A Multimedia Strategy to Integrate Introductory Broad-Based Radiation Science Education in US Medical Schools.

US physicians in multiple specialties who order or conduct radiological procedures lack formal radiation science education and thus sometimes order procedures of limited benefit or fail to order what is necessary. To this end, a multidisciplinary expert group proposed an introductory broad-based radiation science educational program for US medical schools. Suggested preclinical elements of the curriculum include foundational education on ionizing and nonionizing radiation (eg, definitions, dose metrics, and risk measures) and short- and long-term radiation-related health effects as well as introduction to radiology, radiation therapy, and radiation protection concepts. Recommended clinical elements of the curriculum would impart knowledge and practical experience in radiology, fluoroscopically guided procedures, nuclear medicine, radiation oncology, and identification of patient subgroups requiring special considerations when selecting specific ionizing or nonionizing diagnostic or therapeutic radiation procedures. Critical components of the clinical program would also include educational material and direct experience with patient-centered communication on benefits of, risks of, and shared decision making about ionizing and nonionizing radiation procedures and on health effects and safety requirements for environmental and occupational exposure to ionizing and nonionizing radiation. Overarching is the introduction to evidence-based guidelines for procedures that maximize clinical benefit while limiting unnecessary risk. The content would be further developed, directed, and integrated within the curriculum by local faculties and would address multiple standard elements of the Liaison Committee on Medical Education and Core Entrustable Professional Activities for Entering Residency of the Association of American Medical Colleges.

Murder by radiation poisoning: implications for public health.

On November 23, 2006, former Russian military intelligence officer Alexander Litvinenko died in a London hospital. Authorities determined he was deliberately poisoned with the radionuclide Polonium-210 (210Po). Police subsequently discovered that those involved in this crime had--apparently inadvertently--spread 210Po over many locations in London. The United Kingdom Health Protection Agency (HPA) contacted many persons who might have been exposed to 210Po and provided voluntary urine testing. Some of those identified as potentially exposed were U.S. citizens, whom the HPA requested that the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) assist in contacting. CDC also provided health care professionals and state and local public health officials with guidance as to how they might respond should a Litvinenko-like incident occur in the U.S. This guidance has resulted in the identification of a number of lessons that can be useful to public health and medical authorities in planning for radiological incidents. Eight such lessons are discussed in this article.

The roles of medical health physicists in a medical radiation emergency.

Medical health physicists working in a clinical setting will have a number of key roles in the event of a nuclear or radiological emergency, such as a terrorist attack involving a radiological dispersal device or an improvised nuclear device. Their first responsibility, of course, is to assist hospital administrators and facility managers in developing radiological emergency response plans for their facilities and train staff prior to an emergency. During a hospital's response to a nuclear or radiological emergency, medical health physicists may be asked to (1) evaluate the level of radiological contamination in or on incoming victims; (2) help the medical staff evaluate and understand the significance to patient and staff of the levels of radioactivity with which they are dealing; (3) orient responding medical staff with principles of dealing with radioactive contaminants; (4) provide guidance to staff on decontamination of patients, facilities, and the vehicles in which patients were transported; and (5) assist local public health authorities in monitoring people who are not injured but who have been or are concerned that they may have been exposed to radioactive materials or radiation as a result of the incident. Medical health physicists may also be called upon to communicate with staff, patients, and the media on radiological issues related to the event. Materials are available from a number of sources to assist in these efforts. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) is developing guidance in the areas of radiological population monitoring, handling contaminated fatalities, and using hospital equipment for emergency monitoring. CDC is also developing training and information materials that may be useful to medical health physicists who are called upon to assist in developing facility response plans or respond to a nuclear or radiological incident. Comments on these materials are encouraged.

A public health perspective on the U.S. response to the Fukushima radiological emergency.

On 11 March 2011, northern Japan was struck by first a magnitude 9.0 earthquake off the eastern coast and then by an ensuing tsunami. At the Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Plant (NPP), these twin disasters initiated a cascade of events that led to radionuclide releases. Radioactive material from Japan was subsequently transported to locations around the globe, including the U.S. The levels of radioactive material that arrived in the U.S. were never large enough to cause health effects, but the presence of this material in the environment was enough to require a response from the public health community. Events during the response illustrated some U.S. preparedness challenges that previously had been anticipated and others that were newly identified. Some of these challenges include the following: (1) Capacity, including radiation health experts, for monitoring potentially exposed people for radioactive contamination are limited and may not be adequate at the time of a large-scale radiological incident; (2) there is no public health authority to detain people contaminated with radioactive materials; (3) public health and medical capacities for response to radiation emergencies are limited; (4) public health communications regarding radiation emergencies can be improved to enhance public health response; (5) national and international exposure standards for radiation measurements (and units) and protective action guides lack uniformity; (6) access to radiation emergency monitoring data can be limited; and (7) the Strategic National Stockpile may not be currently prepared to meet the public health need for KI in the case of a surge in demand from a large-scale radiation emergency. Members of the public health community can draw on this experience to improve public health preparedness.

