Real-time Feedback in Pay-for-Performance: Does More Information Lead to Improvement?

BACKGROUND: Pay-for-performance (P4P) has been used expansively to improve quality of care delivered by physicians. However, to what extent P4P works through the provision of information versus financial incentives is poorly understood. OBJECTIVE: To determine whether an increase in information feedback without changes to financial incentives resulted in improved physician performance within an existing P4P program. INTERVENTION/EXPOSURE: Implementation of a new registry enabling real-time feedback to physicians on quality measure performance. DESIGN: Observational, predictive piecewise model at the physician-measure level to examine whether registry introduction associated with performance changes. We used detailed physician quality measure data 3 years prior to registry implementation (2010-2012) and 2 years after implementation (2014-2015). We also linked physician-level data including age, gender, and board certification; group-level data including registry click rates; and patient panel data including chronic conditions. PARTICIPANTS: Four hundred thirty-four physicians continuously affiliated with Advocate from 2010 to 2015. MAIN MEASURES: Physician performance on ten quality metrics. KEY RESULTS: We found no consistent pattern of improvement associated with the availability of real-time information across ten measures. Relative to predicted performance without the registry, average performance increased for two measures (childhood immunization status-rotavirus (p < 0.001) and diabetes care-medical attention for nephropathy (p = 0.024)) and decreased for three measures (childhood immunization status-influenza (p < 0.001) and diabetes care-HbA1c testing (p < 0.001) and poor HbA1c control (p < 0.001)). Results were consistent for subgroup analysis on those most able to improve, i.e., physicians in the bottom tertile of performance prior to registry introduction. Physicians who improved most were in groups that accessed the registry more than those who improved least (8.0 vs 10.0 times per week, p = 0.010). CONCLUSIONS: More frequent provision of information, provided in real-time, was insufficient to improve physician performance in an existing P4P program with high baseline performance. Results suggest that electronic registries may not themselves drive performance improvement. Future work should consider testing information feedback enhancements with financial incentives.

Using Behavioral Economics to Design Physician Incentives That Deliver High-Value Care.

Behavioral economics provides insights about the development of effective incentives for physicians to deliver high-value care. It suggests that the structure and delivery of incentives can shape behavior, as can thoughtful design of the decision-making environment. This article discusses several principles of behavioral economics, including inertia, loss aversion, choice overload, and relative social ranking. Whereas these principles have been applied to motivate personal health decisions, retirement planning, and savings behavior, they have been largely ignored in the design of physician incentive programs. Applying these principles to physician incentives can improve their effectiveness through better alignment with performance goals. Anecdotal examples of successful incentive programs that apply behavioral economics principles are provided, even as the authors recognize that its application to the design of physician incentives is largely untested, and many outstanding questions exist. Application and rigorous evaluation of infrastructure changes and incentives are needed to design payment systems that incentivize high-quality, cost-conscious care.

Effect of Financial Bonus Size, Loss Aversion, and Increased Social Pressure on Physician Pay-for-Performance: A Randomized Clinical Trial and Cohort Study.

Importance: Despite limited effectiveness of pay-for-performance (P4P), payers continue to expand P4P nationally. Objective: To test whether increasing bonus size or adding the behavioral economic principles of increased social pressure (ISP) or loss aversion (LA) improves the effectiveness of P4P. Design, Setting, and Participants: Parallel studies conducted from January 1 to December 31, 2016, consisted of a randomized clinical trial with patients cluster-randomized by practice site to an active control group (larger bonus size [LBS] only) or to groups with 1 of 2 behavioral economic interventions added and a cohort study comparing changes in outcomes among patients of physicians receiving an LBS with outcomes in propensity-matched physicians not receiving an LBS. A total of 8118 patients attributed to 66 physicians with 1 of 5 chronic conditions were treated at Advocate HealthCare, an integrated health system in Illinois. Data were analyzed using intention to treat and multiple imputation from February 1, 2017, through May 31, 2018. Interventions: Physician participants received an LBS increased by a mean of $3355 per physician (LBS-only group); prefunded incentives to elicit LA and an LBS; or increasing proportion of a P4P bonus determined by group performance from 30% to 50% (ISP) and an LBS. Main Outcomes and Measures: The proportion of 20 evidence-based quality measures achieved at the patient level. Results: A total of 86 physicians were eligible for the randomized trial. Of these, 32 were excluded because they did not have unique attributed patients. Fifty-four physicians were randomly assigned to 1 of 3 groups, and 33 physicians (54.5% male; mean [SD] age, 57 [10] years) and 3747 patients (63.6% female; mean [SD] age, 64 [18] years) were included in the final analysis. Nine physicians and 864 patients were randomized to the LBS-only group, 13 physicians and 1496 patients to the LBS plus ISP group, and 11 physicians and 1387 patients to the LBS plus LA group. Physician characteristics did not differ significantly by arm, such as mean (SD) physician age ranging from 56 (9) to 59 (9) years, and sex (6 [46.2%] to 6 [66.7%] male). No differences were found between the LBS-only and the intervention groups (adjusted odds ratio [aOR] for LBS plus LA vs LBS-only, 0.86 [95% CI, 0.65-1.15; P = .31]; aOR for LBS plus ISP vs LBS-only, 0.95 [95% CI, 0.64-1.42; P = .81]; and aOR for LBS plus ISP vs LBS plus LA, 1.10 [95% CI, 0.75-1.61; P = .62]). Increased bonus size was associated with a greater increase in evidence-based care relative to the comparison group (risk-standardized absolute difference-in-differences, 3.2 percentage points; 95% CI, 1.9-4.5 percentage points; P < .001). Conclusions and Relevance: Increased bonus size was associated with significantly improved quality of care relative to a comparison group. Adding ISP and opportunities for LA did not improve quality. Trial Registration: ClinicalTrials.gov Identifier: NCT02634879.

