Zika Virus Knowledge among Pregnant Women Who Were in Areas with Active Transmission.

We surveyed women in New York, New York, USA, who were in areas with active Zika virus transmission while pregnant. Of 99 women who were US residents, 30 were unaware of the government travel advisory to areas with active Zika virus transmission while pregnant, and 37 were unaware of their pregnancies during travel.

Zika Virus Preparedness and Response Efforts Through the Collaboration Between a Health Care Delivery System and a Local Public Health Department.

ABSTRACTThe Zika virus was largely unknown to many health care systems before the outbreak of 2015. The unique public health threat posed by the Zika virus and the evolving understanding of its pathology required continuous communication between a health care delivery system and a local public health department. By leveraging an existing relationship, NYC Health+Hospitals worked closely with New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene to ensure that Zika-related processes and procedures within NYC Health+Hospitals facilities aligned with the most current Zika virus guidance. Support given by the public health department included prenatal clinical and laboratory support and the sharing of data on NYC Health+Hospitals Zika virus screening and testing rates, thus enabling this health care delivery system to make informed decisions and practices. The close coordination, collaboration, and communication between the health care delivery system and the local public health department examined in this article demonstrate the importance of working together to combat a complex public health emergency and how this relationship can serve as a guide for other jurisdictions to optimize collaboration between external partners during major outbreaks, emerging threats, and disasters that affect public health. (Disaster Med Public Health Preparedness. 2018;12:689-691).

Active Monitoring of Travelers for Ebola Virus Disease-New York City, October 25, 2014-December 29, 2015.

The CDC recommended active monitoring of travelers potentially exposed to Ebola virus during the 2014 West African Ebola virus disease outbreak, which involved daily contact between travelers and health authorities to ascertain the presence of fever or symptoms for 21 days after the travelers' last potential Ebola virus exposure. From October 25, 2014, to December 29, 2015, the New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene (DOHMH) monitored 5,359 persons for Ebola virus disease, corresponding to 5,793 active monitoring events. Most active monitoring events were in travelers classified as low (but not zero) risk (n = 5,778; 99%). There were no gaps in contact with DOHMH of ≥2 days during 95% of active monitoring events. Instances of not making any contact with travelers decreased after CDC began distributing mobile telephones at the airport. Ebola virus disease-like symptoms or a temperature ≥100.0°F were reported in 122 (2%) active monitoring events. In the final month of active monitoring, an optional health insurance enrollment referral was offered for interested travelers, through which 8 travelers are known to have received coverage. Because it is possible that active monitoring will be used again for an infectious threat, the experience we describe might help to inform future such efforts.

Reporting of False Data During Ebola Virus Disease Active Monitoring-New York City, January 1, 2015-December 29, 2015.

The New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene (DOHMH) began to actively monitor people potentially exposed to Ebola virus on October 25, 2014. Active monitoring was critical to the Ebola virus disease (EVD) response and mitigated risk without restricting individual liberties. Noncompliance with active monitoring procedures has been reported. We conducted a survey of 4,075 eligible persons to evaluate (1) the frequency of reporting of false data during active monitoring, and (2) factors associated with reporting of false temperature data. A total of 393 persons (9.6%) responded to the survey. Fifty-five (14.0%) provided false temperature data, 5 (1.3%) did not report EVD-like symptoms that they had experienced, and 2 (0.5%) did not report a hospital or emergency room visit. Having visited Liberia (OR: 3.4, 95% CI: 1.4-7.9), Sierra Leone (OR: 3.4, 95% CI: 1.6-7.5), or multiple EVD-affected countries (OR: 12.9, 95% CI: 3.5-47.7); being aged <50 years (OR: 7.5, 95% CI: 1.7-33.1); and rating the importance of active monitoring as low (OR: 1.4, 95% CI: 1.1-1.8) were associated with increased odds of reporting false temperature data. Over 10% of respondents reported providing false data during EVD active monitoring. However, it remains unclear whether reporting of false data during active monitoring impedes the ability to rapidly identify EVD cases in settings with a low burden of EVD.

Using a call center to coordinate Zika virus testing-New York City, 2016.

BACKGROUND: After local testing criteria for Zika virus expanded to include asymptomatic pregnant women who traveled to areas with active Zika virus transmission while pregnant, the New York City (NYC) Department of Health and Mental Hygiene (DOHMH) experienced a surge in test requests and subsequent testing delays due to factors such as incorrectly completed laboratory requisition forms. The authors describe how DOHMH addressed these issues by establishing the Zika Testing Call Center (ZTCC). METHODS: Using a case study approach, the authors illustrate how DOHMH leveraged protocols, equipment, and other resources used previously during DOHMH&s Ebola emergency response to meet NYC's urgent Zika virus testing needs. To request Zika virus testing, providers call the ZTCC; if patients meet testing criteria, the ZTCC collects data necessary to complete requisition forms and sends the forms back to providers. The ZTCC also provides guidance on specimens needed for Zika virus testing. Providers submit completed requisition forms and appropriate specimens to DOHMH for testing. RESULTS: During March 21 through July 21, 2016, testing for 3,866 patients was coordinated through the ZTCC. CONCLUSION: The ZTCC exemplifies how a health department, using previous emergency response experiences, can quickly address local testing needs for an emerging infectious disease.