[Safety Walk Rounds - Clinical unit visits with a focus on patient safety]. / Sicherheitsrundgänge ­ Abteilungsbesuche mit Fokus auf die Patientensicherheit.

Safety Walk Rounds - Clinical unit visits with a focus on patient safety Abstract. Background: Safety Walk Rounds are a promising strategy to promote the safety culture and optimising patient safety. The purpose of this study was to explore patient safety attributes in various clinical areas including recommendations for improvement and leadership support. Methods: Safety Walk Rounds were conducted by the chief patient safety officer based on a structured questions format to open patient safety dialogues with clinicians at the ward level. Field notes were utilized for thematic analyses and topic categorization. Results: A total of 187 clinicians (64 % nursing staff, 19 % physicians, 17 % other health care professionals) participated on the Safety Walk Rounds. The discussion findings are presented in five categories: Events & circumstances (potentially) harmful for patients; safety culture; need for local action, as well as the need for leadership support to provide safe care. Conclusion and outlook: Safety Walk Rounds across the hospitals' clinical areas delivered insight into patient safety issues and safety culture with its caregiver's engagement to provide safe care as well as action points for future improvement including leadership support.

Addressing Patient Safety Hazards Using Critical Incident Reporting in Hospitals: A Systematic Review.

INTRODUCTION: Critical incident reporting systems (CIRS) are in use worldwide. They are designed to improve patient care by detecting and analyzing critical and adverse patient events and by taking corrective actions to prevent reoccurrence. Critical incident reporting systems have recently been criticized for their lack of effectiveness in achieving actual patient safety improvements. However, no overview yet exists of the reported incidents' characteristics, their communication within institutions, or actions taken either to correct them or to prevent their recurrence. Our main goals were to systematically describe the reported CIRS events and to assess the actions taken and their learning effects. In this systematic review of studies based on CIRS data, we analyzed the main types of critical incidents (CIs), the severity of their consequences, their contributing factors, and any reported corrective actions. METHODS: Following the Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses guidelines, we queried MEDLINE, Embase, CINAHL, and Scopus for publications on hospital-based CIRS. We classified the consequences of the incidents according to the National Coordinating Council for Medication Error Reporting and Prevention index, the contributing factors according to the Yorkshire Contributory Factors Framework and the Human Factors Classification Framework, and all corrective actions taken according to an action hierarchy model on intervention strengths. RESULTS: We reviewed 41 studies, which covered 479,483 CI reports from 212 hospitals in 17 countries. The most frequent type of incident was medication related (28.8%); the most frequent contributing factor was labeled "active failure" within health care provision (26.1%). Of all professions, nurses submitted the largest percentage (83.7%) of CI reports. Actions taken to prevent future CIs were described in 15 studies (36.6%). Overall, the analyzed studies varied considerably regarding methodology and focus. CONCLUSIONS: This review of studies from hospital-based CIRS provides an overview of reported CIs' contributing factors, characteristics, and consequences, as well as of the actions taken to prevent their recurrence. Because only 1 in 3 studies reported on corrective actions within the healthcare facilities, more emphasis on such actions and learnings from CIRS is required. However, incomplete or fragmented reporting and communication cycles may additionally limit the potential value of CIRS. To make a CIRS a useful tool for improving patient safety, the focus must be put on its strength of providing new qualitative insights in unknown hazards and also on the development of tools to facilitate nomenclature and management CIRS events, including corrective actions in a more standardized manner.

Critical incident reporting over time: a retrospective, descriptive analysis of 5493 cases.

PURPOSE: As recommended by the WHO and many national healthcare authorities, health care institutions of most industrialised countries have employed a critical incident reporting system (CIRS). However, little is known about differences in critical incidents across clinical specialties, the use of CIRSs amongst different professional groups, the types, severity and risk of reoccurrence of critical incidents, their contributing factors and the preventive actions taken in response. METHODS: In this retrospective, descriptive study we critically reviewed all reports filed in the CIRS of our institution between 2013 and 2019 and analysed characteristics over time. RESULTS: Of the 5493 analysed incidents, the main types were related to medications (32.8%), clinical procedures (32.6%) or behaviour of employees (23.3%). Only 21.6% of reports were made by physicians, 51.3% were rated at least "high risk". Major contributing factors were personal factors (44.0%), lack of training and knowledge (43.7%) and communication errors (36.1%). Most actions taken to prevent similar events aimed at improving communications (23.6%); in 46.3% no actions whatsoever were taken. Longitudinal analysis revealed that reporting increased in internal medicine and obstetrics but collapsed in laboratory medicine / microbiology. Steady increases in medication-type incidents as well as lack of training and knowledge as contributing factors were observed. CONCLUSION: This study revealed that the efferent loop (feedback, preventive actions taken) was the weakest part of the CIRS in our institution, indicating that no learning may have resulted from a large number of reports. In particular, the actions taken appeared to not adequately address the major contributing factors. This highlights that special attention must be paid to the efferent loop of a CIRS to fulfil the purpose of such a reporting system and ultimately to improve patient safety.

