An antibiotic's journey from marketing authorization to use, Norway.

Here we describe in detail marketing authorization and reimbursement procedures for medicinal products in Norway, with particular reference to nine novel antibiotics that received marketing authorization between 2005 and 2015. The description illustrates that, in places like Norway, with effective antibiotic stewardship policies and an associated low prevalence of antibiotic-resistant bacterial infection, there is little need for newer, more expensive antibiotics whose therapeutic superiority to existing compounds has not been demonstrated. Since resistance begins to emerge as soon as an antibiotic is used, Norway's practice of leaving newer antibiotics on the shelf is consistent with the goal of prolonging the effectiveness of newer antibiotics. An unintended consequence is that the country has signalled to the private sector that there is little commercial value in novel antibiotics, which may nevertheless still be needed to treat rare or emerging infections. Every country aims to improve infection control and to promote responsible antibiotic use. However, as progress is made, antibiotic-resistant bacteria should become less common and, consequently, the need for, and the commercial value of, novel antibiotics will probably be reduced. Nevertheless, antibiotic innovation continues to be essential. This dilemma will have to be resolved through the introduction of alternative reward systems for antibiotic innovation. The DRIVE-AB (Driving re-investment in research and development and responsible antibiotic use) research consortium in Europe has been tasked with identifying ways of meeting this challenge.

Nous décrivons ici en détail les procédures d'autorisation de mise sur le marché et de remboursement des médicaments en Norvège, en particulier de neuf nouveaux antibiotiques qui ont reçu une autorisation de mise sur le marché entre 2005 et 2015. Cette description montre que, dans les pays comme la Norvège qui ont adopté des politiques d'utilisation raisonnée des antibiotiques et qui affichent ainsi une faible prévalence d'infections bactériennes résistantes aux antibiotiques, il n'est guère besoin de nouveaux antibiotiques plus coûteux dont la supériorité thérapeutique par rapport aux composés existants n'a pas été démontrée. Étant donné que la résistance apparaît dès que l'on commence à utiliser un nouvel antibiotique, la désaffection de la Norvège pour les nouveaux antibiotiques concorde avec l'objectif d'en prolonger l'efficacité. Conséquence inattendue, le pays a signalé au secteur privé que ces nouveaux antibiotiques ne présentaient qu'un faible intérêt commercial mais qu'ils pourraient cependant être nécessaires pour traiter des maladies infectieuses rares ou nouvelles. Tous les pays souhaitent faire avancer la lutte contre les infections et promouvoir l'utilisation responsable des antibiotiques. Cependant, à mesure qu'ils progresseront, les bactéries résistantes aux antibiotiques devraient devenir moins fréquentes et la nécessité ainsi que l'intérêt commercial de nouveaux antibiotiques devraient par conséquent s'en trouver réduits. L'innovation en matière d'antibiotiques reste toutefois essentielle. Ce dilemme devra être résolu avec l'introduction de systèmes de récompenses alternatifs pour l'innovation dans le domaine des antibiotiques. Le consortium de recherche européen DRIVE-AB (Driving re-investment in research and development and responsible antibiotic use) a été chargé de trouver des solutions pour relever ce défi.

En este documento se detallan los procedimientos de autorización de comercialización y compensación para productos medicinales en Noruega, con especial referencia a nueve antibióticos nuevos que recibieron la autorización de comercialización entre 2005 y 2015. La descripción ilustra que, en lugares como Noruega, que cuentan con políticas eficaces de administración de antibióticos y una prevalencia baja relacionada de infecciones bacterianas resistentes a los antibióticos, hay poca necesidad de antibióticos nuevos más caros cuya superioridad terapéutica respecto a los componentes existentes no ha sido demostrada. Dado que la resistencia comienza a surgir tan pronto como se utiliza un antibiótico, la práctica de Noruega de dejar nuevos antibióticos de lado es coherente con el objetivo de prolongar la eficacia de los nuevos antibióticos. Una consecuencia inesperada es que el país ha explicado al sector privado que los antibióticos nuevos apenas tienen valor comercial, los cuales, sin embargo, pueden ser necesarios para tratar infecciones raras o nuevas. Todos los países tratan de mejorar su control de infecciones y fomentar un uso responsable de los antibióticos. No obstante, conforme se va progresando, las bacterias resistentes a los antibióticos deberían ser cada vez menos comunes y, por tanto, es probable que la necesidad y el valor comercial de los antibióticos nuevos se vean reducidos. Sin embargo, la innovación en el campo de los antibióticos sigue siendo fundamental. Este dilema deberá resolverse mediante la introducción de sistemas de recompensa alternativos por innovar con antibióticos. El consorcio de investigación europeo DRIVE-AB, que fomenta la reinversión en investigación y desarrollo y en el uso responsable de los antibióticos, deberá identificar formas de lograr este objetivo.

Insights into early stage of antibiotic development in small- and medium-sized enterprises: a survey of targets, costs, and durations.

