RESUMEN
Previous research has shown that children aged 4-5 years, but not 2-3 years, show adult-like interference from a partner when performing a joint task (Milward, Kita, & Apperly, 2014). This raises questions about the cognitive skills involved in the development of such "corepresentation (CR)" of a partner (Sebanz, Knoblich, & Prinz, 2003). Here, individual differences data from one hundred and thirteen 4- to 5-year-olds showed theory of mind (ToM) and inhibitory control (IC) as predictors of ability to avoid CR interference, suggesting that children with better ToM abilities are more likely to succeed in decoupling self and other representations in a joint task, while better IC is likely to help children avoid interference from a partner's response when selecting their own response on the task.
Asunto(s)
Conducta Infantil/fisiología , Conducta Cooperativa , Función Ejecutiva/fisiología , Individualidad , Inhibición Psicológica , Percepción Social , Teoría de la Mente/fisiología , Preescolar , Ego , Femenino , Humanos , MasculinoRESUMEN
Young children not only need to learn how to perform isolated actions, but also temporally and spatially coordinated actions such as using a knife and fork. Routes to learning such coordinated actions include imitation and participation in joint action. However, little is known about the mechanisms guiding transmission of coordinated actions through observation and joint action performance. This paper reports an experiment comparing children's tendency to imitate multiple, coordinated actions following demonstration by a single model acting bimanually (Bimanual Observation condition), two models performing the same actions jointly with one performing each hand action (Joint Observation condition) and a condition in which the child actively takes part in the joint action demonstration by performing one part in coordination with a partner (Joint Action condition). When children were subsequently left alone to perform the task independently, they were more likely to imitate both coordinated actions in the two observation conditions than in the Joint Action condition, with no difference between performance in Bimanual and Joint Observation conditions. It is argued that this is due to children being more able to form a global representation of both actions and the relations between the two when observing from a distance than when actively involved in the task.
Asunto(s)
Aprendizaje , Percepción , Niño , Preescolar , Femenino , Humanos , Masculino , Análisis y Desempeño de TareasRESUMEN
This opinion piece offers a commentary on the four papers that address the theme of the development of self and other understanding with a view to highlighting the important contribution of developmental research to understanding of mechanisms of social cognition. We discuss potential mechanisms linking self-other distinction and empathy, implications for grouping motor, affective and cognitive domains under a single mechanism, applications of these accounts for joint action and finally consider self-other distinction in group versus dyadic settings.
Asunto(s)
Conducta Social , Afecto , Cognición , Empatía , Humanos , Psicología del Desarrollo , Desempeño Psicomotor , AutoimagenRESUMEN
When two adults jointly perform a task, they often show interference effects whereby the other's task interferes with their own performance (Sebanz, Knoblich, & Prinz, 2003). The current study investigated whether these co-representation effects can be observed in young children. This phenomenon can be used as a criterion for adult-like joint action in children, which has been under debate in existing literature due to the difficulty in identifying what mechanisms underlie the behaviours observed (Brownell, 2011). In Experiment 1, two children performed an adapted Bear Dragon task (Kochanska, Murray, Jacques, Koenig, & Vandegeest, 1996), where children were required to point to a picture when instructed to do so by one puppet and to inhibit pointing when instructed to by the other. In the Same Task condition, both children in a pair were asked to respond to the same puppet, whereas in the Different Task condition, they were asked to respond to different puppets. Children made more errors in the Different Task condition than the Same Task, suggesting that they were experiencing interference from their partner's task rule. In Experiment 2 children in Different and Same task conditions began with the same task as in Experiment 1 and then switched which puppet to respond to. Switch costs were lower in the Different task condition, consistent with children having already represented the alternative task rule on behalf of their partner during the pre-switch phase. Experiment 3 replicated the effect of Task in a novel computer-based paradigm with children between 4 and 5years, but not younger. These data provide the first direct evidence that children as young as 4years co-represent a partner's task during a joint activity, and that younger children may not be capable of co-representation.