Expected and Unexpected Consequences of the Affordable Care Act: The Impact on Patients and Surgeons-Pro and Con Arguments.

The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA), called the Affordable Care Act (ACA) or "ObamaCare" for short, was enacted in 2010. The Public Policy and Advocacy Committee of the Society for Surgery of the Alimentary Tract (SSAT) hosted a debate with an expert panel to discuss the ACA and its impact on surgical care after the first year of patient enrollment. The purpose of this debate was to focus on the impact of ACA on the public and surgeons. At the core of the ACA are insurance industry reforms and expanded coverage, with a goal of improved clinical outcomes and reduced costs of care. We have observed supportive and opposing views on ACA. Nonetheless, we will witness major shifts in health care delivery as well as restructuring of our relationship with payers, institutions, and patients. With the rapidly changing health care landscape, surgeons will become key members of health systems and will likely need to lead transition from solo-practice to integrated care systems. The full effects of the ACA remain unrealized, but its implementation has begun to change the map of the American health care system and will surely impact the practice of surgery. Herein, we provide a synopsis of the "pro" and "con" arguments for the expected and unexpected consequences of the ACA on society and surgeons.

The role of behavioral health services in accountable care organizations.

Nationally, care delivery organizations are developing accountable care organizations (ACOs), but few have an appreciation of the importance of behavioral health services or knowledge about how to include them in an ACO since their funding and delivery are currently segregated from other medical services. This commentary reviews data on the impact of patients with concurrent medical and behavioral health conditions. They indicate that three-fourths of patients with behavioral health disorders are seen in the medical setting, but are largely untreated because few medical patients choose to access the behavioral health sector, which is where behavioral health providers are paid to work. Untreated behavioral health conditions in medical patients are associated with persistent medical illness and significantly increased total medical healthcare service use and cost, especially in those with chronic medical conditions. At a national level, those with behavioral health conditions use one-third of total healthcare resources. This will not change unless at-risk ACOs can effectively correct the mismatch between behavioral health patients and behavioral healthcare delivery. The authors suggest that ACO subcontracting for traditional segregated behavioral health services, whether from local provider groups or external vendors, will not achieve ACO-mandated access, treatment, and cost reduction goals. Rather, behavioral health specialists will need to become core ACO member providers. This will allow them to be deployed along with other member providers using value-added delivery approaches in the medical setting to integrate medical and behavioral health service delivery, and to achieve synergistic health and cost improvement.

Straight talk: new approaches in healthcare. Physician practice turnaround in an integrated delivery system.

This is the second installment in a series of group discussions by top executives on key issues in healthcare today. Straight Talk is present by Modern Healthcare and PricewaterhouseCoopers. This session tackles the subject of physician practice turnaround in an Integrated Delivery System. The discussion was held on March 5, 2002 at Modern Healthcare's Chicago headquarters, moderated by Charles S. Lauer.

A model for integrating independent physicians into accountable care organizations.

The Affordable Care Act encourages the formation of accountable care organizations as a new part of Medicare. Pending forthcoming federal regulations, though, it is unclear precisely how these ACOs will be structured. Although large integrated care systems that directly employ physicians may be most likely to evolve into ACOs, few such integrated systems exist in the United States. This paper demonstrates how Advocate Physician Partners in Illinois could serve as a model for a new kind of accountable care organization, by demonstrating how to organize physicians into partnerships with hospitals to improve care, cut costs, and be held accountable for the results. The partnership has signed its first commercial ACO contract effective January 1, 2011, with the largest insurer in Illinois, Blue Cross Blue Shield. Other commercial contracts are expected to follow. In a health care system still dominated by small, independent physician practices, this may constitute a more viable way to push the broader health care system toward accountable care.