Estimates of doses from global fallout.

This paper summarizes information about external and internal doses resulting from global fallout and presents preliminary estimates of doses resulting from intermediate fallout in the contiguous United States. Most of the data on global fallout were extracted from the reports of the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation, in which the radiation exposures from fallout have been extensively reviewed at regular intervals. United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation estimated the average effective doses received by the world's population before 2000 to be about 0.4 mSv from external irradiation and 0.6 mSv from internal irradiation, the main radionuclide contributing to the effective dose being 137Cs. Effective doses received beyond 2000 result mainly from the environmentally mobile, long-lived 14C and amount to about 2.5 mSv summed over present and future generations. Specific information about the doses from fallout received by the United States population is based on the preliminary results of a study requested by the U.S. Congress and conducted jointly by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and the National Cancer Institute. Separate calculations were made for the tests conducted at the Nevada Test Site and for the high-yield tests conducted mainly by the United States and the former Soviet Union at sites far away from the contiguous United States (global tests). The estimated average doses from external irradiation received by the United States population were about 0.5 mGy for Nevada Test Site fallout and about 0.7 mGy for global fallout. These values vary little from one organ or tissue of the body to another. In contrast, the average doses from internal irradiation vary markedly from one organ or tissue to another; estimated average thyroid doses to children born in 1951 were about 30 mGy from Nevada Test Site fallout and about 2 mGy from global fallout.

The Fukushima radiological emergency and challenges identified for future public health responses.

On 11 March 2011, northern Japan was rocked by first a magnitude 9.0 earthquake off the eastern coast and then an ensuing tsunami. The Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant complex was hit by these twin disasters, and a cascade of events was initiated that led to radionuclide releases causing widespread radioactive contamination of residential areas, agricultural land, and coastal waters. Radioactive material from Japan was subsequently transmitted to locations around the globe, including the U.S. The levels of radioactive material that arrived in the U.S. were never large enough to be a concern for health effects, but the presence of this material in the environment was enough to create a public health emergency in the U.S. The radiation safety and public health communities in the U.S. are identifying challenges they faced in responding to this incident. This paper discusses three of those challenges: (1) The growing shortage of trained radiation subject matter experts in the field of environmental transport and dosimetry of radionuclides; (2) the need to begin expressing all radiation-related quantities in terms of the International System of Units; and (3) the need to define when a radiation dose is or is not one of "public health concern." This list represents only a small subset of the list of challenges being identified by public health agencies that responded to the Fukushima incident. However, these three challenges are fundamental to any radiological emergency response. Addressing them will have a significant positive impact on how the U.S. responds to the next radiological emergency.

Federal interagency communication strategies for addressing radiation emergencies and other public health crises.

Federal agencies have a variety of roles and responsibilities related to communicating with the public before, during, and after a radiological emergency. To better understand the various efforts currently underway, the Radiation Studies Branch of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention convened a roundtable of representatives from federal agencies with responsibility for communicating with the public about radiation emergencies. Roundtable participants shared valuable information about efforts underway to develop information and messages for a variety of audiences and agreed that continued interagency coordination and dialogue about communication before, during, and after an event are needed. The group suggested several strategies for future collaborative efforts and indicated a desire to continue working together to develop and assess messages for radiological emergency preparedness and response. The group also recommended that more work be done to determine whether messages need to be packaged or tailored for specific special populations and suggested that more research be conducted to answer questions about specific audience/cultural needs around communicating radiation risks. Since this roundtable, attendees have continued to work together to develop and test messages for the public.

Many tests of significance: new methods for controlling type I errors.

