Zika Virus Surveillance and Preparedness - New York City, 2015-2016.

Zika virus has rapidly spread through the World Health Organization's Region of the Americas since being identified in Brazil in early 2015. Transmitted primarily through the bite of infected Aedes species mosquitoes, Zika virus infection during pregnancy can cause spontaneous abortion and birth defects, including microcephaly (1,2). New York City (NYC) is home to a large number of persons who travel frequently to areas with active Zika virus transmission, including immigrants from these areas. In November 2015, the NYC Department of Health and Mental Hygiene (DOHMH) began developing and implementing plans for managing Zika virus and on February 1, 2016, activated its Incident Command System. During January 1-June 17, 2016, DOHMH coordinated diagnostic laboratory testing for 3,605 persons with travel-associated exposure, 182 (5.0%) of whom had confirmed Zika virus infection. Twenty (11.0%) confirmed patients were pregnant at the time of diagnosis. In addition, two cases of Zika virus-associated Guillain-Barré syndrome were diagnosed. DOHMH's response has focused on 1) identifying and diagnosing suspected cases; 2) educating the public and medical providers about Zika virus risks, transmission, and prevention strategies, particularly in areas with large populations of immigrants from areas with ongoing Zika virus transmission; 3) monitoring pregnant women with Zika virus infection and their fetuses and infants; 4) detecting local mosquito-borne transmission through both human and mosquito surveillance; and 5) modifying existing Culex mosquito control measures by targeting Aedes species of mosquitoes through the use of larvicides and adulticides.

Ebola virus disease in a humanitarian aid worker - New York City, October 2014.

In late October 2014, Ebola virus disease (Ebola) was diagnosed in a humanitarian aid worker who recently returned from West Africa to New York City (NYC). The NYC Department of Health and Mental Hygiene (DOHMH) actively monitored three close contacts of the patient and 114 health care personnel. No secondary cases of Ebola were detected. In collaboration with local and state partners, DOHMH had developed protocols to respond to such an event beginning in July 2014. These protocols included safely transporting a person at the first report of symptoms to a local hospital prepared to treat a patient with Ebola, laboratory testing for Ebola, and monitoring of contacts. In response to this single case of Ebola, initial health care worker active monitoring protocols needed modification to improve clarity about what types of exposure should be monitored. The response costs were high in both human resources and money: DOHMH alone spent $4.3 million. However, preparedness activities that include planning and practice in effectively monitoring the health of workers involved in Ebola patient care can help prevent transmission of Ebola.

Public health and environmental response to the first case of naturally acquired inhalational anthrax in the United States in 30 years: infection of a new york city resident who worked with dried animal hides.

In Pennsylvania on February 16, 2006, a New York City resident collapsed with rigors and was hospitalized. On February 21, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and the New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene were notified that Bacillus anthracis had been identified in the patient's blood. Although the patient's history of working with dried animal hides to make African drums indicated the likelihood of a natural exposure to aerosolized anthrax spores, bioterrorism had to be ruled out first. Ultimately, this case proved to be the first case of naturally occurring inhalational anthrax in 30 years. This article describes the epidemiologic and environmental investigation to identify other cases and persons at risk and to determine the source of exposure and scope of contamination. Because stricter regulation of the importation of animal hides from areas where anthrax is enzootic is difficult, public healthcare officials should consider the possibility of future naturally occurring anthrax cases caused by contaminated hides. Federal protocols are needed to assist in the local response, which should be tempered by our growing understanding of the epidemiology of naturally acquired anthrax. These protocols should include recommended methods for reliable and efficient environmental sample collection and laboratory testing, and environmental risk assessments and remediation.

The NYC Health Department's Reflections on First-Ever Public Health Deployments in Support of Puerto Rico and the US Virgin Islands After the 2017 Hurricane Season.

In late 2017 and early 2018, the New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene deployed multiple teams to Puerto Rico and the US Virgin Islands to support public health in those territories. This article is a description of how those teams were conceived, deployed, supported, and reintegrated into the agency. This was an unprecedented mission for our agency, and what follows is a reflection on what worked and what didn't work for us. It is our hope that other jurisdictions can use this information to organize and execute similar missions in the future, and that collectively we can continue to advance the field of public health preparedness and response.

Active Monitoring of Travelers for Ebola Virus Disease-New York City, October 25, 2014-December 29, 2015.

