RESUMEN
BACKGROUND: Following hospitalization of the first patient with Ebola virus disease diagnosed in the United States on 28 September 2014, contact tracing methods for Ebola were implemented. OBJECTIVE: To identify, risk-stratify, and monitor contacts of patients with Ebola. DESIGN: Descriptive investigation. SETTING: Dallas County, Texas, September to November 2014. PARTICIPANTS: Contacts of symptomatic patients with Ebola. MEASUREMENTS: Contact identification, exposure risk classification, symptom development, and Ebola. RESULTS: The investigation identified 179 contacts, 139 of whom were contacts of the index patient. Of 112 health care personnel (HCP) contacts of the index case, 22 (20%) had known unprotected exposures and 37 (30%) did not have known unprotected exposures but interacted with a patient or contaminated environment on multiple days. Transmission was confirmed in 2 HCP who had substantial interaction with the patient while wearing personal protective equipment. These HCP had 40 additional contacts. Of 20 community contacts of the index patient or the 2 HCP, 4 had high-risk exposures. Movement restrictions were extended to all 179 contacts; 7 contacts were quarantined. Seven percent (14 of 179) of contacts (1 community contact and 13 health care contacts) were evaluated for Ebola during the monitoring period. LIMITATION: Data cannot be used to infer whether in-person direct active monitoring is superior to active monitoring alone for early detection of symptomatic contacts. CONCLUSION: Contact tracing and monitoring approaches for Ebola were adapted to account for the evolving understanding of risks for unrecognized HCP transmission. HCP contacts in the United States without known unprotected exposures should be considered as having a low (but not zero) risk for Ebola and should be actively monitored for symptoms. Core challenges of contact tracing for high-consequence communicable diseases included rapid comprehensive contact identification, large-scale direct active monitoring of contacts, large-scale application of movement restrictions, and necessity of humanitarian support services to meet nonclinical needs of contacts. PRIMARY FUNDING SOURCE: None.
Asunto(s)
Trazado de Contacto , Fiebre Hemorrágica Ebola/prevención & control , Fiebre Hemorrágica Ebola/transmisión , Fiebre Hemorrágica Ebola/epidemiología , Humanos , Transmisión de Enfermedad Infecciosa de Paciente a Profesional/prevención & control , Personal de Enfermería en Hospital , Cuarentena , Medición de Riesgo , Texas/epidemiologíaRESUMEN
The first imported case of Ebola virus disease (Ebola) diagnosed in the United States was confirmed on September 30, 2014; two health care workers who cared for this patient subsequently developed Ebola. Since then, local, state, and federal health officials have continued to prepare for future imported cases, including developing strategies to identify and monitor persons who have had contact with an Ebola patient. This report describes some of the needs of persons who were contacts of Ebola patients in Texas. It is based on requests received from contacts in the course of daily contact tracing interactions and on how those needs were met through community partnerships. Meeting the needs of contacts of the Ebola patients was essential to successful contact tracing, which is critical to interrupting transmission. Although a formal needs assessment of contacts was not conducted, this report provides important information for preparing for an importation of Ebola. Anticipating the nonclinical needs of persons under public health surveillance includes addressing potential concerns about housing, transportation, education, employment, food, and other household needs. Ensuring necessary supports are in place for persons who are asked to refrain from entering public venues can impact their willingness to comply with voluntary and mandated quarantine orders. Engagement with a wide range of community partners, including businesses, schools, charitable foundations, community and faith-based organizations, and mental health resources would enhance public health emergency preparedness for Ebola by readying resources to meet these potential needs.
Asunto(s)
Trazado de Contacto , Fiebre Hemorrágica Ebola/epidemiología , Evaluación de Necesidades , Análisis por Conglomerados , Humanos , Texas/epidemiologíaRESUMEN
We present the case of a patient with a history of hemorrhage following prior surgery whose pregnancy was complicated by plasminogen activator inhibitor type 1 deficiency. To our knowledge, this is the first reported case of a pregnancy complicated by plasminogen activator inhibitor type 1 (PAI-1) deficiency.