BACKGROUND: Antibiotic innovation has dwindled to dangerously low levels in the past 30 years. Since resistance continues to evolve, this innovation deficit can have perilous consequences on patients. A number of new incentives have been suggested to stimulate greater antibacterial drug innovation. To design effective solutions, a greater understanding is needed of actual antibiotic discovery and development costs and timelines. Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) undertake most discovery and early phase development for antibiotics and other drugs. This paper attempts to gather a better understanding of SMEs' targets, costs, and durations related to discovery and early phase development of antibacterial therapies. METHODS: DRIVE-AB, a project focused on developing new economic incentives to stimulate antibacterial innovation, held a European stakeholder meeting in February 2015. All SMEs invited to this meeting (n = 44) were subsequently sent a survey to gather more data regarding their areas of activity, completed and expected development costs and timelines, and business models. RESULTS: Twenty-five companies responded to the survey. Respondents were primarily small companies each focusing on developing 1 to 3 new antibiotics, focused on pathogens of public health importance. Most have not yet completed any clinical trials. They have reported ranges of discovery and development out-of-pocket costs that appear to be less expensive than other studies of general pharmaceutical research and development (R&D) costs. The duration ranges reported for completing each phase of R&D are highly variable when compared to previously published general pharmaceutical innovation average durations. However, our sample population is small and may not be fully representative of all relevant antibiotic SMEs. CONCLUSIONS: The data collected by this study provide important insights and estimates about R&D in European SMEs focusing on antibiotics, which can be combined with other data to design incentives to stimulate antibacterial innovation. The variation implies that costs and durations are difficult to generalize due to the unique characteristics of each antibiotic project and depend on individual business strategies and circumstances.

An assessment of the future impact of alternative technologies on antibiotics markets.

BACKGROUND: The increasing threat of antimicrobial resistance combined with the paucity of new classes of antibiotics represents a serious public health challenge. New treatment technologies could, in theory, have a significant impact on the future use of traditional antibiotics, be it by facilitating rational and responsible use or by product substitution in the existing antibiotics markets, including by reducing the incidence of bacterial infections through preventative approaches. The aim of this paper is to assess the potential of alternative technologies in reducing clinical use of and demand for antibiotics, and to briefly indicate which segments of the antibiotics market that might be impacted by these technologies. METHODS: An initial mapping exercise to identify the alternative technologies was followed by a review of relevant published and grey literature (n = 52). We also carried out stakeholder engagement activities by a round-table discussion with infectious disease specialists and a multi-criteria decision analysis exercise with pharmaceutical industry experts. RESULTS: Ten alternative technologies were identified and analyzed for their potential impact on the antibiotics market. Of these, rapid point-of-care diagnostics, vaccines, fecal microbiota transplantation, and probiotics were considered to have a "high" or "medium" potential impact over a 10-20 year horizon. Therapeutic antibodies, antibiotic biomaterials, bacteriophages, antimicrobial nanoparticles, antimicrobial peptides, and anti-virulence materials were rated as having "low" potential impact. CONCLUSION: Despite the apparent potential of the most promising alternative technologies to reduce demand, that reduction will likely only happen in limited segments of the antibiotics market or, in the case of preventing community acquired streptococcal infections by vaccination, in a low-price generics market segment. Thus, alternative technologies are not expected to represent any disincentive to antibiotics developers. Finally, it is unlikely that alternative technologies will displace the need for new classes, and sub-classes, of antibiotics in the short and medium terms.

Tiered pricing of vaccines: a win-win-win situation, not a subsidy.

It is a widespread misconception that tiered pricing of vaccines entails the producers or consumers in the high-price markets subsidising the consumers in the low-price markets. Such a view is inconsistent with realities, as well as with economic theory. In the vaccine sector, the cost and demand structures ensure that all three parties involved benefit. The developing countries' low-price market consumers get access to a product that would have been unattainable if the vaccines were offered at a uniform price. The producers benefit from increased revenues and profits, and the developed countries' high-price market consumers benefit from slightly lower prices than would be the case in the absence of the low-price market. This article rebuts the notion that tiered pricing of vaccines is a subsidy, and discusses past experiences, present challenges, and future opportunities for tiered pricing of vaccines in relation to developing countries' immunisation programmes.

Is the pneumococcal vaccine Advance Market Commitment motivating innovation and increasing manufacturing capacity? Some preliminary answers.

This paper seeks to give some preliminary evidence on the potential outcome of the pneumococcal vaccine Advance Market Commitment (AMC), with a focus on its impact on innovation in 'emerging' vaccine manufacturers in developing countries. The evidence is derived from a series of interviews with executives at industrial vaccine developing organizations with pneumococcal vaccines in their R&D portfolio, including both multinational pharmaceutical companies and 'emerging' manufacturers. The main findings are that so far there is no evidence to support any claim that the AMC is speeding innovation of pneumococcal vaccines, or that it is contributing to productive capacity expansion. Representatives of emerging manufacturers consistently state that the AMC is either irrelevant or inappropriate for supporting their innovative activities on pneumococcal vaccines.