There have been many discussions of how Type I errors should be controlled when many hypotheses are tested (e.g., all possible comparisons of means, correlations, proportions, the coefficients in hierarchical models, etc.). By and large, researchers have adopted familywise (FWER) control, though this practice certainly is not universal. Familywise control is intended to deal with the multiplicity issue of computing many tests of significance, yet such control is conservative--that is, less powerful--compared to per test/hypothesis control. The purpose of our article is to introduce the readership, particularly those readers familiar with issues related to controlling Type I errors when many tests of significance are computed, to newer methods that provide protection from the effects of multiple testing, yet are more powerful than familywise controlling methods. Specifically, we introduce a number of procedures that control the k-FWER. These methods--say, 2-FWER instead of 1-FWER (i.e., FWER)--are equivalent to specifying that the probability of 2 or more false rejections is controlled at .05, whereas FWER controls the probability of any (i.e., 1 or more) false rejections at .05. 2-FWER implicitly tolerates 1 false rejection and makes no explicit attempt to control the probability of its occurrence, unlike FWER, which tolerates no false rejections at all. More generally, k-FWER tolerates k - 1 false rejections, but controls the probability of k or more false rejections at α =.05. We demonstrate with two published data sets how more hypotheses can be rejected with k-FWER methods compared to FWER control.

Use of epidemiological data and direct bioassay for prioritization of affected populations in a large-scale radiation emergency.

Following a radiation emergency, evacuated, sheltered or other members of the public would require monitoring for external and/or internal contamination and, if indicated, decontamination. In addition, the potentially-impacted population would be identified for biodosimetry/bioassay or needed medical treatment (chelation therapy, cytokine treatment, etc.) and prioritized for follow-up. Expeditious implementation of these activities presents many challenges, especially when a large population is affected. Furthermore, experience from previous radiation incidents has demonstrated that the number of people seeking monitoring for radioactive contamination (both external and internal) could be much higher than the actual number of contaminated individuals. In the United States, the Department of Health and Human Services is the lead agency to coordinate federal support for population monitoring activities. Population monitoring includes (1) monitoring people for external contamination; (2) monitoring people for internal contamination; (3) population decontamination; (4) collecting epidemiologic data regarding potentially exposed and/or contaminated individuals to prioritize the affected population for limited medical resources; (5) administering available pharmaceuticals for internal decontamination as deemed necessary by appropriate health officials; (6) performing dose reconstruction; and (7) establishing a registry to conduct long-term monitoring of this population for potential long-term health effects. This paper will focus on screening for internal contamination and will describe the use of early epidemiologic data as well as direct bioassay techniques to rapidly identify and prioritize the affected population for further analysis and medical attention.

Educating medical staff about responding to a radiological or nuclear emergency.

A growing body of audience research reveals medical personnel in hospitals are unprepared for a large-scale radiological emergency such as a terrorist event involving radioactive or nuclear materials. Also, medical personnel in hospitals lack a basic understanding of radiation principles, as well as diagnostic and treatment guidelines for radiation exposure. Clinicians have indicated that they lack sufficient training on radiological emergency preparedness; they are potentially unwilling to treat patients if those patients are perceived to be radiologically contaminated; and they have major concerns about public panic and overloading of clinical systems. In response to these findings, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) has developed a tool kit for use by hospital medical personnel who may be called on to respond to unintentional or intentional mass-casualty radiological and nuclear events. This tool kit includes clinician fact sheets, a clinician pocket guide, a digital video disc (DVD) of just-in-time basic skills training, a CD-ROM training on mass-casualty management, and a satellite broadcast dealing with medical management of radiological events. CDC training information emphasizes the key role that medical health physicists can play in the education and support of emergency department activities following a radiological or nuclear mass-casualty event.

TLC-Asthma: an integrated information system for patient-centered monitoring, case management, and point-of-care decision support.

A great deal of successful work has been done in the area of EMR development, implementation, and evaluation. Less work has been done in the area of automated systems for patients. Efforts to link data at multiple levels - the patient, the case manager, and the clinician have been rudimentary to-date. In this paper we present a model information system that integrates patient health information across multiple domains to support the monitoring and care of children with persistent asthma. The system has been developed for use in a multi-specialty group practice and includes three primary components: 1) a patient-centered telephone-linked communication system; 2) a web-based alert reporting and nurse case-management system; and 3) EMR-based provider communication to support clinical decision making at the point-of-care. The system offers a model for a new level of connectivity for health information that supports customized monitoring, IT-enabled nurse case-managers, and the delivery of longitudinal data to clinicians to support the care of children with persistent asthma. Systems like the one described are well-suited, perhaps essential, technologies for the care of children and adults with chronic conditions such as asthma.