RESUMEN
Global cooperation is essential for coordinated planning and response to public health emergencies, as well as for building sufficient capacity around the world to detect, assess and respond to health events. The United States is committed to, and actively engaged in, supporting disease surveillance capacity building around the world. We recognize that there are many agencies involved in this effort, which can become confusing to partner countries and other public health entities. This paper aims to describe the agencies and offices working directly on global disease surveillance capacity building in order to clarify the United States Government interagency efforts in this space.
Asunto(s)
Creación de Capacidad , Control de Enfermedades Transmisibles , Gobierno Federal , Salud Global , Agencias Gubernamentales/estadística & datos numéricos , Cooperación Internacional , Vigilancia de la Población , Humanos , Relaciones Interinstitucionales , Vigilancia de Guardia , Estados UnidosRESUMEN
Early detection of emerging disease events is a priority focus area for cooperative bioengagement programs. Communication and coordination among national disease surveillance and response networks are essential for timely detection and control of a public health event. Although systematic information sharing between the human and animal health sectors can help stakeholders detect and respond to zoonotic diseases rapidly, resource constraints, and other barriers often prevent efficient cross-sector reporting. The purpose of this research project was to map the laboratory and surveillance networks currently in place for detecting and reporting priority zoonotic diseases in Jordan in order to identify the nodes of communication, coordination, and decision-making where health and veterinary sectors intersect, and to identify priorities and gaps that limit information sharing for action. We selected three zoonotic diseases as case studies: highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) H5N1, rabies, and brucellosis. Through meetings with government agencies and health officials, and desk research, we mapped each system from the index case through response - including both surveillance and laboratory networks, highlighting both areas of strength and those that would benefit from capacity-building resources. Our major findings indicate informal communication exists across sectors; in the event of emergence of one of the priority zoonoses studied, there is effective coordination across the Ministry of Health and Ministry of Agriculture. However, routine formal coordination is lacking. Overall, there is a strong desire and commitment for multi-sectoral coordination in detection and response to zoonoses across public health and veterinary sectors. Our analysis indicates that the networks developed in response to HPAI can and should be leveraged to develop a comprehensive laboratory and surveillance One Health network.
RESUMEN
Public health and food safety officials have long recognized the important role that state agencies play in protecting consumers from foodborne disease. With the increasing occurrence of multi-jurisdictional outbreaks, efforts have been underway to modernize and make more uniform the patchwork of state laws, protocols, and policies that exist across the U.S. for food-borne illness surveillance and outbreak response activities. To aid in this endeavor, and to better understand the role of law in a state's ability to carry out these functions effectively, we are creating a database of key legal authorities and provisions relating to foodborne illness surveillance and outbreak response across the 50 states and District of Columbia. There appears to be wide variation in the legal infrastructure for these activities, ranging from how certain terms are defined, to what and when foodborne illnesses must be reported, to which level of government has responsibility over investigation and response of foodborne outbreaks. As outbreaks become more widespread and involve multiple jurisdictions, it is important that public health and food safety stakeholders understand the legal authorities under which they operate, how such authorities may impede or promote efficient and effective surveillance and outbreak response, and use that knowledge to determine if state laws should be updated or strengthened.