Real-time virtual infection prevention and control assessments in skilled nursing homes, New York, March 2020-A pilot project.

OBJECTIVE: To describe a pilot project infection prevention and control (IPC) assessment conducted in skilled nursing facilities (SNFs) in New York State (NYS) during a pivotal 2-week period when the region became the nation's epicenter for coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19). DESIGN: A telephone and video assessment of IPC measures in SNFs at high risk or experiencing COVID-19 activity. PARTICIPANTS: SNFs in 14 New York counties, including New York City. INTERVENTION: A 3-component remote IPC assessment: (1) screening tool; (2) telephone IPC checklist; and (3) COVID-19 video IPC assessment (ie, "COVIDeo"). RESULTS: In total, 92 SNFs completed the IPC screening tool and checklist: 52 (57%) were conducted as part COVID-19 investigations, and 40 (43%) were proactive prevention-based assessments. Among the 40 proactive assessments, 14 (35%) identified suspected or confirmed COVID-19 cases. COVIDeo was performed in 26 (28%) of 92 assessments and provided observations that other tools would have missed: personal protective equipment (PPE) that was not easily accessible, redundant, or improperly donned, doffed, or stored and specific challenges implementing IPC in specialty populations. The IPC assessments took ∼1 hour each and reached an estimated 4 times as many SNFs as on-site visits in a similar time frame. CONCLUSIONS: Remote IPC assessments by telephone and video were timely and feasible methods of assessing the extent to which IPC interventions had been implemented in a vulnerable setting and to disseminate real-time recommendations. Remote assessments are now being implemented across New York State and in various healthcare facility types. Similar methods have been adapted nationally by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.

Screening of Clostridioides difficile carriers in an urban academic medical center: Understanding implications of disease.

OBJECTIVE: Efforts to reduce Clostridioides difficile infection (CDI) have targeted transmission from patients with symptomatic C. difficile. However, many patients with the C. difficile organism are carriers without symptoms who may serve as reservoirs for spread of infection and may be at risk for progression to symptomatic C. difficile. To estimate the prevalence of C. difficile carriage and determine the risk and speed of progression to symptomatic C. difficile among carriers, we established a pilot screening program in a large urban hospital. DESIGN: Prospective cohort study. SETTING: An 800-bed, tertiary-care, academic medical center in the Bronx, New York. PARTICIPANTS: A sample of admitted adults without diarrhea, with oversampling of nursing facility patients. METHODS: Perirectal swabs were tested by polymerase chain reaction for C. difficile within 24 hours of admission, and patients were followed for progression to symptomatic C. difficile. Development of symptomatic C. difficile was compared among C. difficile carriers and noncarriers using a Cox proportional hazards model. RESULTS: Of the 220 subjects, 21 (9.6%) were C. difficile carriers, including 10.2% of the nursing facility residents and 7.7% of the community residents (P = .60). Among the 21 C. difficile carriers, 8 (38.1%) progressed to symptomatic C. difficile, but only 4 (2.0%) of the 199 noncarriers progressed to symptomatic C. difficile (hazard ratio, 23.9; 95% CI, 7.2-79.6; P < .0001). CONCLUSIONS: Asymptomatic carriage of C. difficile is prevalent among admitted patients and confers a significant risk of progression to symptomatic CDI. Screening for asymptomatic carriers may represent an opportunity to reduce CDI.

Serratia marcescens bacteremia traced to an infused narcotic.

BACKGROUND: From June 30, 1998, through March 21, 1999, several patients in the surgical intensive care unit of a hospital acquired Serratia marcescens bacteremia. We investigated this outbreak. METHODS: A case was defined as the occurrence of S. marcescens bacteremia in any patient in the surgical intensive care unit during the period of the epidemic. To identify risk factors, we compared patients with S. marcescens bacteremia with randomly selected controls. Isolates from patients and from medications were evaluated by pulsed-field gel electrophoresis. The hair of one employee was tested for fentanyl. RESULTS: Twenty-six patients with S. marcescens bacteremia were identified; eight (31 percent) had polymicrobial bacteremia, and seven of these had Enterobacter cloacae and S. marcescens in the same culture. According to univariate analysis, patients with S. marcescens bacteremia stayed in the surgical intensive care unit longer than controls (13.5 vs. 4.0 days, P<0.001), were more likely to have received fentanyl in the surgical intensive care unit (odds ratio, 31; P<0.001), and were more likely to have been exposed to two particular respiratory therapists (odds ratios, 13.1 and 5.1; P<0.001 for both comparisons). In a multivariate analysis, receipt of fentanyl and exposure to the two respiratory therapists (adjusted odds ratio for one therapist, 6.7; P=0.002; adjusted odds ratio for the other therapist, 9.5; P=0.02) remained significant. One respiratory therapist had been reported for tampering with fentanyl; his hair sample tested positive for fentanyl. Cultures of fentanyl infusions from two case patients yielded S. marcescens and E. cloacae. The isolates from the case patients and from the fentanyl infusions had similar patterns on pulsed-field gel electrophoresis. After removal of the implicated respiratory therapist, no further cases occurred. CONCLUSIONS: An outbreak of S. marcescens and E. cloacae bacteremia in a surgical intensive care unit was traced to extrinsic contamination of the parenteral narcotic fentanyl by a health care worker. Our findings underscore the risk of complications in patients that is associated with illicit narcotic use by health care workers.

SHEA guideline for preventing nosocomial transmission of multidrug-resistant strains of Staphylococcus aureus and enterococcus.

BACKGROUND: Infection control programs were created three decades ago to control antibiotic-resistant healthcare-associated infections, but there has been little evidence of control in most facilities. After long, steady increases of MRSA and VRE infections in NNIS System hospitals, the Society for Healthcare Epidemiology of America (SHEA) Board of Directors made reducing antibiotic-resistant infections a strategic SHEA goal in January 2000. After 2 more years without improvement, a SHEA task force was appointed to draft this evidence-based guideline on preventing nosocomial transmission of such pathogens, focusing on the two considered most out of control: MRSA and VRE. METHODS: Medline searches were conducted spanning 1966 to 2002. Pertinent abstracts of unpublished studies providing sufficient data were included. RESULTS: Frequent antibiotic therapy in healthcare settings provides a selective advantage for resistant flora, but patients with MRSA or VRE usually acquire it via spread. The CDC has long-recommended contact precautions for patients colonized or infected with such pathogens. Most facilities have required this as policy, but have not actively identified colonized patients with surveillance cultures, leaving most colonized patients undetected and unisolated. Many studies have shown control of endemic and/or epidemic MRSA and VRE infections using surveillance cultures and contact precautions, demonstrating consistency of evidence, high strength of association, reversibility, a dose gradient, and specificity for control with this approach. Adjunctive control measures are also discussed. CONCLUSION: Active surveillance cultures are essential to identify the reservoir for spread of MRSA and VRE infections and make control possible using the CDC's long-recommended contact precautions.