[Safety-II in daily clinical practice]. / Safety-II im stationären Krankenhausalltag.

BACKGROUND: Providing patient safety is a central matter in health care requiring complex treatment processes containing many risks. In hospital care, adverse events and patient harm occur frequently. In this context, the safety sciences investigate causes and contributing factors of such events as well as improvement measures. With Safety-I and Safety-II, two complementary approaches come into play. While Safety-I aims to minimize adverse events, the Safety-II approach focuses on understanding the system as a whole whose normal operations can result in both desired and adverse events. With the implementation of the Critical Incident Report System (CIRS), the Safety-I approach (with a focus on errors and correction of negative consequences for patient safety) has become an integral part of the university hospital chosen for this study. The subject matter of this study is to determine if and how the Safety-II approach (focussing on normal operation and the understanding of positive effects for patient safety) is already in use and what measurements can support its integration in daily clinical practice. METHOD: Through observation, the structures of daily feedback meetings (huddles) from six different hospital departments have been gathered to determine if they can be considered as potential starting points for the implementation of the Safety-II approach. The following expert interviews (n=7) discussed four potentials of the Safety-II approach using the Resilient Assessment Grid (RAG). Finally, a focus group discussed which measurements are central for the integration of the Safety-II approach in daily clinical practice. RESULTS: The study shows that department teams partially follow the Safety-II approach. During team huddles, positive experiences are already exchanged. The expert interviews revealed that the RAG potentials respond, learn and anticipate have already been realized satisfactorily while the potential monitor fell behind. The focus groups regard the Safety-II approach more as a matter of corporate culture and less as a paradigm shift which is needed to be integrated into day-to-day business. DISCUSSION: Successfully establishing the Safety-II approach requires a focus not just on unwanted occurrences. It is also necessary to focus on the often not directly apparent desired occurrences, which ensure patient safety, and to systematically reflect on them in order to contribute to the development of the organizational culture. Having a better understanding of how the system of daily clinical practice with all its subsystems works will make it possible to proactively counteract unwanted occurrences, for example through regular feedback sessions and debriefings, and to increase patient safety.

Adherence to the WHO surgical safety checklist: an observational study in a Swiss academic center.

BACKGROUND: The World Health Organization (WHO) Surgical Safety Checklist is used globally to ensure patient safety during surgery. Two years after its implementation in the University Hospital Basel's operating rooms, adherence to the protocol was evaluated. METHODS: This mixed method observational study took place in the surgical department of the University Hospital of Basel, Switzerland from April to August 2017. Data collection was via individual structured interviews with selected OR team members regarding checklist adherence and on-site non-participant observations of Team Time Out and Team Sign Out sequences in the OR. Data were subjected to thematic analysis and descriptive statistics compiled. RESULTS: Comprehensive local expert interviews indicated that individual, procedural and contextual variables influenced the application of the checklist. Facilitating factors included well-informed specialists who advocated the use of the Checklist, as well as teams focused on the checklist's intended process and on its content. In contrast, factors such as staff insecurity, a generally negative attitude towards the checklist, a lack of teamwork, and hesitance to complete the checklist, hindered its implementation.The checklist's application was evaluated in 104 on-site observations comprising of 72 Team Time Out (TTO) and 32 Team Sign Out (TSO) sections. Adherence to the protocol ranged between 96 and 100% in TTO and 22% in TSO respectively. Lack of implementation of the TSO was mainly due to the absence of one of the key OR team members, who were busy with other tasks or no longer present in the operating room. CONCLUSION: The study illustrates factors, which foster and hinder consistent application of the WHO surgical safety checklist namely individual, procedural and contextual. It also demonstrates that the TTO was consistently and correctly applied, while the unavailability of key OR team members at sign-out time was the most common reason for omission or incomplete use of the TSO.