The CDC recommended active monitoring of travelers potentially exposed to Ebola virus during the 2014 West African Ebola virus disease outbreak, which involved daily contact between travelers and health authorities to ascertain the presence of fever or symptoms for 21 days after the travelers' last potential Ebola virus exposure. From October 25, 2014, to December 29, 2015, the New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene (DOHMH) monitored 5,359 persons for Ebola virus disease, corresponding to 5,793 active monitoring events. Most active monitoring events were in travelers classified as low (but not zero) risk (n = 5,778; 99%). There were no gaps in contact with DOHMH of ≥2 days during 95% of active monitoring events. Instances of not making any contact with travelers decreased after CDC began distributing mobile telephones at the airport. Ebola virus disease-like symptoms or a temperature ≥100.0°F were reported in 122 (2%) active monitoring events. In the final month of active monitoring, an optional health insurance enrollment referral was offered for interested travelers, through which 8 travelers are known to have received coverage. Because it is possible that active monitoring will be used again for an infectious threat, the experience we describe might help to inform future such efforts.

Preparing the Health System to Respond to Ebola Virus Disease in New York City, 2014.

The world's largest outbreak of Ebola virus disease began in West Africa in 2014. Although few cases were identified in the United States, the possibility of imported cases led US public health systems and health care facilities to focus on preparing the health care system to quickly and safely identify and respond to emerging infectious diseases. In New York City, early, coordinated planning among city and state agencies and the health care delivery system led to a successful response to a single case diagnosed in a returned health care worker. In this article we describe public health and health care system preparedness efforts in New York City to respond to Ebola and conclude that coordinated public health emergency response relies on joint planning and sustained resources for public health emergency response, epidemiology and laboratory capacity, and health care emergency management. (Disaster Med Public Health Preparedness. 2017;11:370-374).

Protecting the Public from H1N1 through Points of Dispensing (PODs).

In fall 2009, the New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene (DOHMH) operated 58 points of dispensing (PODs) over 5 weekends to provide influenza A (H1N1) 2009 monovalent vaccination to New Yorkers. Up to 7 sites were opened each day across the 5 boroughs, with almost 50,000 New Yorkers being vaccinated. The policies and protocols used were based on those developed for New York City's POD Plan, the cornerstone of the city's mass prophylaxis planning. Before the H1N1 experience, NYC had not opened more than 5 PODs simultaneously and had only experienced the higher patient volume seen with the H1N1 PODs on 1 prior occasion. Therefore, DOHMH identified factors that contributed to the success of POD operations, as well as areas for improvement to inform future mass prophylaxis planning and response. Though this was a relatively small-scale, preplanned operation, during which a maximum of 7 PODs were operated on a given day, the findings have implications for larger-scale mass prophylaxis planning for emergencies.

Public compliance with mass prophylaxis guidance.

In 2008, the New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene (NYC DOHMH) conducted a series of 8 focus groups to determine what improvements could be made to existing plans to ensure that the public would adhere to instructions issued during an emergency that required mass antibiotic distribution following an aerosolized anthrax attack. Discussion focused on perceptions surrounding public health emergencies, overall point-of dispensing (POD) strategy, willingness to pick up medications for others, and additional information that participants would need before and during an emergency. Participation in each group ranged from 7 to 10 members. Most participants indicated a willingness to actively participate in emergency response and to follow directions issued by authorities. Some said they would wait to see how others reacted to medication being provided before taking theirs. Participants expressed a universal desire for education on both dispensing plans and diseases before an incident occurs. They expressed concerns about anxiety levels among the public and maintaining adequate security at dispensing sites, though they felt that NYC's plans were generally realistic. The most trusted sources identified to disseminate information were the mayor, the city health commissioner, and a local cable news channel. While many participants indicated they would use the internet to find information during an emergency, multiple delivery methods must be used to ensure the broadest reach within the community, as not everyone has internet access. Health authorities must partner with the public before, during, and after an emergency to achieve the best possible outcomes from a response effort that relies greatly on public cooperation.

The danger of declining funds: Public Health Preparedness in NYC.

Since 2001, the New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene (NYC DOHMH) has built a strong public health preparedness foundation, made possible in large part by funding from the Public Health Emergency Preparedness (PHEP) Cooperative Agreement provided by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. While this funding has allowed NYC DOHMH to make great progress in areas such as all-hazards planning, risk communication, disease surveillance, and lab capacity, the erosion of federal preparedness dollars for all-hazards preparedness has the potential to reverse these gains. Since the initiation of the PHEP grant in 2002, PHEP funding has steadily declined nationwide. Specifically, the total federal allocation has decreased approximately 20%, from $862,777,000 in 2005 to $688,914,546 in 2009. With city and state budgets at an all-time low, federal funding cuts will have a significant impact on public health preparedness programs nationwide. In this time of strict budgetary constraints, the nation would be better served by strategically awarding federal preparedness funds to areas at greatest risk. The absence of risk-based funding in determining PHEP grant awards leaves the nation's highest-risk areas, like New York City, with insufficient resources to prepare for and respond to public health emergencies. This article examines the progress New York City has made and what is at stake as federal funding continues to wane.