The Prisoner's Dilemma paradigm provides a neurobiological framework for the social decision cascade.

To function during social interactions, we must be able to consider and coordinate our actions with other people's perspectives. This process unfolds from decision-making, to anticipation of that decision's consequences, to feedback about those consequences, in what can be described as a "cascade" of three phases. The iterated Prisoner's Dilemma (iPD) task, an economic-exchange game used to illustrate how people achieve stable cooperation over repeated interactions, provides a framework for examining this "social decision cascade". In the present study, we examined neural activity associated with the three phases of the cascade, which can be isolated during iPD game rounds. While undergoing functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), 31 adult participants made a) decisions about whether to cooperate with a co-player for a monetary reward, b) anticipated the co-player's decision, and then c) learned the co-player's decision. Across all three phases, participants recruited the temporoparietal junction (TPJ) and the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC), regions implicated in numerous facets of social reasoning such as perspective-taking and the judgement of intentions. Additionally, a common distributed neural network underlies both decision-making and feedback appraisal; however, differences were identified in the magnitude of recruitment between both phases. Furthermore, there was limited evidence that anticipation following the decision to defect evoked a neural signature that is distinct from the signature of anticipation following the decision to cooperate. This study is the first to delineate the neural substrates of the entire social decision cascade in the context of the iPD game.

Temperament and intuition: a commentary on Feltz and Cokely.

In this paper, we examine Adam Feltz and Edward Cokely's recent claim that "the personality trait extraversion predicts people's intuitions about the relationship of determinism to free will and moral responsibility" (INSERT REFERENCE). We will first present some criticisms of their work before briefly examining the results of a recent study of our own. We argue that while Feltz and Cokely have their finger on the pulse of an interesting and important issue, they have not established a robust and stable connection between extraversion and compatibilist-friendly intuitions.

Social Feedback Modulates Neural Response Associated With Cognitive Bias in Individuals Expressing Anxious Symptoms.

BACKGROUND: Social anxiety is characterized by a tendency to overestimate the likelihood of negative outcomes and consequences before, during, and after interpersonal interactions with social partners. Recent evidence suggests that a network of brain regions critical for perspective-taking, threat appraisal, and uncertainty resolution may function atypically in those prone to social anxiety. In this study, we used functional magnetic resonance imaging to examine neural activity in specific regions of interest in a sample of young adults who endorsed high or low levels of social anxiety. METHODS: We recruited 31 college student volunteers (age: 18-28 years), categorized as having high or low anxiety based on their Liebowitz Social Anxiety Scale-Self Report scores. These participants were each scanned while playing the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma game with three computerized confederates, two of whom they were deceived to believe were human co-players. This study focuses on data collected during play with the presumed humans. Regions of interest were defined for the temporoparietal junction, anterior midcingulate, and dorsomedial prefrontal cortex. Average weighted mean blood-oxygen-level-dependent signals for each subject were extracted and analyzed using mixed design analyses of variance to detect group differences in activation during decision-making, anticipation, and appraisal of round outcomes during the game. RESULTS: Behavior analysis revealed that the high-anxiety group was more likely to defect than the low-anxiety group. Neuroimaging analysis showed that the high-anxiety group exhibited elevated blood-oxygen-level-dependent activity relative to the low-anxiety group in all three regions during the social feedback appraisal phase but not during decision-making or the anticipation of interaction outcomes. CONCLUSIONS: These findings provide evidence that some behaviors linked to cognitive biases associated with social anxiety may be mediated by a network of regions involved in recognizing and processing directed social information. Future investigation of the neural basis of cognition and bias in social anxiety using the prisoner's dilemma and other economic-exchange tasks is warranted. These tasks appear to be highly effective, functional magnetic resonance imaging-compatible methods of probing altered cognition and behavior associated with anxiety and related conditions.

The effect of analytic and experiential modes of thought on moral judgment.

According to dual-process theories, moral judgments are the result of two competing processes: a fast, automatic, affect-driven process and a slow, deliberative, reason-based process. Accordingly, these models make clear and testable predictions about the influence of each system. Although a small number of studies have attempted to examine each process independently in the context of moral judgment, no study has yet tried to experimentally manipulate both processes within a single study. In this chapter, a well-established "mode-of-thought" priming technique was used to place participants in either an experiential/emotional or analytic mode while completing a task in which participants provide judgments about a series of moral dilemmas. We predicted that individuals primed analytically would make more utilitarian responses than control participants, while emotional priming would lead to less utilitarian responses. Support was found for both of these predictions. Implications of these findings for dual-process theories of moral judgment will be discussed.

Selfless giving.

In four studies, we show that people who anticipate more personal change over time give more to others. We measure and manipulate participants' beliefs in the persistence of the defining psychological features of a person (e.g., his or her beliefs, values, and life goals) and measure generosity, finding support for the hypothesis in three studies using incentive-compatible charitable donation decisions and one involving hypothetical choices about sharing with loved ones.

Toward an integrated neuroscience of morality: the contribution of neuroeconomics to moral cognition.

Interest in the neural processes underlying decision making has led to a flurry of recent research in the fields of both moral psychology and neuroeconomics. In this paper, we first review some important findings from both disciplines, and then argue that the two fields can mutually benefit each other. A more explicit recognition of the role of values and norms will likely lead to more accurate models of decision making for neuroeconomists, whereas the tasks, insights into neural mechanisms, and mathematical modeling common in neuroeconomic research offer moral psychologists the opportunity to expand their field and move beyond methodological limitations that may have hindered the field's progress to this point. We conclude by highlighting an exciting group of recent studies that illustrate the potential of research that embraces the integrated moral/neuroeconomic approach that we suggest here.