features or (b) task sets based on such features serve as contextual boundaries for adaptive control in standard distractor-interference tasks. To distinguish between these possibilities, we manipulated whether the structure of a standard, visual distractor-interference task allowed (Experiment 1) or did not allow (Experiment 2) participants to associate salient visual features (i.e., colour patches and colour words) with different task sets. We found that changing salient visual features across consecutive trials reduced a popular measure of adaptive control in distractor-interference tasks-the congruency sequence effect (CSE)-only when the task structure allowed participants to associate these visual features with different task sets. These findings extend prior support for the task set hypothesis from somewhat atypical cross-modal tasks to a standard unimodal task. In contrast, they pose a challenge to an alternative "attentional reset" hypothesis, and related views, wherein changing salient perceptual features always results in a contextual boundary for the CSE.

The congruency sequence effect in a modified prime-probe task indexes response-general control.

Adapting flexibly to recent events is essential in everyday life. A robust measure of such adaptive behavior is the congruency sequence effect (CSE) in the prime-probe task, which refers to a smaller congruency effect after incongruent trials than after congruent trials. Prior findings indicate that the CSE in the prime-probe task reflects control processes that modulate response activation after the prime onsets but before the probe appears. They also suggest that similar control processes operate even in a modified prime-probe task wherein the initial prime is a relevant target, rather than merely a distractor. Because adaptive behavior frequently occurs in the absence of irrelevant stimuli, the present study investigates the nature of the control processes that operate in this modified prime-probe task. Specifically, it investigates whether these control processes modulate only the response cued by the prime (response-specific control) or also other responses (response-general control). To make this distinction, we employed a novel variant of the modified prime-probe task wherein primes and probes are mapped to different responses (i.e., effectors), such that only response-general control processes can engender a CSE. Critically, we observed a robust CSE in each of 2 experiments. This outcome supports the response-general control hypothesis. More broadly, it suggests that the control processes underlying the CSE overlap with general mechanisms for adapting to sequential dependencies in the environment. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).

Task sets serve as boundaries for the congruency sequence effect.

Cognitive control processes that enable purposeful behavior are often context-specific. A teenager, for example, may inhibit the tendency to daydream at work but not in the classroom. However, the nature of contextual boundaries for cognitive control processes remains unclear. Therefore, we revisited an ongoing controversy over whether such boundaries reflect (a) an attentional reset that occurs whenever a context-defining (e.g., sensory) feature changes or (b) a disruption of episodic memory retrieval that occurs only when the updated context-defining feature is linked to a different task set. To distinguish between these hypotheses, we used a cross-modal distractor-interference task to determine precisely when changing a salient context-defining feature-the sensory modality in which task stimuli appear-bounds control processes underlying the congruency sequence effect (CSE). Consistent with the task set hypothesis, but not with the attentional reset hypothesis, Experiments 1 and 2 revealed that changing the sensory modality in which task stimuli appear eliminates the CSE only when the task structure enables participants to form modality-specific task sets. Experiment 3 further revealed that such "modality-specific" CSEs are associated with orienting attention to the sensory modality in which task stimuli appear, which may facilitate the formation of a modality-specific task set. These findings support the view that task sets serve as boundaries for the CSE. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).

Turning distractors into targets increases the congruency sequence effect.

The congruency effect in distractor-interference tasks is typically smaller after incongruent trials than after congruent trials. Current views posit that this congruency sequence effect (CSE) reflects control processes that come into play when an irrelevant distractor cues a different response than a relevant target. However, the CSE is counterintuitively larger in the prime-probe task when the prime is occasionally a second target than when the prime is more frequently a distractor. In the present study, we investigated whether this effect occurs because the appearance of an occasional prime target (a) constitutes a rare, unexpected event that triggers heightened control or (b) allows participants to use the same task set (i.e., stimulus-response mapping) for the prime and probe in each trial. Consistent with the latter hypothesis, we observed this effect in Experiment 1 even when the critical trial types appeared equally often. Further, in Experiment 2, we extended this finding while ruling out perceptual differences between conditions as an alternative account. These findings provide novel support for the task set hypothesis and reveal that the CSE reflects control processes that do more than minimize distraction from irrelevant stimuli.

An attentional mechanism for minimizing cross-modal distraction.

Prior findings suggest that coping with distraction relies on cognitive control processes that increase attention to task-relevant processing and/or decrease attention to task-irrelevant processing. In line with this view, the size of the congruency effect in unimodal Stroop-like tasks, a popular measure of distraction, is typically reduced after more distracting incongruent trials relative to after less distracting congruent trials. It remains unclear, however, whether, and under what conditions, the control processes underlying this congruency sequence effect (CSE) minimize cross-modal distraction. The contingent attentional capture hypothesis predicts a cross-modal CSE when a distracter possesses a target-defining feature. In contrast, the perceptual conflict hypothesis predicts a cross-modal CSE when there is perceptual conflict between a distracter and a target. To distinguish between these hypotheses, we conducted two experiments wherein an auditory distracter word preceded a visual target that appeared in one of two formats (i.e., word or arrow). We observed robust, cross-modal CSEs. Moreover, the pattern of CSEs that we observed was more consistent with the contingent attentional capture hypothesis than with the perceptual conflict hypothesis. These findings reveal a novel attentional mechanism for minimizing cross-modal distraction.

Resisting distraction and response inhibition trigger similar enhancements of future performance.

Resisting distraction and response inhibition are crucial aspects of cognitive control. Interestingly, each of these abilities transiently improves just after it is utilized. Competing views differ, however, as to whether utilizing either of these abilities (e.g., resisting distraction) enhances future performance involving the other ability (e.g., response inhibition). To distinguish between these views, we combined a Stroop-like task that requires resisting distraction with a restraint variant of the stop-signal task that requires response inhibition. We observed similar sequential-trial effects (i.e., performance enhancements) following trials in which participants (a) resisted distraction (i.e., incongruent go trials) and (b) inhibited a response (i.e., congruent stop trials). First, the congruency effect in go trials, which indexes overall distractibility, was smaller after both incongruent go trials and congruent stop trials than it was after congruent go trials. Second, stop failures were less frequent after both incongruent go trials and congruent stop trials than after congruent go trials. A control experiment ruled out the possibility that perceptual conflict or surprise engendered by occasional stop signals triggers sequential-trial effects independent of stopping. Thus, our findings support a novel, integrated view in which resisting distraction and response inhibition trigger similar sequential enhancements of future performance.

Identifying stimuli that cue multiple responses triggers the congruency sequence effect independent of response conflict.

According to most accounts of executive control, resisting distraction requires enhancing task-relevant processing, reducing task-irrelevant processing, or both. Consistent with this view, the congruency effect in Stroop-like tasks-a putative measure of distraction-is often smaller after highly distracting incongruent trials than after less distracting congruent trials. Competing accounts of executive control, however, differ on which aspect of an incongruent trial triggers this congruency sequence effect (CSE). The activation-suppression account posits the activation of an incorrect response. In contrast, the response cueing account posits identifying stimuli that cue multiple responses. To distinguish between these accounts, we conducted 2 experiments involving a modified prime-probe task wherein participants respond to the distracter in occasional catch trials. We found that the CSE is triggered by identifying stimuli that cue multiple responses, rather than by the activation of an incorrect response. Further, we observed this effect while ruling out an alternative "response conflict" trigger. These findings are more consistent with the response cueing account than with the activation-suppression account. (PsycINFO Database Record